THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF HONG KONG

CLASS ACTIONS SUB-COMMITTEE

CONSULTATION PAPER

CLASS ACTIONS

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NOVEMBER 2009
This Consultation Paper has been prepared by the Class Actions Sub-committee of the Law Reform Commission. It does not represent the final views of either the Sub-committee or the Law Reform Commission, and is circulated for comment and discussion only.

The Sub-committee would be grateful for comments on this Consultation Paper by 4 February 2010. All correspondence should be addressed to:

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THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION
OF HONG KONG

CLASS ACTIONS SUB-COMMITTEE

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Preface

Terms of reference

1. In 2000, the Chief Justice appointed a Working Party to review the civil rules and procedures of the High Court. One of the recommendations in its final report, published in 2004, was that:

"In principle, a scheme for multi-party litigation should be adopted. Schemes implemented in comparable jurisdictions should be studied by a working group with a view to recommending a suitable model for Hong Kong."

2. The Working Party said that the introduction of a multi-party litigation scheme was widely supported, including by bodies such as the Special Committee on Personal Injuries of the Hong Kong Bar Association and the Consumer Council. The final report also suggested that it might be appropriate for the Chief Justice or Secretary for Justice to refer the subject of multi-party proceedings to the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong.

3. At its meeting on 5 September 2006, the Law Reform Commission agreed that the subject of class actions should be taken on as a project, with the following terms of reference:

"To consider whether a scheme for multi-party litigation should be adopted in Hong Kong and, if so, to make suitable recommendations generally."

The Sub-committee

4. A Law Reform Commission sub-committee under the chairmanship of Mr Anthony Neoh, SC, was appointed in November 2006 to consider this subject and to make proposals to the Commission for reform. The membership of the sub-committee was:

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<th>Role</th>
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<td>Mr Anthony Neoh, SC</td>
<td>Senior Counsel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chairman)</td>
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<td>Hon Mr Justice Barma</td>
<td>Judge of the High Court</td>
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2 Cited above, at 239, para 464.
3 Cited above, at 240, para 465.
Meetings

5. The sub-committee commenced the study of its reference in January 2007 and between then and the publication of this consultation paper
Multi-party litigation and definition of class actions

6. Multi-party litigation has been defined as referring to:

"... instances where a collection or group of users [of courts] shares characteristics sufficient to allow them to be dealt with collectively. The central, common feature will vary with the group, but will militate in favour of a collective or group approach. This feature may be found in a question of law or fact arising from a common, related or shared occurrence or transaction. The definition of the combining force necessary to commence a multi-party procedure is intended to be as flexible a concept as the overriding principles of administrative efficiency and fairness will permit."

7. As pointed out by the Working Party on Civil Justice Reform, the need for specific procedures to deal with cases involving numerous potential litigants arises in two main situations. The first is where a large number of persons have been adversely affected by another's conduct, but each individual's loss is insufficient to make undertaking individual litigation economically viable. The second is where a large number of similar or related claims (each of which may be individually viable in financial terms) are instituted at the same time, which presents problems for the court in disposing efficiently with the various proceedings. In most major common law jurisdictions these situations are met by procedures to allow what is termed a "class action".

8. Rachael Mulheron, author of The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems, defines a class action as:

"A legal procedure which enables the claims (or part of the claims) of a number of persons against the same defendant to be determined in the one suit. In a class action, one or more persons ('representative plaintiff') may sue on his or her own behalf and on behalf of a number of other persons ('the class') who have a claim to a remedy for the same or a similar alleged wrong to that alleged by the representative plaintiff, and who have claims that share questions of law or fact in common with those of the representative plaintiff ('common issues'). Only the representative plaintiff is a party to the action. The class members are not usually identified as individual parties but are merely described. The class members are bound by the outcome of the litigation on the common issues, whether

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favourable or adverse to the class, although they do not, for the most part, take any active part in that litigation.”

9. The potential advantages of such an approach include the fact that it promotes access to justice (by allowing claimants to seek compensation who could not have afforded to do so individually), avoids court resources being expended unnecessarily on numerous individual actions and ensures that a consistent disposal is applied to all claimants with a similar cause of action. The availability of a procedure for a class action is particularly useful in relation to consumer litigation, where the individual claim may be small though numerous individuals may be involved. In its submission to Lord Woolf in relation to his review of access to justice, the UK’s National Consumer Council said:

"As we become an increasingly mass producing and mass consuming society, one product or service with a flaw has the potential to injure or cause other loss to more and more people. Yet our civil justice system has not adapted to mass legal actions. We still largely treat them as a collection of individual cases, with the findings in one case having only limited relevance in law to all of the others.”

10. While class actions are generally "plaintiff-led", "defendant-led" class actions are also possible (though a rarity in practice). In recommending the introduction of a new procedure for multi-party actions, the Law Reform Commission of Ireland observed that, while defendant multi-party actions would constitute a very small fraction of multi-party actions overall, there was "no reason to exclude the possibility of defendant multi-party actions.”

11. Rachael Mulheron sums up the principal objectives of a class action regime as including the following:

"… to increase the efficiency of the courts and the legal system and to reduce the costs of legal proceedings by enabling common issues to be dealt with in one proceeding; to enhance access by class members to legally enforceable remedies in the event of proven wrongful behaviour in a timely and meaningful fashion; to provide defendants with the opportunity to avoid inconsistent decisions over long periods of time and possibly in different forums; to take account of personal autonomy of putative class members where appropriate; to provide predictability of procedural rules and outcomes; and to arrive at an outcome employing the philosophy of proportionality rather than perfection.”

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9 R Mulheron, cited above, at 66.
12. Most of these (enhancement of access to justice, reduced costs, greater likelihood of consistency of decisions, etc) could equally well be described as "advantages" of a class action regime. Such a regime arguably reduces social costs by not only making the process of litigation more efficient but also enabling parties to achieve finality in legal disputes, and thereby enables them to assess risks and costs more readily. For example, a publicly listed company cited as a defendant in a class action can gauge the extent of its exposure and make informed provisions in its accounts far more readily than would otherwise be possible if faced with a multitude of potential legal actions. In the latter case, the law on limitation of actions would help, but a defendant would still face uncertainty during the period of limitation prescribed by law.\(^{10}\)

**Typical elements of a class action regime**

**Control by the courts: certification**

13. In all regimes studied, one essential feature of the class action predominates. It is that all class actions must be managed by the courts. Generally, the process of court management starts with authorisation of the class action. The court's examination of whether certain criteria are fulfilled before authorising the commencement of a class proceeding is generally known as "certification". This initial process of certification is not without controversy. For instance, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) argued strongly against the adoption of a certification process and said that, rather than bringing about procedural efficiency, it achieved the reverse. The ALRC pointed to the experience in the United States and Quebec, where:

> "the preliminary matter of the form of the proceedings has often been more complex and taken more time than the hearing of the substantive issues. Because the Court's discretion is involved, appeals are frequent, leading to delays and further expense." \(^{11}\)

14. The contrary view is that, given the special nature of a class action, the process of certification protects absent class members and the defendants:

> "A class proceeding cannot proceed as of right ... since members of the class who are not active in the litigation will have their rights determined by class proceeding, the Court must decide whether the litigation is appropriate for class treatment, including that the absent members' interest will be adequately represented in the litigation. The certification motion also

\(^{10}\) The periods of limitation for different causes of action are prescribed by the Limitation Ordinance (Cap 347). The limitation period of the most commonly found causes of action is set out in section 4 of the Limitation Ordinance as follows:

> "(1) The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to say - (a) actions founded on simple contract or on tort; ... "

provides (the defendant) opposing certification to demonstrate why the litigation should not go forward as a class proceeding.”

15. Jurisdictions which have implemented the class action have generally adopted the certification procedure. In deciding whether or not proceedings can be certified, the court will generally need to be satisfied that the minimum class size has been fulfilled (what is termed the “numerosity” issue); that there is the requisite nexus between the individual parties' claims; that a class action is preferable to alternative procedures; and that the representative plaintiff and the lead case is adequate and typical.

**Opt-in or opt-out**

16. An issue which inevitably arises in class proceedings is the question of how the members of the class should be determined. Under an "opt-out" scheme, persons who hold claims concerning questions (of law or fact) which are raised in the class proceedings are bound as members of the class and will be subject to any judgments made in the class proceeding unless they take an affirmative step to indicate that they wish to be excluded from the action and from the effect of the resulting judgment.

17. The "opt-out" approach has been adopted in jurisdictions such as Australia, the United States, Quebec and British Columbia. This procedure enables the entire class to be protected as to the running of time prescribed by limitation of actions laws. Once a class action is started the clock stops for the certified class. Those who opt out will have to look after themselves as the clock keeps running against them.

18. Under the "opt-in" approach, a potential class member must expressly opt into the class proceeding by taking a prescribed step within the stipulated period. Once he becomes a member, he will be bound by the judgment or settlement and be open to receive the benefits incurred. The main benefit of an "opt-in" regime is the preservation of the autonomy of the individual to participate in litigation only if he wishes to do so. A further benefit is that the size of the plaintiff group is reduced and allows for an easier ascertainment of damages and case preparation for all parties involved. But here, only those members who have opted in are protected against the running
of time in relation to limitation of actions. Those who have not opted in must look after themselves.

**Cut-off date**

19. To achieve finality of result of the action, a "cut-off" date is incorporated into the class action regime. The "cut-off" date refers to the date from which no potential party can be added to the action. The setting of a cut-off date is necessary to guard against the threat of an endless accumulation of parties to the action over time. The Law Reform Commission of Ireland considered that, in determining an appropriate cut-off date, it was necessary to balance the interests of an unregistered plaintiff and his right to join in the action with the interests of the defendants and the class, whose interests lay in an expeditious conclusion of the suit. The Law Reform Commission of Ireland concluded that the question of when the cut-off date would fall in the future was best determined at certification.

**Notification**

20. Class action schemes generally include provisions as to how potential members of the class are to be notified of the action for the obvious reason that the existence of the action should be as widely known as possible to enable them to decide either to opt-out or opt-in depending on which kind of procedure the regime adopts. In his final report, Lord Woolf favoured a flexible approach to notification requirements:

"[the court] should have a discretion as to how this is to be done – individual notification, advertising, media broadcast, notification to a sample group, or a combination of means, or different means for different members of the group."

[The] Court must have the discretion to dispense with notice enabling parties to opt-out having regard to factors such as the cost, the nature of the relief, the size of individual claims, the number of members of a group, the chances that members will wish to opt out and so on."  

21. In the United States, it has been recognised that it may be appropriate to dispense with the requirements of giving notice in cases where notice may be so expensive as to be disproportionate to the costs and benefits of the litigation. Thus, the courts have the discretion to dispense with notice which informs potential claimants of their option to opt-out. In the dispensation of such notice, the court is to have "regard to factors such as cost, the nature of the relief, the size of individual claims, the number of members of

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a group, the chances that members will wish to opt out and so on."  

22. It should be noted that giving notice may be necessary at various stages of the proceedings, including commencement of the proceedings and at settlement. Furthermore, with the popularity of the Internet, class action web pages are set up in court websites, and the press, operating in multi-media (print, radio, television, webcasting, websites) can be expected to play a role in publicising class actions.

**Subgroups and lead or representative cases**

23. In many cases there will be no need to divide the plaintiff group into sub-groups since there will be only one unitary group. However, where there are many claimants and certain claims of one group differ from those of another group of claimants, it is generally useful to divide the general group into different sub-groups:

"Most instances of multi-party litigation involve not only central issues common to the collective group, but also a web of distinct issues at an individual or sub-group level. Any attempt to deal conclusively with these issues en masse would be to over-reach the potential of the procedure and to render the entire process unmanageable … it will be most important to divide up the various elements of the case into convenient categories which lend themselves to collective resolution."  

24. The use of lead or representative cases may lead to the more efficient resolution of proceedings. The lead cases should, so far as possible, fairly and adequately represent the interests of the group. Whether test cases are suitable or not depends on the circumstances and there should not be a rigid rule regarding their selection.

**Need for flexible set of rules to achieve optimal outcome**

25. It can be seen from the above introductory remarks that irrespective of whether an opt in or opt out procedure is adopted, the Court in which the class action is brought has a central role to play to ensure the optimal outcome for resolution of the dispute. A set of rules should therefore be adopted to allow the Court a high degree of discretion to flexibly manage the case within a principled framework.

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Layout of this paper

26. The first chapter sets out the present rules for representative action procedures and their inadequacies as revealed in their application to a range of different types of potential mass litigation cases. Chapter 2 examines the law on representative and class action proceedings in other jurisdictions whilst Chapter 3 sets out the arguments for and against the introduction of a class action regime. Chapter 4 turns to the procedural options of adopting an opt-in or opt-out model for class actions. Chapter 5 examines the treatment of public law cases under the class action regime while Chapter 6 deals with the issue of the choice of plaintiff and avoidance of potential abuse. Chapter 7 looks at the handling of class actions involving parties from other jurisdictions and Chapter 8 sets out the funding model for the class actions regime. The sub-committee's recommendations on procedural details are set out in Chapter 9, while Chapter 10 contains a summary of all our recommendations and invitation to comment.

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28. We would particularly wish to express our gratitude to our two secretaries, Mr Lee Tin Yan, Senior Government Counsel who has served the sub-committee from September 2007 to June 2009 and Mr Byron Leung, Senior Government Counsel who has served us except from September 2007 to June 2009. This has been a complex exercise extending over many jurisdictions. But for their industry and meticulous research work, we would not have been able to complete this consultation paper in a relatively short time of just under three years.
Chapter 1

The current rule on representative proceedings in Hong Kong

Introduction

1.1 In Hong Kong, the sole machinery for dealing with multi-party proceedings is provided by Order 15, rule 12 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A) (RHC). Order 15, rule 12(1) provides:

"Where numerous persons have the same interest in any proceedings … the proceedings may be begun, and, unless the Court otherwise orders, continued, by or against any one or more of them as representing all or as representing all except one or more of them."

According to Order 15, rule 12(2), the Court is also empowered, on the application of the plaintiffs, to appoint a defendant to act as representative of the other defendants being sued.

1.2 A judgment or order given in representative proceedings will be binding on all persons so represented. It is open to a defendant, however, to dispute his liability to have the judgment or order enforced against him on the ground that by reason of facts and matters particular to his case he should be exempted from such liability.

1.3 The current Order 15 Rule 12 in Hong Kong is modelled on Order 15 Rule 12 in England. The rule has been rigidly applied until recent years, where inroads have begun to be made. In Hong Kong Kam Lan Koon Ltd v Realray Investment Ltd, Deputy Judge Saunders (as he then was) adopted what Megarry J said in John v Rees that the rule for representative actions was not a rigid one, but was a rule of convenience; and that what was important was to have before the court, either in person or by representation, all those who would be affected, so that all should be bound by the result.

1.4 The English rule on representative proceedings was considered in the landmark case, Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd. In this case, each of the 45 shippers had cargo onboard the defendant's vessel which was sunk during the war. The representative plaintiffs sued the defendant for

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1 Order 15, rule 12(3), RHC (Cap 4A).
2 Order 15, rule 12(5), RHC (Cap 4A).
5 [1910] 2 KB 1021 (CA).
"damages for breach of contract and duty in and about the carriage of goods by sea" on behalf of themselves and other shippers. The Court of Appeal held by majority that the shippers did not have the "same interest" as required by the rule.

1.5 The classic judicial statement on the "same interest" requirement was made by Lord Macnaghten in *Duke of Bedford v Ellis*:

"[g]iven a common interest and a common grievance, a representative suit was in order if the relief sought was in its nature beneficial to all whom the plaintiff proposed to represent."

The Hong Kong High Court applied these criteria in *CBS/Sony Hong Kong Ltd v Television Broadcasts Ltd*, and decided that the plaintiffs had to comply with the threefold test of establishing "a common interest, a common grievance and a remedy which is beneficial to all the plaintiffs". The court held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the test. On the other hand, in *Fynn v AG*, Mayo J allowed a police research officer to sue the Government, on behalf of colleagues similarly affected, for breach of contract of employment because of the Government's decision to provide for separate pay scales within the Disciplined Services. The court held that the plaintiff met the requirements in Order 15 rule 12 and *Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries*.

1.6 In *Hong Kong Kam Lan Koon Ltd v Realray Investment Ltd (No 2)*, Lam J held that the court's main concern in deciding whether representative action was appropriate was to ensure that the interests of the individual members who might potentially be affected by the outcome had been fairly and sufficiently safeguarded. At the interlocutory stage, all that the court could do was to assess by reference to the materials and the submissions before it whether there was sufficient identity of interest amongst those members so that it would be fair and just for the action to proceed by way of representative action. The commonality of the represented parties' interests in the proceedings could be reviewed as the case developed, and the court had jurisdiction to order the proceedings not to proceed in the representative form.

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6 [1901] AC 1 (HL), at 8. Fletcher Moulton LJ in the "Markt" case regarded this as the "most authoritative" definition. It has repeatedly been quoted in English decisions, and "has been accorded almost the status of a statutory formula".
9 Jones J said that even if he was wrong, he would exercise his discretion to disallow the action to be continued in its present form as it was both inconvenient and unfair to the defendants. In particular, a representative action would deprive the defendants of their right to make an application for security for costs and to apply for an order of discovery.
13 In *China Vest II-A, LP v Chan Kueng Un, Roy* [1998] 4 HKC 453 (CA) (at 459), Godfrey JA held that, while a representative action brought on behalf of a number of sellers was properly constituted, he found a representative action unsatisfactory as some of the sellers were incorporated in various places outside the jurisdiction. He therefore ordered that all the sellers be added as plaintiffs in the proceedings.
1.7 The defects of the current provisions have been summarised by the Chief Justice's Working Party on Civil Justice Reform as follows:

"The limitations of these provisions are self-evident. While they are helpful and merit retention in the context of cases involving a relatively small number of parties closely concerned in the same proceedings for such cases, they are inadequate as a framework for dealing with large-scale multi-party situations.

In the first place, the availability of representation orders is narrowly defined and subject to considerable technicality. Secondly, even where a representation order has been made and the case has proceeded to judgment, finality is not necessarily achieved. Individuals affected by the representation order are still free to challenge enforcement and to re-open the proceedings on the basis that facts and matters peculiar to his case exist. Thirdly, the rule makes no specific provision for handling the special problems of multi-party litigation (discussed further below).

Without rules designed to deal specifically with group litigation, the courts in England and Wales and in Hong Kong have had to proceed on an ad hoc basis, giving such directions as appear appropriate and seeking, so far as possible, agreement among parties or potential parties to be bound by the outcome of test cases. Such limited expedients have met with varying degree of success."

1.8 The effect of Lord Macnaghten's judicial statement in *Duke of Bedford v Ellis* (above) is that all class members have to show identical issues of fact and law, and the implication is that they have to prove:

(a) the same contract between all plaintiff class members and the defendant – a representative action could not be founded upon separate contracts between each of the class members and the defendant. Separate contracts do not have a "common source of right" and are "in no way connected".\(^{15}\)

The result is that a representative action is not available in consumer cases, even where each class member's claim arises out of a "standard form" contract with the same defendant. In other words, a representative action is unavailable where it is otherwise likely to have most effect.

(b) the same defence (if any) pleaded by the defendant against all the plaintiff class members – if a defendant can raise separate defences against different plaintiff class members, separate trials

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\(^{15}\) [1910] 2 KB 1021 (CA), at 1040 (Fletcher Moulton LJ).
may be required and liability cannot be decided in the same proceedings. On the other hand, it would be unjust to disallow the defendant from raising such defences which could have been raised in a unitary action.

The result is that the mere availability of a defence against one member of a plaintiff class is sufficient to deny the class the "same interest" in the proceedings.

(c) the same relief claimed by the plaintiff class members -- no representative action can be brought where the relief sought by the representative plaintiff is damages on behalf of all class members severally.\(^\text{16}\) Since proof of damages is unique to each class member and the facts underlying the measure of damages would be different, the damages awarded may not be the same for all class members. This further limits the utility of the representative procedure. The phrase "beneficial to all" in Lord Macnaghten's statement can also be interpreted to mean that "the plaintiff must be in a position to claim some relief which is common to all", but there is no objection if he also claims relief unique to himself.\(^\text{17}\)

The result is that because of the same relief requirement, representative proceedings cannot be used to claim damages where some class members do not have a claim for relief identical to those of all other members, even though their claims have the same factual basis (for example, where passengers on a ship which sinks can claim personal injury or property damage or both). Proof of damage is a necessary ingredient of a tortious cause of action, and the representative plaintiff cannot, by proving his or her own damage, claim to represent the class and obtain relief on behalf of all class members.\(^\text{18}\) Hence, equitable relief, such as a declaration or injunction, has normally, if not invariably, been the only form of relief which has been awarded in English representative actions.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^\text{16}\) [1910] 2 KB 1021 (CA), at 1040-1041 (Fletcher Moulton LJ). In this case, each of the class members had a separate measure of damages (ie the value of their lost cargos), and had no interest in the damages claimed by the representative plaintiffs. Hence, proof of damages was personal to each class member, and had to be proved separately since the facts underlying the measure of damages differed.

\(^\text{17}\) [1910] 2 KB 1021 (CA), at 1045 (Buckley LJ).

\(^\text{18}\) "... there was a long-held view that, under the English representative rule, 'if the cause of action of each member of the class whom the plaintiff purported to represent was founded in tort and would, if established, be a separate cause of action and not a joint cause of action belonging to the class as a whole, no representative action could be brought.' Proof of damage was a necessary ingredient of a tortious cause of action, and the representative plaintiff could not, by proving his or her own damage, claim to represent the class and obtain relief on behalf of all class members." R Mulheron, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems, a Comparative Perspective (2004, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing), at 82.

\(^\text{19}\) Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1981] Ch 229, at 244, 255. His Lordship went on to say that even with injunctive relief, there was the "separate defences" problem - class members needed to prove separately an apprehension of injury and were subject to individual defences of laches or acquiescence.
Relaxation of the "same interest" requirement

1.9 The application in the Markt decision of the "same interest" requirement expounded by Lord Macnaghten meant that few actions could be brought under the representative actions rule. As a result, the courts sought ways to relax the requirements so as to make it easier to bring representative proceedings.

Changing from the "same interest" test to the "common ingredient" test

1.10 In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries, the representative plaintiff sued the defendant, on behalf of the company shareholders, for the tort of conspiracy.20 The defendant contended that since each class member had a separate cause of action founded in tort, proof of damage was needed for each member and, since there were separate damages claims, no representative action could be brought.

1.11 Vinelott J upheld the action as validly commenced, and highlighted the "common ingredients" in the action for conspiracy that could be dealt with in the representative action: the misleading statements made by the defendant in the challenged circular. He stated that "there must be a common ingredient in the cause of action of each member of the class"21 or "some element common to the claims of all members of the class"22 which the representative plaintiff was representing. If the common ingredient was proved, class members could rely on the judgment as res judicata and could prove the remaining elements of the cause of action in separate proceedings.23

1.12 The change from the "same interest" test to the "common ingredient" test made the rule on representative proceedings more flexible and useful. However, the view of Vinelott J has not been further developed in English jurisprudence, even though it has been adopted in other jurisdictions.24

Separate contracts no longer a hindrance

1.13 The "same contract" requirement has been relaxed in cases subsequent to the Markt case. In Irish Shipping Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Co plc (The Irish Rowan),25 a defendant representative action, the plaintiff shipowners sued the representative defendants pursuant to Order 15 Rule 12. The representative defendants were sued on their own behalf and on behalf of all the other 77 liability insurers. Each insurer had a separate contract of insurance, and none was liable for the other insurers' liability. The

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Court of Appeal held that the action was validly commenced, as the defendant class had the "same interest" in defending the action, despite their separate contracts. A common leading underwriter clause in each contract of insurance provided that all settlements of claims undertaken by the representative defendants would be binding upon all class members.

1.14 There was no common leading underwriter clause in *Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v Taylor (The Kyriaki)*, but this defendant representative action was upheld by Walker J because of the convenience of the representative proceedings. He endorsed the view expressed in *The Irish Rowan* case that it would be very inconvenient to have separate actions. In the light of these developments it can be said that the existence of separate contracts is no longer a hindrance to establishing the requisite "same interest" element.

**Separate defences not an impediment**

1.15 In the New Zealand case, *RJ Flowers Ltd v Burns*, separate defences were pleaded by the defendant against different members of the plaintiff class. McGechan J said that the action could be divided into various smaller representative proceedings so as to deal with each defence separately. Staughton LJ in *The Irish Rowan* case also said that it was "theoretically possible" for the 77 defendants to defend the action separately. Hence, it seems that the mere fact of presenting separate defences against different class members does not preclude the satisfaction of the "same interest" requirement.

1.16 In a recent case in England, *Independiente Ltd v Music Trading On-Line (HK) Ltd*, the plaintiff class members were owners or exclusive licensees of the UK copyright in various sound recordings. The defendant operated a website, selling compact discs of popular artists imported from Hong Kong. The plaintiff class members complained that the practice amounted to parallel importation, and sought an injunction, damages or an account of profits, and delivery up of infringing copies. The defendant disputed the appropriateness of the representative action. The court rejected the defendant's arguments and held that the "same interest" requirement was satisfied and the representation action could proceed, even though separate defences could be raised against different plaintiff class members.

**Damages can be awarded in representative actions**

1.17 Judicial attempts have been made to award damages in representative actions. First, in *Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman*
Industries, the relief claimed was not damages, but a declaration of the class members' entitlement to damages because of the company officers' conspiracy.\(^{31}\) Armed with the court's declaration, class members could subsequently claim damages individually.

1.18 Secondly, the entire liability of a defendant could be owed to the class as a lump sum, without the need to make individual assessments.\(^{32}\) This will satisfy the "same relief" requirement. This method would be particularly useful where class members agreed to the payment of the damages to a particular body,\(^{33}\) or where the representative was obliged to distribute the fund *pro rata*.\(^{34}\)

1.19 Thirdly, Sir Denys Buckley in *CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc*\(^{35}\) regarded the pursuit of damages by the class members in different measure as an adjunct to the major relief claimed, an injunction common to the entire class. The class claimed an injunction so as to prevent the defendant's infringement. The court in the *Independiente* case, in which both injunctive relief and damages were sought, expressly followed Sir Denys Buckley's views.\(^{36}\) Similarly, in *Duke of Bedford v Ellis*,\(^{37}\) the main remedies sought were a declaration as to the construction of a statute and an injunction restraining breaches of the statute. The claim to an account of the amount overcharged was just an adjunct to the main remedies sought.

**Other developments that facilitate representative actions**

1.20 Apart from the relaxation of the "same interest" requirement, there are other developments that could facilitate the commencement of representative actions.

1.21 **Formation of sub-classes** - Sub-classes, having a particular question in common which is not common to other class members, have been allowed in respect of plaintiff classes\(^{38}\) and defendant classes.\(^{39}\) The formation of sub-classes can facilitate the commencement of representative actions.\(^{40}\)


\(^{32}\) *Walker v Murphy* [1915] 1 Ch 71 (CA), at 85 (Kennedy LJ), at 90 (Swiften Eady LJ); *EMI Records Ltd v Riley* [1981] 1 WLR 923 (Ch), at 926 (Dillon J).

\(^{33}\) *EMI Records* [1981] 1 WLR 923 (Ch) at 926.

\(^{34}\) *Morrison Steamship Co Ltd v Greystoke Castle (Cargo Owners)* [1947] AC 265 (HL).

\(^{35}\) [1988] Ch 61 (CA).

\(^{36}\) [2003] EWHC 470 (Ch), at para 30.

\(^{37}\) [1901] AC 1 (HL).

\(^{38}\) *Duke of Bedford* [1901] AC 1 (HL) (3 classes of growers represented in an action against a defendant).


1.22 **Class description rather than identification** - Order 15 Rule 12 does not specify whether the identities of the members of the class must be known or, at least, can be ascertained when commencing the action. Academics have suggested that, in case of doubt, the names of the class members should be annexed to the writ. However, the court has allowed a description of the defendant class, without identifying its members, where injunctive relief was sought against the class. In the *Independiente* case, the defendant argued that the "same interest" requirement could not be satisfied where the owners and exclusive licensees of the UK copyright varied from day to day. The court, however, held that the difficulty in ascertaining the number and identities of the class members did not bar the commencement of the representative action.

1.23 **Assessment of relative benefits of representative action** - The rationale for representative actions is convenience and judicial economy.

There have been recent judicial observations that the court should take into account judicial economy and convenience when considering whether to allow a representative action. Purchas LJ said in *The Irish Rowan* case,

> "The benefits of a representative action, of course, in a multiple contractual arrangement of this kind are too obvious to require statement and on balance the convenience and expedition of litigation is far better served with a wide interpretation of the rule."  

There should be a comparison between the benefits and burdens of representative and unitary proceedings. If a representative action is not more suitable than a unitary action, no representative action should be allowed. A more recent example is the *Independiente* case where the defendant argued that a representative action would prolong the trial, given the facts of the case. The court was not convinced:

> "It is true that the representative element of the claim is likely to make the proceedings longer and more expensive than would be the case if they were confined to the claims of the individual claimants. But that is not the only comparison to be made. The other is to compare the aggregate time and cost involved if there were separate claims brought by these claimants and each and every Relevant Member. Plainly the saving of time and expense by permitting the representative element of the claim to be pursued in conjunction with the individual claims of the claimants is considerable. If the claim succeeds then the defendants can hardly complain. If it fails they will get their

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41 In *EMI Records Ltd v Kudhail* [1985] FSR 36 (CA), the court allowed the representative action where the plaintiffs could not ascertain identity of all members because of the secretive nature of the activities of the defendant class.

42 [2003] EWHC 470 (Ch), at 23.

43 Lord Macnaghten observed in *Duke of Bedford v Ellis* [1901] AC 1 (HL), at 8, "when the parties were so numerous that you never could 'come at justice'."


45 Megarry J in *Bollinger SA v Goldwell Ltd* [1971] FSR 405 (Ch), at 411-412.
1.24 **No need to have express consent of the class** - Express consent of the class members appears not to be necessary for commencing a representative action. The nature of a representative action is that those with like interests may not know, or approve, of the action commenced by the representative plaintiff.47 In the *Independiente* case, the defendant argued that the representative plaintiffs had not demonstrated that they had the authorisation of the class members. The court accepted that there was no such authorisation, but that was "irrelevant as a matter of law".48 This decision was subsequently followed in *Howells v Dominion Insurance Co Ltd*.49 In *Sung Sheung Hong & Ors v Leung Wong Soo Ching & Ors*50 it was held that the consent of the class was not necessary in choosing the representatives who could be self-chosen.

**Applying the judicially expanded rule on representative proceedings to types of cases that may invoke the class actions regime**

1.25 It would seem from the above discussion that judicial attempts to mitigate the restrictions placed by the *Markt* case on the existing representative rule have provided some key features and a framework for multi-party litigation.

1.26 The change from the "same interest" test to the "common ingredient" test makes the rule on representative proceedings more flexible and useful. Separate contracts and separate defences are no longer impediments to bringing representative actions. Damages can also be awarded in such actions. All these judicially initiated changes have, to a certain extent, enabled the commencement of representative actions. The sub-committee has considered the application of the judicially expanded rule on representative proceedings to different types of cases that might be suitable for proceedings under a class actions regime, such as insurance cases, real estate development cases, environment cases, labour disputes, consumer cases, public interest cases, securities cases, etc. The types of cases which the sub-committee considers might be suitable for class action proceedings are set out in Annex 1 to this paper. On a general level, we note that the litigants in person project found that there was little evidence to suggest that the litigants in person under the preliminary study would have engaged in class action proceedings had that option been available.51 Some of the salient features of specific types of cases warrant discussion.

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46 [2003] EWHC 470 (Ch), at 38.
47 *Gaspet Ltd v Elliss (Inspector of Taxes)* [1985] 1 WLR 1214 (Ch), at 1220-1221.
48 [2003] EWHC 470 (Ch), at para 32.
49 [2005] EWHC 552 (QB), at para 26. The court decided: "the authority of the members to the bringing and continuing of proceedings was irrelevant, such authority being clearly provided in the circumstances by the provisions of the [representative rule]."
51 See Annex 2.
1.27 *Labour disputes* - The existing Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund may have already taken care of the situation where an employer is insolvent. *Ex gratia* payment may be made out of the fund. In addition, section 25 of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap 25), which is broadly worded, specifically provides for representative claims in the context of labour disputes. There are almost identical provisions in section 24 of the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance (Cap 453) and section 21 of the Small Claims Ordinance (Cap 338). Many of the multi-party labour disputes were dealt with under the rules governing the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund and some other current rules. Hence, there might not be a need for a class action regime in such cases.

1.28 *Consumer cases* - The Consumer Council's Consumer Legal Action Fund (CLA Fund) is a trust fund set up to enable consumers to obtain legal redress by providing financial support and legal assistance. The advice obtained from the CLA Fund and the field experience of the Consumer Council show that the representative action procedure under Order 15 rule 12 of the RHC has not been used because of uncertainties with interpretation of the present rules. In fact, no representative action has been commenced by the CLA Fund so far. There are also perceived complications arising from representative actions. With reference to the consumer case studies we observe that (with the exception of the mobile phone operator case) because of the limited ascertainable number of consumers, a test case was the preferred option to commence proceedings. Where a test case was used, a single legal action was raised against the defendant and the defendant was not protected from other legal actions. It was questionable whether the defendant could settle with the other consumers on the basis of the judgment in the test case. We also observe that in cases involving disputes in relation to a residential development, each case was different and the issues were open-ended. A representative action was therefore not adopted.

1.29 *Public interest cases* - This category covers a wide range of cases, including human rights cases, constitutional issues, civil service and right of abode cases, as well as statutory provisions on discrimination cases.

1.30 *Securities cases* - Five scenarios were considered. First, in respect of misappropriation or theft of clients' assets by officers of licensed corporations, the compensation scheme in Part XII of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap 571) appears to provide a more effective remedy than litigation for clients who suffer loss less than $150,000. There does not seem to be a special need to invoke multi-party litigation in these circumstances. Secondly, in the case of a shortfall in securities held on behalf of clients by an insolvent intermediary, there appears to be a practice of grouping clients' claims according to the facts and seeking court directions on sample claims for the purpose of determining entitlements in a more efficient and cost-effective manner. It is questionable whether a multi-party litigation regime will be particularly useful in such a scenario.
1.31 The third scenario involves claims arising from mis-selling, unsuitable recommendations or negligent investment advice. By the nature of these claims, liability hinges on the clients' personal circumstances, and each case can be different from each other. The "same interest" requirement is unlikely to be fulfilled. Mr Justice Vinelott's change from the "same interest" test to the "common ingredient" test in the Prudential Assurance case may make it easier for claimants to invoke the rule on representative proceedings. He stated that "there must be a common ingredient in the cause of action of each member of the class" or "some element common to the claims of all members of the class" which the representative plaintiff was representing. Whether there is a "common ingredient" is a matter of fact. If the common ingredient is proved, class members can rely on the judgment as res judicata and then prove the remaining elements of the cause of action in separate proceedings.

As to the difficulties in awarding damages which should be calculated with reference to the particular loss suffered by each member, there have been judicial attempts to deal with these. For example, in the Prudential Assurance case, the relief claimed was not damages, but a declaration of the class members' entitlement to damages because of the company officers' conspiracy. The class members could subsequently claim damages individually, using the court's declaration. Separately, in such a scenario, the Securities and Futures Commission may, in appropriate cases, seek to facilitate a settlement for investors, although the Commission has no power to order a licensed person to pay compensation.

1.32 The fourth scenario is the civil liability arising from the causes of action created by a number of provisions in the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap 571) which could give rise to individual but related claims against a defendant. As in the previous scenario, the judicially expanded rule on representative proceedings may, as discussed, make it easier for claimants to invoke this type of proceedings.

1.33 The fifth scenario involves losses caused by an unregulated person. Where a large number of claimants suffer loss arising out of similar circumstances, they may, as in the last two scenarios, find it easier to bring representative proceedings because of the judicially expanded rule on this type of proceedings.

Comparison of a full class action regime with the judicially expanded rule on representative proceedings

1.34 While acknowledging the judicial endeavour to counter-balance the strictness imposed by the Markt decision, Rachael Mulheron nevertheless believes that a full regime of multi-party litigation is more desirable so as to enable efficient, well-defined and workable access to justice. A full regime, in

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54 [1981] Ch 229, at 255.
55 Sections 108, 281, 305 and 391.
her opinion, provides statutory protection and a number of benefits and advantages that the representative procedure does not:\(^56\)

**Conduct of proceedings protecting**

(a) the proviso that the potentially burdensome effects of discovery against individual class members is only available with the leave of the court, not as of right;

(b) the admissibility of statistical evidence under strict, statutorily-described, conditions;

(c) staying any counterclaim against a class member by the defendant until the common issues have been resolved;

**Protecting representative claimant**

(a) whilst permitting applications for security for costs against the representative claimant, judicially treating these more generously than in the case of unitary actions;

(b) allowing the representative claimant by statutory mandate to claim the costs of any successful action as a first charge upon the judgment sum paid by the defendant, thereby protecting the costs exposure of the representative claimant in the event of success;

**Costs and lawyers' fees**

(a) special costs provisions, or the availability of public funding, to ameliorate the burdens of instituting class suits, otherwise unavailable to unitary claimants;

(b) judicial monitoring and approval of solicitor-client fee agreements (particularly fee agreements contingent upon success), which offers protection for both the successful class (which wishes to protect the judgment sum from incursions from high legal fees) and for claimant solicitors who have carried the risk of an expensive, burdensome and ultimately successful class suit;

**Disposal of the case**

(a) a power in the court to award damages by specifying a sum in respect of each class member, or alternatively, in an aggregate amount without needing to specify amounts awarded in respect of individual class members;

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(b) permitting settlement or discontinuance of the class suit only with the approval of the court;

(c) a power in the court to order the constitution of a fund (controlled by the court or by a party nominated by the court) from which payments to class members are to be made;

(d) permitting by statutory mandate a *cy-pers* distribution where distribution of a judgment sum to class members is impossible or impracticable;

**Miscellaneous**

(a) requiring court-approved notice to be disseminated to the class members following key events, such as withdrawal or settlement by the representative claimant of his or her claim, commencement of the class suit, judgment, or where either a settlement proposal or an application for discontinuance of the class suit is made by the defendant;

(b) suspending the limitation period from running against individual class members, upon the commencement of the class suit.

1.35 We are of the view that even with the adoption of a more liberal view by the court of Order 15, rule 12 of the RHC, there remains a substantial degree of uncertainty in using the current representative action procedure. We agree with Professor Mulheron that a comprehensive regime for class action litigation is more desirable.

**Recommendation 1**

We believe that there is a good case for the introduction of a comprehensive regime for multi-party litigation so as to enable efficient, well-defined and workable access to justice, and would welcome public views as to whether such a regime should be introduced.
Chapter 2

The law on representative proceedings and class action regimes in other jurisdictions

Introduction

2.1 We have looked at the law on representative proceedings and class actions in a number of jurisdictions: Australia, Canada, England and Wales, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the People’s Republic of China (the Mainland), New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan and the United States of America. Australia and the USA have multiple jurisdictions, and the following paragraphs focus mainly on their respective federal regimes (which tend to be reflected in state procedural statutes). We have included reference to law reform proposals in some jurisdictions which have not yet introduced a class action regime, notably Ireland and South Africa. These summaries of the class action regimes in other jurisdictions are intended to serve as a background against which the recommendations in later chapters may be considered.

Australia: federal regime

2.2 In Australia, only two jurisdictions have specific legislation on representative proceedings: the Commonwealth and Victoria. In 1988, the Australian Law Reform Commission published its proposals for a class action regime.\footnote{Australian Law Reform Commission. \textit{Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court} (Report No 46, 1988).} The Commission’s proposals were in large part implemented with the enactment of Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) as inserted by the Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act 1991 No 181 (section 3).

2.3 Part 4A (Group Proceeding) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 governs the conduct of class proceedings in the state of Victoria, Australia. The provisions of Part 4A are substantially the same as those of Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The following discussion will focus on the federal regime.

Commencement of representative proceedings

2.4 Part IVA of the FCA Act is entitled “representative proceedings”, and a “representative proceeding” under Part IVA is defined by section 33A to mean a proceeding commenced under section 33C. Section 33C(1) of the
Act lists the criteria which must be met before a representative proceeding can be commenced:

(a) there must be "7 or more persons" having claims against the same person,
(b) the claims of all those persons are in respect of, or arise from, the same, similar or related circumstances, and
(c) the claims of all those persons must give rise to "a substantial common issue of law or fact".

2.5 It is immaterial whether the claims arise from separate transactions or contracts between the respondent and individual group members, or arise from separate acts or omissions by the respondent. A person commencing a representative proceeding must have a sufficient interest to warrant a proceeding on his own behalf. There is no certification required from the court. An exception to the numerosity requirement is stipulated in section 33L, which allows the court "on such conditions (if any) as it thinks fit" to continue the proceedings if at any stage it appears to the court that there are fewer than seven group members.

Opt-out scheme

2.6 An application commencing a representative proceeding may either describe or otherwise identify the group members, but it is not necessary to name, or specify the number of, the group members. The "opt-out" scheme has been adopted under the Australian Federal regime. Section 33E(1) of the FCA Act stipulates that "the consent of a person to be a group member in a representative proceeding is not required." The court must fix a cut-off date for a group member to opt out of the representative proceeding and a group member wishing to opt out must do so by written notice before that date.

Notice requirements

2.7 Notice must be given to the group members in respect of the following matters:

(a) the commencement of the proceeding and their right to opt-out before a specified date;
(b) a respondent's application for the dismissal of the proceeding on the ground of want of prosecution; and

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2 Section 33C(2)(b), FCA Act.
3 Section 33D, FCA Act.
4 Under this section, the court may also order that the proceeding no longer continue.
5 Section 33H, FCA Act.
6 Section 33J(1), FCA Act.
7 Section 33J(2), FCA Act.
(c) a representative party’s application to seek leave to withdraw under section 33W as representative party.\(^8\)

The court can dispense with any of these notice requirements if the proceeding does not include a claim for damages.\(^9\) The form and content of a notice under section 33X, and the way in which (and by whom) the notice is to be given, must be approved by the court.\(^10\)

**Sub-group**

2.8 As regards the resolution of issues common to only some members of the group, the court may give directions in relation to the establishment of sub-groups within the group and the appointment of a person to be a sub-group representative party.\(^11\) The manner in which the resolution of individual issues should be conducted is also dealt with by directions of the court.\(^12\) The court is afforded a wide range of powers to protect the interests of the group. The court may substitute another group member as the representative party if, on a group member’s application, it appears to the court that the current representative party is not adequately representing the interests of the group members.\(^13\)

**Wide power of the court**

2.9 In addition to specific powers, the court is granted the power to “make any order the Court thinks appropriate or necessary to ensure that justice is done in the proceeding”.\(^14\) The approval of the court must be obtained before a representative proceeding may be settled or discontinued.\(^15\) Similarly, settlement by a representative party of his individual claim is also only allowed with leave of the court.\(^16\)

**Judgment**

2.10 The court may, in determining a matter in a representative proceeding,

(a) determine an issue of law;

(b) determine an issue of fact;

(c) make a declaration of liability;

(d) grant any equitable relief;

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\(^8\) Section 33X(1), FCA Act.
\(^9\) Section 33X(2), FCA Act.
\(^10\) Section 33Y, FCA Act.
\(^11\) Section 33Q(2), FCA Act.
\(^12\) Section 33Q(1), section 33R and section 33S, FCA Act.
\(^13\) Section 33T(1), FCA Act.
\(^14\) Section 33ZF(1), FCA Act.
\(^15\) Section 33V(1), FCA Act.
\(^16\) Section 33W, FCA Act.
(e) make an award of damages for group members, sub-group members or individual group members, being damages consisting of specified amounts or amounts worked out in such manner as the court specifies;

(f) award damages in an aggregate amount without specifying amounts awarded in respect of individual group members; and

(g) make such other order as the court thinks just. 17

2.11 A judgment must describe or otherwise identify the group members to be affected, and will bind all such persons but not those persons who have opted out of the proceeding under section 33J. 18 A judgment must make clear that the impact of the judgment on the members of the class has already been taken into account. 19

Appeal

2.12 A representative party may appeal a judgment on behalf of group members to the extent that it relates to issues common to the claims of group members. 20 Similarly, a sub-group representative party may appeal a judgment on behalf of sub-group members to the extent that it relates to issues common to the claims of sub-group members. In addition, a respondent to the original representative proceeding and an individual member (relating to his individual claim) may also make an appeal under section 33ZC. If a representative party or sub-group representative party does not bring an appeal within the prescribed time, another member of the group or sub-group may bring an appeal as representing the group or sub-group, as the case may be (section 33ZC).

Costs

2.13 Where the court is satisfied that the costs reasonably incurred in relation to the representative proceeding are likely to exceed the costs recoverable from the respondent, the court may, upon a representative party's application under section 33ZJ, order that an amount equal to the whole or a part of the excess be paid to the representative party out of the damages awarded. The court may also make such other order as it thinks just.

Procedural matters

2.14 The Federal Court Rules 1979 (No 140) provide the practice and procedure for actions commenced under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, with a specific part on representative proceeding in Order 73. Order 73

17 Section 33Z, FCA Act.
18 Section 33ZB, FCA Act.
20 Section 33ZC, FCA Act.
contains, inter alia, the forms for commencing a representative proceeding and an opt-out notice, and governs applications for orders involving notice. The more detailed aspects of the practice and procedure for representative proceedings (such as discovery, expert evidence and other case management or interlocutory matters) are governed by the general provisions of the Federal Court Rules 1979. These provisions also apply to other types of proceedings and are not specific to class proceedings. It is therefore not necessary to set them out in this paper.

Current reform

2.15 Class Action User Group meetings have been convened in Melbourne and Sydney to examine ways of streamlining the conduct of representative proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia. These meetings involve judges, court registrars and legal practitioners and are in response to concerns about the time and resources that can be involved in representative proceedings. The aim is to develop and implement procedures that will help reduce the number of interlocutory hearings and bring matters to trial as quickly as possible (having regard to the complexity of many of these proceedings). The meetings also look at such issues as the role of commercial litigation funders and whether there might be problems with the legislative regime itself.

2.16 In the Federal Court, representative proceedings may be brought under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. This legislation is the responsibility of the Government, with any changes ultimately being a matter for the Parliament. To the extent that the User Group meetings may identify issues concerning the legislative regime, those issues will be referred to the Government for its consideration.

2.17 At this stage, no discussion papers or reform proposals have been prepared, nor is there a specific timetable for proposed reforms.

Canada

2.18 Two common law jurisdictions in Canada have class proceedings regimes: Ontario and British Columbia. There are also proposals to extend such regimes to the Federal Court of Canada, Alberta and Manitoba. These existing and proposed regimes are mainly based on the Uniform Class Proceedings Act, adopted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 1996. Hence, the regime in British Columbia (the Class Proceedings Act, RSBC 1996, c50) is broadly the same as that in Ontario. The following

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21 Mr Philip Kellow, Deputy Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia, in his email to the Secretary of the Sub-committee dated 24 June 2008.


23 The Law Reform Commission in Ireland, Consultation Paper on Multi-Party litigation (Class Actions) (2003), No 23, at para 2.16.
discussion will focus on the Class Proceedings Act 1992 (the 1992 Act) in Ontario.

Commencement of class proceedings

2.19 Under section 2 of the 1992 Act, one or more members of a class of persons may commence proceedings in the court on behalf of the members of the class. A person commencing such proceedings must make a motion to a judge of the court for an order certifying the proceedings as class proceedings and appointing the person as representative plaintiff (section 2(2)).

2.20 Under section 4, any party to proceedings against two or more defendants may, at any stage of the proceedings, make a motion to a judge of the court for an order certifying the proceedings as a class proceeding and appointing a representative defendant.

Certification

2.21 Under section 5, the court would certify a class proceeding on a motion where:

(a) the pleadings or the notice of application discloses a cause of action;

(b) there is an identifiable class of two or more persons that would be represented by the representative plaintiff or defendant;

(c) the claims or defences of the class members raise common issues;

(d) a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure for the resolution of the common issues; and

(e) there is a representative plaintiff or defendant who,

(i) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,

(ii) has produced a plan for the proceedings that sets out a workable method of advancing the proceedings on behalf of the class and of notifying class members of the proceedings, and

(iii) does not have, on the common issues for the class, an interest in conflict with the interests of other class members.

2.22 Where a class includes a subclass whose interests, in the opinion of the court, should be separately represented, the court must, before
certifying the class proceedings, ensure that there is a representative plaintiff or defendant who,

(a) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the subclass;

(b) has produced a plan for the proceedings that would advance the proceedings on behalf of the subclass; and

(c) does not have, on the common issues for the subclass, an interest in conflict with the interests of other subclass members.24

Opt-out scheme

2.23 Any member of a class may, under section 9, opt out of the class proceedings in the manner and within the time specified in the certification order.

Notice requirements

2.24 The following notices must be given:

(a) a notice by a representative party to the class members informing them of the certification of a class proceeding (section 17);

(b) where the court determines common issues in favour of a class and considers that the participation of individual class members is required to determine individual issues, a notice by the representative party to those members (section 18);

(c) a notice by any party where the court considers it necessary to protect the interests of any class member or party or to ensure the fair conduct of the proceedings (section 19).

These notices must be approved by the court before they are given (section 20).

Common issues and individual issues

2.25 The 1992 Act explicitly recognises the possibility of dividing common issues and individual issues within a single procedural agenda.25 The court will generally deal with the common issues of the class, followed by the common issues of any subclass and then any issues relating to individual class members (sections 24 and 25).26

24 Section 5(2) of the 1992 Act.
26 See also the Law Reform Commission in Ireland, Consultation Paper on Multi-Party litigation (Class Actions) (2003), No 23, at para 2.22.
2.26 Common issues for a class or subclass will be determined together. Individual issues that require the participation of individual class members are determined individually in accordance with sections 24 and 25. Under section 11(2), the court may give judgment in respect of the common issues and separate judgments in respect of any other issue.

Wide power of the court

2.27 Throughout the proceedings, the court may make any order respecting the conduct of a class proceeding to ensure its fair and expeditious determination and may also stay such proceeding and, for these purposes, may impose such terms on the parties as it considers appropriate.

2.28 For the purposes of determining issues relating to the amount or distribution of a monetary award under the 1992 Act, the court may admit as evidence statistical information that would not otherwise be admissible as evidence, if the information was compiled in accordance with principles that are generally accepted by experts in the field of statistics.

Judgment

2.29 A judgment on common issues of a class or subclass binds every class member who has not opted out of the class proceeding (section 27(3)). The judgment, however, does not bind (a) a person who has opted out of the class proceedings; or (b) a party to the class proceedings in any subsequent proceedings between the party and a person mentioned in (a) above.

Discontinuance, abandonment and settlement

2.30 Under section 29(1) of the 1992 Act, a class proceeding commenced and certified under the Act may be discontinued or abandoned only with the approval of the court, on such terms as the court considers appropriate. A settlement of a class proceeding is not binding unless approved by the court, and would, upon the court's approval, bind all class members (section 29(2) and (3)).

Appeal

2.31 Under section 30, a party to a class proceeding may appeal:

(a) from an order refusing to certify a proceeding as a class proceeding and from an order decertifying a proceeding;

(b) with leave of the Superior Court of Justice, from an order certifying a proceeding as a class proceeding;

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27 Section 11 of the 1992 Act.
29 Section 23(1) of the 1992 Act.
30 Section 27(2) of the 1992 Act.
(c) from a judgment on common issues.

According to sub-sections 30(4) and (5), if a representative party abandons an appeal or does not appeal, any class member may make a motion to the court for leave to act as the representative party. In addition, a class member, a representative plaintiff or a defendant may appeal from an order under section 24 or 25 determining an individual claim.  

Costs, fees and disbursements

2.32 Class members, other than the representative party, are not liable for costs except in relation to the determination of their own individual claims. The court, in exercising its discretion in respect of costs, may take into account whether the class proceeding was a test case, raised a novel point of law or involved a matter of public interest.

2.33 To counter the disincentive to litigate, section 33 enables a solicitor and a representative party to enter into a written agreement providing for payment of fees and disbursements only in the event of success in a class proceeding (despite the general prohibition on contingency fees in civil proceedings). Such an agreement is not enforceable unless approved by the court, on the motion of the solicitor. A solicitor may make a motion to the court to have his or her fees increased by a multiplier so as to counter the risk involved in an agreement for payment only in the case of success. The agreement must in writing:

(a) state the terms under which fees and disbursements will be paid;

(b) give an estimate of the expected fee, whether contingent on success in the class proceeding or not; and

(c) state the method by which payment is to be made, whether by lump sum, salary or otherwise.

Under section 32(3), amounts owing under such an agreement are a first charge on any settlement funds or monetary award.

Funding mechanism

2.34 The Law Society Amendment Act (Class Proceedings Funding) 1992, in amending the Law Society Act 1990, established the Class Proceedings Committee and the Class Proceedings Fund. The purpose is to

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31 Sub-sections 30(6) and (11).
32 Section 31(2) of the 1992 Act.
33 Section 31(1) of the 1992 Act.
35 Section 32(2) of the 1992 Act.
36 Section 33(4) of the 1992 Act.
37 Section 32(1) of the 1992 Act.
provide financial support for a plaintiff in respect of disbursements in a class proceeding and to pay costs awarded against the plaintiff. The Class Proceedings Committee decides whether funding should be granted for a particular case and, if so, the amount. In making funding decisions, the committee considers various factors, including the merits of the case, whether the plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to raise funds from other sources, whether the plaintiff has a clear and reasonable proposal for the use of any funds awarded, and whether the plaintiff has appropriate financial controls to ensure that any funds awarded are spent for the purposes of the award, public interest and likelihood of certification.

2.35 In return for the funding, a levy is payable by a recipient of the financial aid when he gets a monetary award from the court or when one or more persons in the class is entitled to receive settlement funds out of settlement of the case. The amount of the levy is the sum of the amount of any financial support paid (excluding any amount repaid by a plaintiff) and 10 per cent of the amount of the award or settlement funds. The viability of this scheme is questionable, however. There is a detailed discussion of the reasons for its limited success in Chapter 8 of this paper.

Procedural matters

2.36 According to section 35 of the 1992 Act, the rules of court apply to class proceedings. The rules of court are the Rules of Civil Procedures 1990 (Regulation 194) (the RCP) made under the Courts of Justice Act 1990. Rule 12 of the RCP is made specifically for class proceedings, but this rule is brief, piecemeal and supplementary in nature. The function of this rule is not to provide any comprehensive procedure applicable to class proceedings, but rather to provide supplementary provisions applicable to class proceedings and to rationalise the operation of the RCP generally to the conduct of class proceedings. Hence the procedure to be followed in class proceedings is partly in the 1992 Act and partly in the RCP generally.

2.37 Section 12 of the 1992 Act allows the court, on the motion of a party or class member, to make any order it considers appropriate respecting the conduct of a class proceeding to ensure its fair and expeditious determination and, for that purpose, the court may impose such terms on the parties as it considers appropriate. This broad discretion given to the court is to enable the court to supplement the RCP to the extent necessary to

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38 Section 59.1(2) of the Law Society Act 1990.
39 Section 59.3(3) of the Law Society Act 1990.
40 Section 59.3(4) of the Law Society Act 1990 and Regulation 5 of the Class Proceedings Regulation 771/92.
41 Regulation 10(2) of the Class Proceedings Regulation 771/92.
42 Regulation 10(3) of the Class Proceedings Regulation 771/92.
43 For example, Rule 12.02 provides that the title of class proceedings must include, after the parties’ names, “Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992”. Another example is that under Rule 12.06, leave to appeal to the Divisional Court under section 30 of the 1992 Act shall be obtained from a judge other than the judge who made the original order.
44 Canadian Encyclopedic Digest: Ontario (Carswell, 3rd Ed), Vol 24, Title 105, at para 189.
45 Canadian Encyclopedic Digest: Ontario (Carswell, 3rd Ed), Vol 24, Title 105, at para 189.
accommodate the special nature of class proceedings, but it is not designed to circumvent the RCP.⁴⁶

2.38 Specifically, section 15 of the 1992 Act provides that parties to a class proceeding have the same rights of discovery under the RCP against one another as they would have in any other proceedings. After discovery of the representative party, a party may move for discovery under the RCP against other class members.

England and Wales

2.39 Section III of Part 19 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) introduced the concept of the "Group Litigation Order" (GLO). It was added to the CPR by rule 9 of the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2000 (SI 2000 No 221), and came into force on 2 May 2000, implementing the recommendations in Lord Woolf's final report on Access to Justice.⁴⁷ Rules 19.10 to 19.15 of section III are designed to achieve the objectives stated in the report, and are supplemented by Practice Direction 19B. Nonetheless, these rules and the practice direction cannot be regarded as a comprehensive regime of court procedures for conducting group actions as other provisions of the CPR also affect group litigation.⁴⁸ These rules, however, establish a framework for case management and provide flexibility for the court to deal with group litigation.⁴⁹ A GLO differs fundamentally from a class action in that a GLO involves not a single suit but a number of distinct suits which are administered together.⁵⁰ Practice Direction 19B applies where the multiple parties are plaintiffs. Section III, Part 19 of the Practice Direction also applies where the multiple parties are defendants.⁵¹

2.40 A GLO is defined as an order which provides for the "case management of claims which give rise to common or related issues of fact or law" (GLO issues).⁵² The words "common or related issues" are significant since the interests of the individuals do not have to be the "same", as is required in representative proceedings.

Application for a GLO

2.41 Before applying for a GLO, an applicant's solicitor should consult the Law Society's Multi Party Action Information Service to obtain information about other cases giving rise to the same GLO issues.⁵³

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⁴⁶ Canadian Encyclopedic Digest: Ontario (Carswell, 3rd Ed), Vol 24, Title 105, at para 231.
⁴⁸ Civil Procedure Vol 1 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), at para 19.9.9.
⁴⁹ Civil Procedure Vol 1 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), at para 19.9.9.
⁵¹ Practice Direction, 19BPD.1.
⁵² Rule 19.10, CPR.
⁵³ Practice Direction, 19BPD.2.1.
"It will often be convenient for the claimants' solicitors to form a Solicitors' Group and to choose one of their number to take the lead in applying for the GLO and in litigating the GLO issues. The lead solicitor's role and relationship with the other members of the Solicitors' Group should be carefully defined in writing and will be subject to any directions given by the court under CPR 19.13(c)."

2.42 Rule 19.11(1) does not specify a minimum number of claims before a GLO can be made, nor who may apply for such an order. An application for a GLO must be made in accordance with CPR Part 23, may be made before or after the claims have been issued and may be made by a claimant or a defendant. An application notice must state (a) what order the applicant is seeking; and (b), briefly, why the applicant is seeking the order (rule 23.6). An application notice or written evidence filed in support of the application should include the following information:

(1) a summary of the nature of the litigation;

(2) the number and nature of claims already issued;

(3) the number of parties likely to be involved;

(4) the common issues of fact or law (the GLO issues) that are likely to arise in the litigation; and

(5) whether there are any matters that distinguish smaller groups of claims within the wider group.

2.43 The importance of case management by the court is reflected in the fact that, before an order can be made, the approval of the Lord Chief Justice (Queen's Bench Division), the Vice-Chancellor (Chancery Division) or the Head of Civil Justice (county court), as the case may be, is necessary. That approval may be sought before or after the hearing of the application for the GLO. In addition, the court may make a GLO of its own initiative.

Making of a GLO

2.44 Pursuant to rule 19.11(1), the court may make a GLO where there are or are likely to be a number of claims giving rise to GLO issues. A GLO must give directions regarding the establishment of a register (the group register) on which the claims will be entered, must specify the GLO issues to be managed as a group under the GLO and must also specify the management court which will manage the claims on the register.

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54 Practice Direction, 19BPD.2.2.
55 Practice Direction, 19BPD.3.1.
56 Practice Direction, 19BPD.3.2.
57 Practice Direction, 19BPD.3.3.
58 Practice Direction, 19BPD.4. CPR 3.3 deals with the procedure where a court proposes to make an order of its own initiative.
59 Rule 19.11(2)(c), CPR.
2.45 Under rule 19.11(3), a GLO may:

(a) in relation to claims which raise one or more of the GLO issues —
   (i) direct their transfer to the management court;
   (ii) order their stay until further order; and
   (iii) direct their entry on the group register;

(b) direct that from a specified date claims which raise one or more
   of the GLO issues should be started in the management court
   and entered on the group register; and

(c) give directions for publicising the GLO.

2.46 The GLO procedure applies the "opt-in" system. A claim must
be issued before it can be entered on a group register. An exception to the
opt-in requirement is set out in rule 19.11(3)(a)(iii), rule 19.11(3)(b) and
Practice Direction 9.1. The management court may specify a cut-off date to
opt in or be entered on the group register. Any application to vary the terms
of the GLO must be made to the management court.

Group register

2.47 When a GLO has been made, a group register will be
established on which will be entered such details as the court may direct of the
cases which are to be subject to the GLO. According to the Practice
Direction (19BPD.6.2), any party to a case may apply for details of a case to be
entered on a group register. Unless the case gives rise to at least one of the
GLO issues, an order for details of the case to be entered on the group register
will not be made. The group register will normally be maintained by and kept
at the management court, but the court may direct this to be done by the
solicitor for one of the parties to a case entered on the register.

2.48 Under rule 19.14, a party to a claim entered on the group register
may apply to the management court for the claim to be removed from the
register. Where the management court orders the claim to be removed from
the register, it may give directions about the future management of the claim.

Effect of a GLO

2.49 Where a judgment or order is given or made regarding a GLO
issue, that judgment or order is to be binding on the parties to all other claims
that are on the group register at the time the judgment is given or the order is
made. The court may also give directions as to the extent to which that

60 Practice Direction, 19BPD.6.1A and Rule 19.11(3), CPR.
61 Practice Direction, 19BPD.13.
62 Practice Direction, 19BPD.12.2.
63 Practice Direction, 19BPD.6.1.
64 Practice Direction, 19BPD.6.3.
65 Practice Direction, 19BPD.6.5.
66 Rule 19.12(1)(a) CPR.
judgment or order is binding on the parties to any claim which is subsequently entered on the group register. However, a party who is adversely affected by a judgment or order which is binding on him may seek permission to appeal the order under rule 19.12(2) of the CPR.

2.50 Unless the court orders otherwise, disclosure of any document relating to a GLO issue by a party to a claim on the group register is disclosure of that document to all parties to claims on the group register, and those subsequently entered on the group register.

Case management

2.51 Under rule 19.13, the management court is afforded a wide range of powers with regard to the case management of the class proceedings. Accordingly, the management court may give a wide range of directions, including those:

(a) varying the GLO issues;

(b) providing for one or more claims on the group register to proceed as test claims;

(c) appointing the solicitor of one or more parties to be the lead solicitor for the claimants or defendants;

(d) specifying the details to be included in a statement of case in order to show that the criteria for entry of the claim on the group register have been met;

(e) specifying a date after which no claim may be added to the group register unless the court gives permission; and

(f) for the purpose of entering any particular claim which meets one or more of the GLO issues on the group register.

2.52 The management court may give case management directions at the time or after the GLO is made. Pursuant to rule 19.12(1), directions given at a case management hearing will generally be binding on all claims that are subsequently entered on the group register. Case management will usually be carried out by one judge throughout the life of the case, assisted as necessary by a Master alone or together with a Costs Judge. The managing judge "will assume overall responsibility for the management of the claims and will generally hear the GLO issues." A Master or a District Judge may be appointed to deal with procedural matters, which he will do in accordance with

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67 Rule 19.12(1)(b) CPR.
68 Rule 19.12(4) CPR.
69 Rule 19.13 CPR.
70 19BPD.12.1.
71 19BPD.12.1.
73 19BPD.8.
any directions given by the managing judge. A Costs Judge may be appointed and may be invited to attend case management hearings.

2.53 Cut-off dates imposed under rule 19.13(e) only limit entry to the group litigation. They would not affect the limitation period and do not preclude an individual from seeking the court's permission to join the group at a later date or to issue separate proceedings.

Test claims

2.54 Under rule 19.13(b), the management court may direct one or more of the claims to proceed as test claims. Where a claim, as a test claim, is settled, the management court may order that another claim on the group register be substituted as the test claim. Neither the CPR nor the practice direction provides a definition of "test claim" or any guidance on when and how test cases might be selected. No detailed rules are provided in the CPR to give directions on how test cases are to be chosen. Commentary to the CPR states as follows:

"Test claim is not defined or referred to in the CPR Glossary and neither the rule nor the practice direction provide any guidance on when and how test cases might be selected. In fact group litigation can be case managed in a number of different ways, including division of the group into subgroups, identification of generic or common issues, use of a master pleading, trial of preliminary issues, and some investigation of a sample or all individual claims, as well as the test case approach. By only referring to test cases the rule implies that this is the preferred option."

2.55 In Boake Allen Ltd & Ors v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, the House of Lords heard an appeal arising out of test cases brought by groups of companies seeking relief against discrimination in treatment by the tax authority. The House of Lords considered the need to amend the statement of case to clarify the basis on which the plaintiffs were seeking a remedy. Lord Woolf described the GLO regime as follows:

"Primarily, it seeks to achieve its objective, so far as this is possible, by reducing the number of steps litigants, who have a common interest, have to take individually to establish their rights and instead enables them to be taken collectively as part of a GLO Group. This means that irrespective of the number of individuals in the group each procedural step in the actions need only be taken once. This is of benefit not only to members of the group, but also those against whom proceedings are brought."
In a system such as ours based on cost shifting this is of benefit to all parties to the proceedings.

... In the context of a GLO, a claim form need be no more than the simplest of documents. It needs to be read together with the application to register and the register bearing in mind its place in the GLO process and the need to limit pre-registration costs so far as this is possible. In this case the suggested deficiency in the claim forms are that they did not sufficiently identify the basis of the revenue being under an obligation to repay the tax paid assuming this should not have been claimed by the revenue. This is an area of the law the parameters of which are still evolving. In my judgment it would be wholly inconsistent with the objective of the GLO to require the nature of the remedy claimed to be spelt out in detail in the claim forms of the taxpayers. The Revenue knew perfectly well the basis of the claims once the issues had been defined for the purpose of the GLO. For each of the parties to have to spell out details of the manner in which they would advance their claim at the outset would have caused substantial extra costs to be incurred researching the law. Cumulatively this would have been grossly wasteful.\textsuperscript{80} (Emphasis added).

2.56 Outside the GLO context, the English Court of Appeal considered the relevant principles for a test case in the decision of \textit{R v Hertfordshire County Council ex p Cheung}.\textsuperscript{81} Donaldson MR said:

"I wholly accept the proposition that if a test case is in progress in the public law court, others who are in a similar position to the parties should not be expected themselves to begin proceedings in order to protect their positions. I say this for two reasons. First, it would strain the resources of the public law court to breaking point. Second, and perhaps more important, it is a cardinal principle of good public administration that all persons who are in a similar position shall be treated similarly. Accordingly, it could be assumed that the result of the test case would be applied to them by the authorities concerned without the need for proceedings and that, if this did not in the event occur, the court would regard this as a complete justification for a late application for judicial review."\textsuperscript{82} (Emphasis added)

2.57 There are a number of problems associated with the use of the test case as a procedural device for the handling of group litigation.

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Boake Allen Ltd & Ors v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs} [2007] UKHL 25, paras [31] and [33].

\textsuperscript{81} Unreported, The Times, 4 April 1986.

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{R v Hertfordshire County Council ex p Cheung}, cited above, at page 5 of the transcript.
Professor R Mulheron identified the following problems in the context of multi-party litigation:

(a) the procedure requires that the determination of other cases be stayed until the outcome of the test case. It is arguable that the indefinite postponement of the investigation or progress of a case which is not treated as a test case might breach article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights. It might be contended that the individual litigants have the right to have their cases determined within a reasonable time and the selection and determination of test cases deprive the individual litigants of that right;

(b) The pre-action protocols which apply to judicial review under the CPR require that all plaintiffs investigate and fully disclose their cases before commencing proceedings. The selection of test cases is contrary to that approach; and

(c) The significance of referring to the possible use of test cases in CPR is uncertain where a choice had usually to be made between a generic issues approach, use of test cases or trial of selected individual cases.

2.58 The Manitoba Law Reform Commission also criticised the use of test cases in group litigation. In its view, leading or test case litigation was of limited utility in multi-party litigation because:

"The plaintiff does not owe any legal obligation to have regard to the impact of their case on future litigation by others, and the lawyer is bound to obtain the most favourable result for the client – even if such a result may create a precedent which is not useful, or is potentially harmful, to other similar litigants. Furthermore, test cases are often settled on terms favourable to the plaintiff without a resolution of the underlying issues (such as admissions of liability, amendments of legislation, or changes in government programming) that gave rise to the litigation in the first place."

2.59 The management court may give directions about how the costs of resolving common issues or the costs of claims proceeding as test claims are to be borne or shared as between the claimants on the group register.

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84 Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights provides, in part, that: "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."
86 19BPD.20 (12.4).
Determination of generic issues

2.60 Alternatively, the court will proceed to determine issues arising out of individual cases as generic issues. Those issues are common to a number of parties under a GLO but do not determine the disputes of any individual case which turns on its own facts. In *Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v David, Christine Addison & Ors*, Moore-Bick J dealt with a group of Esso licensees who carried on business as retailers of motor fuel at petrol stations. The central question arose in relation to a products promotion scheme and turned on whether upon the true construction of the licence agreements and in the light of the way in which the promotion was operated, Esso was entitled to recover from the licensees the cost of the promotional gifts supplied to them to enable them to operate the products promotion scheme. Moore-Bick J made an order to enable the court to determine common issues concerning the construction of the licence agreement in relation to the promotion scheme and such other issues arising out of the licence agreement as might conveniently be determined with them. The GLO was deliberately framed as broadly as possible to allow the court to determine similar cases within the group litigation.

His Lordship spelt out his thinking as follows:

"Although the issues for determination were largely agreed well in advance of the trial, there remained a certain amount of debate about their precise scope and content which had not been fully resolved. Broadly speaking, [counsel for the defendants] urged me to determine as many issues of fact and law as possible on this occasion in order to enable his clients to obtain the maximum benefit from the group litigation. [Counsel for the claimants] was more concerned to ensure that in the absence of full evidence from both sides the court did not determine issues that were specific to individual licensees. In deciding in the light of the evidence and arguments what issues can and cannot conveniently be determined at this stage I have been guided by two considerations. The first is that I should only determine generic issues, that is, issues that are common to all, or most, of the licensees, or which ... are common to a defined group of licensees. This restriction is necessary both because it is in the nature of group litigation that the court can only decide issues that are common to a number of parties and because it would have been quite impossible at this trial, or indeed any single trial, to determine in an efficient manner a large number of disputes which turn on their own particular facts. One consequence of this approach is that although I received evidence from eight of Esso's Area Managers and seventeen of the licensees, I have not attempted to make findings about what passed between any particular licensee and his own Area Manager at any stage. The second is that I should determine as many generic issues as possible in

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87 [2003] EWHC 1730 (Comm).
order to make full use of the benefits offered by this form of procedure and to enable the licensees to know as far as possible where they stand." (Emphasis added)

Settlements

2.61 The CPR and practice direction do not specifically offer any guidance on dealing with settlements in relation to group litigation. Some of the problems are specific to group litigation, and can lead to disputes between claimants, which are not easy for their legal representatives to resolve.

Trial

2.62 The management court may give directions for the trial of common issues, and for the trial of individual issues. Common issues and test claims will normally be tried at the management court. The court may direct that individual issues be tried at other courts whose locality is convenient for the parties.

Costs

2.63 Part 44 of the CPR governs generally the costs of court proceedings, and rule 48.6A applies, in particular, where the court has made a GLO. The general rule under rule 44.3(2) that an unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party applies to group litigation. According to rule 48.6A(4), a group litigant is liable for the individual costs of his own claim. Any order for common costs against group litigants imposes on each group litigant liability for an equal proportion of the common costs, unless the court orders otherwise. Furthermore, a group litigant coming late to the group register may be held liable for a proportion of the costs incurred before his name is entered on the register.

2.64 Where the court makes an order about costs in relation to any application or hearing which involves one or more GLO issues, as well as issues relevant only to individual claims, the court will direct the proportion of the costs that is to relate to common costs and the proportion that is to relate to individual costs.

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88 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v David, Christine Addison & Ors [2003] EWHC 1730 (Comm) at para [14].
89 Civil Procedure Vol 1 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), at para 19.15.1.
90 “… (a) what should happen when an ‘acceptable’ offer to settle a lead or test case is made (beyond giving the court the discretion to order that another case might be substituted), and (b) what the court might do when a ‘global’ offer to settle the entire action is made, without the offeree specifying how the sum might be divided between the individual recipients …” Civil Procedure Vol 1 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), at para 19.15.1.
91 Practice Direction, 19BPD.15.1.
92 Practice Direction, 19BPD.15.2.
93 Rule 48.6A(3) and (4) CPR. “Common costs” is defined in rule 48.6A(2) as-(i) costs incurred in relation to the GLO issues;
(ii) individual costs incurred in a claim while it is proceeding as a test claim; and
(iii) costs incurred by the lead solicitor in administering the group litigation”.
94 Rule 48.6A(6) CPR.
95 Rule 48.6A(5) CPR. See also 19BPD.24 (16.2).
Other procedural matters

2.65 Section III of Part 19 of the CPR and Practice Direction 19B cannot be regarded as a comprehensive regime for conducting group actions because other provisions of the CPR also affect group litigation. For example, while Practice Direction 19BPD.14 provides some specific guidance on statements of case and particulars of claim in relation to group litigation, the general rules in rule 16.4 and Practice Direction (Statements of Case) still apply.

The Civil Justice Council's reform proposals

2.66 The Civil Justice Council (CJC) published its report on "Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions" (the report) in November 2008. It found that the existing procedure did not provide sufficient or effective access to justice for a wide range of citizens, particularly but not exclusively consumers, small businesses and employees wishing to bring collective or multi-party claims. There was overwhelming evidence that meritorious claims which could have been brought were currently not being pursued. The report found that the existing collective actions were effective in part, but could be improved considerably to promote better enforcement of citizens' rights, whilst protecting defendants from non-meritorious litigation. There was a good deal of evidence to support the proposition that some types of claim were better suited to resolution via an opt-in action whereas others were better suited to resolution through an opt-out action.

2.67 The CJC made 11 recommendations to the government and invited the Lord Chancellor to provide a formal response. The recommendations were:

"RECOMMENDATION 1

A generic collective action should be introduced. Individual and discrete collective actions could also properly be introduced in the wider civil context i.e., before the Competition Appeals Tribunal or the Employment Tribunal to complement the generic civil collective action.

RECOMMENDATION 2

Collective claims should be brought by a wide range of representative parties: individual representative claimants or defendants, designated bodies, and ad hoc bodies.

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96 Civil Procedure Vol 1 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), at para 19.9.9.
98 See above, p 145.
RECOMMENDATION 3

Collective claims may be brought on an opt-in or opt-out basis, subject to court certification (see Recommendation 4). Where an action is brought on an opt-out or opt-in basis the limitation period for class members should be suspended pending a defined change of circumstance.

RECOMMENDATION 4

No collective claim should be permitted to proceed unless it is certified by the court as being suitable to proceed as such. Certification should be subject to a strict certification procedure.

RECOMMENDATION 5

Appeals from either positive certification or a refusal to certify a claim should be subject to the current rules on permission to appeal from case management decisions. Equally, all other appeals brought within collective action proceedings should be subject to the normal appeal rules. Class members may seek to appeal final judgments and settlement approvals.

RECOMMENDATION 6

Collective claims should be subject to an enhanced form of case management by specialist judges. Such enhanced case management should be based on the recommendations of Mr Justice Aikens’ Working Party which led to the Complex Case Management Pilot currently in the Commercial Court.

RECOMMENDATION 7

Where a case is brought on an opt-out or opt-in basis, the court should have the power to aggregate damages in an appropriate case. The Civil Justice Council recommends that the Lord Chancellor conduct[s] a wider policy consultation into such a reform given that it effects both substantive and procedural law.

RECOMMENDATION 8

To protect the interest of the represented class of claimants any settlement agreed by the representative claimant and the defendant(s) must be approved by the court within a ‘Fairness Hearing’ before it can bind the represented class of claimants. In approving a settlement or giving judgment on a collective claim the court should take account of a number of issues in order to ensure that the represented class are given adequate opportunity [to] claim their share of the settlement or judgment.
RECOMMENDATION 9

There should be full costs shifting. 99

RECOMMENDATION 10

Unallocated damages from an aggregate award should be distributed by a trustee of the award according to general trust law principles. In appropriate cases such a cy-pres distribution could be made to a Foundation or Trust.

RECOMMENDATION 11

While most elements of a new collective action could be introduced by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, it is desirable that any new action be introduced by primary legislation. 100

Germany

2.68 It is possible for a large group of people to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants in an action under sections 59 to 63 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung). 101 There is also a trend to legislate to facilitate "interest-group complaints" (Verbandsklagen) asserted by recognised consumer and environmental "interest groups" (Verbände) on behalf of their members and the common interests with which they are associated. 102

2.69 Besides the interest-group complaints, it is worthwhile to note the recent enactment of the Act on Lead Cases of Private Investors (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz, KapMuG). Under sections 1 and 4 of the KapMuG, parties to an action for damages arising out of allegedly incorrect public information on public markets may request the trial of a lead case, provided that the questions at stake are relevant for other similar cases and the parties to at least 10 other cases also request a lead case treatment. The Higher Regional Court will decide upon precisely defined fundamental questions of fact and/or law common to the pending lawsuits in one sample proceeding, while all the other pending cases relating to the same public information are suspended. The final decision rendered in the lead case is binding upon all courts of first instance, regardless of whether a particular
plaintiff has actively participated in the lead case, or whether the individual case raised exactly the same issues that were dealt with in the lead case (section 16 of the KapMuG). There is no issue of an opt-in or opt-out mechanism: once the process is set up, it is autonomous and there is no need to opt in, nor is there any possibility to opt out. The judgment binds all. Plaintiffs who wish to benefit from the decision in the lead case must still file individual actions for damages. The legislation does not allow a claim to be brought in the name of an unidentified group of plaintiffs.¹⁰³ The KapMuG will remain in force for an initial trial period of five years, expiring on 1 November 2010, unless the legislature decides to extend this period.

2.70 A cardinal principle of the German civil justice system is that a litigant must come before the court individually so as to benefit from or be bound by the court's decision.¹⁰⁴ Thus, Germany has traditionally been unwilling to adopt any form of mass litigation, and does not have the Anglo-American type of "class action" or "group action".¹⁰⁵ It is argued that as the German social insurance and welfare system, which is funded in part by industry, already performs the restitutory role played by class actions in the United States, the American-style class action system is therefore not necessary in Germany.¹⁰⁶ The KapMuG provides an interesting example of a piece of legislation that attempts to reconcile the necessities of a mass procedure with the conflicting goal of paying due regard to the specifics of the individual case.¹⁰⁷

Ireland

2.71 There are two principal ways to pursue privately driven multi-party litigation in Ireland: (1) representative actions and (2) test cases.¹⁰⁸ Rule 9 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 sets out the procedure for representative actions:

"Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one cause or matter, one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may be authorised by the Court to defend, in such cause or matter, on behalf, or for the benefit, of all persons so interested."

¹⁰³ Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, (June 2007) "Class Actions and Third Party Funding of Litigation", at 28.
¹⁰⁴ Peter L Murray and Rolf Sturner, German Civil Justice (Carolina Academic Press, 2004), at 203.
¹⁰⁵ Peter L Murray and Rolf Sturner, German Civil Justice (Carolina Academic Press, 2004), at 203.
¹⁰⁶ Peter L Murray and Rolf Sturner, German Civil Justice (Carolina Academic Press, 2004), at 205.
¹⁰⁷ Dietmar Baetge, "Class Actions, Group Litigation & Other Forms of Collective Litigation in Germany" (report prepared from the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University, December 2007) at 31.
However, the following restrictions have been read into rule 9:  

(a) The remedies available are confined to injunctive and declaratory relief; damages may not be sought in a representative action.

(b) Because of the "same interest" requirement, very strict requirements have been read into the nature of the link that must exist between the parties to a representative action.

(c) Legal aid is not available in a representative action: section 28(9)(a)(ix) of the Civil Legal Aid Act 1995 excludes from the remit of civil legal aid any application "made by or on behalf of a person who is a member, and acting on behalf of a person who is a member, and acting on behalf, of a group of persons having the same interest in the proceedings concerned."

2.72 The combined effect of these restrictions is that rule 9 is of limited utility for most instances of multi-party litigation. Particularly restrictive is the unavailability of damages as a remedy. The Irish Law Reform Commission believes that with its parameters so strictly set, the representative action has remained an underused and largely overlooked means of dealing with the demands of multi-party litigation.

2.73 The nature of a test case is the application by analogy of the findings in one case to the facts of others. A test case may arise in two ways. The first is where a particular litigant's claim is chosen from a pool of similar actions as the most appropriate to be used as a test case. Under this approach, there is a degree of organisation among the prospective litigants. The second involves less coordination and is where the outcome of the "first" case to proceed provides guidance as to the outcome of subsequent cases. The "first" case will in effect operate as a test case. In either circumstance, the test case plaintiff acts solely in his own interest, and is not burdened by responsibilities or duties toward the rest of the pool.

2.74 Being more flexible than a representative action, the test case approach is more commonly used in Ireland. The Irish Law Reform Commission, however, pointed out that the test case approach has a number of problems. First, the court hearing the test case may not have an accurate picture as to the scope of the litigation in mind when arriving at a judgment. Plaintiffs in subsequent cases may not be able to secure the same amount of damages, even though they may have equally meritorious claims. Secondly, a defendant will need to face the uncertainty that there will be future

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claims and the possibility of a full set of costs for each of the claims. Thirdly, there will be duplication of the resources of both lawyers and the courts where there are multiple cases involving common issues. This is especially the case where different lawyers deal with different cases falling within the pool. In such circumstances, there will be duplication of work on the common issues and this will be reflected in the costs incurred. This may prove particularly costly where expert witnesses are involved.

2.75 In view of the deficiencies of the existing representative actions and the test case approach, the Irish Law Reform Commission recommended introducing a formal procedural structure to be set out in the Rules of Superior Courts to deal with instances of multi-party litigation (the Multi-Party Action). The Commission's detailed recommendations are as follows:

1. The proposals for multi-party litigation are based on the principles of procedural fairness for plaintiffs and defendants, procedural efficiency and access to justice, and are not to be considered as replacements for existing procedures, particularly the test case, but rather as providing an alternative procedure.

2. Judicial certification of a Multi-Party Action is to be considered a necessary preliminary step to the commencement of a Multi-Party Action.

3. There is no minimum number requirement for certification of a Multi-Party Action, but this would be a matter to be taken into account by the court when considering whether a Multi-Party Action offers a fair and efficient means of resolving the issues, both known and anticipated.

4. A case for which certification is sought should give rise to common issues of fact or law rather than be required to show strict commonality.

5. It is not necessary that common issues predominate over individual issues in a Multi-Party Action.

6. In deciding whether to certify proceedings as a Multi-Party Action, the court must be satisfied that a Multi-Party Action would be an appropriate, fair and efficient procedure in the circumstances.

7. At the certification stage, the court will determine a cut-off date beyond which entry on the register will require the authorisation of the court.

8. There should be provisions for defendant Multi-Party Actions.

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9. The new procedure would operate on an **opt-in basis**, subject only to a power vested in the court to oblige an action to be joined to an existing group.

10. **Pleadings** in a Multi-Party Action must disclose a cause of action.

11. A **representative or lead case** for a Multi-Party Action should be selected to litigate a specific issue which will fairly and adequately represent the interests of individual litigants in the Multi-Party Action. The number or need for lead cases is to be left to the discretion of the court.

12. A **single legal representative** is responsible for the management of the generic issue of the Multi-Party Action. Nomination of this representative may take place on the basis of a voluntary or judicial appointment and will require judicial approval. Separate legal representatives may be responsible for discrete issues within the group on either a sub-group or individual level.

13. Where individual litigants wish to **remove themselves from the register** after the filing of the defence, the authorisation of the court must first be sought.

14. The terms upon which a **settlement** would be accepted or rejected should be agreed by individual members of the group at the opt-in stage. The court should be made aware of the terms of this agreement at certification. The court will have the jurisdiction to set the terms of acceptance or rejection of the settlement only in exceptional circumstances.

15. The **Statute of Limitations** will not stop running against each claim until that case has been filed. This will be followed by judicially controlled entry onto the register.

16. **Costs** involved in the litigation of a generic issue of a Multi-Party Action are to be shared in equal measure as among the constituent members unless the court considers that in the interests of the particular case this rule should be varied. As a general rule, liability for the costs will be deemed to come under a scheme of joint and several liability.

17. The **Civil Legal Aid Act 1995** should be amended to make provision for the funding of an otherwise eligible group member for his proportion of any eventual costs order.

2.76 The Commission's recommendations have not yet been implemented by legislation.
Japan

2.77 The Japanese civil procedure system has its origin in the German system. As a general rule, civil law does not distinguish group rights from individual rights. Thus, it is inherently difficult to embrace the notion of a class action in civil law countries. Against this backdrop, Japan has not legislated for class actions. There are various reasons for the reluctance to introduce a class action system in Japan. Among them, three factors have been identified:

1. The Japanese legal system, especially the Civil Code-centred civil law system, is based on giving restitution for the damages suffered by the victim. The prevention and inhibition of damages is generally deemed to be an administrative issue and there is no general rule with regard to the application for injunction for group actions in the Civil Code. Besides, the punishment of the perpetrator and the maintenance of social order or the formation of social policies are regarded as penal or administrative issues which fall outside the civil law system.

2. The main mission of the civil law system is restitution for each person or legal person, as distinct entities, and both substantive and procedural theory are based on the identification of individual loss. It is difficult to create the concept of damages suffered by an entire victim group that takes into account the losses of potential parties who do not have specific claim or proof.

3. The role of lawyers in Japanese litigation is also based on individual entities and their rights. There are specific, individual rights that must be protected and lawyers are only expected to conduct litigation within that scope. Abstractly defined group or social interests are seen as an insufficient foundation for lawyers’ activities.

2.78 Discussions about whether class actions should form part of the Japanese justice system go back to at least the 1970s. Eventually, Japan

114 Carl F Goodman, *Justice and Civil Procedure in Japan* (Oceana Publications, Inc, 2004), at 414. See also 中村英郎著、陳剛、林劍鋒和郭美松譯：《新民事訴訟法講議》（早稻田大學日本法學叢書）(北京：法律出版社，2001)，第85頁 which states that the class action system is dispute resolution oriented and hence, is not compatible with the Japanese system which is regulatory oriented.

115 “The reality is that the rejection of class action in Japan probably has less to do with legal theory and more to do with industry objection to the class action idea. This objection is probably based on industry's understanding that class actions have resulted in substantial damage awards in the United States. Industry also knows that the class action device can be abused to obtain large legal fees from big corporations while class members receive little or no recovery. The abuses of the class action mechanism are well known in Japan.” Carl F Goodman, *Justice and Civil Procedure in Japan* (Oceana Publications, Inc, 2004), at 414.

decided not to adopt class actions. As a compromise, the original "representative action" mechanism (also known as the appointed party system), established in 1926, was strengthened in the 1996 amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure. The Japanese representative action has its roots in the English equity courts (specifically the bill of peace), despite the German origin of the Japanese civil procedure system.

2.79 Article 30(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a representative (or representatives) can be chosen as plaintiff or respondent from the group of people having common interests in the proceeding. A "represented party" (ie one who has chosen a representative) will be withdrawn from the proceeding as a party.117

2.80 After the reform of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1996, as long as a party with common interests has already initiated a proceeding, a party can select the party who has already initiated the proceeding to be his or her representative without filing a claim specifically for the purpose.118

2.81 As a result of amendments to the Consumer Contract Act in 2007, consumer groups can now take injunction proceedings on behalf of consumers in order to protect consumers' rights. Acts that are subject to injunctions include inappropriate solicitations targeted at an unidentified and large number of consumers and contractual clauses that would unjustly harm consumers' interests. Consumer groups may apply for injunctions against contracts that are entered into or may be entered into by consumers. The consumer groups that can apply for injunctions are called "qualified consumers groups" and must be certified by the Prime Minister in advance. Factors relevant to certification include a group's object, history and executive structure.119

2.82 It is believed that representative actions will not cause as much difficulty for Japanese industry and will not generate the same magnitude of damages and legal fees as the American class action.120 Representative actions have been hailed as a "useful middle ground between the class action and no action at all".121 Nevertheless, questions have been raised as to how often the amended representative action system will be invoked.122

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117 Ikuo Sugawara, "The Current Situation of Class Action in Japan" (report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University, December 2007) at 5.
118 Ikuo Sugawara, "The Current Situation of Class Action in Japan" (report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University, December 2007) at 6.
119 Ikuo Sugawara, "The Current Situation of Class Action in Japan" (report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University, December 2007) at 7.
122 中村英郎著，陳剛、林劍鋒和郭美松譯：《新民事訴訟法講義》（早稻田大學日本法學叢書）北京：法律出版社，2001，第84頁。Ikuo Sugawara stated that "In fact, this system has not been utilised even after the reform of the Code of Civil Procedures in 1998." See his report "The Current Situation of Class Action in Japan" (prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University, December 2007), at 6.
New Zealand

2.83 Unlike Australia and Canada, New Zealand does not have specific legislation devoted to class actions. Rule 78 of the New Zealand High Court Rules nonetheless amounts to a simplified version of Hong Kong's order 15 rule 12 in Hong Kong. It reads as follows:

"Where 2 or more persons have the same interest in the subject-matter of a proceeding, one or more of them may, with the consent of the other or others, or by direction of the Court on the application of any party or intending party to the proceeding, sue or be sued in such proceeding on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested."

A plaintiff that has obtained the consent of all the persons having the same interest in the subject matter of the proceedings can issue representative proceedings as of right.123 The persons being represented are bound by the judgment, even though they are not individually named as parties.

2.84 The Rules Committee of the Ministry of Justice of New Zealand is now working on the introduction of class action procedures to New Zealand. It is contemplated that there would be a high degree of judicial intervention from the outset of any legal proceedings, including the decision as to whether class action proceedings are to be opt-in or opt-out. Such a wide power cannot be found among the various class action regimes elsewhere. According to the minutes of the Rules Committee,124 a draft bill has been prepared and considered by the Rules Committee but is not yet public at this stage.

People's Republic of China (the Mainland)

2.85 Matters concerning the institution of class actions are provided for under the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC (中華人民共和國民事訴訟法)125 (CPL) and the Opinion of the Supreme People's Court on the Several Questions Concerning the Application of the "Civil Procedure Law of the PRC" (最高人民法院關於適用〈中華人民共和國民事訴訟法〉若干問題的意見)126 (the SPC Opinion). The provisions on class actions under the CPL and the SPC Opinion have not been amended since their promulgation in

123 Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Service 39, as at 21 April 2005), Vol 5 Civil Procedure: High Court, at para 69.
124 The minutes can be found at: http://www.courtsnz.govt.nz/about/system/rules_committee/meetings.html (last accessed on 25 August 2008).
125 Adopted at the 4th Session of the 7th NPC on 9 April 1991, effective as of the same date.
126 Promulgated by the Supreme People's Court on 14 July 1992, effective as of the same date.
Meaning of class action

2.86 Article 55 of the CPL has specific provisions for an action in which the subject matter of the claims is of the same category, and there is a large but uncertain number of persons comprising one of the parties at the commencement of the action. Academics generally regard the action specified under this article as a "class action". 128

2.87 According to Article 59 of the SPC Opinion, the reference to "the number of persons comprising one of the parties is large" under Article 55 of the CPL means "more than ten persons". In other words, if one of the parties has more than ten persons in an action concerning the same subject matter, a "class action" may be instituted under Article 55 of the CPL.

Issuance of public notice by the People's Court

2.88 Under Article 55 of the CPL, the People's Court may issue a public notice stating the claims and particulars of the class action to inform those who are entitled to participate in the action to register their rights with the People's Court within a specified period of time. The People's Court has the discretion to decide whether a public notice should be issued under Article 55 of the CPL. The People's Court has decided that in a case under Article 55, the People's Court "may" issue a public notice and is not obliged to do so in every case. Article 63 of the SPC Opinion stipulates that the period of the notice will be determined according to the facts of the case but that period will not be less than 30 days.

According to Michael Palmer and Chao Xi "Collective and Representative Actions in China" (report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University, December 2007), at 2, under the CPL, there are broadly three types of "collective suits". These are "non-representative group litigation" (Article 53 of the CPL), "representative group litigation in which the number of litigants is fixed" at the time the case is filed (Article 54 of the CPL) and "representative group litigation in which the number of litigants is not fixed" at the time the case is filed (Article 55 of the CPL). The following paragraphs will focus on the provisions of Article 55 of the CPL.

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129 梁書文：《民事訴訟法適用意見新釋》(法制出版社)，第104頁；and唐德華(主編)：《新民事訴訟法條文釋義》(人民法院出版社)，第106-107頁。

130 “……人民法院可以發出公告，說明案件情況和訴訟請求，通知權利人在一定期間向人民法院登記……”。

131 梁書文：《民事訴訟法適用意見新釋》(法制出版社)，第110頁。

132 The case was not reported but was discussed and commented in an article: 吳飛："從清華‘200卡’案件談中國集團訴訟"《法學》，1999年第10期，第60-64頁。In this case, twenty-two university students claimed damages against 中國郵電電信管理總局、北京市郵電電信管理總局 and 湖北省郵電電信管理總局 for failure to provide services. The plaintiffs applied to the Xicheng District People's Court of Beijing for the issuance of a public notice under Article 55 of the CPL to inform other victims to register their claims.

133 “……公告期限據具體案件的情況確定，最少不得少於三十日”。

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2.89 The CPL and SPC Opinion do not provide for the manner in which the public notice should be issued. It has, however, been suggested that the public notice may be issued in the following ways:

(a) by posting on the notice board of the People’s Court which is located within the district where the parties in the case reside;

(b) by posting within the district where the parties in the case reside; or

(c) by publication in newspapers. 134

2.90 Apart from the provisions relating to the issuance of a public notice in a class action by the People’s Court, the CPL and the SPC Opinion do not provide for how a class action may be commenced by the parties involved.

Registration of the parties to a class action

2.91 According to Article 55 of the CPL, the purpose of the public notice issued by the People’s Court is to notify those who are entitled to participate in the class action to register their rights with the court. Article 64 of the SPC Opinion stipulates that the registering persons should prove to the court their legal relationship with the opponent party in the action and the damage suffered. 135

2.92 It is believed that under Article 64 of the SPC Opinion a registering person merely has to produce evidence to prove the bare fact that his rights have been damaged. 136 Article 64 further provides that if the person fails to prove these matters, the court should not register him. He may, however, commence a separate action. 137

Appointment of representatives

2.93 Members of a class may elect representatives (代表人) to act on their behalf to conduct the action under Article 55, which also stipulates:

"Those who have registered their rights with the People’s Court may elect representatives to proceed with the action; if no representatives have been elected, the People’s Court may decide the representatives in consultation with those who have
registered their rights with the court.  

2.94 If no representative has been chosen after consultation, Article 61 of the SPC Opinion provides that the People's Court may designate representatives among the parties to the case. The CPL and the SPC Opinion, however, have not set out the criteria and procedure for the election or designation of representatives.

2.95 According to Article 62 of the SPC Opinion, the number of representatives under Article 55 is restricted to two to five persons, and under Article 58 of the CPL, each representative may appoint one to two persons as their "agents ad litem".

Authority of the representatives

2.96 Article 55 of CPL stipulates that the acts of a representative in a class action bind the persons he represents. However, if a representative modifies or waives the claims, admits the claims of the other party or settles with the other party, the representative should first obtain the consent of the persons he represents.

Effect of the judgment

2.97 Under Article 55 of the CPL and Article 64 of the SPC Opinion, judgment in a class action binds persons who have registered their rights with the court. According to Article 55(4), the judgment will also be used to adjudicate the cases of those who have not registered their rights but institute legal proceedings in the People's Court within the limitation period.

Costs

2.98 Generally speaking, a party who files a civil case with the People's Court needs to pay the prescribed "court costs" (案件受理費) (excluding lawyers' fees) under Article 107 of the CPL. However, Article 129 of the SPC Opinion provides that parties to cases under Article 55 of the CPL are not required to pay court costs in advance, and the costs will be paid by the losing party after the conclusion of the case according to the amount of the
subject matter of the action.\textsuperscript{143}

2.99 As regards lawyer's fees, the "loser pays" costs system that makes the losing party in the litigation pay some or all of the winning party's legal expenses does not exist. Chinese courts generally leave each side responsible for its own lawyer's fees, regardless of who wins.\textsuperscript{144}

2.100 Under Article 130 of the SPC Opinion, where people who have not registered their rights but institute legal proceedings within the limitation period apply for execution of the judgment made under Article 55, they are required to pay the "fee for the application for execution" in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Provisions on the Collection of Fees for Litigation in the People's Court (人民法院訴訟收費辦法).\textsuperscript{145}

2.101 Article 12 of the 2006 Measures on Lawyer's Fees prohibits contingency fees in collective actions and the lawyers are not allowed to receive fees that involve a percentage of the net recovery of proceeds.\textsuperscript{146}

Other procedures

2.102 Apart from the relevant articles in the CPL and SPC Opinion discussed above, there seems to be no other specific provision on class actions. There are some court decisions invoking Article 55, but they have not fleshed out the procedures for class actions.\textsuperscript{147} Hence, it appears that the general provisions on civil procedures, primarily in the CPL and the SPC Opinion, would also govern the practice and procedure of class actions.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{143} Michael Palmer and Chao Xi "Collective and Representative Actions in China" (report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University, December 2007) at 15.

\textsuperscript{144} The reported cases recorded in the國家法規數據庫 (operated by國家信息中心) are:

(i) 景連喜等51戶蝦農訴中晨公司等在建港吹填作業中回水污染其養殖水源損害賠償案;

(ii) 程學文等146戶養殖戶訴焦作市糧油運輸綜合公司富達養殖廠利用虛假廣告誘使簽訂的合同無效糾紛案;

(iii) 周迪武等34人訴衡陽市飛龍股份有限公司按原定優先股股利支付股息糾紛案;

(iv) 陳百謙、秋里煥等832人訴哈爾濱市道里區太平鎮人民政府購銷玉米糾紛案；and

(v) 劉先鋒等44戶農民認為鹽亭縣黃甸鎮人民政府違法加重農民負擔案.

\textsuperscript{145} There are other laws and regulations which govern specific areas of the practice and procedures of civil cases, for example, Supreme People's Court's Regulation on Evidence in Civil Cases (promulgated on 1 April 2002).
Singapore

2.103 Like New Zealand, there is no Australian or Canadian style legislation on class actions in Singapore. Order 15 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court made under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322), which is identical to the Hong Kong Order 15 Rule 12, governs representative proceedings. It appears that the representative proceedings procedure has rarely been used. In the period from 2003 to 2007, there was only one reported case involving representative proceedings pursuant to Order 15 Rule 12: *Tan Chin Seng & Others v Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd.*

2.104 The Committee to Develop the Singapore Legal Sector considered that the scope of the existing rule of representative proceedings was limited. The committee therefore recommended that consideration be given to allowing class actions in appropriate categories of cases in Singapore. The committee was of the view that class actions could be used as a tool to enhance access to justice in instances where a large number of persons had been adversely affected by another's conduct and the total amount at issue was significant but each individual's loss might be insufficient to make it commercially viable for that individual to attempt to vindicate his rights alone. But the committee also recognised that the class action procedure might be abused if it were implemented without appropriate limits or control. The Government has accepted in principle the committee's recommendations.

South Africa

2.105 In the opinion of the South African Law Commission, the South African law of standing has traditionally been relatively restrictive: the courts have required a personal, sufficient, and direct interest before a litigant is accorded standing in court. The Commission believes that class actions (as well as public interest actions) are part of the global movement to make

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149 [2002] SGHC 278 (High Court); [2003] 3 SLR 307 (Court of Appeal) See further, Professor Jeffrey Pinsler (2007) "Responses to Questions on Class Actions and Group Litigation", country report submitted to the Globalization of Class Actions Conference.

150 Final Report of the Committee to Develop the Singapore Legal Sector (September 2007), at para 3.28.


152 Final Report of the Committee to Develop the Singapore Legal Sector, cited above, at para 3.20.


155 The Commission proposed in the report (at page 24) to define "public interest action" as "an action instituted by a representative in the interest of the public generally, or in the interest of a section of the public, but not necessarily in that representative's own interest. Judgment of the court in respect of a public interest action shall not be binding (res judicata) on the persons in
access to justice a reality. If the traditional requirement of standing is strictly adhered to, public spirited individuals would not be able to claim relief in the public interest or in the interests of other people who are unable to enforce their rights. The South African Law Commission therefore recommended enacting new legislation for class actions. According to the Commission's 2007-2008 Annual Report, the Commission's report on class actions was submitted to the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development in September 1998 and it was under consideration. The Commission's proposals in respect of class actions are as follows.

1. "Class action" should mean an action instituted by a representative on behalf of a class of persons in respect of whom the relief claimed and the issues involved are substantially similar in respect of all members of the class, and which action is certified as a class action in terms of the Act.

2. The person commencing the class action or the person appointed as a representative in the class action should not need to be a member of the class. Only suitable persons should be appointed as representatives as the quality of the representative may be relevant. The person who brings the application for certification should be able to request the court to appoint him or another person (with that person's prior consent) to be the representative. Before the court appoints a representative, it would have to be satisfied that the contemplated action is a bona fide class action. The court could dismiss a representative on good cause shown.

3. A preliminary application to court should be brought requesting leave to institute or defend an action as a class action. An application for certification as a class action could be granted by the court where:

   (a) there was an identifiable class of persons;
   (b) a cause of action was disclosed;
   (c) there were issues of fact or law which were common to the class;
   (d) a suitable representative was available;

whose interest the action is brought." A discussion of the problems in relation to the application of standing rule in public interest action under Article 38 of the Constitution of South Africa can be found in Clive Plasket, "Representative Standing in South African Law", (report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University, December 2007). The discussion in the following paragraphs in this paper will focus on the Commission's proposals in respect of class actions.
(e) the interests of justice so required; and

(f) the class action was the appropriate method of proceeding with the action.

4. The court hearing the application for certification as a class action is to have the power to give directions as to the appropriate court in which the action should be commenced.

5. Notice to class members and prospective class members should always be given as a general rule. The proposed legislation should deal with the issues of when, by whom, to whom, and how notice should be given. The court is to have the discretion to make opt-in, opt-out or no notice orders. The court would have to consider, in all cases, whether notice of the application for certification should be given to all persons eligible to be a class member.

6. Initially, only the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Constitutional Court, the High Courts, the Land Claims Court, and Labour Court would be allowed to adjudicate class actions. Eventually, class actions would be allowed to be instituted in any court. The authorities empowered to make rules for the courts are to prescribe appropriate procedure for the courts.

7. The court would be able to order that a class action no longer proceed as such if any of the criteria for certification were no longer satisfied at any time after a certification order had been granted.

8. As part of the certification process, the court should be asked for directions as to procedure. The court is to have a wide discretion to determine its own procedures.

9. The court is to have broad general management powers exercisable either on the court's own motion, or on the application of a party or class member.

10. The proposed legislation is to define the term "common issues". Common issues are to be determined together, while issues requiring the participation of individual class members are to be determined individually. The court should not refuse to authorise a class action merely because there are issues pertaining to any claim which would require individual determination or different relief was sought for different class members.

11. Prior court approval is to be required for settlement, discontinuance or abandonment of a class action.

12. The court is to have the discretion to make an order in respect of
the binding effect of its judgment on the class members.

13. The court would be able to make an aggregate assessment or individual assessments of the amount of damages to be awarded. The court would be able to appoint a commissioner to assist the court in this respect. Where the court makes an aggregate assessment, it should give directions regarding distribution of the award to class members and could, if appropriate, require the defendant to distribute the award directly to the class members. The proposed legislation is to have provisions on the aggregate assessment of monetary awards and the disposal of any undistributed residue of an aggregate award.

14. The decision to certify an action as a class action would be only the first step in the proceedings and would not be subject to appeal, while non-certification of an action as a class action would be subject to appeal. Where a representative does not appeal, another member of the class could appeal with leave of the court.

15. The court is to retain its discretion to apply the general rule that costs follow the result. Unless there are special circumstances, the court should not order the representative to provide security for costs. The court would be able to certify a class action on condition that the Legal Aid Board granted the necessary funds or indemnified the defendant for his costs. Opting-in class members could be ordered to contribute towards costs and, if appropriate, to provide security for costs.

16. Subject to the Contingency Fees Act, a legal practitioner could make an arrangement with the representative for the payment of fees, disbursements or both only in the event of success.

17. The existing Legal Aid Board should be utilised as the mechanism to provide legal aid to indigent litigants in class actions.

18. The certification of an action as a class action is to suspend limitation periods for all class members until the member opts out, the member is excluded from the class, or the action is decertified, dismissed, abandoned, discontinued or settled.

Taiwan

2.106 A group litigation system in Taiwan was provided for in the Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure following its amendment in 2003. The system comprises of charitable associations acting under the representative party system (Article 44-1 of the Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure) (TCCP), the joining-in representative party system (Article 44-2 of the TCCP) and the
association's suit for injunction relief (Article 44-3 of the T CCP).

2.107 Under Article 44-1 of the T CCP, multiple parties with a common interest who are members of the same incorporated charitable association may, to the extent permitted by the association's purpose as prescribed in its bylaws, appoint that association as an appointed party to sue on their behalf. The representative parties may conduct all acts of litigation for the appointing parties in principle, provided however that the appointing parties may restrict the representative party's authority to abandon claims, admit claims, voluntarily dismiss the action or settle the case (Article 44 of the T CCP). Judgment in litigation brought by the representative parties is binding on the appointed parties (Article 401(2) of the T CCP).

2.108 In 2003, Article 44-2 of the T CCP was added to establish the joining-in representative parties system in Taiwan. Under the existing provision, when multiple parties (whose common interests have arisen from the same public nuisance, traffic accident, product defect, or the same transaction or occurrence of any kind) appoint one or more persons from themselves in accordance with the provisions of Article 41 to sue for the same category of legal claims, the court may, with the consent of the appointed party, or upon the original appointed party's motion which the court considers appropriate, publish a notice to the effect that other persons with the same common interests may join the action by filing a pleading within a designated period of time.

2.109 The strength of Taiwan's joining-in representative party system is said to be that it respects the parties' choice, disposition or the decision to participate in a procedure. Whether to make use of the joining-in representative party system is left to the parties' decision as they weigh their substantive as well as procedural interests. The system also respects the parties' concern for their procedural interests by allowing the parties to decline appointment by other parties with common interests.160

2.110 Pursuant to Article 44-3 of the T CCP, an incorporated charitable association or a foundation may, with the permission of its competent authority and to the extent permitted by the purposes prescribed in its bylaws, initiate an action for injunctive relief prohibiting specific acts of a person who has violated the interests of the majority concerned. The Judicial Yuan and Administrative Yuan have promulgated "Regulation of Permission and Supervision of Bringing the Lawsuit for Injunction by Incorporated Charitable Association and Foundation" to regulate the permission procedure and standard for the competent authority. The Regulation sets out requirements imposed on the charitable association and foundation, including the length of time since their establishment, the number of members, the amount of assets, interest affected by the alleged illegal action, etc. The characteristic of this system is said to

160 Kuan-Ling Shen and Alex, Yuen-Ping Yang, "Multi-Party Proceedings in Taiwan: Representative and Group Actions", report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University, December 2007, at 12.
be the protection of public interest and collective interest without having multiple parties to each commence legal actions. It is necessary to grant directly a charitable association or foundation the power to prosecute a suit by law in order to maintain the public interest and collective interest.\textsuperscript{161}

**United States of America: federal regime**

*Prerequisites to a class action*

2.111 Rule 23 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FR CP), which governs class actions in federal courts, dates back to 1938, and has operated in its present form since 1966.\textsuperscript{162} A class action is defined as an action in which "one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all." \textsuperscript{163}

2.112 Rule 23(a) provides that the prerequisites to a class action are that:

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(1)] the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
\item[(2)] there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
\item[(3)] the claims or defences of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defences of the class, and
\item[(4)] the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
\end{enumerate}

2.113 Rule 23(b) imposes an additional requirement and provides that a class action may be maintained provided that one of the three conditions there is satisfied. The first is that separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications which would establish contradictory standards of conduct for the defendant, or that adjudications in respect of some individuals would adversely affect the interests of other class members not parties to the

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\textsuperscript{161} Kuan-Ling Shen and Alex, Yuen-Ping Yang, "Multi-Party Proceedings in Taiwan: Representative and Group Actions", reported prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University, December 2007, at 19.

\textsuperscript{162} Although rule 23 only applies to class actions sought in federal courts, most states now have a class action mechanism more or less similar to the post-1966 version of rule 23. To avoid diversity in class action law and practice and to avoid the potential for a single class action filed in one state to affect citizens residing across its border, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-2) was enacted in 2005. Under the Act, defendants of class actions filed in state courts now have the ability to have their cases transferred to federal district courts for processing if any of the parties (including individual class members) are citizens of different states and if the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds US$5 million (Nicholas M Pace, "Class Actions in the United States of America: An Overview of the Process and the Empirical Literature", report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University, December 2007, at 2-3.)

\textsuperscript{163} FR CP 23(a).
adjudications (rule 23(b)(1)). The second is that the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole (rule 23(b)(2)).

2.114 The third condition is the one most commonly applied. This is that the court finds that questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over issues affecting only individuals, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the matter. In determining whether a class action satisfies the third condition, rule 23(b)(3) continues to provide that "matters pertinent to the findings" include:

"(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defence of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against any members of the class;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;

(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action."

Certification of a class action

2.115 Pursuant to rule 23(c)(1)(A), a class action must be certified by the court "at an early practicable time". The order certifying the action must define the class and the class claims, issues or defences, and must appoint the class counsel. According to rule 23(c)(1)(C), an order may be altered or amended before final judgment.

Notice

2.116 For any class certified under rule 23(b)(1) or (2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the class (rule 23(c)(2)(A)). For any class certified under rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood language:

- the nature of the action,
- the definition of the class certified,
- the class claims, issues, or defenses,

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FR CP 23(c)(1)(B).
that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the member so desires,

that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded, and

the binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule 23(c)(3)".

Subclasses

2.117 Under rule 23(c)(4), an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues. Alternatively, a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass can be treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule will then be construed and applied accordingly.

Wide powers of the courts

2.118 Rule 23 gives the courts wide power in relation to the proceedings of the courts. Rule 23(d) sets out the orders a court may make to govern the conduct of the action for the purposes of:

"(1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument;

(2) requiring, for the protection of class members or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice is to be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;

(3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors;

(4) requiring that the pleadings are to be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly;

(5) dealing with similar procedural matters.

The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to
time."

Settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise

2.119 Rule 23(e) refers to the powers given to a court to govern any settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise which occurs in the proceeding. Any form of settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise of claims, issues or defences must be approved by the court, and the court may do so only after a hearing and on finding that the settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise is fair, reasonable, and adequate.166 The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise (rule 23(e)(1)(B)). Under rule 23(e)(4)(A), any class member may object to a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise.

Judgment

2.120 Rule 23(c)(3) provides that a judgment in a class action under rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, will apply to those whom the court finds to be members of the class. A judgment in a class action under rule 23(b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, will apply to those to whom the notice was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.

Appeals

2.121 Under rule 23(f), a court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class action certification if an application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.

Class counsel

2.122 The court that certifies a class action must also appoint a class counsel167 and must assess, inter alia, whether the attorney appointed will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.168 The court may direct potential class counsel to provide information on any subject pertinent to the appointment and to propose terms for attorney fees and non-taxable costs, and may make further orders in connection with the appointment (rule 23(g)(1)(C)). An attorney appointed to serve as class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class (rule 23(g)(1)(B)). The order appointing class counsel may include provisions about the award of attorney

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166 FR CP 23(e)(1).
167 FR CP 23(g)(1)(A).
168 FR CP 23(g)(1)(B) and (C). In appointing class counsel, the court must also consider:
  * the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action,
  * counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in the action,
  * counsel's knowledge of the applicable law, and
  * the resources counsel will commit to representing the class.
fees or non-taxable costs under rule 23(h).169

Attorney fees award

2.123 Under rule 23(h), the court may award reasonable attorney fees and non-taxable costs authorized by law or by agreement of the parties. A claim for an award of attorney fees and non-taxable costs must be made by motion at a time set by the court. A class member, or a party from whom payment is sought, may object to the motion. The court may refer issues related to the amount of the award to a special master or to a magistrate judge.

169 FR CP 23(g)(2)(C).
Chapter 3

The need for the introduction of a class action regime

Introduction

3.1 In this Chapter we consider more closely whether there is a need for the introduction of a class action regime in Hong Kong. We have considered the choice of different models for group litigation in the light of the following overall policy objectives:

(a) the civil justice process should be made more accessible to plaintiffs who are able to bring deserving claims. The Ontario Law Reform Commission spoke of "the goal of permitting the advancement of meritorious claims which have heretofore been uneconomical to pursue because the damages for each individual plaintiff would be too small for each claimant to recover through usual court procedure." Lord Woolf spoke of providing "access to justice where large numbers of people have been affected by another's conduct, but individual loss is so small that it makes an individual action economically unviable."

(b) the civil justice process should facilitate the binding resolution of civil disputes and thereby eliminate the need to revisit issues or claims in separate proceedings. This principle embodies the idea that defendants should not have to spend money or face adverse publicity as a result of a multitude of potential legal actions. As the Alberta Law Reform Institute pointed out: "[t]he principle [also] encompasses the idea that, where plaintiffs are able to make out a recognized cause of action, the civil justice system should provide defendants with an opportunity to make their defence in a proceeding in which the rules are known, and the results can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty, obtained within a reasonable length of time and limited in costs."

(c) the civil justice system should promote judicial efficiency. A court could certify a class action to give all persons affected an opportunity to be heard and to produce a uniform and binding

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judgment. The Ontario Law Reform Commission spoke of "the goal of resolving a large number of disputes in which there are common issues of fact or law within a single proceedings to avoid inconsistent results, and prevent the court's resources from being overwhelmed by a multiplicity of proceedings" and of "an economy of scale" that can come from "permitting a representative plaintiff to sue for damages for an entire class."  

3.2 These policy objectives are also reflected in the underlying objectives outlined in the Civil Justice Reform proposals as follows:  

"(i) increasing the cost-effectiveness of the court's procedures;  
(ii) encouraging economies and proportionality in the way cases are mounted and tried;  
(iii) the expeditious disposal of cases;  
(iv) greater equality between parties;  
(v) facilitating settlement; and  
(vi) distributing the court's resources fairly  
always recognizing that the primary aim of case management is to secure the just resolution of the parties' dispute in accordance with their substantive rights."

Benefit to plaintiffs

Improved access to justice

3.3 Access to justice is regarded as the "cornerstone of class proceedings". According to Rachael Mulheron, the author of "The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems, a Comparative Perspective", the notion "access to justice" has several aspects. First, a class action regime can arm the substantive law with teeth. Sophisticated jurisprudence on tort or contract alone will not help much if the legal system is short of practical and economical ways to enforce deserving claims. J Prichard explains the relationship between class actions and the substantive law as follows:

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7 Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Class Proceedings (1999), MAN LRC REP 100, at 23.
"In the absence of effective procedural mechanisms for pursuing legitimate and legally cognizable claims, the full meaning of our substantive law can never be known. Thus, both common law and statutory statements of our legal rights are often illusory in that they may generate high expectations that are subsequently dashed on the rocks of procedural barriers."

3.4 The second aspect is to overcome cost-related hurdles. The combined effect of the cost of litigation and the restricted availability of legal aid in civil cases discourages people from seeking redress through litigation, especially when the claims are small in amount. A single plaintiff's claim may not be economically viable to pursue because of the costs involved, but the aggregate claims of the plaintiff class may become substantial enough to justify the potential costs. The third aspect is to narrow down the disparity between the parties, especially when a plaintiff is a single litigant or consumer claiming against a governmental body or a wealthy multinational corporation which is backed by an insurance company, with the benefit of tax deductibility for expenses incurred in defending the claim. HB Newberg observes,

"[class members] gain a more powerful adversarial posture than they would have through individual litigation [and this] serves to balance a currently imbalanced adversarial structure, in which large defendants with sufficient economic means are able to enjoy an overwhelming advantage against parties with small individual claims."

3.5 Apart from economic considerations, there are other barriers to the commencement of legal proceedings which a class action regime can help overcome:

"Empirical evidence from Australia and overseas indicates that factors such as fear of sanctions from employers or others in a position to take reprisals; fear of involvement in the legal system; and ignorance of their legal rights prevent injured persons from taking the legal measures, such as litigation, which enforcement of their rights entails. These persons 'could be assisted to remedy if one member of a group, all similarly affected, could commence proceedings on behalf of all members.'"

3.6 We therefore think that there is much to commend the Manitoba Law Reform Commission's view that "a modern class proceedings regime operates to ensure the widest possible access to justice for people who have suffered losses as the result of someone else's fault, particularly where those

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losses are not large enough in financial terms to justify involvement in the expensive process of litigation.”

**Benefit to defendants**

**Avoiding multiple related lawsuits**

3.7 A class action regime can spare defendants repetitive proceedings involving similar (or even identical) issues by resolving those issues in one single trial. This will save defendants the time, cost and inconvenience expended in defending multiple related, similar or identical claims, which may stretch over long periods of time in different jurisdictions. The Ontario Law Reform Commission noted,

“Class actions aggregating individually recoverable claims, are beneficial not only to plaintiffs, but also to defendants, since such actions reduce defence costs by eliminating the need to assert common defences in each individual suit.”

**Finality of disputes and early opportunity of closure**

3.8 To defendants, a class action regime is advantageous because it could lead to finality and class-wide resolution of disputes, preferably through settlement. This is because rulings or settlement agreements on common issues bind all class members. The Alberta Law Reform Institute noted in its report,

“Rather than waiting for individual claims to pile up, corporate defendants can clean up their liabilities in one proceeding, without risking inconsistent decisions or facing multiple lawsuits in numerous jurisdictions.”

Defendants welcome class-wide settlement, and may even favour as broad a definition of the class as possible so as to bind class members definitively and cap liability exposure.

**Negotiated certification**

3.9 The Alberta Law Reform Institute endorsed the views of an Ontario defence counsel that a negotiated certification could provide defence counsel with the chance of influencing the nature of the class, limiting the

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14 DR Hensler, NM Pace, B Dombey-Moore, E Giddens and J Gross, EK Moller, *Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain* (Santa Monica, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 2000), at 410 and 402.
claims and establishing an expeditious and cost-effective way for resolving the claims of the class members.¹⁵

Benefit to society

Increased judicial economy

3.10 A class action regime can enable the court to deal with claims involving common issues of fact or law within a single proceeding, instead of determining the claims individually. This is particularly true where it would be viable to litigate the claims individually. This collective approach will save scarce judicial resources from being used for repetitive proceedings involving similar or identical issues, for example, by obviating the need for re-hearing witnesses’ testimonies in different proceedings. This is especially relevant in the modern world:

"as we become an increasingly mass producing and mass consuming society, one product or service with a flaw has the potential to injure or cause other loss to more and more people."¹⁶

The US Supreme Court stated that class actions could promote "the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure".¹⁷ In addition, most class actions settle before trial,¹⁸ and class actions can bring about early settlement.

3.11 However, a class action regime does not necessarily promote judicial economy in all respects.¹⁹ According to some empirical analysis, class actions consume more judicial resources than typical civil cases.²⁰ Nevertheless, if separately recoverable claims are to be litigated individually, the hearings would be duplicative and cumulatively more consumptive of judicial resources.²¹


¹⁷ General Telephone Co of Southwest v Falcon 457 US 147, 159, 102 S Ct 2364 (1982).

¹⁸ The Federal Judicial Centre undertook a study of all class actions (except mass tort class actions) terminated between 1 July 1992 and 30 June 1994 in four federal district courts. Less than 4% of class actions filed went to trial: TE Willging, LL Hooper and J Niemic, Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (1996).


Enhancement of justice

3.12 The Alberta Law Reform Institute observed that a class action regime could enhance justice in various ways. First, greater access to justice can be attained, and society will be more just. Secondly, different or even inconsistent rulings on similar or identical claims brought by plaintiffs in separate actions can be avoided. Thirdly, judges in class actions can, by way of case management, reduce areas of dispute and increase the likelihood of reaching a fair and equitable ruling.

Deterrence of wrongdoing (behaviour modification)

3.13 A class action regime can have the effect of deterring potential wrongdoers, such as corporations or governmental bodies, from committing wrongful acts, and prompting them to have a stronger sense of obligation to the public. This is achieved by "making it feasible for victims to recover damages from wrongdoers who were previously insulated from having to account for their wrongs because of economic and other barriers to individual proceedings". The underlying philosophy is that:

"the function of a legal system is not limited to its role in providing individuals with a mechanism by which to resolve disputes and redress grievances. Law also serves as a standard of the conduct which the community or the society expects from its members and by the same token, the judicial system should provide realistic sanctions which the community can invoke in order to enforce obedience to its prescribed values and rules of conduct. It seems clear, therefore, that if sellers and manufacturers are, for whatever reason, in practical effect immune from the sanctions of the present legal structure with respect to some claims which might be brought against them, the community has to that extent lost its ability to compel obedience to the standards of conduct it has established."

3.14 The US judiciary, including the Supreme Court, also recognises the deterrence function of class litigation. It has been observed that one effect of a class action regime is to prompt corporations to pay more attention

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to their financial and employment practices, and manufacturers to think twice about their product design decisions.\textsuperscript{27}

3.15 In contrast, the Scottish Law Commission stated that the "sole proper object" of a civil action, including a multi-party proceeding, was "to obtain compensation". \textsuperscript{28} The Commission believed that behaviour modification should be achieved by reforming substantive law or by introducing regulatory regimes with criminal penalties, rather than by reforming court procedures. Similarly, the Australian Law Reform Commission also said that the deterrent effect on behaviour was only incidental to the main goal of facilitating access to justice.\textsuperscript{29}

### Principle and consistency

3.16 In Rachael Mulheron's opinion, a class action regime can provide another advantage to plaintiffs, defendants and the courts: procedural certainty at the outset.\textsuperscript{30} Before advising his clients, a lawyer needs to evaluate whether commencing a class action is appropriate for the circumstances. A set of concrete rules on class actions can facilitate lawyers' evaluation. The Alberta Law Reform Institute also noted, 

"the civil justice system should provide defendants with an opportunity to make their defence in a proceeding in which the rules are known".\textsuperscript{31}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} DR Hensler, NM Pace, B Dombey-Moore, E Giddens, J Gross, EK Moller, \textit{Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain} (Santa Monica, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 2000), at 50, ch 15, section 4, and Table 15-16.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Australian Law Reform Commission, \textit{Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court} (Report No 46, 1988), at para 323. See also Alberta Law Reform Institute, \textit{Class Actions} (Memorandum No 9, 2000), at paras 116 and 118: "While agreeing that increased judicial economy would benefit society, persons who question the wisdom of class actions reform reminded us that it is important to consider the many interests that require balancing. These interests include the need to balance the costs of litigating class actions against the benefits to the class. ... With respect to the deterrence of wrongdoing, they point out that mechanisms such as consumer protection legislation already discipline companies in the market place. They argue that the regulatory enforcement of corporate conduct is a matter for government, not the courts, and that this is particularly so in consumer cases in which each class member claims a small loss but the sum of the losses is huge. The argument, in effect, is that these cases should not be litigated at all. They suggest that a better solution might be to reverse the trend toward enforcement through private action by bolstering government regulation. Governments have access to a wide spectrum of information and to experts who can make decisions based on sound economic opinion whereas courts are limited to the evidence before them and therefore don't see the 'world view.' They make the further point that problems involving many individual differences, as was the situation with respect to the leaky condos in Vancouver, are not helped by class actions and may be better dealt with through increased government regulation."
\item \textsuperscript{31} Alberta Law Reform Institute, \textit{Class Actions} (Memorandum No 9, 2000), at para 15.
\end{itemize}
The Supreme Court of Canada looked at this from the judiciary's angle:

"While it would have been possible for courts to accommodate moderately complicated class actions by reliance on their own inherent power over procedure, this would have required courts to advise ad hoc solutions to procedural complexities on a case-by-case basis. ... The Class Proceedings Act, 1992, was adopted to ensure that the courts had a procedural tool sufficiently refined to allow them to deal efficiently, and on a principled rather than ad hoc basis, with the increasingly complicated cases of the modern era."\(^{32}\)

3.17 In addition, a class action regime can enhance consistency of rulings on similar or identical claims:

"[a class action regime] protects defendants from inconsistent obligations that may be created by varying results in different courts, and similarly, it promotes the equitable principle that similarly situated plaintiffs should receive similar recoveries."\(^{33}\)

Potential risks of class action regime

3.18 We have identified several potential risks of class actions that have also been considered by various overseas law reform agencies. Details of those risks and their possible answers are set out in Annex 3 of this paper. We set out here a few major risks of class actions.

Risk of promoting unnecessary litigation

3.19 Firstly, there is concern that unnecessary litigation may be encouraged if a class action regime were introduced in Hong Kong which, unlike some other legal cultures, is not a litigious society. As observed by the Alberta Law Reform Institute:

"some persons who would not choose to sue in the absence of class action legislation will join class actions solely because they happen to be members of a defined class. This is most likely to occur where the claims are small because joining the class action costs little or nothing. In this way, class actions promote litigation unnecessarily."\(^{34}\)

There could be social costs involved for corporations, for example, in having to take out additional insurance to cover the risk of class litigation.

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\(^{32}\) Hollick v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) 2001 SCC 68, 205 DLR (4th) 19 (SCC) [14].


\(^{34}\) Alberta Law Reform Institute, Class Actions (Final Report No 85, Dec 2000), para 126.
Risk of bringing unmeritorious legal proceedings

3.20 Secondly, some opponents assert that a class action regime will prompt many proceedings which lack merit. This criticism was summarised by the Australian Law Reform Commission as follows:

"[the opponents] point to amorphous classes where one person or a small group have brought legal proceedings purporting to make claims on behalf of … ‘all persons in the United States’. … They allege that large classes of unidentified members each with a small claim result in ‘strike suits’, that is, frivolous claims which utilize the threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel defendants to settle because of the risks inherent in any litigation and the enormous costs of defending a class action. They say that a defendant faced with a class action is, therefore, forced to settle even if the plaintiff’s claim is weak."35

Risk of benefiting entrepreneurial lawyers

3.21 The third potential risk of introducing a class action regime is to benefit persons not intended to benefit at the expense of the class members, ie entrepreneurial lawyers. It is asserted that they will increase the variety and frequency of class actions litigation. The risk is that class actions will become simply vehicles for entrepreneurial lawyers to obtain fees. Plaintiffs’ lawyers may launch an action in the hope of obtaining huge fees for relatively little work by reaching a quick settlement.36

The risk of insufficient protection of the class members' interests

3.22 The risk is exacerbated by the lack of protection of the interests of class members by the class action procedure. The risk stems from the fact that class members typically play a small role in the litigation. If the representative plaintiff is not actively instructing the class counsel, this "clientless" litigation may lead plaintiff lawyers to engage in questionable practices, serving their own financial ends rather than the interests of class members. The Rand Institute pointed out that:

"[t]he powerful financial incentives that drive plaintiff attorneys to assume the risk of litigation intersect with powerful interests on the defence side in settling litigation as early and as cheaply as possible, with the least publicity. Procedural rules, such as the

requirements for notice and judicial approval of settlements, provide only a weak bulwark against self-dealing and collusion."³⁷

Relevance of American experience to Hong Kong

3.23 Introducing a class action regime may involve some risk. In particular, we have been mindful of the risks inherent in the US class action. As the local consumer market is substantially smaller than its US counterpart, however, it is likely that there will be fewer class actions and the size of the class in any action is likely to be smaller.³⁸ Moreover, there are some features in the US legal system which are not shared by the Hong Kong system. We set out these differing features in the following paragraphs.³⁹

Punitive or treble damages

3.24 In the US, the courts would frequently award exemplary, punitive or treble damages:

"Some legislation, particularly anti-trust legislation in the United States, provides that a successful party recovering damages for a legal wrong is entitled to receive treble damages. Verdicts for enormous sums of damages in class actions are often awards of treble damages. In other cases, class actions are brought to recover statutory penalties or minimum damages where the legislation fixes an arbitrary and generally inflated sum as the minimum damages payable."⁴⁰

In contrast, damages in Hong Kong are always awarded to compensate the actual loss or injury suffered, except in extremely rare cases of egregious tortious activity.⁴¹

Juries in civil trials

3.25 In the US, civil trials can be conducted before juries:

"Some critics express fears about the alleged extravagance of possible jury verdicts in class actions. In the United States

³⁷ Deborah R Hensler & Ors, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goods for Private Gain, (Santa Monica, CA RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 2000), at 119 -120.
⁴¹ Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 held that the only situations in which damages are allowed to be punitive, ie with the purpose of punishing the wrongdoer rather than aiming simply to compensate the claimant, are in the case of (a) oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional actions by the servants of government; (b) where the defendant's conduct was 'calculated' to make a profit himself; (c) where a statute expressly authorises this.
Juries assess damages in civil trials and often return verdicts imposing very high awards of damages.  

In Hong Kong, juries in do not sit on civil trials except in very limited circumstances with leave of court.

**Contingency fees**

3.26 Lawyers can be compensated by contingency fees in the US:

"Contingent fees paid to lawyers are a considerable stimulus to class action litigation in the United States. Lawyers usually charge nothing if unsuccessful but are paid an agreed portion of the damages recovered, if successful. The proportion is usually in the order of 20% to 30% of the verdict. ... In the United States steps have been taken to control this abuse by requiring court supervision of fees awarded to lawyers in class action litigation. However, the contingent fee does stimulate an entrepreneurial aspect to litigation in the United States ..."

Hong Kong does not allow contingency fees. In its report on *Conditional Fees*, the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong recommended that they should not be adopted in Hong Kong.

**Costs rule**

3.27 Each party bears their own costs in the US. In Hong Kong, costs would follow the event: the unsuccessful party in an action pays the costs of the successful party.

**Need to take note of differences between US and HK**

3.28 In making our recommendations, we take note of the fact that the US legal system is different to that in Hong Kong and that the use of the class action has given rise to litigation on a scale which Hong Kong can ill afford as a

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43 S 33A(1) of the High Court Ordinance provides that:
   "(1) Where, on the application of any party to an action the Court of First Instance is satisfied that there is in issue – 
   (a) a claim in respect of libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment or seduction; or 
   (b) any question or issue of a kind prescribed for the purposes of this paragraph by rules of court, 
   the action shall be tried with a jury, unless the Court is of the opinion that the trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or accounts or any scientific or local investigation which cannot conveniently be made with a jury."
45 "Conditional Fees" Report, Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (July 2007).
community. The Civil Justice Council also points out similar differences between the US and UK jurisdictions. Accordingly, we believe that the law and practice in other common law jurisdictions, such as Canada and Australia, provides more appropriate precedents for reform in Hong Kong.

Time needed to dispose of class actions proceedings

3.29 In accordance with the policy objective of judicial economy, we have looked at the time needed for plaintiffs concerned to achieve results in class actions, as compared with unitary actions commenced by individual litigants.

3.30 In response to requests from the organisers of the International Conference on the Globalization of Class Action, reporters from a number of common law jurisdictions that have class actions procedures were asked to respond to a Protocol on various aspects of collective litigation in their respective regimes. The following are extracts from their responses to the question of "what is the average time to dispose of a group case, and how does this compare to comparable non-representative non-group litigation?"

Australia

"[Vince Morabito's] empirical study of [class action proceedings] has revealed that the average duration of the 19 [class action] proceedings have been completed is approximately 18 months whilst the median duration is 14 months. This data is broadly similar to the data contained in the annual reports of the Supreme Court of Victoria, with respect to the duration of non-group proceedings instituted in that court.

It is useful to divide [class action] proceedings into two broad categories: the first category comprises those proceedings which came to a conclusion following either a judicially approved settlement or a judgment that was handed down at the end of the trial. The second category includes those proceedings which were, voluntarily or involuntarily, (a) discontinued (b) discontinued as class proceedings; or (c) transferred to another jurisdiction.

- The average duration of the first category of [class action] proceedings is just over 26 months whilst the median duration is 17 months.
• The average duration of the second category of [class action] proceedings is just over 6 months.  

Canada

"The time it takes for a case to get to the certification motion varies greatly from action to action. On average, it is expected that the certification motion will not be heard for at least one year from the time the action is commenced. It is not unusual for the hearing to be heard two or three years after the claim is instituted, because of pleadings motions, cross-examination on the certification material, and scheduling difficulties. Ordinary litigation also can take three years or more to get to trial, depending on the same variable.

Courts have commented on the length of time cases are taking to get to certification and determination on merits. The Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal for Ontario commented in one case, which went to the Supreme Court of Canada twice on interlocutory matters, that the protracted nature of the matter "cast some doubt on the wisdom of hearing a case in instalments". He continued, noting that "before employing an instalment approach, it should be considered where there is potential for such a procedure to result in multiple rounds of proceedings through various levels of court. Such an eventuality is to be avoided where possible. As it does little service to the parties or to the efficient administration of justice."

More recently, a judge refusing leave to appeal from a certification order, noted that the claim had been commenced over three years earlier and that it was "now time for the issues raised to be sent on for trial. The interests of justice and, I would have thought, the parties, demand resolution."

On the other hand, in complex litigation experienced counsel have argued that litigating the key issues in advance of certification rather than the entire case at once shortens rather than lengthens the proceedings and contains costs. Moreover, to address the concern about the length of time cases are taking to get to the certification hearing, case management judges are becoming more open to insisting on the 90-day rule, which

49 Smith v National Money Mart Co [2 April 2007], Court File No. 03-CV-1275 (Ont, SCJ) [unreported].
50 See eg Attis v Canada (Minister of Health) [2007] OJ No. 2990 at para 11 (SCJ) (QL). See also Roy Millen, "Addressing the Merits of a Proposed Class Proceeding in Advance of Certification", Class Action V : 4 (July 2007) 367, who argues that "pre-certification motions on the merits have become an important tool for streamlining proposed class action proceedings, in order to reduce the risks of wasted cost, delay and uncertainty necessitated by the process of and following certification."
requires that the certification motion be brought within 90 days of the close of pleadings.\footnote{Observation by Chief Justice Winkler in commenting on a draft of the paper of W A Bogart, Jasminka Kalajdzie and Ian Matthews entitled "Class Actions in Canada: A National Procedure in a Multi-jurisdictional Society?" (see above). The 90-day rule is common to many class proceedings statutes, including Ontario Class Proceedings Act at section 2(3) and the British Columbia Class Proceedings Act at section 2(3).}

The length of time required for a case to reach the trial of the common issues is, of course, even longer. In Mandville v Manufacturers Life Insurance Co, for example, an action commenced in December 2001, the certification and summary judgment motions were argued in September 2002 [2002] OJ No. 5386 (SCJ) (QL), the appeal argued and denied in June 2004 [2004] OJ 2509 (CA) (QL), and as of the summer of 2007, was still in the oral and documentary discovery stage. The case is not expected to go to trial before 2008.\footnote{W A Bogart, Jasminka Kalajdzie and Ian Matthews, "Class Actions in Canada: A National Procedure in a Multi-jurisdictional Society?" a report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, December 2007, at 32.}

\section*{England and Wales}

"It is not possible to state an average time for [Group Litigation Orders] ("GLOs"): the answer depends on the individual case. Cases that involve many individual claimants will obviously need some time for communications between the generic team of lawyers and the individual claimants. The essence of the GLO approach, however, involves some form of economic short-circuiting of normal procedures in those cases where individual issues do not predominate and need to be investigated and considered by the court in any depth, and resolving major dispositive issues at an early stage, on the basis of test cases or a preliminary issue."\footnote{Individual issues do not predominate in cases such as pharmaceutical or tobacco product liability cases, where it is usually a false economy to avoid investigation of individual medical issues.}

\section*{United States of America}

"Research suggests that the average federal class action consumes about five times as much in the way of court resources compared to non-class litigation.\footnote{Christopher Hodges, "Global Class Actions Project Country Report: England and Wales", a report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, December 2007, at 30.} This figure would likely be quite different if the focus was only on certified class actions that were vigorously opposed through the certification procedure. In this connection, reference is made to the findings of Thomas E Willging, Laurel L Hopper and Robert J Niemic in their Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Federal Judicial Center, 1996) pp. 22-23. The report also stated that "[i]n comparison with nonclass civil cases, class actions are not routine in terms of their longevity. Overall, the median time for filing to disposition for class actions was two to three times that of other civil cases in three of the four districts [under study], and in the fourth (SD Fla), class actions took about four and a half months longer at the median." (at 19).}
process. It is difficult, however, to identify sets of "ordinary" cases that would be roughly comparable to class actions, mass joiners, or mass consolidation in terms of complexity for a more precise comparison. Moreover, it is generally believed that though more judicial time may be spent per class action or per mass consolidation, there is a net benefit to the court in processing related claims on a group basis compared to what would be required if each claim were prosecuted as a separate lawsuit. On the other hand, the claims of members in many class actions would evaporate outside of a class action process because of the low monetary stakes.”

3.31 It is difficult to generalise and state an average time for the disposition of class action proceedings as compared with non-group proceedings. The length of time cases take to reach the certification hearing is a cause for concern. Limited empirical studies reveal that class actions tend to consume more judicial resources than typical civil cases. But it is suggested that the class actions procedure provides net benefit to the court in processing claims on a group basis. If separately recoverable claims are to be litigated individually, hearings would be duplicated and there would be greater overall use of judicial resources.

Regulatory action

3.32 Before concluding the review of the arguments for and against a class action regime, it might be noted that regulatory bodies in the exercise of their statutory powers may pursue actions that may benefit individual citizens whose interests have been affected by misconduct. For example, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has statutory power under section 214 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap 571) (the SFO) to seek orders from the Court of First Instance for prescribed remedies in cases of misconduct in the affairs of listed or previously listed companies, including oppression and unfairly prejudicial treatment of shareholders. Such orders are likely to benefit the shareholders of these companies, albeit generally indirectly. The SFC may also seek restitutionary remedies under section 213(2)(b) of the SFO in respect of contraventions of the SFO. The SFC may take disciplinary action in respect of misconduct or if it determines that a licensed person or registered institution is not a fit and proper person to undertake a regulated activity under the SFO. The penalty the SFC imposes may take account of any compensation paid by the licensed person or registered institution although the SFC itself does not have power to require payment of compensation. Further information about the regulatory powers of the SFC can be obtained from its website at www.sfc.hk. Whilst regulatory action may achieve some measure of redress or benefit for individuals, it cannot be regarded as a substitute for better individual access to the courts through class action.

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Our conclusions

3.33 We consider that there is a convincing case for reform of the existing procedures governing multi-party actions in Hong Kong, so that the policy objectives set out at the start of this chapter can be better achieved. In our view, appropriate reforms could enhance access to justice and offer people without means an avenue to redress wrongs. In addition, it could be argued that a class action regime would redress the imbalance between the consumer and the corporate sector. There are in Hong Kong a number of companies which are powerful in terms of market share and resources, but there are no organised consumer groups with comparable funding and capacity, although the Consumer Council partly fills the void. Our deliberations therefore lead us to the position that reform is needed and we recommend that reform take the form of a regime which can deal with potential class actions in Hong Kong and achieve equal access to justice for all.

3.34 We have carefully considered the potential risks of bringing in a class action regime. We have studied the risk assessments of various overseas law reform agencies and academics. The risks identified by them and their answers to those risks are set out in Annex 3 of this paper. We are conscious of the risk that a class action regime in Hong Kong may prompt unnecessary litigation. There could be additional costs involved for corporations, for example, in having to take out insurance to cover the risk of class litigation. Equally, corporations are in a position to manage their risks by avoiding the very circumstances giving rise to the risk of class litigation.

3.35 The sub-committee is not persuaded that these concerns tip the balance against reform though we have remained alert to the possible risks associated with the introduction of a class action regime in Hong Kong in framing our recommendations for reform. In considering an appropriate regime for Hong Kong, we have reviewed the current debate on possible reform in the European Union. The essence of the debate relates to whether private damages claims should be enlisted as supplementary mechanisms for regulatory enforcement, and whether it is possible to so balance civil procedures and funding systems for multiple claims as to avoid excessive litigation and costs.57 There is a significant level of concern to avoid what are seen as the disadvantages of the American class action system, including excessive litigation, excessive legal transactional costs, blackmail settlements, and punitive high costs for business that impose a significant drag on the economy and innovation.58 We have discussed earlier in this chapter some of the factors peculiar to the US system which contribute to these perceived disadvantages.

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difficulties and we do not suggest that we should follow the US approach to class actions.

3.36 We bear in mind the need for caution to ensure that the introduction of a class action regime in Hong Kong does not encourage unmeritorious litigation. It is important that there are appropriate procedures for filtering out cases that are clearly not viable and appropriate rules should be in place to ensure fairness, expedition and cost effectiveness. At the same time, it will be necessary to explore procedures alternative to the court process which will complement the class action.

Mediation and arbitration

3.37 Dr Christopher Hodges, in giving his comments on the introduction of a class action regime in Hong Kong, has drawn our attention to the growth in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, led by a desire to avoid the costs and delays of litigation processes and adoption of new techniques involving ADR and ombudsman mechanisms. A 2007 study led by Professor Jules Stuyck reached the following conclusions:59

(a) in the EU States, ADR is a continuum, encompassing the main elements of direct negotiation, mediation/arbitration, small claims procedures, collective actions for damages and actions for injunction;

(b) every Member State of the EU has put in place a unique mix. The ADR matrix in a state must be seen in the context of the organisation and effectiveness of its ordinary judicial proceedings, the way its business is structured and consumers are organised, the effectiveness of market surveillance, the way administration operates at local and general levels, and historic, political, socio-economic, educational and cultural factors;

(c) no particular method or mix of ADR processes or techniques could be put forward as the best choice from a consumer perspective;

(d) generally, whether a dispute resolution mechanism is appropriate in a particular situation will depend on a series of variables, including the circumstances of the dispute, the nature of the complaint or claim, the amounts of money involved, as well as the experience, personality, resources, knowledge and


60 J Stuyck and others, An Analysis and Evaluation of Alternative Means of Consumer Redress Other Than Redress Through Ordinary Judicial Proceedings (Catholic University of Leuvan, January 17, 2007, issued April 2007) and its executive summary at 5 -15. This is an important study which includes reports from every EU member plus USA, Canada and Australia on the range of existing mechanisms.
understanding, skills, confidence and attitudes of the consumers and businesses in question. These variables might differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction so that the mix that functions appropriately in one jurisdiction will not necessarily be effective in another jurisdiction.

3.38 Class actions seeking damages usually consist of two parts. The first part deals with the determination of the applicable legal principles that have to be applied to the individual cases and, where appropriate, also deals with the determination of the issue of liability of the defendant. The second part of the litigation deals with the application of those legal principles to individual cases and, where appropriate, the assessment of the quantum of damages to be paid to the individual class members. ADR procedures are especially useful to the second part of the class action litigation. We have considered the procedural framework for class actions in Australia and find the following provisions to be of practical relevance to the introduction of a class action regime in Hong Kong.

Section 53A of the Federal Court Act

3.39 Section 53A of the Federal Court Act of Australia 1976 (Cth) empowers the Court to refer proceedings to a mediator, even without the consent of the parties, or to arbitration where the parties agree.

"(1) Subject to the Rules of Court, the Court may by order refer the proceedings in the Court, or any part of them or any matter arising out of them, to a mediator or an arbitrator for mediation or arbitration, as the case may be, in accordance with the Rules of Court.

(1A) Referrals under subsection (1) to a mediator may be made with or without the consent of the parties to the proceedings. However, referrals to an arbitrator may be made only with the consent of the parties."

3.40 Order 10 of the Federal Court Rules makes provision for mediation and arbitration:

"1. Directions hearing – general

(1) On a direction hearing the Court shall give such directions with respect to the conduct of the proceedings as it thinks proper.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subrule (1) or (1A) the Court may -...
(g) order, under Order 72, that proceedings, part of proceedings or a matter arising out of proceedings be referred to a mediator or arbitrator.

(h) order that the parties attend before a Registrar for a conference with a view to satisfying the Registrar that all reasonable steps to achieve a negotiated outcome of the proceedings have been taken, or otherwise clarifying the real issues in dispute so that appropriate directions may be made for the disposition of the matter, or otherwise to shorten the time taken in preparation for and at the trial ..."

3.41 Similarly, where class action proceedings are pending in the Supreme Court of Victoria the Supreme Court Rules make provision for the court to refer proceedings, or any part of the proceedings, to a mediator with or without the consent of any party.61

3.42 In addition, at both Federal Court and Victorian Supreme Court level, there are a variety of other procedural alternatives open, including the referral of matters or issues to special referees.62

Relevant Australian cases

3.43 In McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd.63 following the decision on liability, the Federal Court proceeded to hear the claims of seven group members, constituted 16 subgroups consisting of particular persons who each claimed less than $100,000 and delegated to a judicial registrar the power to hear and determine those claims. Wilcox J, writing extra-judicially, observed that the circumstances relating to the assessment of damages payable to each group member:

"varied enormously, so there was no escape from individual assessment. However, the parties selected a few cases that raised major points of principle. These were heard over a few days and rulings made. The parties then entered into negotiations in relation to individual cases, exchanging information in accordance with directions made by the Court and with mediation of many cases by a Court officer. Two or three cases were not resolved by agreement. The damages in those cases had to be determined by a judge. All the rest were agreed.

Towards the end of the process of negotiating settlements, the Court ordered publication of advertisements in newspapers circulating amongst graziers notifying group members that they..."

61 See Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic), O 50.07.
62 See eg Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic), O 50.
must submit any outstanding claims by a particular date, or be excluded from the benefit of the judgment. By the time that date arrived, 499 claims had been received. After the last of them was resolved, the total payout reached some $100 million. Total court time for the whole operation was only about 30 days.” (Emphasis added)

3.44 In *Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (No 2)*, Gillard J received written submissions, but did not make any directions, in relation to the appropriate regime for the hearing and determination of the claims of remaining group members. His Honour preferred to wait until the class of claimants able to maintain a claim in the proceeding was closed. The plaintiffs proposed that group members:

- with claims exceeding $250,000 should be given leave pursuant to section 33R(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) to take part in the proceeding for the purpose of determining their compensable loss and that directions be made to progress each of these to trial by judge. If appropriate, the court could also refer a particular claim to a special referee for assessment pursuant to rule 50.01 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Vic).

- with claims between $50,000 and $250,000 should not be given leave to take part in the proceeding pursuant to section 33R(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic). The claims of those group members should be particularised and referred to a joint mediation and, if agreement was not reached at that mediation, they should then be given leave pursuant to section 33R(1) of the Supreme Court Act, and the assessment of their claims should be referred to a special referee pursuant to rule 50.01 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Vic).

- with claims of less than $50,000, should be particularised and referred to a mediation. If agreement was not reached at that mediation then either the claims of those group members should be referred by the court to a special referee pursuant to rule 50.01 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Vic) or there should be a trial for the purposes of determining, pursuant to s 33Z(1)(f) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), an award of damages in an aggregate amount.

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65 [2003] VSC 212.
66 See also *Federal Court Act*, section 53A above.
3.45 Gillard J said (at [83]) that:

"In my view, the parties should seriously consider a regime whereby the claims are referred to an arbitration pursuant to r 50.08. This procedure is only available if the parties consent. However, it has the advantage that usually arbitration awards are final and the avenues open to dispute the findings are limited, whereas references to special referees are sometimes bogged down by the application of a party seeking an order that the court decline to adopt the report under r 50.04."

3.46 A recent case illustrates the growth in the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in class action proceedings to avoid the costs and delays of litigation processes. On 23 May 2008, a class action was commenced in the Federal Court of Australia against Centro Properties Ltd and others. The defendants were alleged to have breached the Australian Securities Exchange Listing Rules, the Corporation Act 2001 (Cth), the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) by making certain representations to the market and by failing to immediately disclose to the Australian Securities Exchange information that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of the company’s securities. The Federal Court ordered that mediation be held to explore the possible resolution of the claims in the Centro class action. With the consent of Centro and the law firms representing the investors, the Federal Court of Australia ordered on 17 December 2008 that the Centro class action be mediated by 17 April 2009. Strict time limits were imposed for all shareholders to register a claim to stay within the class action or to opt out of the proceedings. The court ordered that if the remaining shareholders did not register by the deadline with the plaintiff’s law firm they would be barred from making any claim against the defendants in respect of, or relating to, the subject matter of proceeding. The potential members of the class were reminded that this was the last chance to join the class action and participate in the mediation which had been agreed after Centro agreed to explore a resolution of the claims.

3.47 In Hong Kong, the Chief Justice’s Working Party on Civil Justice Reform has recommended the provision of better information and support by the court to the litigants with a view to encouraging greater use of purely voluntary mediation (Recommendation 138 of the Working Party’s report). The Working Party has also recommended the adoption of appropriate rules to empower the court, after taking into account all relevant circumstances, to make adverse costs orders in cases where mediation has been unreasonably refused after a party has served a notice requesting mediation on the other party or parties; or after mediation has been recommended by the court on the application of a party or of its own motion (Recommendation 143).

67 See also the comments to the same effect by Gillard J in Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] VSC 212 at [85].

68 See media release and notice to the shareholders posted by the law firm Slater & Gordon on their website at: www.slatergordon.com.au.
3.48 The Working Party pointed out that in suitable cases, mediation may result in very substantial savings in costs. The costs savings can be even more dramatic in relation to complex and hard-fought cases. In addition, mediation can produce flexible and constructive outcomes as between the parties which traditional legal remedies cannot offer as well as provide the chance of a swifter resolution of the dispute in conditions of confidentiality and in an atmosphere where the parties are channelled towards seeking settlement rather than towards inflicting maximum adversarial damage on each other.

3.49 In the case of Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust, although the English Court of Appeal declined to sanction mandatory mediation, it indicated that in making its decision on costs, the court may take into account the conduct of the parties both before and during the legal proceedings, as well as their efforts to resolve the dispute. For a costs sanction to apply, the unsuccessful litigant must prove that his opponent's refusal to have recourse to ADR was "unreasonable in all the circumstances".

3.50 In the recent case of iRiver Hong Kong Ltd v Thakral Corporation (HK) Ltd, Mr Justice Yeung endorsed the dicta of Dyson LJ in Halsey that:

"[t]he value and importance of ADR have been established within a remarkably short time. All members of the legal profession who conduct litigations should now routinely consider with their clients whether their disputes are suitable for ADR."

Mr Justice Yeung also cautioned that under the new Order 1A of the Rules of High Court (which includes the underlying objective of the rules "to facilitate the settlement of disputes") and Order 1B of the Rules of High Court (which sets out the case management power of the Court), parties and their lawyers have a duty to the court to further the underlying objectives. They would, he said, "be well advised to have the above comments on ADR in mind in making attempts to resolve their disputes effectively".

3.51 The Law Reform Commission of Ireland also recommended the use of ADR as a method of dealing with multi-party scenarios without resorting to litigation. It discussed the United Kingdom case in the late 1990s where it emerged that a number of hospitals had, for many years, retained the organs and other body tissue of infants without the consent of their parents and guardians. ADR methods were used successfully to resolve some of the cases outside the courts. The Commission observed that while claims for

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70 Same as above at paras 799-800.
71 [2004] 4 All ER.
72 2004] 4 All ER, cited above, at paragraph 11.
73 CACV No 252 of 2007 dated 8 August 2008, at paragraph 100.
74 CACV No 252 of 2007, cited above, at paragraph 106.
75 The following example is given by the Law Reform Commission of Ireland in its Multi-Party Litigation (2005, Report LRC 76-2005) at paras 1.11-1.12.
damages might be appropriate in some cases, ADR, in which the parents and guardians received an appropriate explanation and apology, could offer a non-litigious way to resolve the dispute. For instance, the group litigation concerning organ retention by Alder Hey Hospital (comprising about 1,100 claims) was settled by way of a three-day mediation through the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution. The settlement included financial compensation but it was accepted that the ability to discuss non-financial remedies ensured a successful conclusion. The families involved produced a "wish list" and this resulted in the provision of a memorial plaque at the hospital, letters of apology, a press conference and contribution to a charity of the claimants' choice.

3.52 We are of the view that the use of ADR could promote cost-effective dispute resolution of class actions if this can be done in a controlled manner. Full exploitation and adoption of ADR techniques such as meditation and arbitration on both an interim and final basis in class action proceedings, in the light of the relevant experience in overseas jurisdictions, should be further considered in greater detail in Hong Kong.

**Settlement of opt-out class actions**

3.53 We have considered the proper relationship between an opt-out class action regime and any mediation in which the lead plaintiff will have to negotiate a binding settlement agreement on behalf of the absent class members.

3.54 This issue arises in Australia. Unlike traditional settlements in conventional civil litigation, group members in class actions, who will be bound by the settlement agreement if it is approved by the court, will usually not have participated in the settlement negotiations and will not have consented to, or even been aware of, the proposed terms of settlement. In order to try and ensure that the interests of the group members are protected the Australian federal legislation incorporates important provisions for court approval. Section 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 provides as follows:

"(1) A representative proceeding may not be settled or discontinued without the approval of the Court.

(2) If the Court gives such an approval, it may make such orders as are just with respect to the distribution of any money paid under a settlement or paid into the Court."

3.55 Because the lawyers acting for the applicant and the group in the case will often only be paid and recoup significant out-of-pocket expenditure if the litigation is successfully concluded they will often have a strong financial incentive to settle. Similarly, a commercial litigation funder which has

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financed the case will have a strong commercial interest in seeing a return on its investment. There are often also a variety of reasons why it may be in the commercial interests of the respondent(s) to settle a class action. As Bongiorno J noted in *Tasfast Air Freight v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd*, with reference to the substantially equivalent provision in the Victorian legislation:

"[T]he principles upon which a s33V is based might be said to be those of the protective jurisdiction of the Court, not unlike the principles which lead the Court to require compromises on behalf of infants or persons under a disability to be approved."

3.56 We have set out the relevant Australian cases on the assessment of costs to be paid to the solicitors acting for the plaintiffs in Chapter 8 under the heading "Costs in case of settlement".

3.57 Dr Morabito suggested that the following lessons can be learnt from the Australian experience of requiring judicial approval of settlements:78

(a) To enable the courts to discharge satisfactorily the extremely challenging task of reviewing class action settlements, effective assistance and detailed guidance with respect to the substantive and procedural issues should be provided. It is suggested that, similar to the US practice, special counsels/masters should be appointed to represent the class in order to preserve the adversarial nature of the proceedings. The guardian can serve as "devil’s advocate" both to safeguard the interests of the absentee class and to provide more information to the court;

(b) Courts must be assisted in safeguarding the interests of unrepresented class members. With reference to the US federal class actions, it is suggested that the courts should consider appointing a committee of unrepresented class members in class actions where class members include represented and unrepresented parties, to serve as spokespersons for the unrepresented parties; and

(c) Class action regimes must specify the factors that the courts are to apply when reviewing proposed settlement agreements. A tentative list of the relevant factors for consideration includes the following:79

"(i) The terms of the settlement;
(ii) Likely duration, cost and complexity of the action if

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77 [2002] VSC 457, [4].
approval were not given;

(iii) Amount offered to each class member in relation to the likelihood of success in the class action;

(iv) Even if the class won at trial, judgment amount not significantly in excess of settlement offer;

(v) The recommendations and experience of class legal representatives;

(vi) The recommendations of neutral parties, if any;

(vii) The attitude of the class members to the settlement (including the number of objectors);

(viii) Good faith, absence of collusion and consistency with class action objectives; and

(ix) Whether distribution of settlement benefits satisfactory."

**Dispute resolution mechanism for the financial industry**

3.58 We have considered recent proposals in Hong Kong for the establishment of dispute resolution mechanisms in the financial industry.\(^8^0\) We note that in other jurisdictions where such mechanisms exist, there is still a need for a class action regime.

**Competition law proposals**

3.59 On 7 May 2008, the government published a consultation paper which set out the proposed major provisions for a cross-sector competition law as well as the establishment of an independent Competition Commission to enforce the law.\(^8^1\) The paper proposes that parties aggrieved by anti-competitive conduct should be allowed to bring private actions before a proposed Competition Tribunal. Such actions could either be “follow-up” actions, seeking compensation for losses suffered as a result of anti-competitive conduct, or "stand-alone" actions, seeking a determination by the Competition Tribunal.

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\(^8^0\) Including the Securities and Futures Commission’s Issues Raised by the Lehmans Minibonds Crisis – Report to the Financial Secretary (December 2008), para 35.5 and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s Report on Issues Concerning the Distribution of Structured Products Connected to Lehman Group Companies (31 December 2008), para 8.49.

3.60 In August 2008, the Consumer Council published its response to the proposals. The Consumer Counsel suggested that the Government should adopt a combination of two complementary mechanisms allowing collective redress of the individual claims of victims of anti-trust infringements (ie representative action for damages brought by qualified entities or an opt-in collective action for damages), similar to the recent proposals made by the European Commission for improving the collective redress system of anti-competitive conduct.

Recommendation 2

We consider that the principle of equal access to justice, that is founded on the concepts of fairness, expedition and cost effectiveness, should guide any change to the present system for mass litigation. Thus guided, we are satisfied that, a good case has been made out for consideration to be given to the establishment of a general procedural framework for class actions in Hong Kong courts, bearing in mind the need for caution that litigation should not thereby be unduly promoted. We believe that in any system for class actions it is crucial that there are appropriate procedures for filtering out cases that are clearly not viable and that appropriate rules should be in place to assure fairness, expedition and cost effectiveness. In addition, Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques such as mediation and arbitration, on both an interim and final basis, should be fully utilised.

The Consumer Council’s submissions can be found at: http://www2.consumer.org.hk/2008080501/full.pdf
Chapter 4
Opt-in v Opt-out

Introduction

4.1 An issue which inevitably arises in class proceedings is the question of how the members of the class should be determined. In fact, law reform agencies in other jurisdictions have regularly acknowledged that the choice between an opt-in and an opt-out regime is possibly the most controversial issue in the design of a multi-party litigation regime. Under an "opt-out" scheme, persons who hold claims concerning questions (of law or fact) which are raised in the class proceedings are bound as members of the class and their rights will be subjected to any judgments made in the class proceeding unless they take an affirmative step to indicate that they wish to be excluded from the action and from the effect of the resulting judgment. The "opt-out" approach has been adopted in jurisdictions such as Australia, the United States, Quebec and British Columbia. In contrast, under the "opt-in" approach, a potential class member must expressly opt into the class proceeding by taking a prescribed step within the stipulated period. A person will not be bound by the judgment or settlement unless he has opted in to the proceedings.

Basic features of the two procedures for class actions

4.2 According to Professor Mulheron, the "opt-out" procedure involves two stages:

"First, the representative plaintiff must take steps to notify those who may qualify as class members about the class action being on foot. The second stage requires that the opt-out notice be lodged by those people who fall within the class description and who do not wish to participate in the action."

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1 For example, the Ontario Law Reform Commission in Report on Class Actions (1982), at 467.
2 R Mulheron (above), at 29.
3 Absolute opt-out rights were inferred in class actions for damages under section 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 Professor Mulheron observed at 34 (above) that: "... an opt-out model, by which persons are bound as members of the class unless they take an affirmative step to indicate that they wish to be excluded from the action and from the effect of judgment, has been overwhelmingly adopted among the common law jurisdictions. The opt-out approach allows a class action be commenced by the representative plaintiff without the express consent of the class members." (emphasis added)
5 R Mulheron (above), at 35.
4.3 The consequences for those members who have opted out have been explained by Professor Mulheron as follows:

“For those members who opt out, they are therefore entitled to bring their own proceedings, or disassociate from the dispute altogether; however, they are not entitled to share in any relief obtained by the class, nor are they bound by a judgment against the class. On the other hand, for those who fail to act at all, they will be bound by the judicial determination of the common questions or settlement of the action, and, if either of these is in favour of the class, they may receive their share of monetary relief, depending upon the outcome of their individual issues.”

4.4 In contrast, under the "opt-in" approach, a potential class member must expressly opt into the class proceeding by taking a prescribed step within the stipulated period. Once he becomes a member, he will be bound by the judgment or settlement and be eligible to receive the benefits incurred. The main benefit of an "opt-in" regime is the preservation of the autonomy of the individual to participate in litigation only if he wishes to do so. A further benefit is that the size of the plaintiff group is reduced and allows for an easier ascertainment of damages and case preparation for all parties involved. This is the approach adopted in England and Wales under the Group Litigation Order procedure, albeit with a slight caveat that the litigant’s claims may be consolidated to a group action by order of the court.

Competing arguments

4.5 The arguments for and against the opt-out approach are summarised by Professor Mulheron as follows:

**Competing arguments: the opt-out approach**

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<tr>
<td>(a) defendants are unlikely to have to deal with any claims other than those made in the class action, and if they do, then they can know more precisely how many class members they may face in subsequent individual proceedings;</td>
<td>(a) it is objectionable that a person can pursue an action on behalf of others without an express mandate;</td>
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<td>(b) the opt-out regime enhances access to legal remedies for</td>
<td>(b) a person is required to take a positive step to disassociate from litigation which he/she has done little or nothing to promote;</td>
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<td>(c) class actions may be raised</td>
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6 R Mulheron (above), at 38.
7 Civil Procedures Rules, Rule 19.11(3)(b).
8 R Mulheron (above), at 37-8.
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<td>those who are disadvantaged either socially, intellectually or</td>
<td>by busy-bodies, encouraged by unprincipled entrepreneurial lawyers;</td>
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<td>psychologically and who would be unable for one reason or another to take the positive step of including themselves in the proceedings;</td>
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<td>(c) increased efficiency and the avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings to the benefit of all concerned;</td>
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<td>(d) access to justice is the basic rationale for class actions, and inclusiveness in the class should be promoted (ie, the vulnerable should be swept in);</td>
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<td>(e) safeguards can prevent &quot;roping in&quot; (eg, adequate notice explaining opt-out rights, permission to opt out late in the action, and other procedural requirements);</td>
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<td>(f) for each class member, the goal of individual choice whether or not to pursue a remedy can be achieved if the decision for the class member is whether to continue proceedings rather than commence them;</td>
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<td>(g) opting out more effectively ensures that defendants are assessed for the full measure of the damages they have caused rather than escaping that consequence simply because a number of class members do not take steps to opt in;</td>
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<td>(h) the meaning of silence is equivocal, and does not necessarily indicate indifference or lack of</td>
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<td>(d) absent class members may know about the litigation too late to opt out, in which case they are bound by the result, whether or not they want to be;</td>
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<td>(e) unfairness to defendants is increased by creating an unmanageably large group in which the members are not identified by name and it is very difficult to undertake negotiations for a settlement;</td>
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<td>(f) it is unattractive for a court to enforce claims against the defending party at the instance of plaintiffs who are entirely passive and may have no desire to prosecute the claim;</td>
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<td>(g) opt-out regimes create potential for the general res judicata effect of the class action judgment to be undermined by individual class members exercising their right of exclusion;</td>
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<td>(h) to the extent that class members exercised opt-out rights for the purpose of prosecuting their individual suits, the desired economies would suffer and the risk of inconsistent decisions would increase;</td>
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<td>(i) opt-out regimes do not cure the fact that persons will not want to engage in litigation because they are timid, ignorant, unfamiliar with business or legal matters, or do not understand the</td>
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<td>For</td>
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<td>interest, so class members should not be denied whatever benefits are secured by the class action by failing to act at an early stage of the action — fairer for the silent to be considered part of the class than not.</td>
<td>notice – the same persons who would not opt in may also opt out, which can undermine the purpose of inclusive class membership.</td>
</tr>
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Access to justice

4.6 The reasons for adopting an opt-out regime are stated by the Australian Law Reform Commission as follows:

"[a] requirement of consent will effectively exclude some people from obtaining a legal remedy. It may also undermine the goals of efficiency and avoidance of a multiplicity of proceedings. All these policies can only be served by enabling proceedings to be commenced in respect of all persons who have related claims arising from the same wrong without requiring their consent...."\(^9\)

4.7 In contrast, an opt-in requirement for class actions would omit from a lawsuit those who did not take the steps necessary to opt in. In particular, where the cause of action involves small losses to a large number of persons, an opt-in requirement may prove unsatisfactory simply because the losses are too small to attract potential class members’ attention. It has also been suggested that the adverse effects of an opt-in requirement might be felt more acutely by the more disadvantaged members of society.\(^10\) That would defeat the policy objective of achieving equal access to justice by way of introducing a class action regime.

4.8 Vince Morabito has suggested that the failure to opt in is attributable to a number of reasons other than lack of interest in the class actions:\(^11\)

(a) those who fail to opt in may not have received the notice either because they cannot be identified individually or because they have moved their residence;

(b) they may not have taken the affirmative step because of

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\(^10\) Deborah R Hensler and Thomas D Rowe "Complex Litigation At the Millennium: Beyond "It Just Ain't Worth It": Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform" 64 *Law & Contemporary Problems* 137 (Spring/Summer 2001) at 145-146.

ignorance, timidity and unfamiliarity with business or legal matters;

(c) they may be afraid of sanctions from employers or others in a position to take reprisals and afraid of involvement in the legal process;

(d) class members are often uneducated, unknowledgeable or fearful and lack the education and understanding to respond properly to a legal notice requiring them to opt in.

To sum up, Vince Morabito stated that:

"[A]n opt in scheme would deprive those most in need of the benefits of class actions, that is those who cannot initiate individual proceedings (such as those with individually non-recoverable claims), from obtaining the benefits of such an action."

4.9 A recent Research Paper of the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales seeks to identify whether there is an unmet legal need for a new initiative for collective redress, over and above the representative rules and the Group Litigation Order (GLO). The paper suggests that the "unmet need" could be satisfied by the introduction of an opt-out collective redress regime. The Council found that the number and types of collective actions in England were limited by the opt-in system under the GLO. It reported that:

"A Questionnaire distributed to Respondents who have had experience in conducting opt-in group litigation in England produced some interesting insights during the course of preparing this Research Paper. The experience in English group litigation indicates that, under an opt-in regime, the opt-in rates vary considerably, from very low percentages (<1%) to almost all (90%), or all, of group members opting to participate in the litigation. In several instances, however, the percentages of opting-in could not be determined because early cut-off dates were established, and the total number in the group was never able to be ascertained before the litigation was finalised. Respondents indicated that the vast majority of the [actions under study] sustained some procedural difficulties because they were conducted under an opt-in regime – and the tasks of identifying and communicating with large classes, together with pleadings requirements at the outset, were especially difficult.

Furthermore, the experience derived from English group litigation indicates … that there are almost twenty (20) reasons as to why group members may not opt in to litigation – reasons that are as
diverse as is human nature. While some of these reasons will preclude these claimants ever choosing to litigate their grievances, many of the reasons for not opting-in that emerged in the study for this Research Paper are particularly pertinent when the litigation is in its 'infancy', prior to any determination or settlement of the common issues, and when the litigation inevitably retains such an 'individualised' hue.\textsuperscript{13} (emphasis added)

**Empirical data on degree of participation under different schemes**

4.10 In a comparative study covering the major class action systems in a number of jurisdictions it was found that the degree of participation under opt-in systems was lower than that found under opt-out systems. The study concluded that:

"The exercise of 'crunching the numbers' on opt-in versus opt-out confirms the anecdotal evidence that opt-out 'catches more litigants in the fishing net'. Where modern empirical data exists, the median opt-out rates have been as low as 0.1%, and no higher than 13%. Where widespread empirical data does not exist as yet, judicial summations of opt-out rates indicate a range of opt-outs between 40% (which is rare, on the cases surveyed) and 0%, with a tendency for the rates of participation under opt-out regimes to be high … . On the other hand, whilst the experience in English group litigation indicates that, under its opt-in regime, the opt-in rates vary considerably, from very low percentages (<1%) to almost all group members opting to participate in the litigation, European experience sometimes indicates a very low rate of participation (less than 1%) where resort to opt-in was necessary in consumer claims and where the class sizes were very large. In the United States too, a much lower participation rate has been evident under opt-in than under opt-out. In that respect, the dual pillars – access to justice and judicial efficiency in disposing of the dispute once and for all – are enhanced by an opt-out regime."\textsuperscript{14} (Emphasis added)


Finality and closure of issues

4.11 The opt-out procedure overcomes the difficulties of identifying and naming all class members affected by the defendant's misconduct and achieves the closure of issues between the parties. The Irish Law Commission said:

"Opt-out systems appear to commend themselves in terms of finality. At one stroke the major share of putative cases can be dealt with, and defendants can predict, with some certainty, closure of the issue. ... From the outset, the defendant will be aware of the extent of the plaintiff group. This may also prove beneficial for the plaintiffs in that the defendant may be amenable to settlement. Where the defendant is a company dependent on its good name and reputation in the market, the sooner a line can be drawn under a multi-party claim which attracts public attention the better. ..."

Closure may also be beneficial to the functioning of the judicial system, which has an interest in encouraging the efficient disposal of the litigation. Under an opt-out system the courts are more likely to be spared the slow-drip effect of identical factual or legal issues arising in a series of separate cases ..."\(^1\)

4.12 To protect the interests and dignity of class members does not require an absolute and unrestricted right to opt out. The desirable goals of a class action system which adopts an opt-out model can be fulfilled as long as the following requirements are satisfied:

"(a) the prerequisites which need to be complied with for the commencement of the class proceedings do not generate unfairness as a result of bringing together in the one action excessively diverse claims;

(b) absent group members have a sufficient degree of participation in, and control over, the class action;

(c) absent group members are adequately represented by the representative plaintiff;

(d) the court presiding over the class litigation plays an active role in order to protect the interests of absent group members; and

(e) an opportunity is conferred on group members to persuade the court that they should be allowed to opt out.”

Human rights and basic law considerations

4.13 We have looked into the issue of whether the proposed opt-out model will meet the requirements of access to justice and protection of property rights guaranteed under Articles 6 and 35 of the Basic Law. We are satisfied that the proposed "opt-out" model does pursue legitimate aims and that appropriate procedures can be devised for such a model which amount to a proportionate response to the legitimate aim of promoting access to justice. As long as the opt-out model includes sufficient threshold requirements in the application of representative proceedings and procedural safeguards to preserve a group member's freedom of choice comparable to those provided for in Part IVA of the Federal Court Act, we believe it will meet the "fair balance" requirement arguably implicit in Articles 6 and 35 of the Basic Law. More detailed discussion of the human rights and Basic Law issues can be found in Annex 4.

Our recommendations

Opt-out regime as the starting point

4.14 We propose that the class action regime in Hong Kong should adopt an "opt-out" approach unless there are strong reasons to depart from this in the interests of justice. We believe that as long as the opt-out model includes sufficient threshold requirements and procedural safeguards to preserve a group member's degree of participation in, and control over, the class action, a fair balance can be achieved between the goal of promoting greater access to justice and the preservation of the parties' autonomy. That said, no regime can cater for all circumstances and we consider that a discretion should be vested in the court to depart from the opt-out regime where there are strong reasons for doing so. The essential justification must be that justice could not otherwise be attained.

4.15 However, in view of the considerations to be further discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, we have reservations as to whether an opt-out regime is appropriate for public law litigation or the handling of class actions involving parties from other jurisdictions. Instead, we consider that the default position for multi-party litigation in those situations should be the opt-in model, so that only those persons who have expressly consented to be bound by a decision in the class action will be treated as parties to that judgment.

\[16\] V Morabito (above), at 622-3.
Judicial discretion

4.16 We have also considered whether the court should be invested with a sufficient degree of discretion to attain the objectives of the class action. We have reviewed in detail the flexibility favoured by both the Woolf Report and the Civil Justice Council Report in England and Wales and by the South African Law Commission. However, we are concerned that flexibility of the class action rules should not result in a lack of predictability of procedural outcomes. We agree with the Alberta Law Reform Institute’s conclusion that "judicial choice places the parties in a position of uncertainty because they do not know in advance which procedure will be followed; and it invites litigation over the procedural choice."17 This conclusion was also supported by the Irish Law Reform Commission.18

4.17 We think it important to fashion a framework of principles within which judicial discretion may be exercised. This framework of principles should take account of the extent to which the members of the class might be prejudiced by being bound by a judgment given in an action which may not have come to their attention. Practical difficulties might make the giving of individual notice to all members impossible, impracticable or unaffordable. An applicant wishing to depart from the default opt-out position will have the burden of proof to show that the exceptional circumstances of the case dictate that only a different notice requirement will serve the interests of justice and the proper administration of justice.

Recommendation 3

We recommend that, subject to discretionary powers vested in the court to order otherwise in the interests of justice and the proper administration of justice, the new class action regime should adopt an opt-out approach. In other words, once the court certifies a case suitable for a class action, the members of the class, as defined in the order of court, would be automatically considered to be bound by the litigation, unless within the time limits and in the manner prescribed by the court order a member opts out.

This recommendation has been made on the basis of the information and discussion contained in this chapter. We would welcome views on whether the opt-out approach should be the default approach, subject to the powers of the court to order otherwise upon showing of strong grounds and, if not, what should be the proper approach.

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Chapter 5
The treatment of public law cases

Introduction

5.1 In this Chapter, we consider whether, in light of the special features of public law litigation in Hong Kong, including in particular the unique constitutional position prevailing under the Basic Law, the adoption of a class action regime such as we have proposed in Recommendations 1 to 3 is suitable, either generally or with modifications, for public law cases. We put forward, for public discussion, four possible options for class actions in public law litigation.

5.2 A challenge to the substantive or procedural lawfulness of an enactment or a decision, action or failure to act in relation to the exercise of a public function is made by way of an application for judicial review pursuant to section 21K(1) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) and order 53 of the Rules of the High Court. The procedure involves a two-stage process. The applicant must first apply for leave to move for judicial review. At the leave stage, the court will examine the application to see that (i) the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter under challenge, (ii) the case is reasonably arguable, and (iii) there has not been inappropriate delay in the making of the application. Once leave is granted, the applicant may proceed with a substantive application for judicial review.

5.3 In many situations, a public law decision on an application for judicial review may have wider ramifications beyond the individual applicant's case. By way of example, a challenge to the constitutionality of primary legislation will, if successful, generally result in a declaration of inconsistency with the Basic Law. Similarly, a challenge to the lawfulness of a Government policy or a judicial review seeking to enforce a legitimate expectation generated by a representation made by the Government will generally have consequences for a larger group of persons than the individual applicant in the judicial review. It is therefore pertinent to examine whether a class action regime, and in particular whether an opt-out model of such a regime, is appropriate in the context of public law litigation generally and in Hong Kong in particular.

The appropriateness of class action procedures to public law litigation generally

5.4 In jurisdictions which have a class action procedure, it is available in the context of both private and public law litigation. In fact, the
Ontario Law Reform Commission found that the largest proportion of class actions in the United States involved actions against governments arising from breaches of civil rights and claims for equitable remedies (such as injunctions or declarations) on the grounds that the government had wrongfully acted or refused to act and had thereby infringed the civil rights of the class as a whole.  

5.5 In Australia, class actions are also employed in judicial review proceedings despite the fact that the applicable legislation does not specifically refer to judicial review. As French J said in *Zhang de Yong v Minister of Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs* in relation to the Australian Federal class action regime:

"The new procedure was said to enable groups of people, whether they be shareholders or investors or people pursuing consumer claims, to obtain redress and do so more cheaply and efficiently than would be the case with individuals actions. There was no reference in the Second Reading Speech to the use of the representative action in judicial review proceedings ... Prior to and at the time of the enactment of the legislation, the emphasis of public discussion was on its application to possible consumer class actions and their impact on business. But there is nothing in the language of Pt IVA which limits its application to such actions. Nor is there anything to prevent its application to appropriate proceedings for an order of review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) or prerogative relief."  

(Emphasis added)

5.6 That case provides an illustration of the adoption of the class action procedure in public law litigation in the Federal Court of Australia. The action was brought on behalf of all persons who had been refused refugee status between March 1992 and June 1993. The representative plaintiff argued that the principles of natural justice conferred upon all persons applying for refugee status a legal right to an oral hearing by the relevant decision-maker. French J held that legal proceedings could be brought as class suits in the Federal Court. He also held that the claims of the class members were in respect of "the same, similar or related circumstances":

"In so holding, I have regard to the need for a purposive approach to the construction of s 33C(1)(b) [of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976], bearing in mind the utility of determining the common issue in this way. If the application were to succeed, all group members would be entitled to the offer of an oral hearing by the decision-maker .... If the application fails, then a principle applicable to each group member would be established, namely that there is not entitlement in any member of the group to an oral hearing by reason only of the fact that the

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member is an applicant for administrative review of the refusal to grant refugee status."

There was plainly an advantage in dealing with the claims of all persons who had been refused refugee status in the relevant period by way of one class action, so that the common issue of whether they were entitled to an oral hearing could be determined once and for all.

**Salient features of public law litigation: distinguishing the general from the particular**

5.7 Certain features of public law litigation call for special attention to be given to the procedural rules governing multi-party situations. One such feature is the fact that, in public law litigation, although there may be issues of law and/or facts which are common to the group, the individual circumstances of each claimant's case may be highly material to the outcome of the administrative decision-making process. A decision to allow a class action to proceed involves a balance of convenience and justice between on the one hand allowing individuals to fully engage the court's attention to their individual circumstances and on the other dealing first with common issues of law and/or facts before determining individual cases thereafter. In *Zhang de Yong*, it was held on the facts of the case that a class action was appropriate because of what were contended to be common questions of law or fact applicable to all of the group members. However, the individual circumstances of each case might have an important bearing on the outcome of the administrative decision, notwithstanding the existence of one or more common issues sufficient to justify the use of the class action procedure. The court noted the following:

"A challenge to the lawfulness of an administrative policy or practice affecting the exercise of statutory power may raise, as does this case, a narrow point for decision. **Individual claims in relation to particular determination under the power are left unheard if the representative action fails. The possibility arises of the extended principle of res judicata affecting issues wider than those ventilated in the representative proceedings.** Having regard to that possibility, the utility of the representative action in judicial review requires scrutiny. **The question must be asked in each case whether members of the group and the decision makers are likely to be better off with a determination which binds them all on one issue but fails to deal with the individual claims.** Where the lawfulness of a policy is contested by an individual, the test case may, pending an appeal, establish the law. However, it does not provide as firm a bulwark against re-litigation of the same point in like cases as does the determination in representative proceedings which

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3 As above. See also *Wu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs* (no 2) (1994) 51 FCR 232 and *Ling v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs* (unreported, Federal Court, Neaves J, 10 February 1994).
directly binds the decision-maker and members of the group. The costs and benefits of representative proceedings in the area of judicial review will have to be assessed on a case by case basis.” (Emphasis added)

5.8 As noted in the passage quoted above, an important consideration in determining the appropriateness of a class action procedure is the adverse consequence for individual group members arising from the operation of the extended doctrine of res judicata, in particular when there are significant points of difference as between the various individuals' claims. French J analysed the issue as follows:

"... The question whether the extended principle of res judicata is capable of application to representative proceedings confined as these have been to a common issue of law or fact remains open. Section 33Q [the court may appoint sub-groups within the group or give directions on the resolution of individual issues] contemplates the hiving off of individual claims when the common determination does not finally determine the claims of all group members. That may support a view that the extended principle may operate when the claims are not hived off under that section. In a case in which the group members have not raised individual claims but have been defined into the group on their related circumstances and the common issue, it is necessary that care be taken to ensure that claims based on individual circumstances of which the Court knows nothing are not prejudiced.” (Emphasis added)

5.9 This example illustrates the need to scrutinise closely the appropriateness of the class action procedure in the public law context and, if that procedure is thought suitable, to have regard to (and, if necessary, limit) the consequences of a determination of the claim of the representative applicant so that the subsequent pursuit of individual applications by other members of the represented class are permissible (albeit subject to the decision of the court on the common issue). If there is any possibility that a common issue of law or fact may prejudice any individual claim within the class, then, unless some method is found to prevent injustice to the individual by making sub-class orders or exclusionary orders for individuals who could not be accommodated within the class, a class action should not be ordered.

**A particular constitutional feature in Hong Kong**

5.10 In our deliberations over the appropriateness of a class action regime in the context of public law litigation in Hong Kong, we considered a special constitutional feature which is not present in other jurisdictions. This

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is Article 158 of the Basic Law, which provides:

"The power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress shall authorize the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to interpret on their own, in adjudicating cases, the provisions of this Law which are within the limits of the autonomy of the Region.

The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may also interpret other provisions of this Law in adjudicating cases. However, if the courts of the Region, in adjudicating cases, need to interpret the provisions of this Law concerning affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, or concerning the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region, and if such interpretation will affect the judgments on the cases, the courts of the Region shall, before making their final judgments which are not appealable, seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress through the Court of Final Appeal of the Region. When the Standing Committee makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned, the courts of the Region, in applying those provisions, shall follow the interpretation of the Standing Committee. However, judgments previously rendered shall not be affected."

5.11 An interpretation may be a free-standing interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress under Basic Law Article 158(1) or it may be an interpretation by the Standing Committee on a judicial reference mandated by Article 158(3). In either case, the interpretation is binding on and bound to be followed by the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. We have called the former type of interpretation a "free-standing" interpretation because the provision of the Basic Law under interpretation need not be the subject matter of any litigation. The latter type, arising under Article 158(3), requires the existence of a case before an HKSAR court.

5.12 Once made, the interpretation dates from 1 July 1997, since it will have declared what the law has always been (consistent with the common law declaratory theory of judicial decisions). However, in the case of an interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, whether on a judicial reference under Article 158(3) or on a free-standing basis under Article 158(1), applying the common law principle of finality, judgments previously rendered shall not be affected by the interpretation. In the Ng Siu

See Lau Kong Yung & Ors v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 300, at 326G-H and Ng Siu Tung & Ors v Director of Immigration (2002) 5 HKCFAR 1, at 24-25 (para 27).
See Lau Kong Yung, cited above, at 326D-E.
See Ng Siu Tung, cited above, at 24 (para 26) and 27 (para 37).
Tung Case,\textsuperscript{9} the Court of Final Appeal held that "judgments" in the phrase "judgments previously rendered" only covered the formal orders pronounced by the courts in determining litigation and did not extend to the ratio and reasoning of a judgment. A judgment therefore only bound the parties to the litigation but not strangers to the litigation. The latter only enjoyed any benefit of a judgment by virtue of the operation of precedent. If the value of the judgment as a precedent were overturned by a subsequent interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the judgment would no longer represent the law to be applied.

5.13 Since the principle that judgments previously rendered are not affected by an interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress only applies to the actual parties to concluded litigation, it is in the interests of individuals with a public law claim concerning the proper interpretation of the Basic Law to commence litigation to ensure that they are parties to a court judgment and therefore in a position to be protected from any subsequent interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress which may be adverse to their interests. This factor gives rise to case management issues and requires the consideration of the case for a class action regime in the context of public law litigation.

5.14 However, it might be argued that a class action regime adopting an opt-out model would effectively deprive an interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of any practical effect since all potential claimants would automatically be parties to the judgment previously rendered unless they opted out. It may be suggested that a class action regime of the type we have proposed in Recommendations 1 to 3 would become, by a side wind, a vehicle for what, in practical terms, amounts to a radical constitutional change. An alternative view which might be argued is that a class action regime of the type proposed does no such thing: the legal and constitutional status of an interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress as envisaged in the Basic Law remains unaltered. It will apply to any future litigation and is binding on the HKSAR courts. Whether that interpretation affects one person or 1,000 is irrelevant to the legal and constitutional position.

5.15 This particular feature of the constitutional position in Hong Kong forms the basic context of our discussion below.

Possible alternative approaches

5.16 In light of the special constitutional position in Hong Kong, it is difficult to draw direct assistance from the experience of other jurisdictions in relation to public law class actions. To deal with our particular constitutional situation, we have considered the following four options for the treatment of public law cases in a class action regime:

\textsuperscript{9} See Ng Siu Tung, cited above.
Option 1: Public law cases should be excluded from the general class action regime and dealt with separately, leaving the class action regime for private law cases only;

Option 2: The court should be given the discretion in a public law case to adopt either the opt-in or opt-out procedure, with no presumption in favour of the opt-out procedure (as is proposed in our Recommendations 1 to 3);

Option 3: Public law cases should follow the same opt-out model that we are recommending for general application (Recommendations 1 to 3), with additional certification criteria to be put in place to filter out public law cases that are not suitable for class action proceedings; and

Option 4: Public law cases should adopt an opt-in model, so that only those persons who have expressly consented to be bound by a decision in a class action will be treated as parties to that judgment.

The arguments for and against each option are set out below.

**Option 1: Exclusion of public law cases from the class action regime**

*Alternative approaches*

5.17 We have searched for an appropriate way to exclude public law cases from the class action regime. We found that there are a number of ways in which constitutional cases (or some of them) could be excluded from the general class action regime:

(a) exclude by legislation specified subject matter from the class action regime (along the lines of, for instance, section 486B of the Australian Migration Act 1958 and section 3(a) of the Israeli Class Actions Law 2006);

(b) limit class actions to actual members of the class and exclude those who do not have a direct cause of action (such as the restriction of an application for a Group Litigation Order to a claimant or a defendant pursuant to Part 19 III of the Civil Procedure Rules in England); or

(c) allow the courts to take into account possible adverse consequences for the public of allowing a class action against the government (as is done by, for instance, clause 8(b)(1) of the Class Actions Law of Israel).

5.18 Details of these alternative approaches can be found in our discussion of Option 3 below. These mechanisms do not necessarily result in
the exclusion of all public law proceedings from the general class action regime. Method (a) above only excludes specific public law subject matter from class action proceedings whilst method (b) only disallows the commencement of class action proceedings by legal persons who have neither a direct cause of action nor a direct basis for complaint. Method (c) is a residual discretion given to the courts to refuse to certify class action proceedings on the ground that such proceedings would risk "severe harm to the public". These are therefore ways of carving out some constitutional cases and would not exclude all public law proceedings from the class action regime. We discuss later in this chapter the particular difficulty which class actions may give rise to in relation to the Basic Law. Although we are not aware of any jurisdiction which adopts a blanket exclusion of all public law cases from the class action regime, there may be a need to do so in view of the Basic Law concern which we discuss.

*Arguments for and against the exclusion of public law cases from the class action regime*

5.19 We outlined in our discussion above the argument that consideration should be given excluding public law cases of a constitutional nature from the class action regime because a class action in such cases would in practical terms negate the effect of an interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Although there have to date been only three interpretations by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and it is reasonable to suppose that interpretations will continue to be made only in exceptional circumstances, the possibility of an interpretation can never be ruled out. It has therefore been suggested that it would be best to exclude constitutional public law cases from the proposed class action regime altogether. Because an interpretation would "bite" only on those who had yet to litigate, and because it is likely that a greater proportion of prospective claimants would litigate if a class action regime were available than would choose to do so on their own, the argument runs that excluding constitutional public law cases from the class action regime would mean that an interpretation would impact on a larger number of prospective claimants. There would therefore, it is said, be no diminution of the effect of the interpretation.

5.20 An added difficulty, however, is that it is not always possible to predict with certainty whether or not a Basic Law question will arise in the course of proceedings. If the concern expressed about the application of an NPC interpretation is to be met, it may therefore be necessary to exclude all public law cases from the class action regime. It has been suggested that the effects of such a general exclusion would be mitigated by existing case management techniques, such as the use of a test case. This will be discussed below.

5.21 A number of arguments can, however, be raised against the exclusion of public law cases. Firstly, it can be argued that the fact that an interpretation would be likely to impact on a smaller number of persons where a class action regime applied than where it did not does not affect the legal or
constitutional status or validity of the interpretation, nor can it reasonably be
said to amount to a "radical constitutional change" (see para 5.14 above). In
any case, the problem (if problem there be) is unlikely to arise in all but a tiny
handful of cases and does not justify excluding from the benefits of a class
action regime every claimant in a public law case. The rationale of any
class action regime is to enhance access to justice for all. The number of
cases which is likely to engage Article 158(3) of the Basic Law can be
expected to be tiny and it is open to question whether the scale of the
perceived problem is sufficient to outweigh the general public interest in
enhancing access to justice.

5.22 In practice, the experience of the right of abode litigation and the
adverse consequences for those who were not parties to the Hong Kong court
judgment which preceded the interpretation of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress would suggest that, in the absence of a class
action regime, each individual claimant would be likely to begin a separate
action. There would be an unseemly race by members of the class to obtain
judgment before the risk of an interpretation adverse to their interests.

5.23 Adopting a different approach for public law (as opposed to
private law) litigation might be perceived as "favouritism" towards government.
If it is thought that the interpretation issue poses a real difficulty, then a way
should be found to mitigate the constitutional problem while allowing the class
action to be available to all public law cases. It may be noted that a similar
discussion took place in Israel regarding the Class Action Law there and a
compromise was struck. Following the incremental approach taken in Israel
(where new causes of action in specific areas may be added over time to those
listed in the second addition to the Class Actions Law 2006), one possible
option could be to exclude public law proceedings from the class action regime
in the first instance (say the first five years) so that experience could be
gathered on private law class actions and a separate regime for multiple party
public law proceedings developed, bearing in mind the constitutional issues
discussed above.

The Group Litigation Order regime in England and Wales as a model for Hong
Kong

5.24 If it is decided that the class action regime should not be
applicable to public law cases, there is obviously still a need to give the courts
flexibility to deal with the issues involved in multi-party litigation. One
alternative would be to set up a new but separate regime modelled on the
Group Litigation Order ("GLO") procedure now in use in England.

5.25 The Civil Procedural Rules ("CPR") in England establish a
framework for the case management of "claims which give rise to common or
related issues of fact or law". They are intended to provide flexibility for the
court to deal with the particular problems created by these cases. The court
is empowered to make a GLO "where there are or are likely to be a number of

10 Rule 19.10.
claims giving rise to the GLO issues". The rules enable the court to manage the claims covered by the order in a co-ordinated way. The GLO will contain directions about the establishment of a "group register" on which the claims to be managed under the GLO will be entered and will specify the court ("the management court") which will manage the claims on the register. Judgment, orders and directions of the court will be binding on all claims within the GLO.

5.26 Directions given by the management court may include an order specifying the details to be included in a statement of case in order to show that the criteria for entry of the claim on the group register have been met. Paragraph 14.3 of the Practice Direction on Group Litigation indicates that a schedule of information on individual claims, or questionnaires, may be used to obtain the specific facts relating to each claimant on the group register. It will often be more cost effective than requiring each individual group litigant to prepare his/her own particulars of claim.

Test cases

5.27 Test cases under a GLO As described above in Chapter 2, under a GLO the management court is given case management powers which enable it to deal with generic issues by, for example, selecting particular claims as test claims. The relevant case law and the potential problems associated with the use of a test case as a procedural device for the handling of group litigation have been discussed above.

5.28 Alternatively, the court can proceed to determine issues arising out of individual cases as generic issues. We have considered the case of Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v David, Christine Addison & Ors, details of which have been set out in Chapter 2 of this paper.

5.29 The right of abode group litigation experience In Hong Kong, test cases were used as a means of handling public law litigation involving a constitutional challenge in the right of abode litigation: see Ng Ka Ling & Ors v. Director of Immigration and Chan Kam Nga & Ors v Director of Immigration.

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11 Rule 19.11.
12 Rule 19.12.
13 Rule 19.12(1)
14 Rules 19.13(b) and 19.15.
17 (1999) 2 HKCFAR 82.
5.30 Prior to the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong in July 1997 and shortly thereafter, a number of judicial review proceedings (i.e., HCAL 9, 13, 44 of 1997) were brought by persons claiming to have rights of abode pursuant to Article 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law. The court invited the legal representatives of the parties to comment on Mr Justice Keith's proposal for the speedy disposition of those cases and later applications. The court brought another similar application to the Department of Justice's notice. Department of Justice (DoJ) on behalf of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) responded to the Court’s proposals. Meanwhile, HCAL 60 of 1997 was commenced by three applicants. The DoJ was informed of the court's view that this case raised issues which would have been raised in the previous cases and also an additional issue in relation to para 1(2) of the new schedule 1 to the Immigration Ordinance introduced by the Immigration (Amendment) (No 2) Ordinance (No. 122 of 1997) (which limits eligibility of right of abode to Chinese citizens whose father or mother was settled or had right of abode in Hong Kong at the time of birth of the person or at any later time) and thus should be heard first in an expedited hearing towards the end of July 1997.

5.31 Clarke & Liu indicated in their correspondence to the DoJ that they were assigned by the Director of Legal Aid (“DLA”) to seek judicial review on behalf of about 54 other right of abode claimants, and that they intended to select a few representative cases to canvass all relevant issues. A directions hearing was held before Mr Justice Keith (who was then in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List of the Court of First Instance) during which the questions of selecting appropriate representative cases was discussed. A number of suitable representative applicants were selected to test the legal issues involved so that it would not be necessary for the court to hear each of the cases then pending before the court and these other pending cases could be stayed. As a result of this hearing, the court ordered that no further steps be taken in HCAL 9, 13, 44, 56 and 60 of 1997 until such representative cases which were to be identified and selected had been heard and determined.

5.32 At the request of the DLA, the Director agreed that for those claimants who had been granted legal aid but by whom legal proceedings had not be instituted, the Director would not remove them from Hong Kong pending the outcome of the test cases. Correspondence was exchanged between the DoJ and Clarke & Liu on the selection of appropriate representative cases. Eventually, the parties agreed that four representative cases involving five representative applicants would be selected for determination by Mr Justice Keith.

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18 Article 24(2) of the Basic Law provides:
"The permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be (1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; (2) Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; (3) Persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of those residents listed in categories (1) and (2); ...".
5.33 The hearing of the representative cases took place before Mr Justice Keith as scheduled. Apart from HCAL 9, 13, 44, 56 and 60 of 1997, proceedings in HCAL 79 and 107 of 1997 and HCAL 5 of 1998 were also stayed pending the determination of Mr Justice Keith in the representative cases.

5.34 Those cases eventually culminated in the judgments of the CFA in the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga cases. Subsequently, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law which had the effect of reversing a substantial part of the CFA’s judgments in those cases. Thereafter, a group of over 5,000 claimants sought to obtain the benefit of those earlier judgments in the Ng Siu Tung case, in part arguing that they were to be treated as parties to the original cases. In this context, the CFA had occasion to examine the effect of the earlier test cases and held:

"In Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga, the questions at issue were contentious questions of public law. They were understood generally to be ‘test cases’. It could be assumed that the principles declared, being the answers to the questions of law, in the test cases would be applied to persons in similar position. That result would come about because effect would be given by the government and its agencies in other cases to the decisions and, if need be, by the courts applying the doctrine of precedent."

5.35 In the light of the above dicta, it is suggested that, in so far as constitutional cases are concerned, the adoption of a test case approach provides a possible mechanism for dealing with multi-party public law litigation. However, given the need for individuals to be parties to a relevant judgment in order to benefit from the principle that judgments previously rendered are not affected by a subsequent interpretation under Article 158 of the Basic Law, it may reasonably be anticipated that multi-party public law litigation may involve very large numbers of claimants. For this reason, a test case regime on its own may not be sufficient and we consider that further case management powers would need to be given to the courts to enable such litigation to be efficiently and effectively managed.

General management powers of the courts

5.36 In various class action regimes the court is given broad general management powers so that the complexity of most class actions can be dealt with and the rights and obligations of those not before the court can be determined fairly. For example, article 1045 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure provides:

"The Court may, at any stage of the proceedings in a class action,"
prescribe measures designed to hasten their progress and to simplify the proof, if they do not prejudice a party of the members."

5.37 Similarly, section 12 of the Ontario Class Proceedings Act provides:

"12. The court, on the motion of a party or class member, may make any order it considers appropriate respecting the conduct of a class proceeding to ensure its fair and expeditious determination and, for that purpose, may impose such terms on the parties as it considers appropriate."

5.38 Having considered the class action legislation in a number of jurisdictions, the South African Law Commission proposed the following draft provision governing procedural matters in the case management court in a class action regime:

"9. (1) The court in which the class action is prosecuted shall –

(a) give directions as to the procedure to be followed in the conduct of the class action;

(b) delineate the common issues to be decided in the class action;

(c) determine whether there are individual issues that require separate adjudication and, if so, give directions as to the procedure to be followed in order to adjudicate such issues; …"

5.39 In this context, it is relevant to note that a key proposal arising from the recent review of civil justice in Hong Kong by the Chief Justice’s Working Party on Civil Justice Reform (CJR) was to give express case management powers to the court. Amendments have been made to both primary and subsidiary legislation as a result of the CJR’s proposals. Order 1A has been added to the Rules of the High Court (RHC) to set out the underlying objectives (ie increasing cost-effectiveness in the court’s procedures, as expeditious disposal of cases as is reasonably practicable, reasonable proportionality and procedural economy in the conduct of cases, ensuring fairness between the parties, facilitating settlement and fair distribution of court’s resources), with the primary aim of securing the "just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties".

5.40 The court must seek to give effect to the underlying objectives when exercising its powers or interpreting the rules. The parties and lawyers must assist the court to further the underlying objectives, and those underlying objectives also require active case management by the court.

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21 Order 1A(2) of the RHC.
22 Order 1A(3)&(4) of the RHC.
5.41 Active case management includes the court encouraging the parties to co-operate with each other, fixing the time-table, identifying, isolating or consolidating the issues, encouraging the parties to seek Alternative Dispute Resolution, dealing with the case without requiring the parties to attend, etc.23

5.42 Order 1B has been added to the RHC to set out some express powers of case management, including in particular the court's power to make orders on its own motion with or without first hearing the parties (in the latter case the parties have a right to apply to set aside the order), and to give procedural directions by way of orders nisi if the court thinks the parties unlikely to object to such directions.

5.43 Order 25 of the RHC has been redrafted to replace Summons for Directions with Case Management Summons and Conference procedures to facilitate active case management. Prescribed questionnaires are to be filed by all parties within 28 days after the close of pleadings. Parties who are not able to come to an agreement on the court directions to be given on case management may take out a summons seeking directions. The court is empowered to give directions and fix a case management time-table for the steps to be taken up until the date of the trial. The time-table will include milestone dates and non-milestone dates (only the latter may be varied by consent summons). Order 25 of the RHC also deals with fixing case management conferences and/or pre-trial review, etc.

5.44 The various amendments to the RHC come into effect in April 2009.

5.45 With the benefit of the new case management powers introduced as a result of the CJR, it may be that a scheme for public law litigation in Hong Kong could be modelled on the GLO in England (even in the absence of a new class action regime). In this model, the court should be empowered and encouraged to exercise a flexible management regime so that multi-party public law litigation can be dealt with efficiently, cost-effectively and fairly.

Option 2: Judicial discretion to adopt opt-in or opt-out approach in public law cases

5.46 Proposals have been put forward in England, South Africa and New Zealand that the court should have the option of adopting either an opt-in or opt-out procedure in any given case, depending on the circumstances. The tentative reform proposal in New Zealand was discussed in Chapter 2. In England, Lord Woolf stated in the Access to Justice (Final Report):

"The court should have powers to progress the MPS ["multi-party situation"] on either an 'opt-out' or an 'opt-in' basis, whichever is...

23 Order 1A(4) of the RHC.
most appropriate to the particular circumstances and whichever contributes best to the overall disposition of the case. In some circumstances it will be appropriate to commence an MPS on an ‘opt-out’ basis and to establish an ‘opt-in’ register at a later stage.\textsuperscript{44}

5.47 The Civil Justice Council’s (CJC) November 2008 report on "Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions" took a similar line to that of the Woolf Report and considered that both the opt-in and opt-out approaches to collective actions had their merits. Key Finding 9 of the CJC’s report was that:

"There should be \textbf{no presumption} as to whether collective claims should be brought on an opt-in or opt-out basis. The Court should decide, according to new rules, practice directions and/or guidelines, which mechanism is the most appropriate for any particular claim taking into account all the relevant circumstances. In assessing whether opt-in or opt-out is most appropriate the court should be particularly mindful of the need to ensure that neither claimants’ nor defendants’ substantive legal rights should be subverted by the choice of procedure."\textsuperscript{25} (original emphasis)

5.48 The CJC therefore recommended that it should be possible to bring collective claims on an opt-in or an opt-out basis, subject to court certification. Where an action is brought on an opt-out or an opt-in basis, the limitation period for class members should be suspended pending a defined change of circumstance.\textsuperscript{26}

5.49 The South African Law Commission recommended that the proposed legislation on class actions should provide for the notice requirement to class members and prospective class members. After a thorough review of the various notice regimes, the South African Law Commission found in favour of the discretionary approach of the Ontario Law Reform Commission and recommended that the court’s discretion should be further extended by providing a choice between an opt-in notice (in limited circumstances), an opt-out notice and no notice at all. The underlying reasons are set out as follows:

"\textbf{We believe that the discretionary approach adopted by the Ontario Commission is appropriate for the reasons stated. However, it is recommended that the court’s discretion should be further extended by providing a choice between opt-in notice (in limited circumstance), opt-out notice, and no notice at all. The reason for disagreeing with the rejection of opt-in proceedings is}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Lord Woolf, \textit{Access to Justice} (Final Report, 1996) at 236, para 46.
\item \textsuperscript{26} See above, at 145.
\end{itemize}
that there are circumstances in which the members of the class have such substantial claims that they might suffer severe prejudice in the event of the action failing or not being as effectively prosecuted as it could be. Such a judgment would make the individual claims res judicata and prevent any further litigation on the same issue. In these circumstances it is important to ensure that the claimants have knowledge of the action and the way in which it is being prosecuted if they are to be bound by it. [27] (Emphasis added)

5.50 The South African Law Commission also made it clear that the opt-in notice requirement should only be applied as an exception to the general opt-out rule and should be ordered only in limited circumstances. It discussed the US regime and stated its reason why the opt-in notice should be an exception rather than the rule as follows:

"While it is suggested that requiring opt-in notice should be an option open to the court, it is accepted that the giving of this kind of notice should be the exception rather than the rule. The reason for preferring opt-out to opt-in procedures which is attributed to the drafters for the 1966 amendment [to Rule 23 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] is entirely valid. A large percentage of South African society is illiterate, ignorant and impecunious because they have been denied the benefit of a good education. The need to ensure that benefits flowing from class actions accrue to such people is probably far greater in South Africa than in the United States. For this reason it is recommended that the court should order opt-in notice only where the court is of the opinion that the class members may be significantly prejudiced by the fact they will be bound by a judgment given in an action which may not have come to their notice. The kind of case in which it is envisaged that there would be significant prejudice would be, for instance, where a large number of people suffer damages as a result of the same incident, such as an airplane crash. Where the individual claims are sufficiently large to make it probable that they would enforce their own claims then they should not be bound by a judgment unless they have expressly consented to be bound." [28] (Emphasis added)

5.51 It could be argued that if the class action regime in Hong Kong were to allow the court to decide whether the opt-in or opt-out procedure would apply in any given case, this would enable the court to take into account the possible constitutional prejudice caused to the HKSAR by a binding judgment given in an opt-out class action, assuming that the HKSAR Government could

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say at the outset that the Basic Law question was likely to attract an interpretation by the Standing Committee. On the other hand, once it became known that the Government was asking for the opt-in procedure to apply because of a possible interpretation by the Standing Committee, that would itself be likely to cause large numbers of litigants to opt in. It may therefore make little practical difference whether an opt-out or an opt-in procedure is adopted.

5.52 A further question to consider is whether it is appropriate to give the court a discretion to decide in public law cases in which Basic Law provisions are not invoked (and the potential problem of an interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress does not therefore arise) whether an opt-out or an opt-in regime should apply. In such cases, adopting an opt-in procedure would merely add to the cost of the action.

5.53 A final issue is that, if the court is given a discretion, principles will need to be developed as to how that discretion is to be exercised. The court will have to be guided by a balance between justice and convenience, and such consideration as is thought appropriate of the NPC interpretation issue we have discussed above.

Option 3: Opt-out model for class actions in public law cases

5.54 If an opt-out model for class actions is adopted, absent members would be included in the class and a subsequent interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress would have no practical effect upon them. In practical terms, the number of those who are parties to a class action judgment where the opt-out procedure is adopted will inevitably be greater than if the litigation had been conducted under the opt-in procedure: the individual must take positive steps to join the class under the latter procedure; he need do nothing under the former.

5.55 Even if an opt-out model were to be adopted for class actions in Hong Kong, there may be a need to introduce additional criteria for certifying public law actions. We have considered a number of possible restrictions to the application of a general class action regime to public law cases with regard to the subject matter, the identity of the applicant for certification of a class action, or possible adverse consequences for the public of allowing a class action against the government.

5.56 (a) exclude certain subject matter Section 486B of the Migration Act 1958 (Aus) (which was introduced with effect from 1 October 2001) provides that class actions are not permitted in migration proceedings (that is, proceedings which raise an issue in connection with visas, deportation, or removal of unlawful non-citizens).29

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29 The amendment reflected the Federal Government’s policy intention to seek to address the increasing use of class action litigation by people with no lawful authority to remain in Australia to obtain a bridging visa and thereby substantially extend their time in Australia. Class actions were being used to encourage large numbers of people to litigate in circumstances where they
Section 3(a) of the Israeli Class Actions Law 2006 provides that no class action may be submitted for certification as a representative claim "unless it is a suit as specified in the second addition [to this Law] or in a matter set in an explicit instruction of the law, which allows for the submitting of a class action". The second addition to the Class Actions Law sets out a list of causes of action in respect of which a plaintiff may request that a court certify a claim as representative. The final item on the list, item 11, provides that a request for certification of a claim as representative may be made vis-a-vis claims against a state agency for return of unlawfully collected moneys, including taxes, fees, or other mandatory payments. Ms Shirley Avner of the Israeli Ministry of Justice expressed the view to us that the most efficient filter to weed out unsuitable administrative law cases was the adoption of a limited, incremental approach where new causes of action in specific areas could be added over time to the list after careful deliberation. Therefore, the filing of suits as class actions should be confined to the causes of action listed in the second addition to the Class Actions Law.30

Thus, precedent elsewhere demonstrates that, by means of specialist legislation, certain types of class actions could be excised from the ambit of a generic Hong Kong class action.

(b) limit class actions to members of the class

Professor Mulheron has suggested that, if a Hong Kong class action regime were to be drafted so as to require that any class action in relation to a public law matter must be brought by a member of the class, then purely "ideological claimants" would be disallowed. By "ideological claimant" is meant a legal person (such as a trade union or community organisation) which does not have any direct cause of action or a direct basis for complaint, other than provisions contained in its articles of association indicating linkage with the subject matter of the proceedings. As a practical matter, this is a way of limiting certain public interest litigation (especially if the class member is subject to a security for costs order with which he cannot comply) to parties with direct causes of action. In Hong Kong, standing requirements are in order 53 rule 3(7) of the Rules of the High Court which provides that: "the court shall not grant leave [to apply for judicial review] unless it considers the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates". "Ideological claimants" would have to satisfy these existing requirements before they could start any public law litigation. However, they would have to further pass the "direct interest" hurdle before they could be considered a member of the class.

In England, para 3.1 of Part 19B of the Practice Direction

would not otherwise have litigated. It was believed that large numbers of people were being encouraged to participate in class actions in order to obtain a visa. They did not have a lawful entitlement to be in Australia but used class actions in order to access a bridging visa (see the submissions of the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs as summarised in paras 1.6-1.15 of Joint Standing Committee on Migration of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Review of Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No.2) 2000, (October 2000).

30 Email to the Secretary of the Sub-committee dated 17 May 2009 from Shirley Avner, Advocate, Head Counseling Assistant, Ministry of Justice, Israel.
provides that any application for a Group Litigation Order (GLO) under Part 19 III of the Civil Procedure Rules may be made only by a claimant or a defendant. Therefore any claimant under the GLO must be a class member. That procedure is therefore not available to an "ideological claimant".

5.61 If the approach suggested by Professor Mulheron were adopted in Hong Kong, a public law case could not be brought in Hong Kong by a claimant representing a class of claimants unless the individual claimant himself had a direct cause of action. While this approach would exclude certain public law cases from the scope of a class action regime, it would seem difficult to justify excluding non-class member claimants from public law cases but not, for instance, from private actions on consumer or environmental issues. While it might be possible to exclude public law litigation from a generic class action regime by means of a specific legislative exclusion or by requiring a class action to be brought by a "member of a class", we do not recommend proceeding in this way, as this would be a piecemeal approach.

5.62 (c) allow the courts to take account of possible adverse consequences for the public We have also considered the provisions of the Israeli Class Actions Law 2006 which allow the court, in deciding whether or not to approve an application for a class action against the state, to consider the possible adverse consequences for the public of allowing the litigation to proceed by way of a class action. Opponents of the use of class actions against the state in Israel argue that a distinction can be drawn between the state and other legal entities in this context. They argue that there are a number of factors which should legitimately exclude the possibility of class actions against the state:

(a) in Israel, there exists an alternative, superior mechanism for protecting the kind of public goals that representative actions are intended to attain in other jurisdictions, namely, direct petitioning of the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, in matters pertaining to the legality of actions and decisions of the state;

(b) The inability to bring class actions against the state does not undermine the existing rights of Israeli litigants to sue the state, in the same way as any other entity, for any individual damage caused; and

(c) The possibility of compelling state authorities by way of a class action to return unlawfully collected dues, taxes, fees or other mandatory payments would not only cause havoc for public administration (particularly for local authorities) but would be contrary to the interests of the public, as funds collected by state authorities are used to serve public interests, and not for private gain.
5.63 The Class Actions Law of Israel was passed on 12 March 2006. The national report submitted by Amichai Magen and Peretz Segal to the Globalization of Class Actions Conference pointed out that the provision represents:

"a compromise between proponents and opponents [of the availability of class actions against the state] where, on the one hand representative action against the state has been included in the list of causes of action which can be pursued by means of representative suits, while on the other hand, the Law contains a number of instruments designed to address the concerns voiced by opponents by granting the state ... protection."\(^{31}\)

5.64 Clause 8(b)(1) of the Class Actions Law of Israel provides that where:

"A request for approval [of a class action] was submitted against the state, one of its authorities, a local authority or a corporation lawfully established, and the court was convinced that the very fact of the suit being managed as a class action may cause severe harm to the public in need of the defendant's service or the public in general versus the benefit expected to come to the group members and the public by managing the suit in this way, and the damage cannot be prevented by way of approving changes as aforesaid in clause 13 [which empowers the court to approve a class action in such changed form as it deems necessary to ensure a fair and efficient management of the class action], the court is allowed to take this into consideration when deciding whether to approve a class action;"

5.65 Ms Shirley Avner of the Israeli Ministry of Justice informed us that clause 8(b)(1) of the 2006 Class Actions Law evolved from similar tests that were set out in specific Israeli laws in relation to class actions against banks and insurance companies. No reference was made to overseas experience during the legislative process. Ms Avner advised us that there have been few court cases which have considered and interpreted the "severe harm to the public" test. In each case, the court has rejected the request for certification for other reasons, such as failure to exhaust all other legal remedies (especially in suits against the tax authorities, since in Israel there are special appeal committees), or the fact that the suit does not rely on one of the causes of action specified in the second addition to the 2006 Class Actions Law. There have been no cases where changes to the suit have been approved under clause 13 to prevent the "severe harm to the public" which would otherwise be caused by a class action. If a similar provision were to be adopted in Hong Kong, it might be argued that the possible precipitation of a constitutional dilemma would constitute "severe harm to the public" on the

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facts of the case and would therefore be sufficient to justify the exclusion of class action proceedings in a constitutional case against the government.

5.66 The opt-out approach creates a more all-embracing class, including its silent members. It may be argued that a class action regime does not invalidate an interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress under Article 158(3) of the Basic Law. Apart from restricting the application of a general class action regime to public law cases in the ways discussed above, we have also considered practical steps which could be taken when a public law case comes up for certification. If the HKSAR Government considers that the Basic Law question is likely to be interpreted by the Standing Committee, a temporary stay of the application might be sought and granted upon terms which would preserve the status quo for all parties. The Hong Kong courts will in any event be bound by the interpretation in subsequent cases. On the other hand, it involves the HKSAR Government indicating a likelihood of interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. It might be argued that this suggestion creates some difficulty since references to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress can come about in two distinct ways: either because of the judicial reference mandated by Article 158(3) or by a free-standing interpretation under Article 158(1). Expecting the HKSAR Government to announce an intention to seek an interpretation where the relevant Basic Law provision is not an excluded provision which would require a judicial reference mandated by Article 158(3) might be thought to be unrealistic. Moreover, the announcement of such an intention itself might well precipitate a constitutional dilemma.

**Option 4: Opt-in model for class actions in public law cases**

5.67 The last option we have considered is to adopt the opt-in model as the default position for multi-party public law litigation in Hong Kong, so that only those persons who have expressly consented to be bound by a decision in a class action will be treated as parties to that judgment. This would enable and facilitate multi-party public law litigation in Hong Kong, while at the same time avoiding the possible constitutional difficulty to which we have referred.

5.68 As the opt-in model would not bar an individual who has not opted in to the class proceedings from subsequently litigating over the same issue, it is unlikely that this model could be said to interfere with the right to access to court protected under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights and the Basic Law. In the circumstances, the adoption of opt-in procedures for public law class actions would be unlikely to give rise to any objections under Article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights or Article 35 of the Basic Law (access to the courts), or under Articles 6 and 105 of the Basic Law (protection of property rights).
Conclusions

5.69 We believe there is a clear need to devise procedures to cater for group litigation in public law cases. We further believe that the present separation between public law and private law cases should be maintained. At present, public law cases are initiated in the Court of First Instance of the High Court and are governed by Section 21K(1) of the High Court Ordinance and Order 53 of the Rules of the High Court. We recommend that there be no change to this basic system and that any group litigation regime should be built upon it. The minimum which should be achieved by any such regime should be to give the court discretion to devise suitable machinery for a multi-party public law action, by way of test cases or the resolution of issues generic to all the claimants, in the light of the experience of the Group Litigation Order in England and class actions elsewhere. We do not favour such a piecemeal approach.

5.70 We have identified and discussed in this chapter the following four possible alternative approaches for the treatment of public law cases in a class action regime:

Option 1: Public law cases should be excluded from the general class action regime and a separate system for multi-party public law proceedings should be set up, leaving the class action regime for private law cases only.

Option 2: The court should be given the discretion in a public law case to adopt either the opt-in or opt-out procedure, with no presumption in favour of the opt-out procedure (as is proposed in our Recommendations 1 to 3);

Option 3: Public law cases should follow the same opt-out model that we are recommending for general application (Recommendations 1 to 3), with additional certification criteria to be put in place to filter out public law cases that are not suitable for class action proceedings; and

Option 4: Public law cases should adopt an opt-in model, so that only those persons who have expressly consented to be bound by a decision in a class action will be treated as parties to that judgment.

5.71 Our discussion of these options has taken account of Hong Kong’s unique constitutional circumstances and the significance of Article 158 of the Basic Law. We have not yet reached any firm conclusion on the various issues raised in this chapter and would welcome the community’s views before we consider these questions further.
Chapter 6

Choice of plaintiff and avoidance of potential abuse

Introduction

6.1 We consider that where there is a risk in a class action that the successful defendant will not be able to recover his costs from an impecunious plaintiff acting as the class representative, appropriate protection should be put into place against such unsuccessful claims. A related question arises from the Australian experience, where the law firms acting for the representative in class actions have had to deal with a large number of procedural disputes raised by the defendant.¹ The funding of indigent plaintiffs is an issue which needs to be addressed by any class action regime. We will set out our views on the funding issue in Chapter 8 of this paper.

6.2 To avoid abuse of the process of the court and to ensure that those put at risk of litigation should be fairly protected, we believe that procedural safeguards should be established. The feasibility of relying on the usual principle of abuse of the process of the court is examined. We have considered whether funding proof should be provided upon certification of a class action by the representative. We have also studied the applicability to class actions of the established principles on security for costs so as to strike the right balance in allowing reasonable access to justice by indigent litigants whilst at the same time giving sufficient protection to defendants.

The problem identified

6.3 It is a general feature of all class action regimes that if the class loses, the class members enjoy specific and unilateral costs immunity. This

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¹ The situation is described by the Australian courts as follows: "there is a disturbing trend that is emerging in representative proceedings which is best brought to an end. I refer to the numerous interlocutory applications [lodged by defendants], including interlocutory appeals, that occur in such proceedings. … By giving appropriate directions the court can ensure that the parties get on with the litigation and do not become bogged down in what are often academic or sterile arguments about pleadings, particulars, practices and procedures. It is not unknown for respondents in class actions to do whatever is necessary to avoid a trial, usually by causing the applicants to incur prohibitive costs. The court should be astute to ensure that such tactics are not successful". (Bright v Femcare Ltd (2002) 195 ALR 574, at 607).

"many class actions become bogged down by interminable and expensive interlocutory applications and protracted and even more expensive appeals from interlocutory orders" (Bray v F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd (2003) 200 ALR 607, at 660).
immunity is statutorily provided in Australia, Ontario and British Columbia. However costs are generally awarded against the representative plaintiff in an unsuccessful class action. In such circumstances, there is a strong incentive on the part of the class members to structure class action proceedings so as to avoid wealthy class members paying adverse costs. If the defendant wins the action (or wins the certification battle at the outset), and obtains an award of costs in its favour, it can easily be confronted with significant legal costs, which cannot be recovered. This was recognised by Senator Vanstone in the Australian parliamentary debates concerning the enactment of the costs immunity provision for class members (section 43(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (FCA Act). Senator Vanstone said:

"The coalition supports the general principle that a court should not be able to award costs against a person on whose behalf a proceeding has been commenced, especially since that person could have been joined to the action without their knowledge or consent. However, we believe there is scope for abuse. For example, relative wealthy members of a class who are considering bringing an action could deliberately choose an impecunious representative party. Then, if the action is unsuccessful and it is only the representative party which or who can be liable for costs, the defendant will not be able to recover any costs. Therefore, we believe that the court should have discretion in exceptional circumstances to award costs against persons on whose behalf a proceeding has been commenced. Obviously this would only apply when required in the interests of justice." (Emphasis added)

6.4 The fact that the representative claimant may be poorly-funded also has ramifications in other ways (eg who is going to pay for the costs of the opt-out notice if the class action is allowed to progress and an opt-out notice is thus required?) Individual notices to class members whose identities are known, and media advertisements of the class action, can be expensive.

6.5 There are four ways in which the indigent representative claimant issue can be handled, either within the class action regime itself or by recourse to the usual civil procedural rules. They are discussed in the following paragraphs.

**Reliance on vexatious/abusive rules of court**

6.6 Deliberately choosing a "straw" claimant with no financial means could be construed as vexatious and abusive conduct, thereby bringing the proceedings to a halt on that basis. Whilst no cases can be found in Australia

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2 Federal Court Act (Aus), 22 33Q, 33R and 43(1A).
3 Class Proceedings Act (Ont), section 31(2).
4 Class Proceedings Act (BC), section 37(4).
5 Parliamentary Debates, Senate (Cth), November 24, 1992, 3348.
or Canada where the proceedings have been stopped on that basis, it is acknowledged as a possible ground of objection.

6.7 Notably, this argument was run by the defendants in the Australian case of *Cook v Pasminco Ltd (No 2)*, where an undischarged bankrupt was chosen as the representative plaintiff. The propriety of avoiding costs liabilities has been considered by Lindgren J:

"But faced with a number of potential representative parties, solicitors are not obliged to make a choice in the interests of the prospective respondent. No doubt a variety of factors may lead to one person rather than another becoming representative party, such as the proximity of the person to the solicitors' office; ease of communication between the solicitors and the person; degree of interest and involvement; likely performance as a witness; the facts of the individual cases.

Assume now that one prospective representative party is a person whose means appear to be sufficient to meet, wholly or partially, an adverse costs order, while another is almost insolvent. Solicitors are not subject to any legal or ethical obligation to choose the former. Certainly they could not be criticised for choosing the latter. It may even be suggested (I express no view) that they owe a duty to the former to choose the latter, unless other factors suggest a different choice."6 (Emphasis added)

6.8 The Australian court was not prepared to draw adverse inferences as to why an undischarged bankrupt was chosen as the representative plaintiff in that case. A more critical stance towards the structuring of class action to avoid liability for costs can, however, be found in the Canadian case of *Sturner v Beaverton (Town)*, where Middleton J said in respect of a representative proceeding:

"In this case it is not said that Hamilton 'merely has an interest in the suit'. It is said and shewn that it is his suit and that he has been guilty of something in the nature of barratry and maintenance, because, desiring to try his own right, he has procured this man of straw to allow the litigation to be brought in his name.

This, as the cases show, is an abuse of the process of the Court, and I think a contempt of a most serious character, because the Court, which is called into existence to administer justice, is being used as a tool and instrument by which an injury is inflicted, it is said, it can in no way redress. …

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Can there be a fraud which this Court ought to visit more strongly than the conduct pursued in this case, in which, in order to avoid the payment of the costs of a doubtful litigation, to which the plaintiff might be made liable, the real plaintiff procures a pauper to become the nominal plaintiff …?" (Emphasis added)

6.9 This passage was cited with approval by Dawson J in Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd. In this case, the High Court of Australia held that the Supreme Court of Queensland had the power to order costs against the receivers and managers of two insolvent companies that were not parties to the litigation in question. In so holding, the majority justices stated that it is:

"appropriate to recognise a general category of case in which an order for costs should be made against a non-party … . That category of case consists of circumstances where the party to the litigation is an insolvent person or man of straw, where the non-party has played an active part in the conduct of the litigation and where the non-party… has an interest in the subject of the litigation. Where the circumstances of a case fall within that category, an order for costs should be made against the non-party if the interests of justice require that it be made." (Emphasis added)

6.10 In the light of the above, it is always open to a court to draw that inference or impose such an obligation if the sense of frustration of the defendant sufficiently convinces the court that a "straw plaintiff" is being used to shield more financially viable class members from costs orders. However, we have come to the view that the usual vexatious/abusive provisions of the court rules and the principles distilled from case law are not sufficiently effective because they are not aimed at tackling the problem of impecunious class representatives. Instead, we prefer the following options which set out qualifying criteria for certification.

The representative certification criterion

6.11 One of the certification criteria in any opt-out class action regime is the "adequacy of the representative claimant". This has been held to include that the representative claimant has the ability to satisfy any adverse costs order that might be awarded against it. If the representative claimant has no means of proving to the court that it can do that, then certification of the class action may be disallowed (or at least with that particular representative claimant).

7 (1912) 2 DLR 501.
6.12 The financial resources of the representative claimant have figured in the assessment of the adequacy of the representative at the certification stage in cases from both Commonwealth and US jurisdictions. In the case of *Fehringer v Sun Media Corp*, the Ontario court was of the view that the class representative's financial resources should be a relevant consideration in determining whether he or she will be an adequate representative. It was held that:

"the court must be satisfied as to the financial ability of the representative plaintiff to bear the expense that is necessarily involved for the proper prosecution of a class action…. The absence of such evidence leaves the court without an essential element necessary to conclude that the proposed representative plaintiff would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class." \(^9\) (Emphasis added)

### Funding proof at certification

6.13 We are of the view that a new Hong Kong class action regime should also contain an explicit provision that the representative must prove to the satisfaction of the court that suitable funding and costs-protection arrangements (on the part of the representative claimant and/or his lawyers) have been made for the litigation. This type of enquiry could feasibly form part of the certification enquiry.

6.14 Although this explicit criterion has not been enacted in any of the class action regimes we have reviewed, we consider that it does bear some similarity to the requirement, in the US regime, of rule 23(g)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that the court must appoint a class counsel who, it is satisfied, will "fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class". Under rule 23(g)(1)(C)(i), the court must explicitly consider the "resources counsel will commit to representing the class". This provision is unique amongst the class actions statutes. By analogy, it seems reasonable to ensure (by means of an explicit provision in the legislation establishing the class action regime) that the court should be satisfied of the ability of the class representative to satisfy any adverse costs order, should it lose.

### Security for costs

6.15 In the context of class actions, the deliberate structuring of a representative proceeding under Part 4A of the *FCA Act* so as to immunise solvent class members from an order for costs may result in the making of a security for costs order.\(^10\) In *Ryan v Great Lakes Council*, the court observed:

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\(^9\) (2002), 27 CPC (5th) 155 (SCJ), at para 35.

"If the group members or some of them were impecunious companies or persons ordinarily resident outside Australia and a 'person of straw' had been deliberately chosen to be the representative party, it might be appropriate to order that the representative party provide security and that the proceeding be stayed until the security was provided."\(^1\)

6.16 Law reform agencies held different views on whether the defendant should have a general right to make an application for security for costs. Some strongly opposed this\(^1\) while others were in support.\(^1\) Professor Mulheron commented that:

"The purpose of security for costs rule is to enable a successful defendant to be partially protected where party and party costs are awarded against the losing representative plaintiff; and if security is not awarded, this may well cause the defendant considerable hardship if it is eventually successful and cannot recover those costs. On the other hand, the practical effect of allowing security for costs could be to deter meritorious claims where the representative plaintiff seeks to represent others similarly positioned, is not well-off, and has only a modest personal claim."\(^2\)

6.17 The Australian Commonwealth Parliament expressly provides in section 33ZG of the FCA Act that:

"Except as otherwise provided by this Part, nothing in this Part affects:

…

(c) The operation of any law relating to

…

(v) security for costs."

6.18 Section 56 of the FCA Act empowers the Federal Court to order security for costs in an amount and at a time it specifies. The relevant rules governing the furnishing of security for costs can be found in Order 28 of the Federal Court Rules.\(^3\) The principles that may be distilled from the Australian case law are summarised as follows:\(^4\)

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\(^{13}\) South African Law Commission, The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law (Working Paper No 57, 1995), at 5.43, was in favour of a security for costs regime provided that the court should consider when exercising its discretion in relation to security for costs whether the class proceeding was a test case, raised a novel point of law or involved a matter of public interest; see also South African Law Commission, Report on The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in South African Law, para 5.17.5.


\(^{15}\) Order 28 rule 3 of the Federal Court Rules provides: "Cases for security
(a) Ordinarily a representative party will sue for itself and others. If so, the circumstances described in O28 r3(1)(b) of the Federal Court Rules (i.e., an applicant is suing, not for the applicant’s own benefit, but for the benefit of some other person) will not exist;

(b) Where the applicant is a corporation, the Federal Court exercises its discretion to order security for costs under either section 1335 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or section 56 of the FCA Act;

(c) Where the applicant is a natural person, the Federal Court exercises its discretion to order security for costs under section 56(1);

(d) The fact that group members have an immunity to costs orders under section 43(1A) of the FCA Act is irrelevant to the determination of an application for security for costs under section 56(1);

(e) A representative proceeding is brought for the benefit of others. This is a factor which may favour making an order for security for costs;

(f) An impecunious natural person may be ordered to provide security for costs. The traditional rule that security for costs will not be ordered against a natural person by reason only of his impecuniousness (as poverty is no bar to a litigant), does not apply.

(g) Even if the traditional rule against ordering that security be given by an impecunious natural person survived the enactment of section 56 of the FCA Act, it has little relevance to representative proceedings. The characteristics of the group members are important in exercising the discretion with respect to security for costs.

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17 Section 1335(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 provides:
"Where a corporation is plaintiff in any action or other legal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction in the matter may, if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his, her or its defence, require sufficient security to be given for those costs and stay all proceedings until the security is given."
costs and are perhaps more significant than the characteristics of
the representative party;

(h) Whether security for costs ought to be ordered in a
representative proceeding, as in a non-representative
proceeding, is a question to be determined by reference to the
whole of the circumstances;

(i) Three features of representative proceedings which are relevant
to the making (as opposed to the quantum) of a security for costs
order are:

i. the identity and characteristics of the group members;
ii. the source of funding of the proceedings; and
iii. the merits of the claims.

(j) As part of the first feature identified in point (i) above it may be
relevant to consider whether security for costs would be ordered
against the individual group members if separate proceedings
were brought by them against the respondent;

(k) A relevant consideration in the exercise of discretion whether or
not to order security for costs is any delay in moving the Federal
Court for an order for security for costs.

6.19 As discussed in the case of *Cook v Pasminco Ltd (No 2)*, the
lawyers for the class are not obliged to take the interests of the prospective
defendant into account when choosing the representative plaintiff. On the
facts of that case, there was no evidence presented to the court to prove why
an undischarged bankrupt had been chosen as representative plaintiff, and the
court was not prepared to draw any inferences.

6.20 On the other hand, a more robust view was expressed by the Full
Federal Court in *Bray v F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd*:

"Depending upon the particular circumstances, I do not think that
an order providing reasonable security for costs necessarily
operates indirectly to remove the effect of the immunity provided
by s43(1A). It is one thing for a group member to be saddled with an order for what might be joint and several
liability for a very substantial costs order at the end of the
hearing of a representative proceeding, but it is another
thing to have the choice of contributing what might be a
modest amount to a pool by which the applicant might
provide security for costs. It is a question of balancing the
policy reflected in s 43(1A) against the risk of injustice to a
respondent … which, on the admitted facts, has no chance of
recovering very substantial costs from the applicant if it is

successful in defending the proceedings. Much would depend upon the number of group members involved, their financial circumstances and in particular whether an order for security for costs might stifle the proceedings. In that regard, in my opinion, it was for the applicant to adduce evidence about the likely effect of any order for security for costs. 19

(Emphasis added)

6.21 The more robust attitude to security for costs is evident from the following statement of Finkelstein J in the same case:

"While class actions provide many benefits to the community, they have their attendant dangers. They can be used as an instrument of oppression. It is not unknown for a class action to be brought in relation to an unmeritorious claim in the hope of compelling the defendant to agree to a settlement to avoid the enormous expense of fighting the case. Those types of action can be discouraged by an appropriate order for security." 20

(Emphasis added)

6.22 Finkelstein J's approach has been criticised by commentators. In circumstances where group members may be large and financially strong, but have no interest in contributing to the costs of the litigation, there is a risk that the claim of the representative party may be stopped as a result of a security for costs order. This would undermine the costs immunity enjoyed by class members under section 43(1A) of the FCA Act. 21 In a study of major Australian class actions, no evidence was found that impecunious plaintiffs had been intentionally put forward as the lead plaintiffs to ensure that no order for security for costs could be made. On the contrary, the lead plaintiffs in these cases had usually been people of means. 22

6.23 Dr Morabito has also pointed out that this judicial approach is inconsistent with (a) the traditional rule in this area that impecuniosity on the part of the plaintiff does not justify an order for security for costs; (b) the views of the Australian Law Reform Commission that an order for security for costs should not be made on the sole basis that the proceedings conducted by the representative party are for the benefit of the group members rather than himself, 24 (c) the need not to create significant obstacles to the availability of the Part 4A regime; and (d) the importance of not removing, in practice, the immunity from costs that is extended to class members by section 43(1A). In relation to points (c) and (d), it has been observed that an order for security for

19 (2003) 200 ALR 607 (Full FCA) at 141-142.
20 Cited above, at 214.
costs would either stultify the continuance of the actions or force the parties to commence individual actions. Dr Morabito has pointed out the anomaly that if security for costs were to be ordered on a ground analogous to the impecunious nominal plaintiff ground, the defendants would be better off on the issue of security for costs by having been sued in representative proceedings under Part 4A than they would have been if sued by the group members in separate actions.

6.24 Dr Morabito therefore proposed that the court should adopt the principle that security for costs will only be made if the group members (or some of them) are impecunious companies or persons ordinarily resident outside the jurisdiction and a "person of straw" has been deliberately chosen to be the representative party.25

6.25 Professor Mulheron was of the view that security for costs awards in class actions proceedings may be ordered in cases where it is apparent that the representative claimant has no means by which to satisfy a potential adverse costs order. If it was thought appropriate to adopt that approach, the new Hong Kong class action provision could include a provision similar to section 33ZG of the FCA Act.

6.26 We also note that the Civil Justice Council of UK is in favour of extending the existing powers of the court to award security for costs to provide protection for defendants against blackmail claims lodged by impecunious claimants.26

Concrete examples of security for costs

6.27 We have looked into the mechanism in more detail and considered the following examples where the court in Australia ordered the class representative to pay security for costs.

Woodhouse v McPhee27

6.28 The respondents applied for security for costs on the basis that the representative party was unlikely to be able to comply with an order for costs and was bringing the action not for his own benefit but for the benefit of others. The applicant, as a representative party, claimed relief against the respondents on the ground that, as company directors, they had failed to prevent the company from incurring debts to its employees when they had reasonable grounds for suspecting the company was insolvent. The case for an order for security for costs was put essentially on the basis that the individual applicant (who was one of the 98 employees) was likely to be unable

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27 (1997) 80 FCR 529.
to meet an order for costs; was bringing the proceedings not only for his own benefit but for the benefit of the other 97 employees; and would not be prevented from proceeding with his case as he could call upon the 97 represented persons to pay their share of any order for security for costs.

6.29 Merkel J proceeded on the basis that the Federal Court may order security for costs in class action proceedings under section 56 of the FCA Act (which empowers the Federal Court to order security for costs in such amount and at such time as it specifies) against an individual applicant. Merkel J approached section 56 as if the traditional rule in declining to order security for costs against impecunious natural persons generally applied subject to the qualification that the impecunious applicant was not a nominal plaintiff. Merkel J was inclined to the view that a representative proceeding was brought for the benefit of others was a factor which favoured the making of an order for security for costs:

"However, in my view there is no reason why, in general, the fact that a proceeding is brought for the benefit of others under Pt IVA ought not to be a consideration which together with other considerations can favour the ordering of security."

6.30 However, section 43(1A) of the FCA Act gave group members an immunity to an adverse costs order so as to afford them greater access to justice. Bearing that in mind, Merkel J was of the view it would be "incongruous and anomalous" for the courts to remove that immunity by ordering security for costs on the basis that the applicant was bringing proceedings for the benefit of others who ought to bear their share of the potential costs liability to other parties. This conclusion as to the relevance of section 43(1A) outweighed the consideration that a representative proceeding, being brought for the benefit of others, was a factor which favoured the making of a security for costs order. The fact that a proceeding was brought under Pt IVA for the benefit of represented persons "whilst a relevant consideration in favour of granting security, ought not of itself to be as significant a consideration as it might otherwise be in favour of the granting of security".

6.31 Applying the discretion under section 56 (which was not limited by reason of section 43(1A) or section 33ZG(c)(v)), Merkel J declined to order security for costs and, on the facts of the case, the application for security for costs was dismissed. The court took into account the following considerations:

"the individual applicant has a bona fide claim and has a reasonably arguable case for relief under Pt IVA of the Act in a matter which raises important issues of principle in relation to the rights of former employees of a company in liquidation;"

28 Cited above, at 533.
29 Cited above, at 533.
• public policy considerations weigh strongly against any order for security that might impede a group claim for accrued employee entitlements brought against directors on the basis of their liability for insolvent trading by their company;

• an order for security is likely to stultify proceedings unless the security is obtained from the represented parties."

6.32 Merkel J remarked that the discretion might be exercised differently in other circumstances:

"There may be circumstances which arise in a particular case under Pt IVA that may warrant a different approach to that set out above. For example if the claim was spurious, oppressive or clearly disproportionate to the costs involved in pursuing it or if the proceedings were structured so as to immunise persons of substance from costs orders. I would not consider the fact that the represented persons were entitled to the benefit of s43(1A) to be a consideration which in any way operates against an order for security in such cases". 31

(Ephasis added)

Ryan v Great Lakes Council32

6.33 These proceedings related to a claim arising from the consumption by numerous individuals of allegedly contaminated oysters from the lakes located within the defendant Great Lakes Council. It was accepted that the applicants did not have sufficient means to meet the respondents' costs. Counsel for the respondents, in applying for an order for security for costs, submitted that such an order would not stifle the litigation as the group members, who stood to benefit from any success in the action, might be willing and able to contribute to a pool of funds out of which security could be provided. The application for security for costs was, however, rejected by the court at first instance. The appeal by the respondents was also dismissed.

6.34 On appeal, Lindgren J pointed out that it was not suggested that any of the group members would have been ordered to provide security for costs if they had sued in separate actions. In this case, the group members were all individuals ordinarily resident within the jurisdiction and suing for their own benefit. In this sense, if an order for security for costs were made in a representative proceeding the respondents would be better off by reason of the utilisation of the representative proceeding procedure than if separate and individual proceedings had been brought against them. Further, if an order were made for security for costs which necessitated the establishment of a

30 Woodhouse v McPhee (1997) 80 FCR 529, at 534.
31 Woodhouse v McPhee (1997) 80 FCR 529, at 534.
"financial pool", the impact on the group members could not possibly be understood.

6.35 But the judge considered (without limiting the circumstances in which a security order might be made) that security for costs could be ordered in representative proceedings where the proceedings had been structured so as to provide persons of substance with immunity from any costs order and in circumstances where the group members, on whose behalf the proceedings had been commenced, would have been ordered to provide security for costs had they commenced individual proceedings against the respondent.

Tobacco Control Coalition Inc v Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd

6.36 The applicant was an incorporated association. Its members were office-holders of one or both of the New South Wales Cancer Council or Action on Smoking and Health (Australia). The latter organisation had received grants from the New South Wales Cancer Council, which itself had assets exceeding Aus $26 million. The respondents to the proceedings were three major tobacco manufacturers. They sought an order that the representative party provide security for their costs. Wilcox J found that:

- the representative party had been incorporated only a few days before the commencement of the proceedings and after the obtaining of legal advice;
- an office-holder had written a letter indicating the representative party had been created as a vehicle for the litigation in order to protect health and medical groups from potentially adverse cost orders; and
- the proceedings had been structured so as to provide immunity from costs orders for the two organisations whose officers controlled the representative party.

6.37 The judge considered that the proceedings did not have a high prospect of success, nor was the litigation "public interest" litigation, and he ordered that the representative party provide security for costs. In so doing, the court had taken into account the above factors, the defects in the definition of group members and other defects in the pleading of the injunctive and declaratory relief sought. Further, the applicant, even if assumptions were made in its favour as to the evidence, had failed to plead any arguable legal basis for making the respondents liable for much of the conduct referred to in the statement of claim.

Nendy Enterprises Pty Ltd v New Holland Australia Pty Ltd\(^{34}\)

6.38 Security for costs was ordered in these proceedings where the incorporated representative party represented a group of farmers and contractors who acquired combine harvesters sold by the respondent. It was alleged that defects in the harvesters had affected the livelihoods of the members of the group. In a brief judgment, Whitlam J noted that a feature of the case was the way in which the applicant had been selected for his role. It was common ground that the representative party's solicitors had sent out a guide on representative actions to a number of persons, including the applicant. Whitlam J stated: "What is said in the pamphlet about the way in which a person might be identified to commence representation [sic] proceedings is important."

Bray v F Hoffman – La Roche Ltd\(^{36}\)

6.39 Each of the respondents in the proceedings was a company involved in the manufacture and sale of vitamin products. The applicant commenced representative proceedings in the Federal Court pursuant to Pt IVA of the FCA Act, alleging that the respondents had entered into, and carried into effect, an international price fixing and market sharing arrangement in respect of particular vitamin products in contravention of section 45 of the Trade Practices Act 1974.

6.40 On the agreed facts, the applicant had net assets of Aus $73,000 and her only source of income was an invalid pension in the sum of Aus $931.40 per month. It was clear that the applicant did not have sufficient funds to meet a substantial order for costs made against her (estimated to be in the range of Aus $300,000 to $400,000). Merkel J at first instance acknowledged that it was unclear who was financing the present litigation but speculated it may be the applicant's solicitors rather than any particular group member. On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal was not satisfied on the evidence that those who stood to benefit from the proceedings had selected an impecunious applicant in order to protect themselves from the risk of costs which would follow if unsuccessful. The Federal Court of Appeal remarked that the first instance judge appeared to move from the proposition that the deliberate selection of a "person of straw" was an example of the circumstances in which an order for security for costs could be made and elevated it to being a condition precedent for the making of an order in respect of security for costs. In the circumstances, Merkel J did not order security for costs.

6.41 The Full Court of the Federal Court (Carr, Branson and Finkelstein JJ) heard an appeal from, among other things, Merkel J's judgment. Each member of the court considered Merkel J's approach to be in error as an order for security for costs did not negate the effect of the immunity provided

\(^{34}\) [2001] FCA 582.
by section 43(1A) of the FCA Act. The immunity for costs provided by section 43(1A) allowed group members to avoid the risk of being saddled with joint and several liability for costs. But the Full Court considered it was a different matter to ask a group member to contribute a potentially modest sum to a pool by which the applicant might provide security for costs.

6.42 The following non-exhaustive list of considerations relevant to a decision to order security for costs (as opposed to the quantum of security for costs) was identified by Finkelstein J:

"Dependent upon the type of proceeding, the represented group may be quite diverse. The group may include corporations as well as natural persons. The members of the group, whether corporate or not, may be rich or poor. In my view, the characteristics of the group should be taken into account on an application for security. Accordingly, if there is still a rule that an order for security should not be made against an impecunious natural person, ... the rule may have little application to many class actions. Another matter that should be taken into account is that, contrary to parliament's intention, many class actions become bogged down by interminable and expensive interlocutory orders. It may be necessary to consider which party is responsible for this state of affairs when dealing with the quantum of any security costs that may be ordered. It is also appropriate to bear in mind that it is commonly the case in a class action that a person will stand behind (I mean fund) the applicant. Usually this will be the applicant's solicitors, who will sometimes charge what is referred to as a 'contingency fee' for the privilege. When a proceeding is brought by a 'nominal plaintiff' that is a plaintiff who will not himself benefit from the action but is making the claim for the benefit of someone else, an order for security is usually made. A party who is being funded by his solicitor is not really a 'nominal plaintiff'. Nevertheless, the solicitor does stand to benefit from the action (especially as regards additional fees) if the action is ultimately successful, as the solicitor will then be able to recover his costs. That is a relevant, though not a decisive, consideration when deciding whether security should be ordered. In many cases, it will also be relevant to consider the merits of the claim. I think that the court should not shy away from undertaking a preliminary evaluation of the merits. That task is not as difficult as it might seem. Every day judges are required to decide whether or not a party has made out a prima facie case, or has raised a serious issue to be tried, in an application for an interlocutory injunction, the appointment of a receiver or other serious forms of relief. While class actions provide many benefits to the community, they have their attendant dangers. They can be used as an instrument of oppression. It is not unknown for a class action be brought in relation to an unmeritorious claim in the hope of
compelling the defendant to agree to a settlement to avoid the enormous expense of fighting the case. Those types of actions can be discouraged by an appropriate order for security.**"** (Emphasis added)

**Milfull v Terranora Lakes Country Club Ltd (in liq)**

6.43 This representative proceeding was originally commenced in August 1995. One representative proceeding gave rise to five representative proceedings as it was perceived that each group member had to have a claim against each respondent. In March 2004 the Full Court's decision in *Bray v F Hoffman – La Roche Ltd* (above) came to the attention of the solicitors acting for the second to fifth respondents. In August 2004 the first respondent advised the solicitors for the second to fifth respondents that a distribution would be made of Aus $380,000 to the applicants. Seven days later the solicitors for the second to fifth respondents requested security in the sum of Aus $380,000. Between July 2003 and August 2004 various steps were taken in the proceedings, including the filing of defences and cross-claims, and mediation took place.

6.44 Kiefel J regarded the delay in filing the security for costs motion as being relevant and determinative:

"The respondents could have brought an application at a much earlier point. It is true that they may have risked costs. But without notice of such an application the applicant and the group members continued to expend substantial monies without realising that more may be asked of them. If security for costs was to be sought against the applicant he was entitled to know at any early point. If an order was then made the group members could have considered their position. The application in my view has been brought too late and the explanation for the delay is not sufficient."**"**

6.45 On the basis of this line of authorities, Peter Cashman summarised the various factors of consideration in this way:

"Particular circumstances which may support an order for security for costs include where the case appears weak on its merits; where unnecessary costs have been incurred by the conduct of the applicant; or where there is positive evidence that the applicant was deliberately selected as a person of straw. Factors which may weigh against an order for security for costs may include where the proceeding appears to have substantial merit; where there are specific issues of public interest sought to

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be determined in the proceeding; the size of the group affected by the proceeding; the conduct of the respondent (including where interlocutory applications and appeals are unsuccessful); and the public interest in the pursuit of class action proceedings generally.”

Private litigation funding and security for costs

6.46 As discussed in Chapter 8, class actions may be funded by the involvement of private litigation funding companies. In the context of an application for security of costs, the existence of a third party commercial litigation funding arrangement may be considered relevant in the exercise of judicial discretion whether to make an order and/or to the quantum of such costs. In Baygol Pty Ltd v Huntsman Chemical Co Australia Pty Ltd, Tamberlin J said that, in his view, weight should be given to the fact that a matter is funded when determining the level of security for costs:

"I consider that weight should be given to the fact that the litigation is being funded as an investment, which, in my view, weighs on balance in favour of a more liberal provision, especially given the consequences of having inadequate security. In the event that [the defendant] is successful, it could be out of pocket by a large sum. If [the defendant] is not successful then [the plaintiff] will have the amount of security discharged. I do not consider this to be a controlling consideration, and I do not consider that it should be given great significance, but it ought be taken into account in assessing the quantum of security."

Conclusions

6.47 Having considered the security for costs mechanism and the factors for consideration that have been taken into account by the courts under section 33ZG of the FCA Act, we are satisfied that, on balance, the security for costs mechanism would provide a reasonable filtering process which could effectively prevent class members with sound financial capability from deliberately selecting impecunious plaintiffs to act as the class representatives, thereby abusing the process. The effectiveness of the mechanism will, of course, depend upon the integrity of class lawyers in presenting reliable information as to the class members' identity and financial standing. Equally, the court will have to examine a range of financial factors concerning the parties at an early stage of the proceedings.

40 Peter Cashman, Class Action – Law and Practice (The Federation Press, 2007), at 440-441.
6.48 We are of the view that reliance upon the existing vexatious/abusive litigant provisions of the court rules would not be an effective way to prevent litigation being brought by an impecunious representative. The new Hong Kong class action statute could include a provision similar to section 33ZG of the FCA Act to empower the court to order security for costs in appropriate cases. Alternatively, the representative claimant's financial standing could properly form part of the "adequacy of the representative" certification criterion. Furthermore, the ability of the representative claimant (and its legal representatives) to fund the action and to meet any adverse costs award could be made part of the certification scrutiny to which the court will subject the action at the outset.

Recommendation 4

(1) We recommend that appropriate requirements for adequacy of representation should be stipulated to prevent class members with sound financial capability from deliberately selecting impecunious plaintiffs to act as the class representatives, and thereby abusing the court process.

(2) At the same time, truly impecunious litigants should have access to funding.

(3) To avoid abuse of the process of the court and to ensure that those put at risk of litigation should not suffer unfairly, we recommend that in appropriate cases, the representative plaintiffs should be ordered by the court to pay security for costs in accordance with the established principles for making such orders and by way of a provision similar to section 33ZG of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 to empower the court to order security for costs in appropriate cases.
Chapter 7

Handling of class actions involving parties from other jurisdictions

The problem identified

7.1 We envisage that parties in class actions commenced in Hong Kong may straddle across a number of jurisdictions (eg mainland China, Hong Kong and a third jurisdiction). Problems associated with class actions involving parties from other jurisdictions include forum shopping, duplication of proceedings and the res judicata effects of a judgment on foreign or extra-territorial class members. For the purpose of this Chapter, we define a "foreign plaintiff" as a member of a class of persons on whose behalf class action proceedings have been commenced and who is not resident in Hong Kong.\(^1\) We define a "foreign defendant" as a juridical or natural person who could not be served with legal process in Hong Kong.\(^2\)

7.2 Class actions may be brought by plaintiffs in any one of many jurisdictions – locally, nationally or internationally. As the Rand Institute points out, "class action lawyers often have greater latitude in their choice of forum or venue than their counterparts in traditional litigation" and this drives transaction costs upwards:

"Under some circumstances, an attorney filing a state wide class action can file in any county of a state and an attorney filing a nationwide class action can file in virtually any state in the country, and perhaps any county in that state as well. In addition, class action attorneys often can file duplicative suits and pursue them simultaneously. These are powerful tools for shaping litigation, providing opportunities not only to seek out favourable law and positively disposed decision

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\(^1\) We suggest adopting the same definition given in the draft Civil Procedure Rules put forward by the Civil Justice Council in Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions – Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedure for Collective Actions (Final Report), (November 2008), at 190.

\(^2\) See paras 11/02–11/03 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2008 as follows:

“Anyone may invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, or become amenable to it. Writ must be made personally on the defendant, or by post, or by inserting a copy through the defendant’s letter box. However, such service must be effected on the defendant in Hong Kong or, if by post or inserting in a letter box, doing so while the defendant is in Hong Kong: see O.10.”

“[T]he inability of the plaintiff to effect service on the defendant because the defendant is not present within the jurisdiction to enable service to be effected may have the effect of denying the court jurisdiction in cases which are appropriate for trial here (e.g. a tort committed within the jurisdiction). However, the court has a discretionary power to grant a plaintiff leave to service a writ upon a defendant outside the jurisdiction in a variety of circumstances."
makers, but also to maintain (or wrest) control over high-stakes litigation from other class action attorneys."

(Emphasis added)

7.3 The Uniform Law Conference of Canada made the following observations on the problem of multiplicity in class proceedings involving parties from different jurisdictions:

"With the broad availability of class actions in Canada it is possible that overlapping multi-jurisdictional class actions concerning the same or similar subject matter could be commenced in several different Canadian jurisdictions. As a result, potential class members may find themselves presumptively included in more than one class action in more than one jurisdiction and consequently subject to conflicting determinations. Further, defendants and class counsel may be faced with uncertainty as to the size and composition of the class. In addition, there may be difficulty in determining with certainty which class members will be bound by which decisions."

Res judicata concerns

7.4 Even where due notice is given to the foreign class members, difficulties in respect of the recognition and enforcement of a class action judgment in another jurisdiction may arise. The problem has been set out in the following terms:

"Judgment for [a class action] can be granted as a result of a settlement of an action or at the conclusion of a trial. In either circumstance, claimants from jurisdictions other than the jurisdiction in which the judgment is granted will wish to know if they are or can be bound by the foreign [class action] judgment, and if so, how they go about enforcing, or objecting to the enforcement of, that judgement. Similarly, defendants against whom the judgment is issued after a trial and more so, if it is issued as a result of a settlement, will wish to ensure that the

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3 Deborah R Hensler et al., Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain, (Santa Monica, CA RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 2000), at 411.
4 Uniform Law Conference of Canada’s comment on the Uniform Class Proceedings Act (Amendment) 2006. See also the Report of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada’s Committee on the National Class and Related Inter Jurisdictional Issues: Background, Analysis and Recommendations dated March 9, 2005 [14]-[18]. In particular, at [18] it was pointed out that: "[t]he uncertainty created by the potential for multiple actions may also mean that fewer class actions will be brought, since (1) class counsel in any given jurisdiction will not know the scope of the class that he or she will eventually be granted authority to represent; and (2) this in turn will make some class actions less economically viable, since counsel will have to enter into financial arrangements with multiple counsel, thus reducing both the expected fee and potential compensation to class members."
judgment resolves their liability in respect of the broadest group of claimants possible."

7.5 Where foreign class members have been included in US class actions the question arises as to how binding the class action judgment or settlement is on foreign class members. Res judicata concerns were raised, for example, in the District Court of the Southern District of New York recently in *In re Vivendi Universal SA Securities Litigation*, in which the court was troubled by the fact that 'there is no clear authority addressing the res judicata effect of a US class action judgment in England.'

7.6 Since the realistic prospect of recognition of any potential judgment is a condition required by US courts before granting certification to a group of plaintiffs which also includes foreign absent class members, the certification of trans-national class actions will be hampered if European jurisdictions are not prepared to give res judicata effect to US class judgments. The most incompatible US class action feature seems to be the opt-out rule, by which plaintiffs who have not expressly manifested their wish to claim are incorporated in the group.

7.7 The International Bar Association (IBA) published "*Guidelines for Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Judgments for Collective Redress — A Report of the IBA Task Force on International Procedures and Protocols for Collective Redress*" for discussion at the IBA conference in Singapore in October 2007. The purpose of the guidelines is to provide for circumstances where a class action judgment issued in one jurisdiction may be enforceable in another jurisdiction, thus binding foreign class members in that second jurisdiction. The guidelines do not have the force of law, and are yet to be formally approved by the IBA's Executive Council, but they provide a useful framework as to how jurisdictions, generally, are concerned about duplicative litigation and the application of res judicata from one jurisdiction to another.

7.8 The guidelines' eventual aim is that jurisdictions with opt-out class action regimes will ratify the guidelines by implementing Practice Directions encompassing their thrust. However, it is unclear at present as to when and to what extent different jurisdictions will be willing to do so, or indeed, whether those jurisdictions' domestic law on the recognition of foreign judgments would permit such Practice Directions. Nevertheless, it is an important step forward in the debate on duplicative litigation in class actions litigation.

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6 242 FRD 76 (SDNY 2007), at 91.

Recognition and enforcement of Hong Kong class action judgments by Mainland courts

7.9 In so far as a class action commenced in Hong Kong may include members from both Hong Kong and the Mainland, we have considered the following questions:

(a) whether the courts in the Mainland will have legal reservations in recognising and/or enforcing judgments given in Hong Kong and other common law jurisdictions where an opt-out model for class actions is followed;

(b) whether it would be feasible in future to expand the scope of mutual legal assistance to include judgments in class actions so that there can be mutual recognition and reciprocal enforcement of Mainland and Hong Kong class action judgments; and

(c) whether there are any provisions in PRC law which may impinge on the mutual recognition and enforcement of class action judgments between the Mainland and HKSAR if an opt-out class action regime is adopted in Hong Kong and, if so, whether there are any procedural safeguards which could address the PRC law objections.

7.10 In summary, we note that although the "Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Pursuant to Choice of Court Agreements between Parties Concerned" (the REJ Arrangement) provides for the enforcement of Hong Kong civil judgments in the Mainland, the enforcement of class action judgments in the Mainland is outside its scope. It is doubtful if the scope of the REJ Arrangement will be extended to cover judgements in respect of class actions in the foreseeable future.

7.11 Furthermore, it is difficult to predict whether the Mainland, when it enters into the reciprocal recognition and enforcement agreement with a common law jurisdiction (such as Hong Kong), would insist on applying PRC law when determining the procedural rights of litigating parties. There is also a potential risk that the Mainland courts would regard the award of counsel's fees as contradicting the basic principle of PRC law that litigants are responsible for their own lawyers' fees and, consequently, refuse to recognise and enforce the judgment altogether. Finally, the exact parameters of the ordre public doctrine have yet to emerge so that it is not possible to predict whether enforcement of certain kinds of class action judgments may or may not be contrary to the PRC's public interests.
Possible solution

7.12 We have considered whether legal restrictions should be imposed on the commencement of class actions by plaintiffs coming from a number of different jurisdictions. If there are to be no such restrictions on commencing a class action, alternative ways to streamline the litigation process will need to be identified.

7.13 In the following paragraphs we consider two approaches to control class action proceedings commenced by a multi-jurisdictional class of plaintiffs: (a) a court discretion to transfer class action proceedings to another jurisdiction in the interests of justice; and (b) the exclusion of foreign class members from the proceedings.

(a) Discretion to transfer class action proceedings in interests of justice

7.14 It is possible that the Hong Kong class action regime legislation could allow the court in the interests of justice to order a transfer of the proceedings or a stay of proceedings on the basis of the inappropriateness of Hong Kong as the litigation forum. A number of Australian authorities set out the relevant factors when considering the appropriate forum for the commencement and conduct of class actions.

7.15 In Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v The State of Victoria, the High Court of Australia applied the orthodox analysis of service on the defendant as determining the Supreme Court's jurisdiction for class action proceedings under Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic). Although the Supreme Court may have jurisdiction to adjudicate the class action, where the alleged wrong was committed in another state and all group members, plaintiffs and defendants were located in that state, the plaintiff would be confronted with an application to transfer the proceeding under section 5 of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Vic). The possibility of a transfer of proceedings or the stay of proceedings by reason of the inappropriateness of the forum in light of the interests of justice was recognised by Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Mobil Australia Pty Ltd v The State of Victoria where the court said:

"In the ordinary case, where service of the proceeding is effected within the State, the territorial nexus between the proceeding and the State is evident. … [W]here service is effected within Australia, under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), no nexus must be shown. … It may be noted … that the defendant to a proceeding in a Supreme Court, served under the Service and Execution of Process Act, may always seek

9 See Gleeson CJ at [11], and Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [53], [55] and [56].
to have it cross-vested to another State Supreme Court."

(Emphasis added)

7.16 An application may be made for an order to transfer a proceeding under section 5(2)(b)(iii) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act of the state concerned. The High Court made the following observations about section 5(2)(b)(iii) in *BHP Billiton Ltd v Shultz*:

(a) The "interests of justice" in the sub-section are not synonymous with the transferring court being a clearly inappropriate forum, which is the test applied for a *forum non conveniens* application.

(b) What constitutes "the interests of justice" involves a range of considerations. The interests of justice are not the same as the interests of one party, nor are they divorced from practical reality. Nor are the interests of justice to be determined by preferring the public policy reflected in an Act of one State Parliament over the Act of another State Parliament. Regard may be had to the specialist nature of a court or tribunal and the procedural facilities peculiar to it. An important consideration in the interests of justice for a claim in tort will be the place of the tort. Where the place of the tort and the residence of the parties coincide, that will generally be determinative of the appropriate court. Likewise, an important consideration will be the law of the contract and the jurisdiction of any statutory provision relied upon.

(c) Once it appears to the transferring court that in the interests of justice the proceeding ought to be determined in the transferee court, the proceeding must be transferred. No question of discretion arises.

(d) Once a proceeding is transferred there is a question as to whether the transferee court is exercising its own jurisdiction or is exercising jurisdiction "conferred" by the cross-vesting legislation.

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10 (2002) 211 CLR 1, at para 60.
11 Section 5(2)(b)(iii) provides that a Supreme Court (transferring court) shall transfer a proceeding to another Supreme Court (transferee court) if it appears to the transferring court that it is in the interests of justice that the transferee court determine the proceeding.
13 At paras 14 and 25 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon; and 69 per Gummow J.
14 At para 15 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ and 258 per Callinan J.
15 At para 26 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ.
16 At para 31 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ.
17 At paras 170 and 259.
18 At paras 14, 62 and 172.
19 At paras 52-54 per Gummow J.
7.17 There is doubt as to the transferability of at least some group proceedings. There is no reported case on this issue, but the observation of Bongiorno J in *McLean v Nicholson*[^20] is relevant. It was suggested that an effective transfer of a group proceeding may be made under the cross-vesting legislation. The judge made the obiter observation that group proceedings commenced in Victoria may be cross-vested and heard as group proceedings in other Supreme Courts, notwithstanding the absence of legislation in those jurisdictions for the commencement and conduct of group proceedings. There is, however, uncertainty as to whether the Supreme Court to which the proceeding is transferred would adopt the same procedure under Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic).[^21]

7.18 Similar considerations on the choice of forum were contemplated by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada. It was proposed that the relevant legislation should require the court to take into account a number of factors in considering whether, and to what extent, to certify any class proceedings. The primary consideration was whether multi-jurisdictional class proceedings involving the same or similar subject matter had been commenced. Section 4 of the Uniform Class Proceedings Act (Amendment) 2006 provides that:

> "(2) If a multi-jurisdictional class proceedings or a proposed multi-jurisdictional class proceeding has been commenced elsewhere in Canada that involves the same or similar subject matter to that of the proceeding being considered for certification, the court must determine whether it would be preferable for some or all of the claims of the proposed class members to be resolved in that proceeding.

> (3) When making a determination under subsection (2), the court must

> (a) be guided by the following objectives:

> (i) ensuring that the interests of all parties in each of the relevant jurisdictions are given due consideration,

[^20]: (2002) 172 FLR 90. In this case Bongiorno J considered an application to transfer a group proceeding under Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) to the Supreme Court of Queensland. Ultimately, it was not necessary to transfer the proceeding as a group proceeding because it was ordered, pursuant to section 33N of the Supreme Court Act, that the proceeding no longer continue as a group proceeding. The court held that (at para 24):

> "The Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Vic) permits this Court to transfer a proceeding to the Supreme Court of another State or Territory when it is in the interests of justice to do so. The cross-vesting Act confers on the Supreme Court of Queensland all the jurisdiction of this Court: s 4(3) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Vic). Thus it would have jurisdiction to determine the defendant's application that this proceeding no longer continue under Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act. However the power of this Court to cross-vest a case depends upon the interests of justice requiring such transfer. Having regard to the unique nature of Part 4A (there is no Queensland equivalent) and the fact that an order under s. 33N does not affect any party's substantive rights, the interests of justice do not require that this Court refrain from deciding the s 33N application notwithstanding the conclusion reached that the merits of the case should be ultimately determined in the Supreme Court of Queensland." (Emphasis added)

(ii) ensuring that the ends of justice are served,
(iii) where possible, avoiding irreconcilable judgments,
(iv) promoting judicial economy; and

(b) consider all relevant factors, including the following:
(i) the alleged basis of liability, including the applicable laws,
(ii) the stage each of the proceedings has reached,
(iii) the plan for the proposed multi-jurisdictional class proceedings, including the viability of the plan and the capacity and resources for advancing the proceeding on behalf of the proposed class,
(iv) the location of class members and class representatives in the various proceeding, including the ability of class representatives to participate in the proceedings and to represent the interests of class members, the location of evidence and witnesses."

7.19 The court may make any order it deems just, including:

(a) certifying a multi-jurisdictional opt-out class proceeding, if (i) all statutory criteria for certification have been met and (ii) the court determines that it is the appropriate venue for a multi-jurisdictional class proceeding;

(b) refusing to certify an action on the basis that it should proceed in another jurisdiction as a multi-jurisdictional class proceeding;

(c) refusing to certify that portion of the proposed class that includes class members who may be included within a pending or proposed class proceeding in another jurisdiction; and

(d) requiring that a subclass with separate counsel be certified within the class proceeding.

(b) Excluding foreign class members

7.20 An alternative approach is to exclude foreign class members, if the court regards this as appropriate. For example, the Supreme Court of Victoria may of its own motion exclude persons from the group. Section 33KA of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) provides:

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22 Section 4.1 of the Uniform Class Proceedings Act (Amendment) 2006.
"(1) On the application of a party to a group proceeding or of its own motion, the Court may at any time, whether before or after judgment, order—
(a) that a person cease to be a group member;
(b) that a person not become a group member.

(2) The Court may make an order under sub-section (1) if it is of the opinion that—
(a) the person does not have sufficient connection with Australia to justify inclusion as a group member; or
(b) for any other reason it is just and expedient that the person should not be or should not become a group member.

(3) If the Court orders that a person cease to be a group member, then, if the Court so orders, the person must be taken never to have been a group member."

7.21 In Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Victoria, the High Court of Australia noted that this was an undemanding test, in the sense that connection with Victoria was not a test for inclusion in the group and that the location of persons outside Victoria, or even outside Australia, was not necessarily a barrier to their inclusion. The court observed that section 33KA was a troubling provision. Section 33KA(2) refers to the court forming an opinion that a group member does not have sufficient connection with Australia. It was implicit that the existence of group members outside Victoria but within Australia raised no issue, subject to the practical reasons raised concerning the appropriateness of the forum. But a member outside of Australia did raise an issue, as it was unclear what constituted a connection, or for that matter a sufficient connection, with Australia for the purpose of section 33KA.

7.22 In the US, the courts have also excluded foreign class members where the statute under which the class action has been instituted does not have sufficient extra-jurisdictional effect to catch foreign class members. This has recently occurred in respect of the litigation in In re Parmalat Securities Litigation, and F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Empagram.

7.23 Whilst the above two methods of excluding parties from other jurisdictions from invoking the class action regime in Hong Kong are options for discussion, we are not in favour of adopting a rigid exclusionary rule. If plaintiffs from other jurisdictions are excluded from class action proceedings in Hong Kong, then the judgment of those proceedings will only bind class members who are resident in Hong Kong. Depending on the court's interpretation of what amounts to "resident" in Hong Kong and whether future

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24 See the comments made by Damian Grave and Ken Adams, Class Actions in Australia (Lawbook Co, 2005), at para 3.280.
plaintiffs would be caught by this definition, future plaintiffs in other jurisdictions may be barred from commencing fresh legal proceedings on the same subject matter of the class action proceedings. If litigants from other jurisdictions were excluded from a class, then it would be difficult for the court to deal with the common issue of the class action. In principle, the court should allow as many members of the class as possible to have the benefit of the class action. We also note that an opt-out procedure for class actions involving parties from other jurisdictions would be expensive and the associated practical issues, such as the giving of proper notice, should be carefully considered.

(c) Sub-classing of class members from other jurisdictions

7.24 Instead of excluding any party from another jurisdiction, we suggest that procedural/case management techniques should be identified to streamline the litigation process. As a management technique, foreign class members participating in the class action in Hong Kong could be required to form their own sub-class with their own representative claimant. In that way, separate notice requirements could be applied to that representative in respect of members of the sub-class, and if separate legal issues arise that are common to that sub-class alone, they can be accommodated, but dealt with separately from the main class action (even by separate hearing). The use of sub-classes in this way could be helpful in streamlining the class action. A sub-class of foreign class members was created, for example, in *Krumen v Christie’s plc.*

(d) Opt-in requirement

7.25 The notice requirements for foreign class members raise particular difficulties. As a matter of practicality, it may be difficult to identify all places in which notices should be advertised and it is likely that, however many notices are placed, there can be no certainty that they will come to the attention of all potential plaintiffs. Other notices at the time of settlement, or post-judgment on the common issues, may also be required, adding to the burden. Any attempt to be comprehensive is likely to be expensive. In any event, it is doubtful whether courts in other jurisdictions would regard an opt-out approach as satisfactory, since it could hardly be said that plaintiffs from other jurisdictions who had not opted out (for whatever reason) had invoked the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts. This would have implications for the enforceability of the judgment in respect of such plaintiffs, and as to the binding nature of the judgment on them. As a result, the *res judicata* effect of the class action for those members could not be achieved.

7.26 As a means of controlling or limiting foreign class members, and of ensuring that due process concerns are met as regards those foreign class members, the British Columbia Class Proceedings Act provides that a British Columbia resident may commence an action on behalf of a class of resident

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27 284 F 3d 384 (2nd Cir 2003).
who will be bound unless they opt out. Opting in signified that the foreign class members submitted to the jurisdiction of the British Columbia court.

7.27 Section 16 of the Class Proceedings Act provides that non-residents may participate in the proceedings by opting in and joining as a sub-class. Certification of multi-jurisdictional class action is permitted. The drafters of the British Columbia legislation adopted the following suggestion set out in a discussion paper prepared by the British Columbia Ministry of the Attorney General:

"A class defined in a class action brought under the Ontario Act may purport to include individuals whose causes of action arose in BC. If such an individual did not opt-out of the Ontario class action and attempted to sue the defendants in BC, he or she would likely be met by the argument that he or she was bound by the Ontario judgment and was barred from bringing an individual action. The response of the BC litigant would be that legislation in Ontario did not bind him or her. The availability of an expanded class action procedure in a number of provinces could result in several class actions involving the same defendant and the same issues being commenced in each jurisdiction. In some cases, this could undermine the goals of judicial economy which underlie class actions. …

One commentator has suggested that class members could be sub-classed into two groups – provincial residents and extra-provincial residents. Class members residing in the province under whose legislation the class action was filed, or whose cause of action arose in the jurisdiction would be subject to the ordinary opt-out requirements of the Act. Extra-provincial class members would be required to opt-in in order to be part of the class." (Emphasis added)

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28 Section 16 of the Class Proceedings Act (BC) provides as follows:

"(1) A member of a class involved in a class proceeding may opt out of the proceeding in the manner and within the time specified in the certification order.

(2) Subject to subsection (4), a person who is not a resident of British Columbia may, in the manner and within the time specified in the certification order made in respect of a class proceeding, opt in to that class proceeding if the person would be, but for not being a resident of British Columbia, a member of the class involved in the class proceeding.

(3) A person referred to in subsection (2) who opts in to a class proceeding is from that time a member of the class involved in the class proceeding for every purpose of this Act.

(4) A person may not opt in to a class proceeding under subsection (2) unless the subclass of which the person is to become a member has or will have, at the time the person becomes a member, a representative plaintiff who satisfies the requirements of section 6 (1) (a), (b) and (c)." (Emphasis added)

29 See for example Harrington v Dow Coming (1996), 22 BCLR (3d) 97 (S.C.), supplemented (1997), 29 BCLR (3d) 88 (S.C.), in which the Court approved an application to include in the class women who had been implanted anywhere in Canada (outside Ontario and Quebec), or who had been implanted anywhere and were now resident anywhere in Canada (outside Ontario and Quebec).

7.28 In the case of *Harrington v Dow Corning Corp.*, the British Columbia Supreme Court considered the application to include in class actions women who were not residents of British Columbia. In this case, the plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturers and distributors of breast implants. The action was certified as a class proceeding. The plaintiff applied to include all women implanted with one or more breast implant mammary prosthetic devices who were resident in Canada, anywhere other than Ontario and Quebec, or were implanted in Canada, anywhere other than Ontario and Quebec. The manufacturers and distributors argued that the non-resident class should be limited to women, now non-resident, who were implanted in British Columbia. They also argued that the British Columbia resident sub-class should also exclude women who were implanted outside the province.

7.29 The Court allowed the application to include non-resident plaintiffs if they had received breast implants in Canada (but outside Quebec or Ontario) or lived in Canada anywhere other than Quebec or Ontario. The Court endorsed the following dictum by Sopkina J in *Amchem Products Inc v British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board)*:

"With the increase of free trade and the rapid growth of multi-national corporations it has become more difficult to identify one clearly appropriate forum for this type of litigation. The defendant may not be identified with only one jurisdiction. Moreover, there are frequently multiple defendants carrying on business in a number of jurisdictions and distributing their products or services world wide. As well, the plaintiffs may be a large class residing in different jurisdictions. It is often difficult to pinpoint the place where the transaction giving rise to the action took place. Frequently, there is no single forum that is clearly the most convenient or appropriate for the trial of the action but rather several which are equally suitable alternatives."

7.30 The Court in *Harrington* (above) recognised the demands of multi-claimant manufactures' liability litigation for concurrent jurisdiction of courts within Canada. The court held that the common issue of the manufacturer's liability established the real and substantial connection necessary for jurisdiction. The common issue would not be made any more complicated by the inclusion of non-resident class members. The defendants might be deprived of the opportunity of trying that factual issue separately in several jurisdictions but, if that was prejudicial, it was outweighed by the advantage to the class members of having a single determination of a complex issue that could only be litigated at substantial cost. The Court was of the view that if the plaintiff succeeded on the common issue, subsequent proceedings in this case would be more extensive because of the non-resident sub-class but they ought to be less costly than separate proceedings in different jurisdictions. The court opined that non-resident class members, by

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opting in, would assume the obligation of providing relevant evidence that was necessary for the proper disposition of their claims (at [19] of the judgment).

7.31 However, the requirement for non-resident members to opt in to the class was criticised by one commentator on the following grounds:33

(a) An under-inclusive plaintiff class means that the costs internalised by the class action are less than the costs generated by the wrongful conduct;

(b) To the extent that class actions are intended to facilitate compensation for wrongs suffered, under-inclusive plaintiff classes result in the failure of members of the plaintiff class to receive compensation;

(c) To the extent that class actions are intended to also bring closure for defendants, the under-inclusiveness of plaintiff classes means that defendants will be left with unresolved claims that might be brought in other actions or in other fora.

7.32 The Manitoba Law Reform Commission was of the view that class certification should be allowed for all potential plaintiffs, no matter where their places of residence were:

“[t]here is no compelling reason to preclude Manitoba courts from certifying class proceedings that include non-residents of the province, and that to enable them to do so would introduce a desirable reciprocity among provinces with class proceedings legislation. We are further of the opinion that the best procedure for doing so is [by permitting certification of a class covering all potential plaintiffs regardless of their residence], for two reasons. First, requiring non-residents to opt in to a proceeding will inhibit participation, and thereby limit access to justice, in the same manner that an opt in requirement would inhibit participation by Manitoba residents. The second reason an opt-in procedure is undesirable is the fact that, realistically, class proceedings involving classes composed of both residents and non-residents will tend to be brought in those jurisdictions that do not require non-residents to opt in.”34 (Emphasis added)

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The Uniform Law Conference of Canada has considered the problem of multi-jurisdictional class actions. "Multi-jurisdictional class proceedings" are defined as class actions that involve class members who do not reside in the certifying jurisdiction.\(^{35}\) To resolve the problem of multiplicity in multi-jurisdictional class proceedings, the Committee on the National Class And Related Inter-jurisdictional Issues of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada put forward model legislation for reform. The committee proposed that class action legislation should provide that a plaintiff seeking to certify a class proceeding must give notice of such an application to plaintiffs in any class proceedings in Canada with the same or similar subject matter. Section 2(2) of the Uniform Class Proceedings Act (Amendment) 2006 provides as follows:

"The member who commences a [multi-jurisdictional class] proceeding … must

(a) apply to the court for an order
   i. certifying the proceeding as a class proceeding, and
   ii. subject to subsection (4), appointing the member as the representative plaintiff for the class proceeding; and

(b) give notice of the application for certification to
   i. the representative plaintiff in any multi-jurisdictional class proceeding, and
   ii. the representative plaintiff in any proposed multi-jurisdictional class proceeding

commenced elsewhere in Canada that involves the same or similar subject matter."

Our recommendations

We consider that, in contrast to the opt-out regime we recommended in Chapter 4 for class actions in general, the default position for any class members residing in a jurisdiction outside Hong Kong should be that they must opt in to the class action proceedings commenced in Hong Kong in order to be bound by, or to benefit from, a judgment on the common issues. Practically speaking, such a requirement ensures that the class representative (and his lawyers) knows who the class members from other jurisdictions are. To assist potential parties from other jurisdictions, class action proceedings commenced in Hong Kong could be publicised on a website.

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\(^{35}\) Section 1 of the Uniform Class Proceedings Act (Amendment) 2006.
A class action database

7.35 We have considered the way in which class action proceedings in Canada are publicised via the internet. The National Class Action Database (NCAB) is a pilot project initiated by the Civil Litigation Section of the Canadian Bar Association (CBA), following a recommendation by a Uniform Law Conference of Canada's Working Group on Multi-jurisdictional Class Actions. The CBA serves as the repository for the database, which is available for viewing and use on the CBA's website. The database contains information about the existence and status of class actions across Canada so that the public, counsel, and the courts need only look to one source for this information, and without cost to them. The database lists all class actions filed in Canada after 1 January 2007 that are sent to the CBA. Once posted, a class action proceeding will remain on the database unless and until it is dismissed as a class action by the court.

7.36 Counsel who wish to have proceedings posted on the database must complete the Database Registration Form located on the database webpage and send it along with the original pleadings and certification motion (in PDF or Word format) to the CBA. Counsel who submit the registration form are asked to verify the accuracy of the information when it is posted on the web and inform the CBA if and when the information needs to be modified. Once posted, users of the database will be able to browse class action proceedings, obtain useful information and download relevant documents. The database includes brief descriptors of the class action proceedings, including the filing date, style of cause, description of the class, subject-matter of the action, and status of the case.

7.37 Practice directions from courts have been issued in some Canadian jurisdictions requiring the plaintiff's counsel to send the relevant class actions information to the CBA. However, the CBA cannot guarantee the exhaustiveness of the class actions listed, or the accuracy of the information posted.

7.38 We have also noted that the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse of the Stanford Law School provides detailed information relating to the prosecution, defence and settlement of US federal class action securities fraud litigation on its website. A securities class action is a case brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedures 23 on behalf of a group of persons who purchased the securities of a particular company during a

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36 [www.cba.org/classactions/main/gate/index](http://www.cba.org/classactions/main/gate/index). Such a database serves a general public good by allowing citizens to know when and if there are proposed class actions that may impact their rights. Given that the filing of a class action generally stops the limitation clocks from running, this will ensure that individual proceedings are not filed needlessly. Further, prospective class members can voluntarily provide information to either the plaintiff or the defendant, which may assist in the certification process. Finally, prospective class counsel in the same other jurisdictions may not file overlapping actions if they see that the prospective class is already being "taken care of" by competent counsel (although there is no bar to such filing). (See Ward K. Branch and Christopher Rhone "Solving the National Class Problem", 4th Annual Symposium on Class Actions (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, 2007) at 9-10).

37 [http://securities.stanford.edu/info.html#about03](http://securities.stanford.edu/info.html#about03).
specified period of time. The complaint generally contains allegations that the company and/or certain of its officers and directors violated one or more of the federal or state securities laws. The clearinghouse maintains an index of filings for those who have been named in federal class action securities fraud lawsuits since passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

7.39 In Hong Kong, the Law Society or the Bar Association might be the likely candidates for the maintenance and updating of a website along the lines of that operated in Canada. Lawyers of a class action commenced in Hong Kong might be required by Practice Directions issued by the court to send relevant class action information to the responsible professional body for onward posting to the website. Another possibility to be explored is to establish a class action database that is university-based (as is the case with the Stanford University database). In this connection, the possibility of linking this class action database to the official website of the Hong Kong Judiciary should also be explored.

**Flexible court directions for opt-in notice**

7.40 Reflecting the fact that the opt-in procedure we propose for class members from other jurisdictions runs counter to the opt-out approach favoured as the general default position, there should be flexibility to the court to allow appropriate procedures to be applied in the light of the particular circumstances of each case upon application. The flexibility of the court would be exercised within a principled framework and the principles would have to be stated.

7.41 We have reviewed at Annex 5 some examples of orders made by US and Australian courts when directions have been made for opt-in notices within otherwise opt-out class action regimes. These examples show that some of the relevant factors to be considered were:

(a) the operation of the *res judicata* principle in the context of foreign plaintiffs and the problem of re-litigation of the same issues in foreign courts;

(b) whether the use of the opt-in procedures would enable absent class members to file affirmative responses so that they would be regarded as having voluntarily submitted to, or deliberately exited from, the local jurisdiction; and

(c) whether the use of a second notice would also bring about practical advantages to the defendants in that they would be able to ascertain the size of the class and to assess their exposure to litigation risks at an early stage.

7.42 We think these represent a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to the exercise of judicial discretion on an application for the opt-in procedure within a principled framework.
Class actions involving defendants from other jurisdictions

7.43 Where a defendant is from a jurisdiction outside Hong Kong, the current rules on service of proceedings outside Hong Kong as set out in order 11 of the Rules of High Court, as well as the case law on the rule of forum non conveniens, should be equally applicable and sufficient to control class actions with defendants outside Hong Kong.

7.44 Order 11 rule 4 of the Rules of High Court provides as follows:

"(1) An application for the grant of leave under rule 1(l) must be supported by an affidavit stating -

(a) the grounds on which the application is made;
(b) that in the deponent's belief the plaintiff has a good cause of action;
(c) in what place the defendant is, or probably may be found; and
(d) where the application is made under rule 1(1)(c), the grounds for the deponent's belief that there is between the plaintiff and the person on whom a writ has been served a real issue which the plaintiff may reasonably ask the Court to try.

(2) No such leave shall be granted unless it shall be made sufficiently to appear to the Court that the case is a proper one for service out of the jurisdiction under this Order."

7.45 If a writ is to be served outside the jurisdiction, the conditions referred to in order 11, rule 1(1) must be complied with. Rule 1(1) sets out different categories of cases in which service of a writ outside the jurisdiction is permissible. The categories most relevant to class actions commenced in Hong Kong appear to be the following:

"(1) ... [S]ervice of a writ out of the jurisdiction is permissible with the leave of the Court if in the action begun by the writ -

... 

(d) the claim is brought to enforce, rescind, dissolve, annul or otherwise affect a contract, or to recover damages or obtain other relief in respect of the breach of a contract, being (in either case) a contract which –

(i) was made within the jurisdiction, or
(ii) was made by or through an agent trading or residing within the jurisdiction on behalf of a principal trading or residing out of the jurisdiction, or
is by its terms, or by implication, governed by Hong Kong law, or

contains a term to the effect that the Court of First Instance shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any action in respect of the contract;

de the claim is brought in respect of a breach committed within the jurisdiction of a contract made within or out of the jurisdiction, and irrespective of the fact, if such be the case, that the breach was preceded or accompanied by a breach committed out of the jurisdiction that rendered impossible the performance of so much of the contract as ought to have been performed within the jurisdiction;

the claim is founded on a tort and the damage was sustained, or resulted from an act committed, within the jurisdiction; …"

Each separate plaintiff in a given action who wishes to pursue a cause of action against defendants abroad requires separate leave, although this may be applied for in one application. In the context of class action proceedings, this requirement may pose difficulties in proving that each class member has a cause of action against the foreign defendant. In the case of Inverness Corp & Ors v Magic Dreams Cosmetica Infantil, SL & Ors, Yeung J (as he then was) set aside the order for service out of jurisdiction on the ground that the other plaintiffs had failed to show that they had good reasons to join their claim in the same action with the plaintiff who had made out a case for a grant of leave. Yeung J was of the view that:

"...[I]n an action involving more than one plaintiff against defendants who are out of the jurisdiction, each of the plaintiffs must show that their claims against their respective defendants fall within the ambit of O11 r1(1)(a)-(u) before an order for service out of jurisdiction in respect of the action can be properly obtained."

There is a need to relax the legal restriction so as to allow an application for service outside the jurisdiction without the need to show each claim of the members in a class action falls within the ambit of order 11 rule 1(1). As long as the representative plaintiff can make out a case for a grant of leave, an order could be made for service outside jurisdiction.

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The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens

Apart from any statutory provisions, the common law has developed the doctrine of *forum non conveniens* to deal with the situation where either the plaintiffs seeking access to justice in the local court or the defendants resisting claims before the local court are from another jurisdiction. The principles were explained in the English case of *Spiliada Maritime Corp v Casulex Ltd.*40 In considering whether or not to decline jurisdiction, Hong Kong courts usually follow the two-step test of the *Spiliada* case with minor modification. *Adhiguna Meranti (Cargo Owners) v Adhiguna Harapan (Owners)*41 outlines the approach to be adopted by Hong Kong courts as follows:

"(I) Is it shown that Hong Kong is not only not the natural or appropriate forum for the trial, but that there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong? The evidential burden is here upon the applicant [for stay of the proceedings]. The emphasis is upon 'appropriate' rather than 'convenient' because this is not simply a matter of practical convenience. The purpose is to identify the forum 'with which the action has the most real and substantial connection' .... Failure by the applicant [for stay of the proceedings] at this stage is normally fatal.

(II) If the answer to (I) is yes, will a trial at this other forum deprive the plaintiff of any 'legitimate personal or juridical advantages'? The evidential burden here lies upon the plaintiff [of the legal action].

(III) If the answer to (II) is yes, a court has to balance the advantages of (I) against the disadvantages of (II) .... Deprivation of one or more personal or juridical advantages will not necessarily be fatal to the applicant [for stay of the proceedings] provided that the court is satisfied that notwithstanding such loss 'substantial justice will be done in the available appropriate forum'. The court must try to be objective. Proof of this, which can fairly be called the ultimate burden of persuasion, rests upon the applicant for the stay. By these means he establishes that on balance the other forum is more suitable 'for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice.' This may be another way of saying that the plaintiff's choice of forum has been shown to be so inappropriate as to deserve the pejorative description of 'forum-shopping' and to be restrained accordingly."42

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40 [1987] 1 AC 460.
41 [1987] HKLR 904.
7.49 We are of the view that the application of the existing rules relating to *forum non conveniens* are sufficient to deal with the situation. Although when a Hong Kong court faced with an application for stay of Hong Kong class action proceedings would apply Hong Kong rules on *forum non conveniens*, we believe that the rules applied by foreign courts in a group litigation context provide a useful reference. We have set out our research findings in Annex 6, which reviews the relevant case law and commentary in the UK, Australia and the USA. The proposed Article 22 of the *Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of the Hague Conference on Private International Law* (dated August 2000) is also discussed.

Conclusions

7.50 Within the class action regime itself, useful techniques for controlling or excluding foreign class members include: discretion to transfer class action proceedings to appropriate courts; requiring the formation of sub-classes for foreign class members; and requiring them to opt-in in order to submit to/benefit from the jurisdiction of the managing court. We are in favour of a requirement to form sub-classes for foreign class members and to give the court flexible discretion within a principled framework to require opt-in notices to be served on potential class members in other jurisdictions (in contrast to the general opt-out regime recommended in Chapter 4). We are of the view that the current court rules in order 11 of the Rules of the High Court (with minor adaptation) and the common law rule of *forum non conveniens* could be used to control class actions involving either plaintiffs or defendants from other jurisdictions.

**Recommendation 5**

(1) We recommend that where class action proceedings involve parties from a jurisdiction or jurisdictions outside Hong Kong, an opt-in procedure should be adopted as the default position, but that this default rule should be accompanied by a discretion vested in the court to adopt an opt-out procedure for the entire class of foreign plaintiffs or for defined sub-classes, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case upon application.

(2) Where defendants are from a jurisdiction or jurisdictions outside Hong Kong, we recommend that the current rules on service of proceedings outside Hong Kong as set out in order 11 of the Rules of the High Court (with minor adaptation) should be applicable.
(3) We recommend that, in appropriate circumstances, the court may stay class action proceedings involving plaintiffs from other jurisdictions in reliance on the common law rule of *forum non conveniens*, if it is clearly inappropriate to exercise jurisdiction and if a court elsewhere has jurisdiction which is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute.

(4) To assist potential foreign parties to consider whether to join in class action proceedings commenced in Hong Kong, we propose that information on those proceedings should be publicised on a website.
Chapter 8
Funding models for the class actions regime

The problem identified

8.1 It is clear that the costs of litigation are a crucial issue in class action proceedings. It is generally accepted that if a suitable funding model could not be found which allows plaintiffs with limited funds to take proceedings, little could be achieved by a class action regime. As observed by the Ontario Law Reform Commission:

"The question of costs (of litigation) is the single most important issue that this Commission has considered in designing an expanded class action procedure … the matter of costs will not merely affect the efficacy of class actions, but in fact will determine whether this procedure will be utilized at all." (Emphasis added)

8.2 The additional procedural requirements of class actions increase substantially the costs incurred by the representative plaintiff and render a class action a considerably more expensive form of litigation than individual proceedings. Extensive empirical study of class actions in the USA concluded that:

"[c]lass actions are costly. We estimate that total costs in the ten cases [studied], excluding defendants’ own legal expenses, ranged from about $1 million to over $1 billion. Eight of the cases cost more than $10 million; four cost more than $50 million; three cost more than half a billion dollars.

Transaction costs in class action lawsuits include not only fees and expenses for the plaintiff class attorneys and defense attorneys, but also the costs of notice and settlement administration, which can be substantial."
### Costs rules

8.3 The general rule that "costs follow success", if applied unchanged to a class actions regime, would constitute a major obstacle to commencing a class action. The broad effect of the application of this general rule to a class action would be as follows:

**The incidence of liability for costs where costs follow success**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Result of action</th>
<th>Representative plaintiff</th>
<th>Other members of class</th>
<th>Defendant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Action succeeds**  
(Class wins) | **Entitlement:** to "party and party" expenses from defendant.  
**Liability:** for own solicitor's fees not covered by the party and party expenses allowed by the Court on "taxation" (assessment) of the litigation costs reasonably incurred in prosecuting the action ("solicitor and client"). | **Entitlement:** None.  
**Liability:** None. | **Entitlement:** None.  
**Liability:** *for (a) own solicitor's fees ("solicitor and client") and (b) representative plaintiff's expenses ("party and party")* |
| **Action fails**  
(Class loses) | **Entitlement:** None.  
**Liability:** *for (a) own solicitor's fees ("solicitor and client") and* | **Entitlement:** None.  
**Liability:** None. | **Entitlement:** *to "party and party" expenses from representative plaintiff.*  
**Liability:** |

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3 See order 62, rule 3(2) of the Rules of High Court which provides that: "*if the Court in the exercise of its discretion sees fit to make any order as to the costs of or incidental to any proceedings, the Court shall, subject to this Order, order the costs to follow the event, except when it appears to the Court that in the circumstances of the case some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs.*" The existing rule for costs in Hong Kong is that the unsuccessful party will pay the successful party's costs. No matter whether it is the plaintiff or the defendant who wins, the costs incurred by the successful party will not be fully recovered from the unsuccessful party. There is likely to be a substantial difference between the amount of the successful party's actual costs in conducting the action (solicitor and client costs) and the amount that he or she will be entitled to recover from the unsuccessful opponent (party and party costs).

4 Table adapted from the Scottish Law Commission, Multi-Party Actions (No 154, 1996), at para 5.6.
8.4 Plaintiffs will face the prospect of being liable for their own legal costs and a significant portion of the costs incurred by the defendant should their cases fail. This potential liability for large amount of costs has the practical effect of deterring many individuals from taking legal actions, even though they have meritorious claims. As pointed out by Professor Morabito, the goals could not be achieved because of the costs barrier:

"Potential representative plaintiffs whose claims are individually non-recoverable would be unlikely to commence class actions as the extent of their potential liability for costs would exceed the value of their own claim. This state of affairs precludes the attainment of the 'access to justice' goal of class actions. In relation to those potential class representatives, whose claims are individually recoverable, individual proceedings constitute a more appealing option than grouped proceedings as they involve lower costs. Consequently, another major goal of class actions, commonly referred to as the 'judicial economy' goal, becomes unreachable."  

5

8.5 Two alternative costs rules have been implemented or proposed in class action regimes in other jurisdictions:

(a) No costs order rule – under this rule the successful litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect legal costs from the loser. This approach is adopted in the USA. The Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended the adoption of this rule because it would be beneficial to plaintiffs and would remove the threat of a large costs award as a barrier to potential class proceedings.6 British Columbia has, in essence, adopted this approach: successful parties are not entitled to costs, unless there has been "vexatious, frivolous or abusive conduct on the part of any party", "an improper or unnecessary application or other step has been made or taken for the purpose of delay or increasing the costs or for any other improper purpose", or "there are exceptional circumstances that make it unjust to deprive the successful party of costs".7 The Victorian Law Reform Advisory Council recommended the adoption of the American "no costs"

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7 Class Proceedings Act, RSBC 1996, sections 50 and 37.
rule and pointed out that the use of the "costs follow the event" rule as a means of dealing with unfounded claims created risk and uncertainty for all litigants. The losers were penalised simply for having lost, no matter how sound their decision to litigate or to resist settlement might have been. The Manitoba Law Reform Commission recommended following the approach in British Columbia. This would ensure that potential plaintiffs were not deterred from launching a class action by their potential exposure to a large costs award in the event that the proceedings were unsuccessful, and as a result would enhance access to justice for potential claimants.

(b) **Costs follow the event rule** – under this rule the successful party is *prima facie* entitled to costs. Contrary to the Ontario Law Reform Commission's recommendations, the Ontario government adopted the "costs follow the event" rule. In exercising its discretion with respect to costs, the court is directed to consider whether the class action was a test case, raised a novel point of law, or involved a matter of public interest. The plaintiff risks having to pay the defendants' costs (which may be substantial) if he is unsuccessful in certifying the action as a class proceeding or if he is unsuccessful on the merits. In the United Kingdom, the Scottish Law Commission recommended that the court should retain its discretion to apply the general rule that expenses follow success. Lord Woolf was of the view that multi-party actions were not sufficiently different from ordinary litigation as to justify a change in the costs follow the event rule. The South African Law Commission recommended that the court should retain a discretion to consider whether to apply the general rule that costs follow the event in class proceedings. The Australian Law Reform Commission has recommended the retention of the general rule in civil and judicial review proceedings that the loser pays the winner's costs.

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11 Class Proceedings Act (Ont), section 31(1).


**Costs in case of settlement**

8.6 Judicial approval of settlement is required in the jurisdictions of Canada, USA and Australia that we have surveyed. We will concentrate our discussion on the position in Australia. Section 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (FCA Act) provides as follows:

"(1) A representative proceeding may not be settled or discontinued without the approval of the Court.

(2) If the Court gives such an approval, it may make such orders as are just with respect to the distribution of any money paid under a settlement or paid into the Court."

8.7 Where a proposed settlement involves payment of costs of the solicitors for the plaintiffs, courts have required evidence as to the manner in which these costs have been determined and must be satisfied that the amount was fair and reasonable having regard to the work undertaken.\(^{16}\)

8.8 In *Williams v FAI Home Security Pty Ltd (No 5)*, Goldberg J referred to evidence from an independent legal costs consultant who had reviewed the files of the applicants’ solicitors together with their time records.\(^{17}\) The judge was satisfied on the basis of that evidence that the costs to be paid to the applicants' solicitors were fair and reasonable and were lower than those which they would have been entitled to charge their clients.

8.9 In *King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings Ltd)*, Moore J stated that the applicant relied on an affidavit filed by a barrister and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Victoria who had practised exclusively in the area of legal costs consultancy since 1992 and who had expressed the opinion that the account prepared by the applicant's solicitors was fair and reasonable and accurately reflected and applied the method of calculating costs and disbursements agreed by the solicitors and the applicant.\(^{18}\) The solicitors' fees included an uplift fee of 25% and Moore J did not consider that this aspect of the agreement should preclude approval of the settlement.

8.10 In *Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (No 5)*, the court asked for evidence from an independent, experienced solicitor or costs consultant before determining an application for approval of a settlement under section 33V(1) of the FCA Act.\(^{19}\) The court said that in deciding whether to approve the settlement it was required to consider:


\(^{17}\) [2001] FCA 399, at para 19.


the reasonableness of the fee and retainer agreements, including the provisions for ancillary services, interest and an uplift factor;

(b) whether the fee and disbursements charged had been calculated in accordance with the fee and retainer agreement; and

(c) whether any significant portion of the fees and disbursements had been inappropriately or unnecessarily incurred in conducting the proceedings on behalf of the representative applicant and the represented group.

8.11 In that case, Sackville J was of the view that there were "special circumstances" which warranted the need for evidence from an independent experienced solicitor or costs consultant as to the reasonableness of the costs. Those circumstances included:

(a) the provision for payment of "an apparently large amount by way of fees and disbursements";

(b) the fact that a proportion of those fees and disbursements was to be borne by the group members; and

(c) the fact that the represented group included persons who were not individually legally represented in the proceedings.

As Sackville J noted, these circumstances created at least the possibility of a conflict of interest between the solicitors and some remaining group members.

8.12 The judge was also concerned at the proposal that no compensation was to be paid to the representatives of class members who had died before the commencement of the proceedings. In his view, the proposed settlement scheme would be fair and reasonable, so far as this sub-group was concerned, if the 47 members of the sub-group had received notice of the proposed settlement and had not opted out of the proceedings. In his opinion, fairness required that they should receive notice with an opportunity to opt out. Subsequently, after considering further evidence, including from an independent solicitor and costs consultant, Sackville J approved the settlement.

Costs where proceedings no longer continue as a class action

8.13 The Federal Court of Australia may make an order (under sections 33L, 33M or 33N of the FCA Act) that a proceeding is no longer to continue as a representative proceeding under Part IVA.

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22 Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (No 6) [2004] FCA 1598.
In such circumstances, the proceeding may be continued as a proceeding by the representative party on his own behalf (section 33P(a)) and, on their application, group members may be joined as applicants in the proceeding (section 33P(b)).

Group members who become parties for the purpose of the ongoing conduct of the (non-representative) proceeding will lose the immunity from potential liability for adverse costs orders which they enjoyed as group members during the course of the representative proceeding. Former group members will not necessarily remain immune for any order for costs in respect of that period during which the proceedings were being conducted as a class action.23

Costs-shifting measures in other jurisdictions

To overcome the costs barrier, measures have been introduced in other jurisdictions to shift the costs burden from the representative plaintiffs to the defendant, the class members, the class lawyers or to an external funding source.

(a) Shifting costs to the defendant

In Ontario, the costs follow success rule applies (ie a losing representative plaintiff is liable for the party and party costs of the successful defendant), but section 31(1) of the Ontario Class Proceedings Act allows the court to make a different costs order in certain specified circumstances:

"In exercising its discretion with respect to costs under subsection 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court may consider whether the class proceeding was a test case, raised a novel point of law or involved a matter of public interest." (Emphasis added)

Professor Mulheron found that attempts by unsuccessful representative plaintiffs to invoke the discretion of the court under one of the three categories of special case have had mixed success.24 Moreover, recent court decisions have indicated that the judiciary has tended to treat class actions as a non-special branch of civil litigation. Professor Mulheron concluded that:

"The Ontario experience serves to emphasise that, in reality, any statutorily introduced directives to the courts by which to soften the potentially harsh effect of the [costs follow success] rule depends ultimately on judicial discretion, which will not be of much comfort to a representative plaintiff potentially or

23 Peter Cashman, Class Action Law and Practice (2007, the Federation Press), at 456.
8.19 We are of the view that because of the exceptional circumstances in which costs could be transferred to the successful defendant and the narrow scope for the exercise of judicial discretion, this does not provide a solution to the general problem of funding class actions and we do not propose its adoption in Hong Kong.

(b) Shifting costs to class members

8.20 The Australian legislative scheme for class actions implements a means of protecting the representative plaintiff in relation to the costs incurred in conducting a class action. Section 33ZJ(2) of the FCA Act provides that, in successful class actions seeking monetary relief:

“If … the Court is satisfied that the costs reasonably incurred in relation to the [class action] by the person making the application [representative plaintiff] are likely to exceed the costs recoverable by the person from the respondent, the Court may order that an amount equal to the whole or a part of the excess be paid to that person [the representative] out of the damages awarded.”

8.21 This provision is similar to the US "common fund" doctrine. Provisions similar to section 33ZJ(2) have been proposed by the Australian Law Reform Commission, the Ontario Law Reform Commission and the South Australian Law Reform Commission. It ensures that "any difference between the costs recovered under the party/party order and the costs reasonably charged by the solicitors in respect of the litigation is met out of recovered damages." Moreover, the provision overcomes the problem of class members who obtain a "free ride". Section 33ZJ(2) allows the court to

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26 The "common fund" doctrine is explained by Professor Mulheron thus: "The creation of a fund by a successful party to a class action is not a sufficient basis to allow the representative to seek fees on the same basis as the ordinary solicitor-client relationship. The concept is based on principles of equity and requires a showing of a need for the solicitor’s services in the creation, preservation or increase of the fund which has an interest in the fund..." R Mulheron, The Class Action in Common Law Systems, a Comparative Perspective (2004, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing), at 440.
31 The problem of a "free ride" has been described as follows: "Absent class members who are the beneficiaries of the efforts of the class representative and the class lawyer, get a 'free ride' in two respects. First, since absent class members are not parties to the action, they are not potentially liable for the party and party costs of the defendant should the class action fail. Secondly, absent class members are not obliged to contribute to the solicitor and client costs owed by the class representative to the lawyer for the class, unless they have
exact indirect contributions from class members in the event of a successful class action for damages. However section 33ZJ(2) has a number of limitations:

(a) If the class action only seeks non-monetary relief, such as an injunction or declaration, there will be no monetary recovery from which fees and disbursements can be deducted;

(b) The Court can only make an order in respect of an award of damages. If the class members have recovered damages or compensation from a defendant by way of settlement, the provision does not apply;

(c) The provision does not deal with the problem of insufficient funds to initiate the proceedings at the outset; and

(d) The provision does not address the issue of a possible adverse costs order which might be made against the representative plaintiff if the proceeding fails.32

8.22 It is a general feature of all class action regimes that, if the class loses, the class members will enjoy a specific and unilateral costs immunity. This immunity is statutorily provided in Australia,33 Ontario34 and British Columbia.35 Rather than imposing on the class members a liability to pay, section 19(7) of the Class Proceedings Act in British Columbia provides for an alternative method of financing the initiation and conduct of a class action:

"With leave of the court, notice [of certification] may include a solicitation of contribution from class members to assist in paying solicitors' fees and disbursements"

8.23 In the absence of any sanction on class members if they fail to make a contribution, it is doubtful whether this is an effective method of financing class actions. Professor Morabito has referred to the reluctance of absent class members to contribute to the expenses of the class action:

"This reluctance is attributable to two major factors. In the first place, class members will be able to enjoy the benefits flowing from a successful class suit whether or not they provide any financial assistance to the representative plaintiff. Another reason for this reluctance is due to the remoteness of any potential benefit at the time the request entered into agreements to do so." (Emphasis added) Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions (1982) 657.


Federal Court Act (Aus), 22 33Q, 33R and 43(1A).

Class Proceedings Act (Ont), section 31(2).

Class Proceedings Act (BC), section 37(4).
for contributions is normally made, namely, at an early stage of the proceedings.\textsuperscript{36} (Emphasis added)

8.24 Given the limitations of a provision along the lines of section 33ZJ(2) and the reluctance of class members to contribute voluntarily to the costs of the representative plaintiffs, we do not think that transferring the financial burden to the class members is likely to provide the necessary funding for class action litigation.

(c) Shifting costs to the class lawyers

8.25 In the context of class actions, mechanisms for transferring the financial risks inherent in litigation from the representative plaintiff to the class lawyers are provided for in the agreements as to the lawyers’ fees. "Conditional fees" involve the payment of legal fees on the traditional basis of calculation plus an additional percentage if the class action is won. If the class action is lost, then no legal fee will be charged. In contrast, "contingency fees" are based on the amount of compensation recovered from a class action. If the class action is lost, no legal fee will be charged, whereas if the class action is won, then a percentage of the compensation recovered will be charged as legal fees.\textsuperscript{37}

8.26 Traditionally, common law did not allow private funding of litigation. The offence of maintenance\textsuperscript{38} is punishable at common law by a fine or imprisonment. Maintenance consists in the unlawful taking in hand or upholding of or assisting in civil suits or quarrels of others, to the disturbance of common right, and from other than charitable motives. "Champerty"\textsuperscript{39} is a bargain with a plaintiff or defendant to divide the land or other matter sued for between them if they succeed in their litigation, in return for which the champerter funds the party’s suit.

8.27 In the United States, counsel are permitted to take on class actions (and other proceedings) on the basis of a contingency fee agreement, under which the lawyers do not receive payment of any kind unless the claim is successful. The amount which the lawyers are entitled to receive is either defined as a percentage of the amount recovered, or is determined through the "lodestar" method (ie where the fee is based on a multiplier: the hourly rate adjusted for complexity and carrying costs multiplied by risk. The multiplier fee may be topped-up by a counsel fee, if appropriate).\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{37} See the definitions given in the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Conditional Fees (July 2007), at para 6.

\textsuperscript{38} See Bradlaugh v Newdegate 11 QB 1; Alabaster v Harness [1895] 1 QB 339; Holden v Thomson [1907] 2 KB 489; Neville v London "Express" Newspapers, Ltd [1919] AC 368.

\textsuperscript{39} As to what is chamertous, see Re Thomas [1894] 1 QB 747; Rees v De Bernardy [1896] 2 Ch 437.

\textsuperscript{40} Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Class Proceedings (1999), at 35.
8.28 Following the abolition of the offence and tort of maintenance and champerty in the United Kingdom in 1967, the Australian jurisdictions of Victoria, South Australia, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory all subsequently followed suit.\(^{41}\)

8.29 In British Columbia, lawyers are allowed to receive a set percentage of the quantum of damages recovered by the class if the class wins. A fairly wide range of percentages has been judicially permitted.\(^{42}\) The Ontario Class Proceedings Act expressly provides that a lawyer and a representative party may enter into a written agreement which provides that fees and disbursements will only be paid if a class action is successful. Section 33 provides:

"(3) 'base fee' means the result of multiplying the total number of hours worked by an hourly rate … 'multiplier' means a multiple to be applied to a base fee …

(4) … the solicitor [may apply] to the court to have his or her fees increased by a multiplier …

(7) … the court (a) shall determine the amount of the solicitor's base fee; (b) may apply a multiplier to the base fee that results in fair and reasonable compensation to the solicitor for the risk incurred in undertaking and continuing the proceeding under an agreement for payment only in the event of success; ….

(8) In making a determination under (7)(a), the court shall allow only a reasonable fee.

(9) In making a determination under (7)(b), the court may consider the manner in which the solicitor conducted the proceeding."

8.30 The Ontario legislation does not specifically provide for a contingency fee based on a percentage of the amount of any recovery, but it has been judicially endorsed on the basis that such arrangements promote efficiency in the litigation and discourage unnecessary work that might otherwise be done by the lawyer simply in order to increase the base fee.\(^{43}\)

8.31 In Manitoba, section 58 of the Law Society Act authorises contingency fee agreements based on a percentage of an award or settlement. Given the peculiar nature of class proceedings, the Manitoba Law Reform Commission recommended the inclusion within the class proceedings legislation of provisions that deal specifically with contingency fee agreements in the context of class proceedings. The Commission was of the opinion that

\(^{41}\) The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Conditional Fees (July 2007), at para 5.2.


contingency fee agreements should be permitted in the context of class proceedings, and that section 58 of the Law Society Act should apply to class proceedings to the extent that the class proceedings legislation did not specifically affect its provisions. The Commission further recommended that an application to the court for a declaration that a contingency fee agreement was not fair and reasonable to the client should be made to the judge who either presided over the trial or approved the settlement agreement, whichever the case might be.44

8.32 The Australian Law Reform Commission recommended the introduction of an uplift contingency fee for class proceedings conducted under Australia's federal regime.45 This proposal was not enacted. However, Australian lawyers, with the possible exception of Victorian lawyers, are permitted to charge a speculative fee, as long as they believe that their client has a reasonable cause of action and they do not bargain with their client for an interest in the subject matter of the litigation.46 Lawyers in South Australia and New South Wales are permitted to enter into uplift fee arrangements.47

8.33 The Scottish Law Commission strongly opposed the introduction of percentage contingency fees for class actions in that jurisdiction, although it noted that "speculative fees" (where the lawyer is paid only if the client is successful in the litigation and the fee payable may be the normal fee and an agreed percentage of up to 100% of that fee) are already permissible in Scotland.48 The South African Law Commission, on the other hand, suggested the adoption of the Ontario rule. The Contingency Fees Act 1997 was enacted in South Africa to allow legal practitioners, in the event of successful litigation, to receive, in addition to their normal fees for the case in question, an uplift to a maximum of 100% of their normal fees. The South African Law Commission recommended that a legal practitioner in a class action should be allowed to make an arrangement with the representative that fees, or fees and disbursements, will only be paid in the event of success.49

8.34 The Scottish Law Commission set out the following factors for consideration in deciding whether contingency fee arrangements should be permitted:

45 It was proposed that the court be authorised to approve fee agreements, which could include an uplift fee (but not a percentage contingent fee), in advance of the conclusion of the proceeding: Australian Law Reform Commission, Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court, Report No 46 (1988), at paras 296-297.
47 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW), sections 186, 187(2), (3), (4); Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic), section 98 Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), section 42 and Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice 2003(SA), rule 42; and Barristers' Rules (Qld), rule 102A(d). Tasmania prohibits the charging of uplift fees by barristers: Rules of Practice 1994 (Tas), rule 92(1).
"The perceived advantages of contingency fees include the following:

(a) Poor clients who are unable to pay lawyers' fees can bring their cases to court.

(b) Lawyers accepting cases on this basis will have a stake in winning the case and, therefore, will be more committed and more diligent in their preparation and presentation.

(c) Lawyers may benefit by a simplification of the administrative procedures by which they are paid and by an increase in their earnings.

On the other hand, the following are the perceived disadvantages of contingency fees:

(a) It is said, on the basis of experience in America, that a contingency fee system leads to excessive awards and an explosion in litigation.

(b) They create a conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client to avoid the heavy expense of preparing for a trial (proof) the lawyer may encourage settlement when that is not in the client's best interests.

(c) Fees are excessive since lawyers can charge an unreasonable percentage (in the absence of arrangements to control excessive fees).

(d) Lawyers are encouraged to use unethical tactics in the way they conduct cases.

(e) The rule that expenses follow success reduces the attractiveness of contingent fees to litigants in the United Kingdom since if they lose they will still have to pay the other side's costs.

(f) They seem to offer little to those legally aided litigants who have no contribution to pay (unless there is a strong risk of the statutory claw back taking most of the award).

(g) They are only applicable where a financial claim is being made and not, for example, in actions of [injunction or declaration] or in applications for judicial review.сершк"
8.35 Arguably, the most important benefit is that of increasing access to justice by removing or reducing some of the costs disincentives that currently deter the initiation of class actions. This is achieved by transferring some of the risk, and part of the cost, of litigation from the clients to their lawyers, who are better able to assess the risks involved and to bear those risks by spreading them over a large number of lawsuits. On the other hand, perhaps the most persuasive argument against contingency fees is the potential for conflict of interest which they create in relation to such matters as the settlement of the client's claim. The contingent nature of the lawyer's remuneration creates a strong financial incentive for the lawyer to accept a small settlement in order to ensure some fees, rather than risk losing at trial and recovering nothing. The losses incurred as a result of the conflicts of interest which may exist between principals and agents are described by economists as "agency costs".

8.36 The problem of agency costs in class actions can be addressed by a requirement that settlements be approved by the court presiding over the class suit. The legislation governing the class proceedings regimes in both British Columbia and Ontario stipulates that any fee agreement (whether a contingency fee agreement or not) between the class lawyer and representative plaintiff must be in writing and must be approved by the court.

8.37 The two justifications which have been cited for judicial scrutiny of fee agreements in class actions are, first, to protect other class members who may be bound by the terms of a retainer agreement that they did not negotiate, and secondly, to ensure that legal fees are not disproportionate to the services provided.

8.38 The experience in the US indicates that if judicial approval of class settlements is to provide an adequate safeguard against conflicts of interest between class lawyers and class members, judges must be prepared to abandon their traditional passive approach and pursue vigorously the role of guardians of the interest of the absent class members. In their case studies of ten recent class actions for damages, RAND analysts found wide variation in what was delivered to class members as a result of litigation, and in what class counsel received in return. RAND interpreted the case-study findings as

53 Class Proceedings Act (BC), section 38(1); Class Proceedings Act (Ont), section 32(1).
54 Class Proceedings Act (BC), section 38(2); Class Proceedings Act (Ont), section 32(2).
demonstrating that when judges scrutinized proposed settlements and fee requests more closely and refused to approve questionable deals and requests, class members received more of what defendants were willing to pay to settle the cases. The analysts concluded that:

"... the balance of benefits and costs was more salutary when judges

- required clear and detailed notices
- closely scrutinized the details of settlements including distribution strategies
- invited the participation of legitimate objectors and intervenors
- took responsibility for determining attorney fees, rather than simply rubber-stamping previously negotiated agreements
- determined fees in relation to the actual benefits created by the lawsuit [and]
- required ongoing reporting of the actual distribution of settlement benefits."

8.39 High percentage contingency fees of the order of 30 - 40% have been awarded in the USA and in British Columbia. In practice, these awards provide "war chests" which enable the lawyers themselves to fund the class action, thus enhancing access to justice.

8.40 The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong considered the issue of conditional fees in a report published in July 2007. The "costs follow the event" rule operates in Hong Kong, which means that the unsuccessful litigant will usually be ordered to pay the legal costs of the successful party, in addition to his own. The report noted that, if conditional fees were allowed in Hong Kong, an unsuccessful claimant who had a conditional fee arrangement would be relieved from paying his own lawyers, but would still be liable to pay the defendant's legal fees unless he had obtained after-the-event insurance (ATE insurance) to cover these costs. The report pointed out that a wealthy corporate client might choose to use conditional fees without obtaining ATE insurance after weighing up the amount of the premium, the likelihood of losing the case and their financial ability to pay for the other side's costs should the need arise. Experience in other jurisdictions suggested, however, that ATE insurance was an integral component of a conditional fees regime, particularly for those of limited means whom a conditional fee arrangement was intended to assist. Since it was doubtful that ATE insurance would be available at an affordable premium and

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58 Same as above, at 149.
60 The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Conditional Fees, report (July 2007).
on a long-term basis in Hong Kong, the report concluded that the current conditions were not appropriate for the introduction of conditional fees.  

8.41 We suggest that this issue should be re-examined in the class action context. The Civil Justice Council of the UK addressed the issue of contingency fee funding in multi-party claims and suggested that:

"In multi party cases where no other form of funding is available, regulated contingency fees should be permitted to provide access to justice. The Ministry of Justice should conduct thorough research to ascertain whether contingency fees can improve access to justice in the resolution of civil disputes generally."

8.42 We have proposed in Recommendation 4(3) that, in appropriate cases, the representative plaintiffs should be ordered by the court to pay security for costs in accordance with the established principles for making such orders. In other words, the court will ensure that any claimants themselves have sufficient means to pay any adverse costs and provide protection for defendants against blackmail claims lodged by impecunious claimants. The claimants will need to demonstrate that they are sufficiently funded to meet the adverse costs order or that they are adequately insured by ATE insurance. So long as the appropriate financial requirements for adequacy of representation are satisfied, there may be scope for the prospective claimants to seek private funding by way of contingency fee arrangements. Reflecting the assessment of the current situation in Hong Kong as revealed in the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong's report on conditional fees, we have made no recommendation to allow conditional fee arrangements in class actions. However, we agree with the suggestion of the Civil Justice Council that further research should be conducted to ascertain whether contingency fees could improve access to justice in the resolution of civil disputes generally.

**Other alternative sources of funding**

**Conditional legal aid fund**

8.43 In its report on *Conditional Fees*, the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong recommended establishing a Conditional Legal Aid Fund ("CLAF") which would combine conditional fees and legal aid. The fund would take a proportion of the money received by a successful plaintiff to meet claims on the fund by unsuccessful plaintiffs. The initial funding would have to be provided by the Government. An applicant would have to satisfy the fund, as in the case of legal aid, that he had an apparently good case. A new administrative body would be set up to administer the CLAF and to screen applications for the use of conditional fees, brief out cases to private lawyers, finance the litigation, 

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61 LRC report, cited above, Recommendation 1, at paragraphs 7.5-7.30.  
and pay the opponent's legal costs should the litigation prove unsuccessful. The report recommended that the CLAF should be permitted to engage the private lawyers it instructs on a conditional fee basis, while the CLAF should be permitted to charge the client on a contingency fee basis.

8.44 In September 2007, the Law Society of Hong Kong published the Report of its Working party on Condition Fees in response to the Law Reform Commission's proposals. The Law Society was of the view that the disadvantages of conditional fee agreements outweighed their possible advantages as a means of increasing access to justice. A CLAF as suggested by the Law Reform Commission was unlikely to be financially viable and would be untenable given the unavailability of ATE insurance in Hong Kong. The Law Society believed that if the Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme were expanded to include other types of cases which had a high chance of success and certainty of recovery of damages or restoration of property, then the expansion would not jeopardise its financial viability.

8.45 It is unlikely that the Commission's recommendations on CLAF will be taken forward. The Legal Aid Department has made clear in its response to the Commissioner's earlier consultation paper on this subject that it did not favour an expansion of the existing Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme. As regards the CLAF, while the Commission believed that such a scheme could (like the existing Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme) be self-financing, it would require seed money to set the ball rolling. It is unlikely that either the Government or the legal profession will be willing to provide the necessary initial funding.

8.46 Although such a fund would have certain attractions in that it would widen access to justice in class actions, the most serious drawback in the class action context is that such a scheme could only be effective in cases where substantial sums of money are involved. It is doubtful whether the fund would be financially viable.64 There is also a difficult problem of principle where successful litigants are effectively financing unsuccessful cases out of the award of damages which have been judged fair.65 We do not recommend the establishment of a CLAF to cover class action proceedings in Hong Kong.

**Legal aid**

8.47 Consideration may be given to whether the existing legal aid regime should be expanded to finance class actions in the light of overseas experience. The Scottish Law Commission and the South African Law Commission both considered that legal aid was the most suitable means of

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providing financial assistance for class actions. In view of the limitations discussed on other forms of funding by third parties, legal aid was in practice the only feasible means of third party funding if it is desired to provide public financial assistance. The Scottish Commission noted that the present civil legal aid arrangements were not specifically designed to apply to class actions litigation. Legal aid was made available separately to each of the litigants, since each assisted person litigates separately. The financial conditions which must be met before legal aid was granted meant that one or more members of a group might be refused legal aid. If civil legal aid were to be available to the representative plaintiff in a class action it was likely that the financial conditions would have to be disapplied.

8.48 The Australian Law Reform Commission was of the view that the existing legal aid arrangements were not appropriate for group proceedings. The application of strict eligibility criteria in relation to the "means test" would create a poverty trap which would catch people who were too rich to qualify for legal aid but not rich enough to pay lawyers' fees. The means test creates additional problems in the context of class actions. The application of the means test not just in relation to the financial means of the representative plaintiff but also to the means of all class members creates obvious administrative problems, especially in opt-out schemes which do not require the identification of, and the express consent to the bringing of the class suit by, the class members. A fundamental problem is that the availability of legal aid in individual actions does not address the problem that the potentially enormous costs of litigation far exceed the amount of each plaintiff's personal stake and it would be economically irrational to initiate class actions.

8.49 We have consulted the Director of Legal Aid ("DLA") and explored the possibility of extending legal aid to class action proceedings commenced in Hong Kong. He made it clear that the current statutory framework only allowed the granting of legal aid on an individual basis. It

67 Scottish Law Commission, Multi-Party Actions Court Proceedings and Funding Discussion Paper No 98, at para 8.27.
70 The Preamble to the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap 91) is:
"To make provision for the granting of legal aid in civil actions to persons of limited means and for purposes incidental thereto or connected therewith."
Section 2(1) provides that:
"An 'aided person' means a person to whom has been granted a legal aid certificate which is still in force and "person" does not include a body of persons corporate or unincorporate so as to authorise legal aid to be granted to such a body."
Section 10 provides that:
"(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Director may grant to a person a certificate that that person is entitled under the provisions of this Ordinance to legal aid in connection with any proceedings if the Director is satisfied that -
(a) legal aid is sought in connection with proceedings for which legal aid may be granted under section 5 or, as the case may be, section 5A;"
would be necessary to amend the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap 91) if changes were to be made to the individual-based legal aid scheme.

8.50 If legal actions were jointly commenced by legally aided and non-legally aided plaintiffs, all that the DLA would pay is that portion of the costs attributable to the legally aided plaintiffs. If the nominal plaintiff in a class action were eligible for legal aid (meaning that he satisfied both the means and merits tests), legal aid would have to be granted. The DLA would not be concerned about whether the action proceeded as a class action or whether the remaining class members could get funding from other sources, but the DLA would only be responsible for the costs of the aided person as if that person had conduct of the action as a personal as opposed to a representative party.

8.51 If the class action failed, the DLA would be liable to pay the legal costs incurred by the legally aided person as if he were a private plaintiff pursuing the action on his own. The DLA would not be liable to pay the additional costs otherwise incurred by the class action proceedings. Nor would the DLA be held accountable for the costs incurred by other class members. As a corollary, if the class action succeeded, the DLA would recover the common fund costs, plus any outstanding contribution from the legally aided person only, and seek to recover his share of the party and party costs in the action. The additional costs for class action proceedings would have to be borne by the nominal plaintiffs themselves.

8.52 In response to our inquiry as to whether the DLA could be given more discretion to take into account the public interest element and to grant legal aid in appropriate cases, the DLA stressed that the underlying policy of legal aid was to help those who could not afford to get access to justice. As a matter of principle, well-off class members should not be allowed to "free ride" on the legally aided representative of the class.

8.53 The DLA has made clear that, so long as individual applicant is qualified for legal aid under the Legal Aid Ordinance, the commencement of a class action will not itself disqualify him from that entitlement. But since common fund costs cannot normally be recovered from the opposite party on taxation, it will be necessary to disaggregate from the total common fund costs in the representative action the common fund costs attributable to the legally aided person, as if the action had been pursued as a personal action. Thus, if

(b) in the case of legal aid to which section 5 applies, subject to section 5AA, the financial resources of that person do not exceed the amount specified in that section in respect of financial resources; and

(c) in the case of legal aid to which section 5A applies the financial resources of that person do not exceed the amount specified in that section in respect of financial resources.

(3) A person shall not be granted a legal aid certificate in connection with any proceedings unless he shows that he has reasonable grounds for taking, defending, opposing or continuing such proceedings or being a party thereto, and may also be refused legal aid where it appears to the Director that -

…

(g) there are other persons concerned jointly with, or having the same interest as, the applicant in seeking a substantially similar outcome of the proceedings unless the applicant would be prejudiced by not being able to take his own or joint proceedings."
a legally aided person were willing to be a representative plaintiff in a class action, he would have to be made aware that he would have to bear not only the common fund costs due to the DLA but also the residual common fund costs of the action, unless he could seek indemnity from other members of the class or other representative plaintiffs.

8.54 In this connection, we observe that, unless the costs order handed down by the court could divide the common fund costs among the class members equitably, there will be little incentive for anyone to take the leading role in commencing a class action.

**Recommendation 6**

We recommend that in class action proceedings involving legally aided plaintiffs:

1. A legally aided person should not lose his legal aid funding by agreeing to act as representative plaintiff in a class action, but he should only be funded or protected to the same extent as he would be if he were pursuing a personal, as opposed to a class, action;

2. If a legally aided person becomes a representative plaintiff in a class action, that part of the total common fund costs which would be attributable to the aided person if he were pursuing the action on a personal basis should be disaggregated.

We recommend that, if the Legal Aid Ordinance is amended to accommodate legal aid for class actions, mechanisms should be devised to ensure that those who are not legally aided should share equitably in the costs.

**Class action fund**

8.55 A further means of funding class litigation is by the establishment of a class action fund (CAF). The need for a special fund to provide financial assistance to representative plaintiffs was explained by the Australian Law Reform Commission as follows:

"The grouped procedure is designed to provide access to legal remedies for people who might not otherwise be able to pursue their rights because of cost and other barriers. In the case of individually non-recoverable claims, a special fund available to provide support for the applicants' proceedings ... would assist people to obtain a legal remedy ... In individually recoverable
cases the fund could be used to assist with the additional costs which the principal applicant might otherwise have to bear thus promoting judicial economy by encouraging the grouping of these proceedings. Public funding would be an acknowledgement that there is a public purpose to be served by enhancing access to remedies where this is cost effective, especially where many people have been affected.”

(Emphasis added)

8.56 Such a special fund would be entitled to make discretionary grants. That discretion might extend to the financial resources of applicants and there might be a means test on applications or the exaction of a financial contribution such as a proportion of the proceeds of a successful action. The principal advantage of such a fund is that it would be entitled (although not bound) to assist all class litigants (not only impecunious plaintiffs, as with legal aid) to bring actions for any kind of remedy (not only actions for damages, which might be the only actions supported by a CLAF as discussed above). The creation of such a special class actions fund has been described as "the most attractive method of supporting class proceedings." The two Canadian jurisdictions of Quebec and Ontario have set up special funds to finance class actions.

Quebec: Fonds d'aide aux recours collectifs

8.57 In Quebec, An Act Respecting the Class Action 1978 established the Fonds d'aide aux recours collectifs (the Fonds). Section 23 of the Act provides that when deciding whether or not to grant assistance, the Fonds:

"shall assess whether or not the class action may be brought or continued without such assistance; in addition, if the status of the representative has not yet been ascribed to the applicant, the Fonds shall consider the probable existence of the right he intends to assert and the probability that the class action will be brought."

8.58 Sections 5 and 6 of the Act provide that when an action financed by the Fonds is successful, the representative plaintiff must reimburse to the Fonds any fees, costs or expenses received from the defendant, and the Fonds may withhold a percentage of the amount recovered. Section 29 of the Act provides that the Fonds shall pay the assisted person's attorney's fees and expert's fees and other incidental expenses expedient to the preparation or the bringing of the class action.

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72 Scottish Law Commission, Multi-Party Actions Court Proceedings and Funding Discussion Paper No. 98, para 8.43.
8.59 The latest available report (2003 - 2004) on the activity of the *Fonds* demonstrates the continued vigour of this approach. Sixty-five claims were presented and 51 accepted. The level of aid was Can$1,509,123 up by Can$40,000 on the previous year. While 85 per cent of claims were made by individuals 8 per cent were by non-profit making bodies and 5 per cent by co-operatives. Eighty-nine per cent of defendants were for-profit organisations, local or central government.\(^{74}\)

**Ontario: Class Proceedings Fund**

8.60 Section 59(1) of the Ontario Law Society Act established a class proceedings fund:

"*The board shall,*

(a) *establish an account of the Foundation to be known as the Class Proceedings Fund;*

(b) *within sixty days after this Act comes into force, endow the Class Proceedings Fund with $300,000 from the funds of the Foundation;*

(c) *within one year ... endow the Class Proceedings Fund with a further $200,000 from the funds of the Foundation*"

8.61 The purpose of the Class Proceedings Fund is to provide financial support for a plaintiff in respect of disbursements in a class proceeding and to pay costs awarded against the plaintiff.\(^{75}\) The Class Proceedings Committee established under the Act decides whether funding should be granted for a particular case and, if so, the amount.\(^{76}\) In making funding decisions, the Committee considers various factors, including the merits of the case, whether the plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to raise funds from other sources, whether the plaintiff has a clear and reasonable proposal for the use of any funds awarded, whether the plaintiff has appropriate financial controls to ensure that any funds awarded are spent for the purposes of the award, public interest and the likelihood of certification.\(^{77}\) If the class action is successful, the representative plaintiff must reimburse the Fund for the amount it paid out, plus a levy of 10% of the court-ordered award or settlement amount,\(^{78}\) as a "top-up" mechanism for the benefit of future litigants who may require recourse to the Fund.


\(^{75}\) Section 59.1(2) of the Law Society Act 1990.

\(^{76}\) Section 59.3(3) of the Law Society Act 1990.

\(^{77}\) Section 59.3(4) of the Law Society Act 1990 and Regulation 5 of the Class Proceedings Regulation 771/92.

\(^{78}\) Regulations 8(4)(c) and 10(1) of the Class Proceedings Regulation 771/92.
The 2002 and 2003 Annual Reports of the Ontario Fund show that fewer than a dozen applications were made in the period from 2001 to 2003, and that only a handful of applications were granted. In 2005, only six applications for funding were made. Funding was approved for one application, refused in another and was pending in the remaining four as at the end of the fiscal year 2005. The total amount of money awarded to applicants in 2005 (including monies paid in respect of previous years' awards) was only $288,149.22. While the Fund was still under-utilised, 2008 has witnessed some progress: whereas only three applications for funding were received by the Fund in 2007, in the first eight months of 2008 the Fund approved six new applications, refused one and deferred the eighth. There have been criticisms of the Fund's operation. First, it has been suggested that the 10 per cent levy on any judgment or settlement may be too high. It may deter low income class members while those with strong cases may not wish to forfeit 10 per cent. Secondly, it has been suggested that, because of the modest initial financial endowment, the Class Proceedings Committee has been too risk-averse in granting applications for funding. The under-utilisation of the Fund is arguably due to the Committee's policy of not considering a request for funding until a statement of defence has been delivered in the action. Bogart and others found that the primary reasons plaintiffs do not seek funding more often are: the low approval rate by the Class Proceedings Committee; the minimal amount of funding granted; and the high proportion of the ultimate settlement or judgment amount which is levied by the Fund. As pointed out by Professor Mulheron, the Ontario experience also demonstrates that, under the usual "costs follow the event" rule, if a successful defendant can apply to a fund for reimbursement in the event of success in the action, the risk of an adverse costs award may be just as large a deterrent to those administering the fund as to the representative plaintiff.

Victorian Law Reform Commission: proposed Justice Fund

In its 2008 report on Civil Justice Review, the Victorian Law Reform Commission proposed the establishment of a Justice Fund, which would (a) provide financial assistance to parties with meritorious civil claims, and (b) provide indemnity for any adverse costs order or order for security for costs made against the party assisted by the fund.

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84 R Mulheron (same as above), at 459.
8.64 For administrative convenience, and to minimise establishment costs, the Commission recommended that the fund should be established, at least initially, as an adjunct to an existing organisation. The Commission suggested that one possible body might be Victoria Legal Aid.

8.65 The Commission recommended that the Justice Fund should seek to become self funding through:

(a) entering into funding agreements with assisted parties whereby the Justice Fund would be entitled to a share of the amount recovered by the successful assisted party;

(b) having statutory authority in class action proceedings under Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) to either

(i) enter into agreement with an assisted representative party whereby the fund would be entitled to a share of the total amount recovered by the class under any settlement or judgment, subject to approval of the court, or

(ii) to make application to the court for approval to receive a share of the total amount recovered by the class under any settlement or judgment;

(c) recovering, from other parties to the proceedings, costs incurred in providing assistance to the assisted party where the assisted party is successful and obtains an order for costs;

(d) receiving funds by order of the Court in cases where cy-près type remedies (ie distribution of proceeds obtained from the legal proceedings that indirectly benefit the public as a whole in some way relating to the purpose of the class action litigation) are available; and

(e) entering into joint venture litigation funding arrangements with commercial litigation funding bodies.

8.66 The Commission proposed that where the Justice Fund provides assistance, the lawyers acting for the assisted party should normally be required to conduct the proceedings without remuneration or reimbursement of expenses until the conclusion of the proceedings. Where the proceedings were successful they should normally be remunerated by costs recovered from the unsuccessful party and/or out of any monies recovered in the proceedings, without the Justice Fund having to pay the costs incurred in the proceedings. Where the assisted party was unsuccessful, the Justice Fund should meet the costs of the funded party as set out in the funding agreement or varied thereafter by agreement between the Justice Fund and the law firm conducting the assisted party's case.
8.67 The Commission proposed that during the first five years of operation (or such lesser period as the trustees of the Justice Fund might determine in light of the fund's financial position), the liability of the fund for any order for costs or security for costs made against the funded party should be limited, by statute, to the value of the costs incurred by the assisted party which the Justice Fund was required to pay to the lawyers acting for the assisted party under the funding agreement. During that period the Justice Fund would have a discretion to pay some or all of the shortfall between the amount ordered by way of adverse costs or security for costs against the assisted party and the amount of those costs for which the Justice Fund was liable.\(^{85}\)

8.68 At any stage of the proceedings the Justice Fund or the assisted party could apply to the court for an order limiting the amount of costs that the assisted party may be ordered to pay to any other party if the funded party is unsuccessful in the proceedings.

8.69 In our view, the CAF concept offers a useful means of funding a modern class action regime.

**Litigation funding companies**

8.70 Litigation Funding Companies (LFCs) have been defined as:

“… commercial entities that contract with one or more potential litigants. The LFC pays the costs of the litigation and accepts the risk of paying the other party’s costs if the case fails. In return, the LFC has control of the action and, if the case succeeds, is paid a share of the proceeds (usually after reimbursement of costs).”\(^{86}\)

**Judicial consideration of LFCs**

8.71 **Australia** - LFCs have increasingly been recognised as accommodating the commercial realities of class action litigation. Much of

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85 Victorian Law Reform Commission, *Civil Justice Review Draft Proposals* (2007), at 52-3, explained and justified the proposal as follows: "(f)or actuarial and solvency reasons it would be necessary, initially at least, to be able to quantify the potential liability of the fund to meet any adverse costs order in cases in which assistance has been provided. It is proposed that this be done using the approach adopted by the English Court of Appeal in determining the liability of commercial litigation funders for adverse costs in civil litigation in England & Wales [in the case of Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2005] 3 All ER 613]. Thus the legal liability of the fund in respect of adverse costs would be capped at the level at which financial assistance had been provided to the party assisted by the fund. In other words, if the fund had provided financial assistance in the sum of say $1 million dollars to the assisted party, the maximum liability of the fund in respect of any adverse costs order would be the same amount. Although this may not adequately indemnify successful defendants in some cases, particularly where there are multiple defendants, such financial indemnity is a considerable improvement on defendants presently confront in defending class actions brought by parties of limited means." (Emphasis added)

the uncertainty concerning the legal status of litigation funding agreements at common law has been resolved by the High Court of Australia in its decision in *Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd*. The case involved a large number of tobacco retailers recovering licence fees paid to a wholesaler. The amounts of each retailer's claim were too small to justify legal action, but Firmstone, an LFC, approached a number of affected retailers and then brought a class action, at the same time seeking to use the discovery process to identify all other members of the class. The defendant contended that Firmstone was in effect trafficking in litigation and that their involvement constituted an abuse of process. The New South Wales Court of Appeal considered that the central question was the degree of control that the LFC in fact exercised over the litigation and the Court made the following observations:

"In my opinion, a conclusion about abuse of process must stem from a finding directed at the actual or likely conduct of the party in whose name the litigation is brought (or its agents). The court is not concerned with balancing the interests of the funder and its clients. Indeed, it is not concerned with the arrangements, fiduciary or otherwise, between the plaintiff and the funder except so far as they are corrupted or have a tendency to corrupt the processes of the court in the particular litigation. It is only when they have that quality that the defendant has standing to complain about them." (Emphasis added)

8.72 On appeal, the majority of the High Court of Australia dismissed the notion of abuse of process as a basis upon which the defence might claim that funded proceedings should be stayed, simply because a funding agreement existed. The High Court agreed with the principal findings of Mason P that:

"the law now looks favourably on funding arrangements that offer access to justice so long as any tendency to abuse of process is controlled."

"the standard of proof for establishing an abuse of process and thereby obtaining the summary dismissal or permanent staying of proceeding is a high one (See *Williams v Spaults* (1992) 174 CLR 509 at 518-520). Appropriately so, since questions of access to justice are involved."
8.73 For the majority, Chief Justice Gleeson wrote:

"Even if the intervention of a litigation funder seeking to promote an assertion by more retailers of their rights be regarded as some form of intermeddling there is no justification for denying the existence of the matter."\(^{91}\)

8.74 Also for the majority, Justices Gummow Hayne and Crennan wrote:

"The appellants submitted that special considerations intrude in 'class actions' because, so it was submitted, there is the risk that such proceedings may be used to achieve what, in the United States, are sometimes referred to as 'blackmail settlements'. However, as remarked earlier in these reasons, the rules governing representative or group proceedings vary greatly between courts and it is not useful to speak of "class actions" as identifying a single, distinct kind of proceedings. Even when regulated by similar rules of procedure, each proceeding in which one or more named plaintiffs represent the interests of others will present different issues and different kinds of difficulty…"\(^{92}\) (Emphasis added)

"The difficulties thought to inhere in the prosecution of an action which, if successful, would produce a large award of damages but which, to defend, would take a very long time and very large resources, is a problem that the courts confront in many different circumstances, not just when the named plaintiffs represent others and not just when named plaintiffs receive financial support from third party funders. The solution to that problem (if there is one) does not lie in treating actions financially supported by third parties differently from other actions. And if there is a particular aspect of the problem that is to be observed principally in actions where a plaintiff represents others, that is a problem to be solved, in the first instance, through the procedures that are employed in that kind of action. It is not to be solved by identifying some general rule of public policy that a defendant may invoke to prevent determination of the claims that are made against that defendant."\(^{93}\) (Emphasis added)

"It follows that the funding arrangements made and proposed to be made by [LFCs] did not constitute a ground to stay the present proceedings."\(^{94}\)
Also for the majority, Kirby J wrote:

"To lawyers raised in the era before such multiple claims, representative actions and litigation funding, such fees and conditions may seem unconventional or horrible. However, when compared with the conditions approved by experienced judges in knowledgeable courts in comparable circumstances, they are not at all unusual. Furthermore, the alternative is that very many persons, with distinctly arguable legal claims, repeatedly vindicated in other like cases, are unable to recover upon those claims in accordance with their legal rights." \(^{95}\)

"It is against the inherent inequalities, presented by these litigious facts of life, that a representative action may, under proper conditions, afford a litigant with an individual claim and a justifiable prospect to secure practical access to that litigant's legal rights in association with many others. The individual claim may (as in the case of many tobacco retailers in these proceedings) be comparatively small and hardly worth the expense and trouble of suing. **But the aggregate of the claims of those willing to proceed together, as proposed by a funder and organiser such as [LFCs], might be very large indeed. What is a theoretical possibility, as an individual action or series of actions, needs therefore to be converted into a practical case by the intervention of someone willing to undertake a test case, followed by others willing to organise litigants in a similar position, and under appropriate conditions, to recover their legal rights by helping them to act together.**" \(^{96}\) (Emphasis added)

"Real access to legal rights: Apart from the foregoing considerations, it is important to recognise how exceptional it is for a court to bring otherwise lawful proceedings to a stop, as effectively the primary judge did in this case. It is very unusual to do so by ordering the permanent stay of such proceedings. The Court of Appeal recognised this consideration. Properly, it emphasised that it was for the appellants to establish that the respondents' proceedings constituted an abuse of process …" \(^{97}\)

"The reason why it is difficult to secure relief of such a kind is explained by a mixture of historical factors concerning the role of the courts; constitutional considerations concerning the duty of courts to decide the cases people bring to them; and reasons grounded in what we would now recognise as the fundamental human right to have equal access to independent courts and tribunals. **These institutions should be enabled to uphold legal rights without undue impediment and without rejecting**
those who make such access a reality where otherwise it would be a mere pipe dream or purely theoretical...\textsuperscript{98} (Emphasis added)

"The importance of access to justice, as a fundamental human right which ought to be readily available to all, is clearly a new consideration that stimulates fresh thinking about representative or 'grouped' proceedings."\textsuperscript{99} (Emphasis added)

"In my opinion those reasons [for excluding LFCs] disclose an attitude of hostility to representative procedures that is a left-over of earlier legal times. They are incompatible with the contemporary presentation of multiple legal claims. And, most importantly they are fundamentally inconsistent with the rules made under statutory power and the need to render those rules effective."\textsuperscript{100}

8.76 However, the minority judgment of Callinan and Heydon JJ was firm in its disapproval of third party funding:

"Institutions like Firmstone & Feil [the LFC in question], which are not solicitors and employ no lawyers with a practising certificate, do not owe the same ethical duties. No solicitor could ethically have conducted the advertising campaign which Firmstone & Feil got Horwath [an advertising company] to conduct. The basis on which Firmstone & Feil are proposing to charge is not lawfully available to solicitors. Further, organisations like Firmstone & Feil play more shadowy roles than lawyers. Their role is not revealed on the court file. Their appearance is not announced in open court. No doubt sanctions for contempt of court and abuse of process are available against them in the long run, but with much less speed and facility than is the case with legal practitioners. In short, the court is in a position to supervise litigation conducted by persons who are parties to it; it is less easy to supervise litigation, one side of which is conducted by a party, while on the other side there are only nominal parties, the true controller of that side of the case being beyond the court's direct control."\textsuperscript{101} (Emphasis added)

8.77 At the end of their judgement, they added:

"If that conclusion is thought by those who have power to enact parliamentary or delegated legislation to be unsatisfactory on the ground that the type of litigation funding involved in these appeals is beneficial, then it is open to them to exercise that

\textsuperscript{98} [2006] HCA 41, at para 144.
\textsuperscript{99} [2006] HCA 41, at para 145.
\textsuperscript{100} [2006] HCA 41, at para 148
\textsuperscript{101} [2006] HCA 41, at para 266.
power by establishing a regime permitting it. It would be for them to decide whether some safeguards against abuse should be incorporated in the relevant legislation.” 102 (Emphasis added).

8.78 **England and Wales** – The same change in public policy to allow a party who has a legitimate interest in the outcome to provide funding for a case has also occurred in England and Wales. The Civil Justice Council summarised the position in England and Wales as follows:

"English courts have taken the view that third party funding is now acceptable in the interests of access to justice, particularly where the prospective claimant is unable to fund their claim by any other means. In short, the individual's right to access to justice must ultimately be subsumed to the doctrinal concerns of champerty and maintenance.” 103

8.79 In *London & Regional (St George's Court) Ltd v Ministry of Defence*, 104 Coulson J summarised the existing case law as follows:

(a) the mere fact that litigation services have been provided in return for a promise in the share of the proceeds is not by itself sufficient to justify that promise being held to be unenforceable;

(b) in considering whether an agreement is unlawful on grounds of maintenance or champerty, the question is whether the agreement has a tendency to corrupt public justice, and that question requires the closest attention to the nature and surrounding circumstances of a particular agreement;

(c) the modern authorities demonstrated a flexible approach where courts have generally declined to hold that an agreement under which a party provided assistance with litigation in return for a share of the proceeds was unenforceable;

(d) the rules against champerty, so far as they have survived, are primarily concerned with the protection of the integrity of the litigation process.

8.80 **Canada** - The legal status of LFCs in funding litigation was considered by the Ontario courts in the decision of *Nantais v Telelectronics Proprietary (Canada) Ltd*. 105 Permission was given to strangers to the

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105 28 O.R. (3rd) 523 (Gen Div). This was a class action lawsuit against the manufacturer of a defective pacemaker, the investor financing scheme had the apparent approval of the trial judge. A handful of wealthy individuals contributed a total of $35,000 to assist in the financing of the lawsuit. The arrangement was that if the litigation succeeded, the investors were to receive repayment of their initial investment as well as 20% annual interest on their
litigation, who were investors with no legal interest in the class proceedings, to provide funding for costs and disbursements in the proceedings at a high rate of return and on a purely contingent basis.

*Arguments for and against LFCs*

8.81 The advantages of allowing LFC funding include the following:

(a) It provides a level playing field for litigants, and access to justice for those who could not otherwise afford to prosecute their claims.

(b) It helps clients to manage the costs of litigation, which can range between reasonable and astronomical.

(c) It fills a gap caused by the reduction in legal aid funding, the lack of Conditional Fee Arrangements in commercial (as opposed to personal injury) litigation, and the difficulties with securing and enforcing ATE insurance.

(d) It focuses the client (who might otherwise lose interest if being funded under a "no win, no fee" arrangement) on what the litigation might cost him. The funder's due diligence provides a further filter by which claims are scrutinised before consuming litigant and judicial resources, thereby reducing the number of unmeritorious lawsuits.

(e) Litigation funding protects a successful defendant by providing a high probability that (at least some of) its costs will be recovered.

(f) It ensures that costs are minimised, and hence, better competition in legal services should ensue.

(g) A funder's unwillingness to take on risky, low-merit cases means that, in reality, only a potentially small number of cases will suit third-party funding and there is unlikely to be excessive litigation.\(^{106}\)

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The arguments against LFCs include the following:

(a) Some note that it is important that any "rogue" funders who cannot show upfront that they can pay a winning defendant's costs should be excluded, so as to preserve the integrity of the industry.

(b) Some fear that funders will generate more large-scale litigation and that "blackmail suits" and the "compensation culture" are fostered by such funding, and that it will increase the defensiveness of business and those who provide professional services to business.

(c) Others remark that it could provide hedge funds with increasing investment opportunities at the expense of defendants who may be tempted to settle.

(d) Some caution that funders’ successes will impact upon professional indemnity insurance premiums and/or encourage more potential defendant firms to seek the increased protection of limited liability partnership status.

(e) Some fear that funders have the capacity to squeeze the legal fees that lawyers can charge in the action.

(f) It has also been said that funders subtly seek to influence the outcome of cases which they fund ("anyone who's writing a cheque is interested in how it's being spent").

(g) Others note that third-party funding is too expensive to appeal to many (with the success fee between 25 and 50 per cent in most cases).\(^\text{107}\)

Experience in Australia shows that LFCs took the lion's share of any damages awarded. In *Green v CGU Insurance Ltd*,\(^\text{108}\) albeit not a class action, there were abuses of process and failure of liquidators and lawyers to discharge their responsibilities. In that case, the liquidator appeared unlikely to be able to satisfy an adverse costs order of the size contemplated. The liquidator had entered into a litigation funding agreement with an LFC under which the liquidator was indemnified for adverse costs orders, including security for costs. About Aus $2 million was spent in costs when the court estimated that only Aus $500,000 might have been sufficient. It appeared that the LFC was a special purpose entity and the size of its assets was questionable. It was therefore doubtful whether any costs orders could be enforced against it. Hodgson JA, with whom Campbell JA agreed (Basten JA dissenting), held that in the circumstances security for costs should be awarded against the liquidator. The court held that:

\(^{107}\) Same as above, at 317.
"[A] court should be readier to order security for costs where the non-party who stands to benefit from the proceedings is not a person interested in having rights vindicated, as would be a shareholder or creditor of a plaintiff corporation, but rather is a person whose interest is solely to make a commercial profit from funding the litigation. Although litigation funding is not against public policy (Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41; 229 CLR 386 at [87]-[95]), the court system is primarily there to enable rights to be vindicated rather than commercial profits to be made; and in my opinion, courts should be particularly concerned that persons whose involvement in litigation is purely for commercial profit should not avoid responsibility for costs if the litigation fails."  

8.84 It appears that the ongoing debate in other jurisdictions focuses on whether LFCs have displaced the proper role of the parties and assumed undue control of the conduct of the litigation. Justice French of the Federal Court of Australia in a paper presented at the Second Anti-Trust Spring Conference on 29 April 2006 discussed the efficiency of representative proceedings:

"It may be said that the evolution of arrangements under which the costs risk of complex commercial litigation can be spread is arguably an economic benefit if it supports the enforcement of legitimate claims. If such arrangements involve the creation of budgets by commercial funders which are knowledgeable in the costs of litigation it may inject an element of commercial objectivity into the way in which such budgets are framed and the efficiency with which the litigation is conducted. The formation of such a budget does not amount to the assumption by the funder of control of the conduct of the litigation. It is not for the court to judge such arrangements as contrary to the public interest unless it can be shown that a particular arrangement threatens to compromise the integrity of the court's processes in some way. See PSX v. Ericsson (No. 3) (2006) 66 IPLR 277 at 289-90. (Emphasis added)

8.85 Professor Mulheron was of the view that, if the judgment in Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd[11] were applied elsewhere, it would open the doors for LFCs to provide funding to the representative claimant whilst also indemnifying the defendant against its costs, should the class lose the action.

111 [2006] HCA 41.
8.86 Similarly, the Law Council of Australia published a submission in favour of litigation funding in which it stated that such funding provides an important means of improving access to justice and should be encouraged.\footnote{Law Council of Australia, Submission to Standing Committee of Attorney-General, in response to Litigation Funding in Australia, 14 September 2006.} The Law Council commented that LFCs have an important role to play in both insolvency and non-insolvency litigation as a means of creating an option for parties that would otherwise be prohibited from pursuing a legitimate claim, due to the cost of litigation. The Council considered that arguments in favour of permitting LFCs to fund non-insolvency litigation greatly outweighed any contrary arguments, provided relatively simple criteria were met and the courts accepted a supervisory role. The Council also noted that access to justice was the primary public policy consideration that should drive and inform any discussion about litigation funding or any proposed regulation.\footnote{Law Council of Australia, Submission to Standing Committee of Attorney-General, in response to Litigation Funding in Australia, 14 September 2006.}

8.87 Based on an understanding of how third party funding arrangements currently operate in England and Wales, the Civil Justice Council came to the conclusion:

"... that third party funding should be encouraged, subject to (i) the constraints laid down by Arkin [ie that the legal liability of the fund in respect of adverse costs would be capped at the level at which financial assistance had been provided to the party assisted by the fund; Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2005] 3 All ER 613] and (ii) suitable regulation of commercial third party funders to ensure consumer protection particularly in the retainer relationship between funder, lawyer and client, and who has control of the litigation. Such regulation could be by Rules of Court and/or the existing scope of Financial Services Regulation, and/or (possibly) new provisions of the Compensation Act in relation to claims handling."\footnote{Civil Justice Council, Improved Access to Justice – Funding Options and Proportionate Costs (June 2007) para 155.}

8.88 The conclusion reached by Poonam Puri after comparing other forms of financing (though not in the context of class actions) was that third party sources of funding in the form of investor financing may have a useful role to play by plugging the gaps left by established financing arrangements.\footnote{Poonam Puri, "Financing of Litigation By Third-Party Investors: A Share of Justice?" Osgoode Hall Law Journal [1998] Vol 36 No. 3, 515, at 525.}

Champerty and maintenance

8.89 Traditionally, where the costs are calculated as a proportion of the amount recovered, they offend the common law rule against maintenance and champerty. "Maintenance" involves the giving of assistance or encouragement to one of the parties to an action by a person who has neither an interest in the action nor a motive recognised as justifying the
interference.\footnote{116}{Halsbury's Laws of Hong Kong (LexisNexis), at 115-212.} "Champerty" is a particular form of maintenance, namely maintenance of an action in consideration of a promise to give the maintainor a share in the proceeds or subject matter of the action.\footnote{117}{Halsbury's Laws of Hong Kong (LexisNexis), at 115-212.} If LFCs were to be allowed in Hong Kong, changes would have to be made to the common law rule against maintenance and champerty.

8.90 As discussed earlier in this chapter, the common law offences of champerty and maintenance were abolished in the UK by the Criminal Law Act 1967. Section 13(1) abolished these as criminal offences and section 14(1) provided that no one could be liable in tort for any conduct amounting to maintenance or champerty. However, section 14(2) provided that these steps to remove criminal and civil liability, "shall not affect any rule of that law as to the cases in which a contract is to be treated as contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal".

8.91 The Access to Justice Act 1999 also sought to address explicitly the topic of litigation funding. Section 28 of that Act inserted a new section 58B to the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, under which:

"A litigation funding agreement which satisfies all of the conditions applicable to it by virtue of this section shall not be unenforceable by reason only of its being a litigation funding agreement."

The intention of section 58B was to provide, "a comprehensive scheme by which the Lord Chancellor may authorise a person or body to offer ... litigation funding agreements."\footnote{118}{See Standing Committee E, Access to Justice Bill (Lords), May 13, 1999.} The section, however, has never come into force.

8.92 In Hong Kong the law of champerty and maintenance continues to apply unchanged.\footnote{119}{Archbold Hong Kong: Criminal Law, Pleading, Evidence and Practice (2007), paras 30-123 to 126. And see Cannoway Consultants Ltd v Kenworth Engineering Ltd [1995] 2 HKLR 475 and R v Wong Chuk Lam, unreported, 6 April 1989.} It has recently been thoroughly considered by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Unruh v Seeberger.\footnote{120}{[2007] 2 HKLRD 414.} An agreement to share the spoils of litigation was traditionally regarded as encouraging the perversion of justice. Gambling on the outcome of the litigation would endanger the integrity of the judicial process. The Court of Final Appeal was of the view that these traditional legal policies underlying maintenance and champerty continued to apply.\footnote{121}{At paras 82-86 and 100-102.} However, the courts had developed categories of conduct excluded from the sphere of maintenance and champerty. One category of cases involved "access to justice" considerations. Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ pointed out obiter that:

"In Hong Kong, art 35 of the Basic Law recognizes access to the courts as a fundamental right. It has never been a defence to an action nor a ground for a stay to show that the plaintiff is being
supported by a third person in an arrangement which constitutes maintenance or champerty. Neither does liability for maintenance or champerty depend on the action or the defence being bad in law. **It follows that an attack on an arrangement said to constitute maintenance or champerty could well result in a claim which is perfectly good in law being stifled where the plaintiff, deprived of the support of such an arrangement, is unable to pursue it. This is a powerful argument for such cases to be excluded from the ambit of maintenance and champerty.**”  

"It is again obvious that this access to justice category is not static. The development of policies and measures to promote such access is likely to enlarge the category and to result in further shrinkage in the scope of maintenance and champerty. Different measures, whether statutory or judicial, may be taken in different jurisdictions. Here in Hong Kong, a litigant who is funded by the Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme is required to make a contribution out of recovered proceeds for the benefit of the Fund. In England and Wales, conditional (but not contingency) legal fee arrangements have received statutory support in certain types of cases. This has entailed the development of after the event insurance against adverse costs orders. **The development of multi-party litigation or class actions raises questions concerning the conduct of promoters and funders of such litigation.**”  

8.93 The decision of the High Court of Australia in *Fostif* (above) has clarified the position at common law and it is suggested that there is no longer a justification for maintaining a legislative prohibition. Most recent jurisprudence suggests that access to justice is now a paramount concern and the court has sufficient means at its disposal to protect its processes from abuse. In *Fostif* the High Court ruled that the proceedings were not an abuse of process and that litigation funding arrangements were not contrary to public policy for the following reasons:

(a) there was no general rule against maintaining actions. Rules against maintenance and champerty had already been heavily qualified by the rules of insolvency and rules relating to subrogation applying to contracts of insurance;  

(b) a number of states in Australia (specifically New South Wales in this case) had passed laws abolishing the crimes and torts of maintenance and champerty, removing any foundation for

122 At para 95.  
123 Above, para 97.  
125 Above, para 89.
concluding litigation funding arrangements were generally contrary to public policy;\(^{126}\)

(c) questions of illegality and public policy might still arise and there was no objective standard against which the fairness of the agreement might be measured. These were questions which must be answered according to the prevailing circumstances;\(^{127}\) and

(d) existing substantive and procedural rules were sufficient to protect court processes.

8.94 If there is a case in Hong Kong for the involvement of LFCs in class action financing, we are of the view that it will be necessary to change the law on champerty and maintenance. Consideration may have to be given to a proposal similar to that suggested by the Law Council of Australia to repeal the law against maintenance and champerty.\(^{128}\)

**Operation of recovery agents in Hong Kong**

8.95 Recovery agents have been defined as "organisations which assist victims in the recovery of damages, usually arising from personal injury cases, in return for a fee as percentage of the damages recovered."\(^{129}\) In its report on *Conditional Fees*, the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong describes the operation of recovery agents in Hong Kong as follows:

"There are indications that [recovery agents] are becoming more active in Hong Kong. Some lawyers have expressed the view to us that [recovery agents] are mostly interested in maximising their profits within the shortest time. These lawyers assert that [recovery agents] often take on high value cases with a good prospect of success and then charge 20% - 30% of the compensation recovered. The claimants could have paid much less, the lawyers say, had they employed the services of a qualified lawyers. …"\(^{130}\)

8.96 From the discussion earlier in this chapter, it is clear that LFCs should not be equated with recovery agents. But if maintenance and champerty are abolished that will have consequences for both LFCs and recovery agents.

\(^{126}\) Above, para 66-67.

\(^{127}\) Above, para 92.

\(^{128}\) Law Council of Australia, *Submission to Standing Committee of Attorney-General, in response to Litigation Funding in Australia*, 14 September 2006, para 64.

\(^{129}\) Background brief on recovery agents prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat for the meeting of the Panel on Administration of Justice and Legal Services of the Legislative Council dated 17 February 2009, at 1.

\(^{130}\) The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, *Conditional Fees (July 2007)* paragraph 6.38 at 124.
8.97 In its report on *Conditional Fees*, the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong considered the possible impact of abolishing the common law offences of maintenance and champerty. It was suggested that recovery agents might employ more aggressive marketing techniques to enhance their share of the litigation market, as had been the case in England, but the Law Commission concluded that there was, “very little material on which to base an assessment of what the impact is likely to be.”

Possible regulatory regime for LFCs

8.98 We believe that appropriate controls would need to be imposed on the operation of LFCs in class actions to avoid the risk that LFCs seek to obtain excess proceeds (and perhaps legal costs) from the parties by settling out of court. The involvement of LFCs in private litigation is a recent phenomenon and there is an ongoing debate both in the UK and Australia on the proper form of controls to be applied. Mr Bernard Murphy of Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd in Australia (a firm which has been involved in a number of class action cases) and Professor Mulheron in the UK have kindly given us the benefit of their expert views on the issue of professional litigation funding and the lessons to be learnt from experience in the UK and Australia. Those views are reflected in the following paragraphs, which are presented with the aim of prompting public discussion of the various issues.

8.99 **Rules of court or legislation to be applied to LFCs in relation to class actions proceedings** - A critical question is whether LFC activities should be authorised by legislation. Legislation would greatly lessen the likelihood of common law challenges to specific LFC activities. One possibility suggested by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General of Australia (SCAG) would be to set out the criteria against which the courts should assess whether the funding arrangements are contrary to public policy. Alternatively, a narrower approach could be taken, in which the legislation sets out the necessary features for a valid funding arrangement. Without affecting the court's discretion to consider the question of abuse of process, those criteria would ensure a uniform approach was taken to funding arrangements or funded proceedings. The SCAG believed that by clearly indicating the features of acceptable funding arrangements, they would also discourage unnecessary applications to stay or strike out funded proceedings. On the contrary, Mr Murphy thinks that it is not necessary for LFCs to be subject to specific legislative obligations in relation to class action proceedings because class actions already provide a high level of protection for claimants' rights. For example, class actions cannot be settled or discontinued without court approval and are subject to a higher level of judicial supervision than individual litigation. However, Mr Murphy suggests that it may be appropriate for court rules to set out basic rules to be applied to all

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131 The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, *Conditional Fees* (July 2007) paragraph 6.54 at 128.
proceedings funded by third parties, including LFCs and insurers. Such rules might provide, for example, that the court has the power to make orders that an LFC or insurer meet any security for costs or adverse costs order made in favour of a party to the funded action.\textsuperscript{134}

8.100 \textbf{Criteria to be applied by court when a funded claim is commenced} -- The Law Council of Australia was of the view that a list of relevant criteria for courts to consider when a funded claim is commenced should suffice. The list should be a non-exhaustive set of matters that the court should consider when determining whether a funding agreement constitutes an abuse of process, or has the potential to disenfranchise an unwitting plaintiff. It should be left for a court to determine whether the failure of an agreement to satisfy one or a number of those considerations should lead to the agreement being set aside on public policy grounds.\textsuperscript{135}

8.101 Rather than a list of relevant criteria, which is likely to foster challenges and interlocutory disputes, Mr Murphy recommends instead a general prohibition against any litigation funding agreement (LFA) that corrupts or has a tendency to corrupt the processes of the court in that litigation.\textsuperscript{136} The history of class actions and other litigation in Australia has shown that some defendants seek to rely on such criteria to bring challenges to LFAs in an effort to stifle the litigation. The court should only be interested in interfering in private contractual funding arrangements if the arrangements are an abuse because they corrupt or tend to corrupt the court's processes.\textsuperscript{137}

8.102 Professor Mulheron considers that some form of soft regulation by means of court rules is essential and it would not be desirable to leave it to the courts to sort out the "obsolescent chains of champerty and maintenance" by means of satellite litigation. The risk of satellite litigation would be much reduced if such a list existed, as opposed to the common law rules which were formed a long time ago.\textsuperscript{138}

8.103 \textbf{Criteria proposed by Rachael Mulheron and Peter Cashman for determining whether or not an LFA is lawful} - After an analysis of the recent case law in the UK and Australia, Rachael Mulheron and Peter Cashman put forward the following factors and circumstances that indicate that a lawful third-party litigation funding arrangement is on foot:

"(a) the client/funded claimant demonstrated an interest in suing on its own initiative;

(b) the funder is subject to independent 'checks and balances' throughout the litigation;"

\textsuperscript{134} Bernard Murphy's letter to the Secretary of the Class Actions Sub-committee dated 9 September 2008.
\textsuperscript{135} The Law Council of Australia, Submission to Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, in response to Litigation Funding in Australia, 14 September 2006, at paras 75, 76
\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd} 63 NSWLR 203 at 229.
\textsuperscript{137} Bernard Murphy's letter to the Secretary of the Class Actions Sub-committee dated 9 September 2008.
\textsuperscript{138} Rachel Mulheron's email to the Secretary of the Sub-committee dated 11 September 2008.
(c) the funder does not have the capacity to improperly 'monopolise' the litigation;

(d) there is no conflict of interest between the funder and the client;

(e) the type of client is relevant to the overall assessment of the funding arrangements;

(f) the funder has fully informed the client about the effects of the funding arrangement;

(g) the funder must have sufficient resources to meet its commitments to claimant;

(h) the funder must be willing and able to meet any adverse costs order that may be rendered against the funded claimant or the funder, should the action fail;

(i) the funder must not have negotiated an 'inordinately high' fee; and

(j) the funding agreement does not otherwise have any tendency to corrupt the legal process.  

8.104 Mr Murphy does not consider that this is an appropriate approach. He considers that the use of this check-list would promote challenges to LFAs even when the consumer had been well informed and the agreement was appropriate. Whilst many of the criteria are sensible it would be counter productive to do more than require that an LFA not corrupt or have a tendency to corrupt the processes of the court in relation to that litigation. An absence of one or more of the criteria would not necessarily mean that an LFA had such a tendency. In Mr Murphy's experience such a list would generate costly and time-consuming satellite litigation by defendants in an attempt to stifle legitimate claims. His comments on the specific issues, without prejudice to his comments on the use of the check-list, are as follows:

(a) The client/funded claimant demonstrated an interest in suing on its own initiative

He does not consider that this issue can go to a tendency to corrupt the court's processes, and in any event the signature of an LFA probably illustrates sufficient interest by a claimant in the case.

(b) The funder is subject to independent "checks and balances" throughout the litigation

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This is relevant but except in extreme cases should not be considered as a separate criterion but rather as part of whether an LFA has a tendency to corrupt the court's processes. He agrees that appropriate checks and balances could include:

(i) That independent legal advice from experienced, reputable and independent lawyers is being provided to the client to enable him/her to make properly informed decisions about how the proceedings should be conducted. This is an important consideration because the lawyer provides important protection against any risk of corruption of the court's processes;

(ii) That the client was involved in, or approved of, the choice of the lawyer conducting the action. This is usually clear in class actions from the signature of the LFA by the funded person and the signature of the collateral retainer of the lawyer; or

(iii) That the client's action was being judicially supervised, which is always the case with class actions.

(c) The funder does not have the capacity to improperly "monopolise" the litigation

He agrees that this is relevant in determining whether an LFA has a tendency to corrupt the court's processes.

(d) There is no conflict of interest between the funder and the client

He agrees that this is relevant in determining whether an LFA has a tendency to corrupt the court's processes, but it needs to be recognised that the existence of some degree of conflict is inevitable. Low level conflicts are common in litigation, such as between an insurer and an insured in relation to the excess, between a "no win, no fee" litigator and the client as to whether to continue with a case, or between an LFC and a funded person as to how much to spend on hearing a particular issue. The real issue is whether any conflict that does arise is appropriately dealt with, and it is here that the role of a competent independent lawyer is important. Mr Murphy also notes that the LFC and the client's interests are generally strongly aligned, as the LFC's return is typically a percentage of the settlement amount or damages awarded to the client.

(e) The type of client is relevant to the overall assessment of the funding arrangements

He does not agree that this is relevant, as clients are already adequately protected by the disclosure and other obligations imposed on LFCs, and the role of the independent lawyers.
These include obligations imposed by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and conditions imposed upon holders of an Australian Financial Services Licence.

(f) The funder has fully informed the client about the effects of the funding arrangement

He agrees that this is relevant in determining whether an LFA has a tendency to corrupt the court's processes.

(g) The funder must have sufficient resources to meet its commitments to claimant

He agrees that this is relevant, but it has little to do with determining whether an LFA has a tendency to corrupt the court's processes. In Australia, LFCs are obliged to have sufficient resources to provide bank guarantees and security for costs and may be required to reveal the state of their finances to the court. However, this goes to the necessity for security for costs rather than the lawfulness of the LFA.

(h) The funder must be willing and able to meet any adverse costs order that may be rendered against the funded claimant or the funder, should the action fail

He agrees that it is necessary for an LFC or an insurer to be able to meet adverse costs, but this issue is resolved through appropriate security for costs and does not go to a tendency for abuse.

(i) The funder must not have negotiated an inordinately high fee

He agrees that in extreme circumstances this may be a sensible issue for the court to consider in determining whether an LFA has a tendency to corrupt the court's processes. However, courts should be very cautious about interfering with the terms of privately negotiated contracts, and replacing the parties' agreement as to risk and reward with its own, probably less informed, view. The court should recognise that the percentage commission charged may reflect the parties' respective views of the risks of the funded case.

(j) The funding agreement does not otherwise have any tendency to corrupt the legal process.

He agrees that this is relevant, and in fact is the only issue of substance.

8.105 Regulations under the Corporations Act - The Law Council of Australia referred to the benefits of the regulations under the Corporations Act, especially the requirement for satisfactory financial status and statutory disclosure obligations imposed on a holder of an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL). Mr Murphy considers that the obligations imposed by the
Corporations Act and the prudential requirements imposed upon holders of an AFSL offer sufficient consumer protection to those who sign an LFA. Those include obligations to:

"(a) give to each retail client a Financial Services Guide and a Product Disclosure Statement\(^{140}\) including:
   i. details of the funding arrangement and significant risks associated with it;
   ii. the full cost of the funding arrangement including any fees, charges and expenses;
   iii. details of a complaints handling scheme;
   iv. a cooling off regime (at present no less than 14 days); and
   v. any other information material to an applicant’s decision to enter into the funding agreement;

(b) do all things necessary to ensure that the financial services are provided efficiently, honestly and fairly;

(c) have in place adequate arrangements for the management of conflicts of interest;

(d) have available adequate resources to provide the financial services;

(e) have adequate risk management systems in place;

(f) not engage in unconscionable conduct;

(g) not hawk financial products; and

(h) not make false or misleading statements or engage in misleading or deceptive conduct.\(^{141}\)

8.106 It is noted that the Corporations Act has a sanctions and damages regime and that licence holders are generally members of Financial Industry Complaints Service Limited, an industry funded consumer dispute resolution scheme binding on industry but not complainants.\(^{142}\)

8.107 The Law Council of Australia submitted that, if LFCs are required to obtain an AFSL, then the disclosure requirements are, to a large degree, addressed by the above provisions in the Corporations Act and any further disclosure requirements should be general in nature. These might include:

\(^{140}\) A sample of Product Disclosure Statement can be found in IMF (Australia) Ltd., Submission to Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, in response to Litigation Funding in Australia, August 2006, attachment 4.

\(^{141}\) The Law Council of Australia, Submission to Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, in response to Litigation Funding in Australia, 14 September 2006, para 89.

\(^{142}\) The Law Council of Australia, Submission to Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, in response to Litigation Funding in Australia, 14 September 2006, para 91.
(a) identification of the obligations of both the applicant/plaintiff and the LFC concerning the provision and retention of information;

(b) disclosure of any agreement or relationship (commercial or otherwise) existing between the funder and the plaintiff solicitors;

(c) access to discovered and subpoenaed documents;

(d) the percentage of any award monies that are payable by the applicant/plaintiff to the LFC and whether that sum is first reduced by any costs not paid by the losing respondent/defendant;

(e) an obligation on the funder to meet any security for costs order if made and to indemnify and pay any enforced costs order against a funded applicant/plaintiff;

(f) the circumstances in which the agreement may be terminated and the consequences of such termination, with an obligation on the funder to give a termination period of at least one month and to honour its funding obligations up to the date of termination; and

(g) the jurisdiction that governs the agreement."

Mr Murphy disagrees and reiterates that to date in Australia there has not been a demonstrated need for further protections. He nonetheless considers that additional obligations aimed at increasing the accountability of third party funders of litigation (including insurers) to the courts would be beneficial. Specifically, he supports the introduction of the following requirements:

(a) That the parties be required to inform the court and the other party/parties (at the commencement of proceedings or when a party obtains funding) if the conduct of their case is to be funded in whole or in part by a third party and, if so, to identify that party; and

(b) That any person paying any part of the legal costs of a party to civil proceedings be under a duty to assist the court to achieve just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.

The Law Council of Australia, Submission to Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, in response to Litigation Funding in Australia, 14 September 2006, para 91.
8.109 Law Council of Australia’s recommendation that litigation funding agreements should be filed with the originating process and their terms disclosed to the court – Mr Murphy does not consider that parties should be required to file LFAs with the originating process or to disclose the terms of such agreements to the courts unless a bona fide complaint regarding the LFC is made to the court (eg abuse of process). However, parties should be required to notify the court and other parties to the dispute whenever a third party, including insurers and LFCs, funds litigation of that dispute.

8.110 Order of security for costs against LFCs – Mr Murphy says that the liability of the LFC to provide security for costs should be direct and in Australia it is clear that the court has power to order security for costs from an LFC. However, in assessing whether a security for costs order should be made the first relevant consideration is the capacity of the plaintiff to meet any adverse costs order itself. For example, if a large well-resourced public company commences a class action as the representative party it is highly unlikely that it would be required to put on security for costs because it clearly has the resources to pay adverse costs if they should be ordered. If for its own risk management reasons it chose to bring the action in conjunction with an LFC it should not be necessary for the LFC to be required to put on security for costs.

8.111 Mr Murphy went on to comment that if the position of the representative party is that it is unable to meet an adverse costs order then it is appropriate for the LFC to satisfy the court either that it has sufficient funds and need not put on security, or to put on the security. This is necessary because his experience is that defendants have used security for costs applications to try and stifle class actions by causing the financial exhaustion of the LFC even though it is clear that the LFC has sufficient funds to meet any adverse costs order.

8.112 Agreements with LFCs involved in the action – Mr Murphy considers it important that when his client concludes a funding agreement with an LFC and his firm is retained by the client, his firm’s professional obligations are only to the client, and they do not have contractual obligations to others which may be in conflict then or later in the matter.

8.113 LFC’s control over how the case is conducted – Mr Murphy informed us that the level of control that LFCs have over funded cases has increased over the years to reflect changes in the judicial approach to litigation funding and LFCs. As a result of these changes, they now receive day to day instructions regarding the conduct of funded cases from LFCs. However, such funding agreements provide that whenever they consider that an instruction is not in the interests of the client, they must take instructions from the client, and that the client’s instructions are paramount.

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144 In particular, the High Court of Australia’s decision in Campbell’s Cash & Carry v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41.
8.114 Persons from whom lawyers take instructions in relation to key events of the litigation - Mr Murphy informed us that instructions in relation to key events (such as decisions relating to settlement, amendment of the pleadings or changes in the litigation strategy) come from the client in joint consultation with the LFC. If Mr Murphy's firm consider that any instructions from the LFC are not in the best interests of the client, they will advise the client accordingly and take instructions only from the client. As stated above, day to day instructions tend to come from the LFC.

8.115 Ways to resolve conflicting views between clients and LFCs - In the event of a conflict between the LFC and the client, Mr Murphy advises that they follow the client's instructions. The client may, however, be contractually bound to resolve the conflict through dispute resolution mechanisms contained in the funding agreement. Dispute resolution mechanisms that they have used in the past have include:

(a) The Senior Counsel involved in the case, or another Senior Counsel, determining the dispute.

(b) The dispute being determined by way of group member vote (majority rules).

(c) A committee made up of group members determining the dispute.

8.116 Explicit measures to ensure the independence of lawyers from LFCs - The Law Council submits that no explicit measures are necessary because solicitors have obligations to their clients at statute, common law and in equity. Mr Murphy agrees and adds that further measures would add to the burden on solicitors and may be inconsistent with the existing regulatory framework. He does not consider that it is necessary to put explicit measures in place. However, as discussed above, he does not consider that LFCs and lawyers running funded actions should enter agreements with each other. Lawyers acting in funded actions should owe a duty to their clients only and not to the LFC. This has ensured that the lawyer acts independently in the class action in the client's best interests.

8.117 The legality of class formation mechanism - Given the important financing role of the private funders, particularly when the "costs follow the event" rule applies and contingency fee arrangement are not allowed, there is a need to safeguard the funders' financial interests. The usual arrangement is explained by Peter Cashman as follows:

"... where a third-party commercial litigation funder is prepared to advance the funds required to conduct the case and assume any liabilities to meet any order for costs or security for costs ... the funder will usually assist only those who contractually agree to the terms proposed by the funder. This will usually require

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145 The Law Council of Australia, Submission to Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, in response to Litigation Funding in Australia, 14 September 2006, para 92.
group members to agree to the funder obtaining (a) recoupment from the (successful) group members of such costs not recovered from the respondent(s); and (b) a proportion of the amount recovered, which represents the profit to the funder from the 'investment' in the litigation. The funder will also usually nominate the lawyers who will be funded to conduct the case.”

8.118 The legality of such an agreement between the group members and the commercial litigation funder has proved a controversial issue for the Australian courts. In *Dorajay Pty Ltd v Aristocrat Leisure Ltd* \(^{147}\) Stone J held that the mechanism employed by a law firm to form the class was illegal. Under that mechanism, the group represented in (and thus bound by the outcome of) class proceedings was limited to those victims of the allegedly illegal conduct of the defendants who had entered into retainer agreements with (and became clients of) that law firm. The Federal Court was of the view that it was an abuse of court process to turn the opt-out procedure of the Federal legislation in the form of Part IVA of the FCA Act into an opt-in requirement. Young CJ, of the New South Wales Supreme Court, agreed in *Jameson v Professional Investment Services Pty Ltd.* \(^{148}\)

8.119 The decision of *Dorajay* has been criticised by commentators. For example, Cashman is of the view that:

“[T]he effect of the decisions in [Dorajay] and Rod Investments appears to be to prevent class action proceedings being maintained, at least under the statutory class action provisions, on behalf of groups of individuals who collectively agree to pursue claims and seek to provide a procedural mechanism for others to participate. … [I]t is difficult to conceive of why this should become impermissible just because the door is open for other similarly situated individuals to participate (whether by way of joining the group or formally seeking to opt in to the proceeding) after the case has been commenced.”

8.120 On 21 December 2007, the Full Federal Court came to a contrary conclusion to *Dorajay* in the case of *Multiplex Funds Management Ltd v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd.* \(^{150}\) The Full Federal Court allowed a class to be defined as the clients of a litigation funder. It was pointed out that it may arguably be difficult to reconcile the restriction of class proceedings to those persons who have taken the positive step of signing a litigation funding agreement with a named funder with the goals of enhancing access to justice and judicial efficiency in the form of a common binding decision for the benefit of all aggrieved persons. However, it was not for the Court to determine the question of inappropriateness or inefficiency by reference to policy

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\(^{146}\) Peter Cashman, "Class Actions on Behalf of Clients: Is This Permissible?" (2006) 80 *Australian Law Journal* 738, at 742.

\(^{147}\) (2005) 147 FCR 394.


\(^{150}\) [2007] FCAFC 200 1061.
considerations that were not expressed or apparent from the language and scheme of Part IVA of the FCA Act. On a literal construction of section 33C(1) of the 1976 Act, it was held that the subsection permitted a representative party to commence proceedings by one or more of the persons who satisfied the threshold requirements (a) to (c) of that section "as representing some or all of them". Those words expressly permitted the representative party to commence proceedings on behalf of less than all of the potential members of the group. The decision of Dorajay was distinguished because group membership could change after the commencement of the proceedings. Stone J found in that case that the provisions for group members to opt into the proceedings were contrary to the terms and policy of Part IVA. However, the opting in that was allowed in that case extended to include persons who retained the representative party's lawyers after the commencement of the proceedings.

8.121 This series of decisions lead to a debate as to whether the Australia's federal regime in Part IVA of the 1976 Act should have a purposive or a literal interpretation, insofar as the class description is concerned. It remains to be seen whether the Courts will set out clear criteria under which such class formation mechanisms, which is usually associated with private litigation funding, should be permitted.

Summary on LFCs

8.122 From the above discussion, it can be seen that LFCs have been recognised and regulated in Australia. If properly managed in Hong Kong, we believe that LFCs would enhance access to justice for a wide range of people, especially when the legal costs are likely to exceed the amount of a single litigant’s claim. Adequate supervisory measures would need to be in place before litigation funding was allowed. These might include a check-list for lawful LFAs, requirements for disclosure of the funding arrangements, and adequate protection of the independence of the lawyers involved. We would welcome the community's views as to whether LFCs should be recognised in Hong Kong and, if so, what are the appropriate forms of control and regulation to prevent abuse.

The way forward: existing sectorial funds

8.123 Each of the options discussed above for funding class action proceedings presents difficulties: public funding would be needed for a general expansion of legal aid to class action proceedings, or to establish a class

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151 Section 33C(1) of the 1976 Act provides as follows:

"(1) Subject to this Part, where:

(a) 7 or more persons have claims against the same person; and
(b) the claims of all those persons are in respect of, or arise out of, the same, similar or related circumstances; and
(c) the claims of all those persons give rise to a substantial common issue of law or fact;

a proceeding may be commenced by one or more of those persons as representing some or all of them." (emphasis added)
action fund, and the introduction of LFCs would have considerable ramifications and should be treated with caution.

8.124 In the light of these difficulties, we think that a better alternative would be to look at specific sectors where there are already funding mechanisms in place, with the aim of applying the new class action regime to one or more of these sectors first to test out its operation. We discuss below a number of such funds, both existing and proposed. We have not yet reached any firm conclusion on the preferred option and would welcome the community's views on this.

**Sectorial litigation funds in the financial sector**

(a) *The SFC's Investor Compensation Fund*

8.125 We have considered the feasibility of expanding the coverage of the existing Securities and Futures Commission's Investor Compensation Fund (ICF) to fund class actions in the securities field. We do not think the ICF would provide the solution. The ICF was established under section 236 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (the SFO) to provide a measure of compensation to clients of a specified person who sustain loss by reason of a default by the specified person (including intermediaries licensed or registered for certain regulated activities under the SFO) in connection with specified securities or futures contracts. Payments may only be made out of the ICF in the limited circumstances set out in section 242 of the SFO. The levy on transactions is also expressly for the purposes of the ICF and therefore linked to the objects of the fund. To use the ICF to fund class actions would change its purpose and alter its nature considerably and require primary legislation. We have reservations about recommending the ICF as a possible class action funding model for the financial sector and, in any event, it cannot provide an immediate solution.

(b) *The Hong Kong Association of Minority Shareholders' proposal*

8.126 Mr David Webb has proposed setting up the Hong Kong Association of Minority Shareholders (HAMS) to exercise shareholders' rights on members' behalf in quasi-class actions and to deter shareholder abuse. The HAMS proposal was last updated on 1 July 2001.\(^{152}\) We have also consulted Mr Webb on his views on the suggestion that a sectorial litigation fund be set up to assist class action proceedings. HAMS would admit any individual or institutional investor or potential investor, whether local or overseas, as a member and would operate in three key areas:

- **Policy** - to promote and lobby for improvements to the legislative and regulatory framework for investment.

\(^{152}\) At [www.webb-site.com/articles/ham.htm](http://www.webb-site.com/articles/ham.htm) (last access on 27 May 2008).
Corporate governance ratings - to encourage good corporate governance and deter bad corporate governance, by means of a comprehensive and objective corporate governance rating system

Enforcement - converting the framework into a meaningful deterrent to bad corporate governance, by quasi-class action litigation of the worst cases on behalf of investor members.

8.127 It is suggested that the direct charges for membership of HAMS would be designed to cover solely the cost of communications with members. Keeping the entrance fee low would attract as broad a participation of the public investors as possible. The annual fee might be around HK$100 for individuals and HK$1,000 for institutions (corporates). Those individuals who wished to receive hard-copy mail communications might be charged an additional $100 to cover postage and printing.

8.128 Mr Webb estimated there are at least 500,000 regular investors (both local and overseas) in the Hong Kong markets, and he would expect membership of at least 50,000 in the first two years, with the number increasing as the benefits of HAMS begin to materialise. With those kinds of numbers, Mr Webb believed that HAMS would be authoritative and investors' views would carry real weight in the process of corporate governance reform.

8.129 The overall direction and policies of HAMS would be determined by a non-executive Board of Governors. In order to be truly representative of investors' wishes and accountable to investors, Mr Webb suggested that the Board of Governors should be elected by its members. To provide a balance between the occasionally differing interests of individual and institutional investors, half of the board would be elected by individual members and the other half by corporate members. Mr Webb was of the view that if HAMS were run by Government-appointed directors, then it would be unable to fulfil its goals.

8.130 Mr Webb suggested that a team of highly skilled lawyers and other professionals in the HAMS Enforcement Division would use the shareholder rights won by the HAMS Policy Division on behalf of all members. With 50,000 members or more, Mr Webb believed that any target stock would have been held at some time in the past by a HAMS member.

8.131 The HAMS Enforcement Division would target the worst cases of abuse, with the highest chances of success, by claiming, and if necessary, suing, for damages. It would also leverage off the findings of any Market Misconduct Tribunal under the SFO, using these findings as evidence. Once a case was in progress, HAMS could advertise for any member who had been a shareholder at the appropriate time to act as plaintiff. This would include anyone who joins HAMS to participate in the action. Many members would be represented by HAMS and would receive a proportionate share of the damages recovered if the case was won.
8.132 Mr Webb suggested that the HAMS Enforcement Division would press claims against companies and their directors for bad governance, such as false and misleading statements, breach of fiduciary duty, oppression of minority shareholders and expropriation of assets. Like other units, the Enforcement Division would be financed from the HAMS operating budget, but it would also seek to recover its costs plus a surplus on those cases that it won. Mr Webb believed that the creation of a credible well-funded litigation deterrent would deter bad corporate governance and would increase the willingness of offenders to reach a settlement without necessarily admitting liability.

8.133 Mr Webb suggested that the fairest practical method to finance the HAMS initiative would be a levy on the market, which he proposed be named the Good Governance Levy (GG Levy). The volume which an investor trades is roughly proportional to the size of their portfolio. Frequent traders would pay a little more than long-term investors. Mr Webb estimated that a reasonable funding level for HAMS would be afforded by a 0.005% levy, or $1 for every $20,000 of purchase or sale. Part of this would be used to accumulate a contingency fund, since market volume and value fluctuates whereas operating expenses are more fixed. To apply such a levy to the market would require legislation.

8.134 Mr Webb’s website reports that the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform (SCCLR) rejected the HAMS proposal. The Deputy Secretary for Financial Services (DSFS) conveyed the SCCLR’s views and wrote:

"[I]n the light of the views expressed by members of the SCCLR, we are not in a position to take the HAMS proposal forward, in its present form. As at present advised, it is unlikely the HAMS proposal will form part of SCCLR’s recommendations in its forthcoming consultation paper as part of the corporate governance review."

Furthermore, DSFS wrote:

"Members of the [SCCLR] expressed the view that whatever merit there might be in some of the HAMS proposals there was a fundamental difficulty in respect of the accountability of the body to be set up as to the use of public monies."

8.135 Mr Webb responded that a variety of checks and balances had been built into the scheme: the governing board would be non-executive (half elected by institutional members and half by retail members); anyone could join HAMS for a token annual fee to cover communication costs; and its CEO would have to report annually to the Legislative Council on how it was spending its revenue, at the risk of losing the levy.

8.136 Mr Webb stressed that the Enforcement Division of HAMS was only needed "in the absence of a proper class-action system". It would be far better to have a class-action system in Hong Kong (not just for shareholders,
but consumers in general). In his view, HAMS was a second-best alternative. Mr Webb added that a number of the Australian class actions had been linked to breaches of competition law such as price-fixing, so it was timely that Hong Kong was now considering introducing class actions, at the same time as a competition law. Mr Webb considered that this was important because fining a firm 10% of its turnover for anti-competitive behaviour, and paying the fine to the Government, did not directly compensate the victims of that firm's behaviour, who might be a much smaller class than the general public whom the Government represents. The victim class should be able to seek compensation directly through a class action. Likewise, in insider dealing cases, paying fines to the Government did not compensate those who suffered loss due to the insider dealer's behaviour.

8.137 Mr Webb suggested that our consultation paper should include a proposal for a general class action regime. He did not favour a halfway system where a government-appointed body decided which class actions could be pursued or had some kind of exclusive rights. A free-market solution was needed.

8.138 The establishment of a fund along the lines of HAMS would present considerable difficulties. The proposal has already been rejected by the SCCLR and would be likely to be strongly opposed by some sectors in the community. It is by no means certain that legislation could be devised which would satisfy the concerns both of legislators and Mr Webb. We do not therefore think that a fund modelled on HAMS would be likely to provide a solution in the short term to the funding of class actions in the financial sector.

The Consumer Legal Action Fund

8.139 The Consumer Council's Consumer Legal Action Fund (the Fund) is a trust fund set up in November 1994 to give greater consumer access to legal remedies by providing financial support and legal assistance. Legal assistance may be in the form of advice, assistance and representation by a solicitor and counsel. The Fund aims to provide assistance in the following circumstances:

(a) to assist consumers to bring or defend a representative action. This type of action enables one consumer to act on behalf of a group of consumers with the same interest in the matter;

(b) to assist consumers to pursue joint claims out of the same or same series of transactions with a common question of law or fact;

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153 Details of the Consumer Legal Action Fund have been extracted from the following document found on the Consumer Council's website: http://www.consumer.org.hk/website/ws_en/legal_protection/consumer_legal_actions_fund/CLAFBriefPDF.pdf
We have also obtained information on the operation of the Fund from the Consumer Council.
(c) to group consumers with similar causes of action and claims together administratively and arrange for them to be heard at the same time or consecutively;

(d) to bring action in the interest of the public; and

(e) to handle cases of significant consumer interest.

8.140 Application for legal assistance under the Fund can be made by a consumer or a group of consumers involved in a matter which:

(a) relates to consumer transactions (such as sharp, unscrupulous or restrictive trade practices or false or misleading advertising claims),

(b) involves significant public interest or injustice,

and the consumers have exhausted all other means of dispute resolution in the matter and the consumers do not qualify for any form of legal aid. However, the trustee of the Fund has discretion in granting or refusing assistance in appropriate cases.

8.141 When considering whether or not to grant legal assistance, the Fund may consider, in particular, the following:

(a) whether a group has been, or there is potential for a large group of consumers to be, adversely affected;

(b) whether court action is the most effective means of resolution in the circumstances;

(c) the cost effectiveness of the action;

(d) the chance of success of the matter;

(e) the bargaining power of the consumers;

(f) the questions of fact or law common to the consumer group (if a group is involved);

(g) the size of the group (if applicable);

(h) the financial security of the other party involved;

(i) whether, if successful, the matter has publicity value and can promote the consumer cause and have a deterrent effect on unscrupulous business practices;

(j) whether the matter may create an undue financial burden on the Fund; and
(k) the practicality of the Fund offering timely assistance in the matter.

8.142 If the consumers’ legal action is unsuccessful, they need not make any payment other than the application fees. The Fund pays for all their costs and expenses. If the legal action is successful, a contribution to be calculated as follows is to be paid to the Fund:

(a) the actual legal costs and expenses paid for the legal action less any costs payable by, and recovered from, the opposite party;

(b) all other sums paid for the legal action out of the Fund; and

(c) 10% of the amount of money (not including the costs recovered from the opposite party) received on behalf of the consumer, the value of property recovered or preserved, the amount by which the liability of the consumer is reduced or discharged or the value of any benefit gained by the consumer in the matter (Benefit Value).

This contribution is subject to a cap of 25% of the Benefit Value for matters that may be, or are, actually determined in the Small Claims Tribunal and 50% for all other matters.

8.143 The number of successful applications to the Fund and the expenses incurred each year since its establishment are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of successful application</th>
<th>Total expenses (HK$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>121,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>321,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>235,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>215,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>329,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>284,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>0 (Up to May 2005)</td>
<td>548,000 (Estimated for payment of litigation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expenses incurred by the Fund each year include litigation expenses, as well as costs related to court proceedings, such as obtaining company search reports and seeking legal opinions for consideration of the applications. As litigation takes time, the total expenses incurred by a successful application may spread over a number of years.

8.144 The Consumer Council is the trustee of the Fund. Two committees are in charge of screening the applications. The Management Committee considers fund applications and recommends to the Board of Administrators whether assistance should be granted to the applicant. The Board of Administrators is responsible for the overall administration and investment of the Fund. It manages fund policy and approves applications after receiving recommendations. Upon receiving applications, legal counsel draft papers on the case background and legal issues to brief the Management Committee. The Management Committee conducts about 4 - 5 meetings per year.

Factors to be considered in an application to the Consumer Legal Action Fund

8.145 The various factors relevant to an application are illustrated in the following cases:

- **No cause of action**
  A young lady was hired as fitting model by a trading company. She was required to (and did) purchase a beauty services package provided by the trading company. She was paid for her modelling job and did not find the price of the package unreasonable or the service quality unacceptable. However, she suspected it was a scam luring her to purchase the package. This application was rejected because there was no evidence of fraud and she had suffered no loss. It was obvious that there was no cause of action.

- **No public interest**
  Factors to be considered include how much media attention will be attracted, whether any significant consumer issue is involved, whether the public will be educated and whether any precedent will be established.
The applicants joined a tour organised by a travel agent to Europe and complained that the accommodation did not meet the standard promised. They were not satisfied with the compensation offered by the travel agent and applied to the fund to assist them to claim loss of enjoyment. Their application was rejected as it was likely that the court would make only a small award for loss of enjoyment. Also, there was no public interest involved.

A case in which assistance was granted

Two kindergartens had charged parents of students excessive fees which exceeded those approved by the Director of Education. The operators of the kindergartens submitted that the parents had suffered no loss because they had received good consideration. The approved fees were insufficient to cover the expenses. Even with the over-charged fees, the kindergartens were running at a loss.

The parents won their case at the Small Claims Tribunal. The operators of the kindergartens appealed to Court of First Instance (CFI). The parents then applied to the Fund for help. The case was considered to be of public interest and to promote the consumer cause to the public. Counsel's opinion had been sought on the merits of the case before assistance was granted. With the Fund's assistance, the parents won the case and the appeal was dismissed.

After the parents' application and the case were reported by the mass media, around 136 other affected parents made complaints to the Consumer Council or applied to the Fund. Since the High Court had decided in favour of the parents, the liability issues had been settled. It was therefore only necessary for those parents to establish the level of damages before the Small Claims Tribunal. A representative action under section 21 of the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (where the claims of more than two persons against the same defendant can be brought by one of them as representative) was not invoked because each claimant needed to have their damages assessed individually.

The school operators were willing to settle. Claimants who were unwilling to settle obtained judgment from the Small Claims Tribunal.

Video rental store case

Assistance was also granted in cases involving a substantial number of consumers. For instance, in 1998, 1,951 complaints were received against a video rental store and 581 applications were received by the Fund. Though a large number of consumers were affected, the Fund did not proceed because the operator had ceased business.
Mobile phone users case

Another example involved issues affecting millions of mobile phone users. Telecommunications operators varied unilaterally the term of their fixed term contracts by imposing a monthly charge of $10 as a cross harbour tunnel/ mobile service fee. More than 100 complaints were received. Having considered Counsel's advice, the Fund decided that assistance should be granted. Thirty-eight complainants applied for assistance but only 10 subsequently entered into agreement with the Fund for assistance, and the number of those preparing their cases with the Fund's assistance was further reduced to six. This was probably because of the time and effort required and the small amount of claims involved. Of these six assisted consumers, three subsequently had their cases settled before action, two settled after filing their respective claims, and one proceeded to trial and succeeded. Representative procedures were not invoked.

Misrepresentation case

Examples of cases involving groups of consumers who allegedly suffered loss as a result of misrepresentation included a number of flat owners complaining against the developer for its promise of unobstructed views, allegedly made when they entered into the contract.

8.146 The factors to be considered in deciding whether assistance will be granted include the merits, the number of consumers involved, common interest, chances to achieve consumer education, and whether some significant consumer and legal issues are involved (eg whether the contractual terms are unconscionable). Not all these criteria must be met. For example, when the case affects significant consumer interests or illustrates new tactics for cheating consumers, applications may still be approved even though not many consumers are involved.

8.147 The fact that assistance has been granted in one case does not necessarily mean that it will be granted in subsequent similar cases. Assistance may not be granted in subsequent cases, for instance, if public education has already been achieved by assisting the original case.

8.148 A successful claim assisted by the Fund may help the Consumer Council in resolving similar complaints filed against the same trader by mediation. This worked in the kindergarten case. In considering whether to grant assistance, the Fund would take into account whether methods of dispute resolution other than litigation (such as mediation) have been exhausted.
Recovery of costs and contribution

8.149 Assisted consumers are required to make a contribution if they have benefited as a result of the Fund's assistance, through litigation or settlement, or otherwise. The contribution is equivalent to the net legal costs (costs actually expended minus costs recovered) and other expenses plus 10% of the benefit derived from the assistance (the damages awarded or the settlement sum). The contribution is capped at 25% of the benefit for small claims cases and 50% of the benefit for cases proceeding in higher courts.

8.150 If one of a group of assisted cases is selected to be a test case, other assisted consumers will be required under their agreements with the Fund to contribute to the costs of the test case if they also obtain benefit (eg through settlement) as a result of the success of the test case. Theoretically, the Fund would exercise its discretion to decide how much of the costs have to be borne by the other assisted consumers. Factors such as the stage of proceedings to which the other assisted consumers had pursued their claims when the test case succeeded may be considered.

8.151 In the kindergarten case, the cases proceeded separately. Most claimants only started actions after the Small Claims Tribunal appeal (which involved nine assisted respondents) was dismissed by the High Court. A majority of them (56) settled with the defendants and 20 refused to accept the settlement offer and proceeded to obtain judgment. The costs of the appeal were recovered on an indemnity basis and had no implications for the contribution to be made by the assisted respondents and other assisted consumers. However, the Fund had incurred expenses in seeking counsel's advice for its consideration of the applications. The Fund therefore required the assisted respondents and the assisted claimant in the small claims action who had derived benefits from the Fund's assistance to share the costs of counsel's advice pro rata to the benefit they had obtained. At the same time, the Fund did not require a contribution on this particular item from those assisted consumers who had accepted the settlement offer before commencing proceedings without incurring substantial costs to the Fund.

Lehman Brothers investment products

8.152 The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 caused significant losses to holders of minibonds which it had issued. Thousands of complaints were made to the Consumer Council, alleging mis-selling of this derivative product by the retail banks. In addition to arranging mediation between the bond-holders and the banks, the Council screened the complaints for cases which might be suitable for the Fund's consideration. The selection criteria focused mainly on the vulnerability of the complainants, as well as the cogency of evidence regarding untoward sales tactics, inadequate risk disclosure and misrepresentation, etc. As at 6 April 2009 the Fund had received 71 applications.
Our conclusions

8.153 In the context of the funding of class action proceedings, we suggest that consideration should be given to expanding the scope of the Fund. In fact, as part of a package of recommendations in a February 2008 report arguing for comprehensive trade practices legislation, the Consumer Council proposed increasing the Fund's resources to enhance its availability. The report pointed out that expensive legal costs were a factor which inhibited litigation in particular by those in the "sandwich class" who were not eligible for legal aid and whose cases were not appropriate for the Fund's assistance. The Consumer Council therefore suggested that consumers' access to redress might be improved either by relaxing the means test under the Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme or by enhancing the availability of the Fund by increasing its resources.

8.154 We are of the view that consumer claims are peculiarly suitable for class action litigation and priority should be given to funding class action litigation in this area. Consideration should be given to expanding the scope of the Fund to provide legal assistance in class action proceedings. But, given the focus of the Fund on consumer claims, it would not extend to public law cases and other forms of public funding would be required to meet the financial needs in those cases.

Conclusions

8.155 Our starting point is that little could be achieved by a class action regime unless suitable means can be found to fund plaintiffs who are of limited means.

8.156 We encapsulate our options for the funding of a class action regime in the form of a table. The first four options would require legislation (albeit that option 4 does not require public funding). The LFC option would have significant implications for the current civil justice system. We therefore recommend that, in the short term, the introduction of funding for class action proceedings in Hong Kong should proceed on a sectorial basis. Depending on the operation and performance of these sectorial funding arrangements, adjustments could be made to the first three recommended options. Our general intention is to take a step by step approach, leading to the establishment of a general class actions fund in the long term.

8.157 The table also indicates the compatibility of the different options. It should be pointed out that if a public class action fund is established, then the sectorial litigation funding arrangements may not be necessary. Otherwise, the various options (albeit with varying scope of operation) are generally compatible and could be implemented together.

155 Consumer Council, Fairness in the Marketplace for Consumers and Business (February 2008, Hong Kong) para 2.56.
In fact, we think that the various options complement one another and may be said to serve different parts of the litigation market. On one hand, public funding should be available where there is a public interest in litigating issues with significant legal implications, even though the chances of success are no better than even. At the other end of the spectrum, the LFCs would be likely only to invest in those cases where the chances of success are high and in such circumstances there is little need for public funding. In relation to all the suggested modes of funding where public money is involved (no matter whether it is by the extension of legal aid, the establishment of a special public fund or the expansion of the Consumer Legal Action Fund) the policy concern should be the same and a merits test should be rigorously applied.
## Funding options of a class action regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Source of funding</th>
<th>Legislation required</th>
<th>Compatibility with other options</th>
<th>Scope of operation</th>
<th>Public interest consideration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mutually exclusive</td>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of legal aid</td>
<td>public</td>
<td>to change the individual-based eligibility criteria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>all those eligible to legal aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class actions fund (CAF)</td>
<td>initial public funding</td>
<td>to establish CAF</td>
<td>HAMS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>open to all class action applicants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litigation funding company (LFC)</td>
<td>private</td>
<td>to recognise and regulate LFCs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>cases with high level of commercial viability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMS proposal</td>
<td>private</td>
<td>to impose levy on stock transactions</td>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>only for HAMS members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Legal Action Fund</td>
<td>initial public funding</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>only for consumer claims</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Recommendation 7

(1) It is generally accepted that if a suitable funding model for plaintiffs of limited means could not be found, little could be achieved by a class action regime. In view of the general rule in Hong Kong that the costs of litigation would follow the event (in other words, the loser pays the costs of the litigation, subject to the discretion of the court to be exercised in accordance with the facts of the case), we have considered the alternatives of transferring the financial burden of group litigation to the following groups: defendants, the class members and the lawyers representing the class. With the exception of conditional fee arrangements (which warrant further study in the light of the security for costs mechanism that we have proposed for class action proceedings in Recommendation 4(3)), we do not find any of these to be viable or practical in the light of overseas experience and local conditions.

(2) We therefore suggest that, in the light of the conditions in Hong Kong, the extension of the ordinary legal aid and supplementary legal aid schemes to class action proceedings might be more suitable. The extension should be made subject to the Director of Legal Aid's residual discretion to refuse legal aid to prevent class members who are outside the financial eligibility limits for legal aid from benefiting.

Our general intention is to take a step by step approach, leading to the establishment of a general class actions fund (ie a special public fund which can make discretionary grants to all eligible class action plaintiffs and which in return the representative plaintiffs must reimburse from proceeds recovered from the defendants) in the long term.

(3) Given the complexity and the difficulties of introducing a comprehensive funding mechanism in Hong Kong, we propose that, in the short term, a better alternative would be to look at specific sectors where there are already funding mechanisms in place, with the aim of applying the new class action regime to one or more of these sectors first to test out its operation. We have considered the possibility of setting up a securities –related litigation fund based
on the proposed model of the Hong Kong Association of Minority Shareholders (HAMS) but have come to the view that it would not be likely to provide a solution in the short term. We have discussed the possibility of the extension of the Consumer Legal Action Fund (the Fund) to class action litigation in consumer claims. On the basis of the present framework of a trust fund providing financial support and legal assistance for aggrieved consumers to obtain legal remedies, we propose that the Fund's resources should be increased to enhance the availability of funding to class action proceedings in consumer claims. If the scope of the Fund were to be expanded to cover class actions, it would be important to devise mechanisms to ensure that members of the class action who are not assisted by the Fund should share equitably in the costs of the proceedings. We have not yet reached any firm conclusion on the preferred option and would welcome the community's views on this.

(4) We have considered the option of involving private litigation funding companies (LFCs) (ie commercial entities that contract with the potential litigants. The LFCs pay the costs of the litigation and accept the risk of paying the other party's costs if the case fails. In return the LFCs are paid a share of the proceeds recovered from successful cases). This is likely to be a controversial issue on which we have not yet reached a final conclusion and we would welcome the community's views. If LFCs were to be allowed in Hong Kong, legislation would be necessary to recognise and regulate LFCs, as well as to clarify what activities are approved in commercial third party funding of litigation.
Chapter 9

Detailed procedural proposals

Detailed design issues

9.1 We recommended earlier in this paper that a new court procedure for class actions should be introduced in Hong Kong. There is a need to consider what the design features of that procedure should be and what specific provisions should be adopted if the introduction of a class action regime is endorsed by the public in the consultation exercise.

9.2 We have proposed that at the outset the court must consider, with reference to prescribed criteria, whether a case is appropriate for the class action procedure. The class certification requirements and rules for the litigation process require further study. Procedural safeguards will have to be put in place to tackle possible abuse of the process. The procedure adopted for class actions will need to reflect the concerns and discussion relating to the four main issues (i.e., the treatment of public law cases, avoidance of potential abuse by plaintiffs, handling of class actions involving parties from other jurisdictions and the funding of class actions regime) that we have considered. The court should be given more case management power and a high degree of flexibility in determining the most appropriate approach in particular cases.

Models of certification criteria

9.3 In this connection, we have noted that Professor Mulheron has identified sixty design issues for an opt-out collective action regime in her submission to the Civil Justice Council. Further work is required to consider the various design issues associated with the procedure at each stage of an opt-out class action.

9.4 A certification stage is an essential element of any class actions mechanism. The Civil Justice Council (CJC) recommended that:

"No collective claim should be permitted to proceed unless it is certified as being suitable to proceed as such. Certification

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should be subject to a strict certification procedure, which is to include provisions for the imposition of security for costs.”

9.5 The CJC therefore recommended that the new collective action mechanism should incorporate a certification process, which should take place as early as possible in the litigation and which should be applied rigorously by the court. Rigorous application will require the representative party to satisfy the court of the following certification criteria:

(a) There are a minimum number of identifiable claimants (the “numerosity” criterion);

(b) The claim is not merely justiciable (discloses a genuine cause of action) but has legal merit (ie certification requires the court to conduct a preliminary merits test) (the “merits” criterion);

(c) There is sufficient commonality of interest and remedy among members of the class (the “commonality” criterion);

(d) The class action is the most appropriate legal vehicle to resolve the issues in dispute (ie it is a superior redress mechanism to, for instance, either pursuing the claim on a traditional, unitary, basis through the civil courts or a specialist tribunal or alternatively, through pursuit of a compensatory remedy via regulatory action where that is available and where it is able to deliver effective access to justice) (the “superiority” criterion); and

(e) The representative party of a class action takes the action forward on behalf of all the group members: he or she is looking after his or her personal interests and the similar interests of the other members of the group. The judgment of a class action will bind not only the representative plaintiff but also the members of the group on whose behalf he or she sues. The representative party should have the standing and ability to represent the interests of the class of claimants both properly and adequately (the “representative” criterion).

9.6 With reference to the certification criteria in four jurisdictions (Australian federal regime, British Columbia, Ontario and the USA federal regime) we have set out in the following table a range of certification requirements to be applied to a hypothetical consumer claim. Using this illustration, it is possible to determine whether an action will satisfy those

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criteria and will therefore fall within the scope of a class action regime. In the meantime, the table provides a starting point for public discussion of whether or not the different certification criteria in other jurisdictions may be too wide and should be modified before adoption in Hong Kong.
### Certification criteria in four jurisdictions with an illustration of a consumer claim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broad area of consideration</th>
<th>Questions to be asked</th>
<th>In particular …</th>
<th>Australia: Federal regime</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>British Columbia</th>
<th>USA: Federal regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum numerosity</td>
<td>How many consumers should be necessary in order for the class action to be warranted?</td>
<td>Is a minimum specified number to be selected? Or simply two or more consumers? Or by stating that wherever their joinder or consolidation is impracticable?</td>
<td>FCA(Aus), s33C(1)(a): &quot;7 or more persons have claims against the same person&quot;</td>
<td>CPA (Ont), s5(1)(b): &quot;an identifiable class of two or more persons&quot;</td>
<td>CPA (BC), S4(1)(b): &quot;an identifiable class of two or more persons&quot;</td>
<td>FRCP 23(a)(1): &quot;the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary merits</td>
<td>What, if any, preliminary merits filter should be satisfied (apart from the usual requirement that the pleadings disclose a cause of action)?</td>
<td>Should it be necessary to show that the class action has a 'high probability of success', to warrant the fact that it will be consumptive of judicial resources? Is a minimum financial threshold per consumer warranted? Should a cost-benefit analysis be required in</td>
<td>No express requirement</td>
<td>CPA (Ont) s5(1)(a): &quot;the pleadings or the notice of application discloses a cause of action&quot;</td>
<td>CPA (BC), s4(1)(a): &quot;the pleadings or the notice of application discloses a cause of action&quot;</td>
<td>No express requirement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the class action's favour?</td>
<td></td>
<td>FCA (Aus), s33C(1)(c): &quot;the claim of all [class members] give rise to a substantial common issue of law or fact&quot;</td>
<td>CPA (Ont) s5(1)(c): &quot;the claims … of the class members raise common issues&quot;</td>
<td>CPA (BC), s4(2)(a): &quot;In determining whether a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure … the court must consider … (a) whether question of fact or law common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members&quot;</td>
<td>FRCP 23(a)(2): &quot;there are questions of law or fact common to the class&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Commonality of issues       | How is the degree of commonality to be worded? | How significant must the common issues be? Predominant? Important in moving the litigation forward? Merely a ‘triable issue’? How significant must the individual issues be before the class action fails certification? | | | | FRCP 23(b)(3): "the question of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members"
| Superiority                 | Must the class action be the superior means of resolving the common issues, or the entire dispute? | What factors will make up that superiority matrix? Costs comparisons between unitary and class litigation? Look at the characteristics of the consumers? Look at whether there is any 'need' for the class action? Should |
|                            | | | FCA (Aus), S33 N(1): Court may order discontinuance where it is in the interests of justice to do so because: (a) the costs incurred as a class action | CPA (Ont), S5(1)(d): The court must find that a class action would be the "preferable procedure for the resolution of the common issues" | CPA (BC), S4(1)(d) and S4(2): When determining preferability, the court must consider: (a) whether common questions of fact or law | FRCP 23(b)(3): The court must find that a class action is superior to "other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy" Pertinent matters
<table>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>it matter if the defendant is to be adversely affected by the class action? What effect does the institution of separate proceedings have upon superiority?</td>
<td>the costs if each class member sued individually; (b) all the relief sought can be obtained by proceeding other than a class action; (c) the class action will not provide an efficient and effective means of dealing with the class members' claims; (d) it is &quot;otherwise inappropriate&quot; that the claims be pursued by class action.</td>
<td>predominate over individual questions; (b) whether a significant number of class members have valid interest in individually controlling actions; (c) whether the class action would involve claims presently being litigated in another action; (d) whether other means of resolving the claims are less practical or less efficient; (e) whether a class action would be more difficult to administer than if relief were</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>include: (a) the interest of class members in individually controlling prosecution of separate actions; (b) the extent and nature of any litigation already commenced by class members; (c) the desirability of concentrating the class litigation in the particular forum; (d) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad area of consideration</td>
<td>Questions to be asked</td>
<td>In particular ...</td>
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<td>The representative</td>
<td>Should an absence of conflict of interest, adequacy, and typicality, all be required for the representative to pass certification?</td>
<td>How is conflict to be assessed? What factors matter to adequacy, and which are to be considered irrelevant? Is there any place for typicality? If so, does it mean that there has to be an interest in the litigation on the part of the consumers?</td>
<td>FCA (Aus), s33T(1): &quot;If … it appears to the Court that a representative party is not able adequately to represent the interests of the group members, the Court may substitute another group member as representative party and make such other orders as it thinks fit&quot;</td>
<td>CPA (Ont), s5(1)(e): &quot;there is a representative plaintiff or defendant who, (i) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class, (ii) has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable method of advancing the proceeding on behalf of the class and of notifying class members of the proceeding, and (iii) does not have, on the common issues for the</td>
<td>CPA (BC), s4(1)(e): Similar to CPA (Ont), s5(1)(e)</td>
<td>FRCP 23(a)(4): &quot;the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class&quot; FRCP 23(a)(3): &quot;the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad area of consideration</td>
<td>Questions to be asked</td>
<td>In particular …</td>
<td>Australia: Federal regime</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
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<td>class, an interest in conflict with the interests of other class members&quot;</td>
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</table>

Abbreviations:  
9.7 For example, a manufacturer sold toys widely throughout Hong Kong. A particular type of dolls contained serious design defects and caused monetary loss and physical injuries to a large number of consumers and their children. Mass tort class actions were commenced on behalf of all those affected.

9.8 We consider the implications of the different formulations of the certification criteria, in relation to this hypothetical example as follows:

(a) Numerosity criterion - the Australian and Canadian provisions for a specified minimum number of litigants are straightforward and impose a lower threshold for commencing a class action. In contrast, the US Federal regime requires a consideration of whether the application of the conventional procedure of consolidation is inappropriate or impracticable. This is a more stringent requirement for certification. Depending on the particular factual matrix of the cases, the mass tort actions may not be able to fulfil this more restrictive requirement if imposed.

(b) Merits criterion - the certification court would have to undertake a preliminary assessment of the merits of the applicant's proposed case. The existing provisions in the Canadian regimes only require the disclosure of a cause of action. This is a usual requirement for commencing legal action and should not be difficult to fulfil for mass tort actions.

(c) Commonality criterion - it is clearly an essential requirement for certifying a class action that there should be an identifiable group whose members raise claims with a common basis. In the case of claims for damages in respect of allegedly defective toys, there is likely to be no connection between the claimants other than that they claim to have been injured by the same toys. Their injuries will have occurred at different times and in different circumstances, there will be questions about whether the injury is attributable to the defective toys or to some other causes peculiar to the claimants. The different formulae for commonality found in the five jurisdictions reflects the varying degrees of commonality required, ranging from "common issues" in Ontario to "substantial common issue of law or fact" in the Australian federal regime and common questions of fact or law which "predominate over any questions affecting only individual members" in British Columbia and the US federal regime. For mass tort actions, it may be more difficult to demonstrate that the common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members because the issue of causation between the defective products and the injuries suffered by individual claimants would have to be considered on a case by case basis. Such cases would more easily satisfy the lower
threshold of common issues stipulated in the Ontario class action regime.

(d) Superiority criterion - it is necessary to make clear that a class action should be resorted to only where it is likely to be the preferable or superior means of resolving the common issues when compared with the traditional means of dispute resolution. In the absence of a certification hearing, the Australian federal court may order that the class action no longer continue because it is not in the interests of justice to do so. Nevertheless the list of factors that should be taken into account is similar to that in the other jurisdictions. It is noted that none of the lists of relevant matters to be taken into account are meant to be exhaustive and Ontario does not specify a list or relevant matters at all. The Canadian regimes of Ontario and British Columbia are different from the US federal regime in two key respects. Class proceedings need only be a "preferable", not a "superior" method of proceeding (although the precise difference between these terms is not necessarily obvious). The second difference is that whilst the US federal rule requires that the class action is the superior method to resolve the "controversy", class actions need only be preferable in respect of the "common issues" (and not all of the issues between the parties) in the Canadian regimes. In this respect, it appears that it is easier for mass tort class actions to fulfil the requirements under the Canadian regimes than the US federal regime. A final point of distinction between the jurisdictions revolves around the question of "superior to what?" Under the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), the court must compare a class action with "other available methods" for the resolution of the dispute. In other words, a class action cannot be inferior to an alternative that is simply not available to the class member. On the other hand, the Australian federal rule requires alternative litigation in the sense of "a proceeding in court", not an alternative dispute resolution method. The possibility of an alternative to class litigation is much greater in the other jurisdictions under review than in Australia, as a result of the less restrictive legislative drafting.

(e) Representative criterion - the Scottish Law Commission explained the two representative requirements of fairness and adequacy as follows:

"The requirement of 'fairly' promoting the interests of the class or group implies that the person concerned should be independent of the [defendants], that there should be

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5 See the observations made by the Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Class Proceedings Report #100 (1999), at 52.
no apparent conflict of interest with other group members and that one member of the group is not likely to be favoured at the expense of another. The requirement that the representative party should protect the interests of other class members 'adequately' implies that he (or she) has the financial resources likely to be necessary to support the litigation and the determination to pursue the litigation to a conclusion."

The determination of whether or not the class representative can act fairly and adequately to represent the interests of the class rests on the following factors:

"(i) the absence of any conflict with the interests of other class members, at least in relation to the common issues of law or fact;

(ii) a plan or scheme for the proceedings and a methodology for presenting and advancing the class interests;

(iii) a means of notifying class members of the existence and conduct of the proceedings;

(iv) adequate legal representation for the class." 

We have discussed the importance of the representative’s sufficiency of financial resources as one of the qualifying criteria under the headings "the representation certification criterion" and "funding proof at certification" in Chapter 6. The reference to security for costs in Chapter 6 also ties in with the adequacy of the representative criterion.

The US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) provides for a separate requirement of typicality on the part of the representative parties (ie that the claims of the class representative are typical of the class). The Irish Law Reform Commission commented that: "[s]trict interpretation of the requirement has allowed judges unsympathetic to class actions to reject certification on this ground. This is one of the reasons that neither the Canadian nor the Australian regimes include a typicality requirement."

9.9 We have set out in some detail the different models for each element of the certification requirements in each of the five jurisdictions

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9 See Irish Law Reform Commission (above), at 72.
examined. We invite public comments on the appropriate certification requirements to be adopted in Hong Kong.

**Legislation to implement a class action procedure in Hong Kong**

9.10 In some other jurisdictions provision for class actions has been made by rules of court, rather than by legislation. The Ontario Commission acknowledged that subordinate legislation provides greater flexibility and easier amendment but, for two reasons, it recommended primary legislation. The first reason was that it was often difficult to determine whether a provision was substantive or procedural and if a provision contained in a rule were held to be substantive it would be liable to be struck down as being *ultra vires*. Primary legislation might be necessary if it was desired to confer new power on the court. The second reason was that the potential impact of the introduction of a class action on the courts, the parties and the public raised important and controversial issues that deserved to be debated fully in the legislative assembly, rather than passed by way of regulation.\(^{11}\)

9.11 The Civil Justice Council (CJC) of England and Wales in its 2008 report on *Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions* recommended that while there was considerable scope for reform by amending the Rules of Court (the Civil Procedural Rules), it would be preferable for reform to be taken forward by primary legislation. This would enable those elements of reform which might affect substantive law to be debated fully and implemented in a way that would preclude *ultra vires* challenges.\(^{12}\)

9.12 Overseas experience shows that it may be preferable to introduce reform through statutory enactment rather than subsidiary legislation. If the recommendations in this paper are accepted and are to be implemented, there will be a need to pass enabling legislation and make changes to the rules pursuant to that enabling legislation. We set out below the areas that any future legislation will have to cover. The list of topics is not intended to be exhaustive. Details of the provisions to be included in the class action regime will need to be further considered in the light of the public consultation.

**Primary legislation for a class action regime**

9.13 To introduce a class action procedure to Hong Kong, provisions similar either to those in Australia or the United States will have to be passed. The legislation should cover the definition, nature and type of class actions, the

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\(^{10}\) Report on Class Actions, at 305-6.

\(^{11}\) See also the Report of the Attorney General's Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform 1990, at 24-5.

suspension of any applicable limitation period relating to members of a represented class, as well as any other matter relating or incidental to the proper management and conduct of class action proceedings. Where an opt-out approach is adopted for the generic class action regime, provisions will have to be made for (a) fair, reasonable and adequate notice to be given to the class members of the class action and (b) a fair, reasonable and adequate period of time ("cut-off date") in which class members can elect to opt out of the represented class for the purpose of the class action proceedings.

9.14 According to the Civil Justice Council, only two opt-out collective action regimes are contained within rules of civil procedure, namely, the United States federal regime (as contained in rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) and rule 334.1-334.40 of the Canadian Federal Court Rules 1998. Otherwise, the regimes of Australia (federal), Victoria (state) and all the presently existing opt-out regimes in Canada, have been implemented by statutes.13 In Victoria, the history of the present opt-out regime, contained within Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act 1986, is illustrative. The opt-out regime was originally implemented by court rules (via order 18A of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedures) Rules. The rules were challenged by the first defendant sued in Schutt Flying Academy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (Attorney-General for the State of Victoria intervening) and the Victorian Court of Appeal was to consider the question of whether order 18A was ultra vires of the rule-making powers vested in the judges under section 25(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 and therefore invalid.14 It was held by a narrow majority of 3:2 that order 18A was valid. Before a further appeal to the High Court of Australia on that question was heard, legislation was passed by the Victorian Parliament to remove any doubt about the legality of the regime.

9.15 In the light of the above, we propose that provision for introducing a class action procedure in Hong Kong should be made by primary legislation.

Changes to Order 15 of the Rules of the High Court

9.16 We have considered whether the existing rules for representative proceedings provided by order 15 of the Rules of the High Court (RHC) should be retained. In Australia, besides the statutory class action regimes applicable in the federal court and in the Victorian Supreme Court, the rules of court in most Australian jurisdictions make provisions for representative actions. Representative actions could be commenced where appropriate on their own or at the same time as the class action proceedings.

9.17 On the other hand, the representative rule equivalent to order 15 rule 12 of the RHC was described by the Scottish Law Commission as "brief and unhelpful", with "[a] number of matters left unprovided for and open to

The Scottish Law Commission held the view that "[t]he representative action procedure does not adequately meet the difficulties of multi-party litigation in Scotland and could not readily be adapted to do so."\textsuperscript{15} The Civil Justice Council of the UK (CJC) in light of its examination of other jurisdictions and following extensive stakeholder consultation recommended that a generic collective action be introduced generally.\textsuperscript{16} The CJC proposed that the current rule governing representative actions set out in Civil Procedure Rules 19.6 should be replaced by a generic collective action procedure as provided for in a revamped Civil Procedure Rules 19.\textsuperscript{17} We are of the view that most probably a self-contained order of the RHC on the general procedural framework for class actions in Hong Kong would be needed.

\textbf{9.18} To implement our Recommendation 2 on appropriate procedures for filtering out cases that are clearly not viable, class action proceedings may not continue as collective proceedings unless certified by a court in accordance with rules set out in the RHC. For the purpose of certification, provisions will have to be made for when certification is to take place, the criteria applicable to certification and which courts may certify proceedings as class action proceedings. We welcome views as to the appropriate certification criteria to be adopted in Hong Kong.

\textbf{Treatment of public law cases}

\textbf{9.19} We have not yet reached any firm conclusion on the various issues raised in relation to the alternative approaches for the treatment of group litigation in public law cases. The necessary legislative changes would depend on which of the four alternative approaches is adopted after public consultation.

\textbf{9.20} We are of the view that even if it is decided that the class action regime should not apply to public law cases there is still a need to give the courts flexibility to deal with the issues involved in multi-party litigation. We have suggested the minimum which should be achieved by any group litigation regime in public law cases. The court should be given the discretion to devise suitable machinery for dealing with multi-party public law actions, by way of test cases or the resolution of issues generic to all the claimants. We suggest that the group litigation regime should be built on the case management experience of the Group Litigation Order in England and class actions elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{15} Scottish Law Commission, \textit{Multi-Party Actions} (No 154, 1996), at para 5.10.
\textsuperscript{17} Civil Justice Council, \textit{Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions – Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedure for Collective Actions} (November 2008), at 137.
\textsuperscript{18} For the draft Civil Procedure Rules 19 please see Civil Justice Council, \textit{Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions – Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedure for Collective Actions} (November 2008), at 189–222.
Choice of plaintiff and avoidance of potential abuse

9.21 Pursuant to our Recommendation 4, an explicit certification requirement should be that the representative plaintiff must prove to the satisfaction of the court that suitable funding and costs-protection arrangements (on the part of the representative claimant and/or his lawyers) have been made for the class action litigation, similarly to the adequacy of class counsel requirement under rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the USA.

9.22 Furthermore, to implement our Recommendation 4(3), provision should be enacted along the lines of section 33ZG of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 to empower the court to order the representative plaintiffs to pay security for costs in accordance with the established principles for making such orders in appropriate cases.

Handling of parties from other jurisdictions

9.23 Our Recommendation 5 deals with the handling of parties from other jurisdictions. A foreign plaintiff should be defined as a member of a class of persons on whose behalf class action proceedings have been commenced and who is not resident in Hong Kong. To accommodate class actions involving parties from jurisdictions outside Hong Kong, the legislation should provide for an opt-in procedure for foreign plaintiffs and give a discretion to the court upon application to allow the entire class of foreign plaintiffs or defined sub-classes to opt out, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case (Recommendation 5(1)). The court will fix a date before which a foreign class member may opt into the class action and a foreign class member who fails to opt in by the deadline may not opt in after that date without the permission of the court. For the avoidance of doubt, the court should be given explicit power to stay class action proceedings commenced by foreign plaintiffs in Hong Kong in reliance on the common law rule of forum non conveniens (see Recommendation 5(3)).

9.24 Where defendants are from jurisdictions outside Hong Kong, we recommend (at Recommendation 5(2)) that the current rules on service of proceedings outside Hong Kong as set out in order 11 of the RHC should be amended to accommodate an application for service outside the jurisdiction without the need to show that each claim of the members in a class action falls within the ambit of order 11 rule 1(1) of the RHC. As long as the representative plaintiff can make out a case for a grant of leave, an order for service outside the jurisdiction could be granted.

9.25 We propose that information on class action proceedings commenced in Hong Kong should be publicised on a website (Recommendation 5(4)). Consideration will have to be given to whether rules of court or practice directions should be enacted requiring the plaintiff's
counsel to send the relevant class action information to the responsible body for posting on the website.

**Legal aid in possible class action proceedings**

9.26 In Chapter 8, we have set out the arguments for and against changes to the individual-based legal aid scheme. If the granting of legal aid to the representative plaintiff in class action proceedings is to be accommodated, it is clear that amendments will have to be made to the current statutory framework of the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap 91). In particular, we recommend that the extension of the ordinary and supplementary legal aid schemes to class action proceedings should be made subject to the Director of Legal Aid's residual discretion to refuse legal aid to prevent class members who are outside the financial eligibility limits for legal aid from benefiting (Recommendation 7(2)).

9.27 We also recommend that if the Legal Aid Ordinance is to be amended to accommodate legal aid for class actions, mechanisms should be devised to ensure that those who are not legally aided should share equitably in the costs (Recommendation 6). The Scottish Law Commission has asked the Scottish legal aid authority to consider whether a scheme along the lines of the Multi-Party Action Arrangements (the Arrangements) of the English Legal Services Commission should be introduced in Scotland.¹⁹ The Scottish Law Commission pointed out that the Arrangements provide for the apportionment (subject to any cost-sharing order made by the court) of costs among all claimants in the group (whether or not legally aided). The Arrangements set out the general principle that generic costs which arise from generic work attributable to a particular group of clients will be divided equally among the members of that group. All other costs will be placed on the account of the individual client concerned.²⁰ Consideration may be given to whether a scheme on the lines of the Arrangements should be introduced in Hong Kong.

**Funding options for class actions**

9.28 We have discussed and recommended a package of viable options for funding class actions in Hong Kong in Chapter 8. There is a need to put the funding mechanism on a sound legal basis and legislation will therefore be needed to implement whichever proposals are accepted by the community.

9.29 We are of the view that so long as the appropriate financial requirements for adequacy of representation are satisfied, there may be scope for prospective claimants to seek private funding by way of contingency fee arrangements. We have not recommended that conditional fee

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arrangements be allowed in class actions but we agree with the suggestion of
the Civil Justice Council that further research should be conducted to ascertain
whether contingency fees can improve access to justice in the resolution of
civil disputes in Hong Kong generally, and specifically in class actions
(Recommendation 7(1)).

9.30 If our recommendation for the establishment of a public class
action fund (CAF) is accepted (Recommendation 7(2)), then enabling
legislation will be needed to provide for its financing, the extent to which the
CAF should be entitled to reimbursement from assisted parties and whether
there will be a limit on the fund’s liability any adverse costs orders made
against the assisted parties (eg at the level at which financial assistance had
been provided to the parties assisted by the CAF).

9.31 If the recommendation for the involvement of private litigation
funding companies (LFCs) is accepted (Recommendation 7(4)), then the
common law rule against maintenance and champerty in Hong Kong will have
to be modified. Consideration will have to be given to legislation dealing with
the recognition and regulation of LFCs, as well as clarifying what activities are
permitted in relation to commercial third party funding of class action litigation.
Possible means of control and regulation of LFCs include the listing of relevant
criteria for the court to consider when adjudicating on whether a funding
arrangement is illegal and statutory requirements as to funding, disclosure and
financial status. In parallel, consideration will have to be given to what
measures may be necessary to ensure the independence of lawyers from
LFCs, in addition to the common law and professional duties already owed by
lawyers to their clients.

9.32 In the light of the complexity and difficulty of introducing a
comprehensive funding mechanism for class actions in Hong Kong, we
propose that a better alternative in the short term would be to look at specific
sectors where there are already funding mechanisms in place, with the aim of
applying the new class action regime to one or more of these sectors first to
test out its operation. We have suggested that consideration should be given
to expanding the scope of the Consumer Legal Action Fund (the Fund) to
provide legal assistance in class action proceedings (Recommendation 7(3)).
On the basis of the present framework of a trust fund providing financial
support and legal assistance, assisted persons are required to make a
contribution if they have benefited as a result of the Fund’s assistance.
However, if the liability of the Fund for any adverse costs order made against
the assisted parties is to be capped, or appropriate mechanisms are to be
introduced to ensure that members of the class action who are not assisted by
the Fund should share equitably in the costs of the proceedings, then
legislation would be required.
Case management powers

9.33 We believe that the procedure adopted for class actions should reflect the experience gained from the implementation of the Civil Justice Reform (CJR) report's proposals for express case management powers. Provisions have been added to the Rules of the High Court which make clear that the primary aim is to achieve a just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties. Depending on operational experience, features which facilitate active case management (such as case management conferences and alternative dispute resolution procedures) may be useful and can be incorporated into the class action procedural rules.

Jurisdiction to hear class action cases

9.34 Consideration must be given to which courts should be authorised to hear class actions. We regard it as advisable to defer the extension of the jurisdiction of the lower courts to hear class actions until such time as the procedure has been in operation in the Court of First Instance for five years or more and a body of case law has been established. The judge plays a significant role in ensuring that class action cases are efficiently and appropriately handled. Suitable fine tuning of the procedural rules can be incorporated in light of experience.

9.35 Initially, all class action cases should be assigned to a specialist list where experienced judges will handle the interlocutory applications (including certification), trial and approval of settlement. In due course, consideration could be given to extending the jurisdiction to hear class actions to the District Court. There may well be class actions where even the aggregate of the claims of the class members would fall within the limits of jurisdiction of the District Court. In view of the complexities of some class actions, District Court judges should be given the power to transfer appropriate cases to the Court of First Instance.

9.36 The function of the Small Claims Tribunal is to enable individuals to enforce small claims by way of an uncomplicated procedure. For this reason, it is suggested that the Tribunal should not be empowered to hear class actions.

See the discussion on the implementation of the CJR recommendations under the heading "General management powers of the courts" in Chapter 5 above.

22 The Ontario Commission: Report on Class Actions at para 455 was of this opinion.
Recommendation 8

(1) We recommend that the provisions for introducing a new court procedure for class actions should be made by primary legislation in Hong Kong, thus enabling those elements of reform which may affect substantive law to be debated fully and implemented in a way that would preclude ultra vires challenges. The detailed design of the legislative provisions to be adopted in class action litigation should be further studied if there is public endorsement for the introduction of a class action regime in this consultation exercise.

(2) We recommend that to implement our recommendation for appropriate procedures to filter out cases that are clearly not viable, class action proceedings should not be allowed to continue as collective proceedings unless certified by a court in accordance with rules set out in the Rules of the High Court.

(3) We recommend that the existing rule for representative actions under Order 15 rule 12 of the Rules of the High Court should be replaced by a generic collective action procedure to be set out in a self-contained Order of the Rules of the High Court.

(4) Depending on the operational experience gained from the implementation of the recommendations in the report of the Chief Justice’s Working Party on Civil Justice Reform, we propose that features which facilitate active case management should be incorporated into the class action procedural rules.

(5) We propose that the extension of the District Court jurisdiction to hear class actions should be deferred for a period of at least five years until a body of case law of the Court of First Instance on the new procedures has been established.

(6) We recommend that District Court judges should be given the power to transfer appropriate class action cases (on the ground of complexity) to the Court of First Instance.

(7) We recommend that the Small Claims Tribunal should not be empowered to hear class action proceedings.
Chapter 10

Summary of recommendations and invitation to comment

Introduction

10.1 The Class Actions Sub-committee of the Law Reform Commission has been asked to consider whether a scheme for multi-party litigation should be adopted in Hong Kong. This consultation paper sets out the sub-committee’s views and makes a number of recommendations. The sub-committee would like to hear the public’s views on its proposals.

10.2 The consultation paper is lengthy and raises complex issues. To try to simplify the consultation process for readers, we have set out below a series of specific questions to which we would particularly welcome a response. We would also, of course, welcome views on any other aspects of the paper which you wish to make.

10.3 In case you do not have sufficient time, or you do not wish to respond to all the questions, we have marked the most important questions in bold.

Questions

10.4 Chapter 1 of the paper sets out the current procedure in Hong Kong for representative actions and concludes that there is a substantial degree of uncertainty in using the current representative action procedure. Recommendation 1 (following paragraph 1.35) states our belief that there is a good case for the introduction of a comprehensive regime for multi-party litigation so as to enable efficient, well-defined and workable access to justice.

Question 1: Do you agree that a comprehensive scheme for multi-party litigation should be introduced in Hong Kong?

10.5 Chapter 3 examines in more detail the need for a class action regime in Hong Kong. Recommendation 2 (following paragraph 3.60) states that we consider that the principles of equal access to justice, that is founded on the concepts of fairness, expedition and cost effectiveness, should guide any change to the present system for mass litigation. Thus guided, we are satisfied that, a good case has been made out for consideration to be given to
the establishment of a general procedural framework for class actions in Hong Kong courts, bearing in mind the need for caution that litigation should not thereby be unduly promoted. We believe that in any system for class actions it is crucial that there are appropriate procedures for filtering out cases that are clearly not viable and that appropriate rules should be in place to assure fairness, expedition and cost effectiveness. In addition, Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques such as mediation and arbitration, on both an interim and final basis, should be fully utilised.

**Question 2:** Do you agree with the sub-committee that fairness, expedition and cost effectiveness should guide any change in procedure for multi-party litigation?

10.6 **Chapter 4** examines the choice between an opt-in and an opt-out approach in determining the members of the class. Recommendation 3 (following paragraph 4.17) proposes that, subject to discretionary powers vested in the court to order otherwise in the interests of justice and the proper administration of justice, the new class action regime should adopt an opt-out approach. In other words, once the court certifies a case suitable for a class action, the members of the class, as defined in the order of court, would be automatically considered to be bound by the litigation, unless within the time limits and in the manner prescribed by the court order a member opts out.

**Question 3:** Do you agree that the proposed class action regime should adopt an "opt-out" approach (in other words, all the members of the class are automatically bound by the litigation, unless they specifically opt out)?

10.7 **Chapter 5** considers four alternative approaches for the treatment of public law cases in a class action regime:

1. Public law cases should be excluded from the general class action regime and a separate system for multi-party public law proceedings should be set up, leaving the class action regime for private law cases only.

2. The court should be given the discretion in a public law case to adopt either the opt-in or opt-out procedure, with no presumption in favour of the opt-out procedure (as is proposed in our Recommendations 1 to 3);

3. Public law cases should follow the same opt-out model that we are recommending for general application (Recommendations 1 to 3), with additional certification criteria to be put in place to filter out public law cases that are not suitable for class action proceedings; and

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(4) Public law cases should adopt an opt-in model, so that only those persons who have expressly consented to be bound by a decision in a class action will be treated as parties to that judgment.

**Question 4:** Which of these four options do you think should be adopted in Hong Kong for dealing with public law cases under the proposed class action regime?

10.8 Chapter 6 addresses the issue of abuse of the process of the court by class members in deliberately selecting impecunious plaintiffs to act as the class representatives. Recommendation 4 (following paragraph 6.48) proposes that:

(1) Appropriate requirements for adequacy of representation should be stipulated to prevent class members with sound financial capability from deliberately selecting impecunious plaintiffs to act as the class representatives, and thereby abusing the court process.

(2) At the same time, truly impecunious litigants should have access to funding.

(3) To avoid abuse of the process of the court and to ensure that those put at risk of litigation should not suffer unfairly, we recommend that in appropriate cases, the representative plaintiffs should be ordered by the court to pay security for costs in accordance with the established principles for making such orders and by way of a provision similar to section 33ZG of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 to empower the court to order security for costs in appropriate cases.

**Question 5:** Do you agree that appropriate measures should be established to prevent class members with sound financial capability from abusing the class action procedure by deliberately selecting impecunious plaintiffs to act as the class representatives?

**Question 6:** If so, do you agree that:

(a) provision should be made for truly impecunious litigants to obtain funding under the new class actions regime; and

(b) the court should be given the power to order the representative plaintiffs to pay security for costs in specified circumstances?
Chapter 7 considers the problems associated with class actions involving parties from other jurisdictions. Recommendation 5 (following paragraph 7.50) proposes that:

(1) Where class action proceedings involve parties from a jurisdiction or jurisdictions outside Hong Kong, an opt-in procedure should be adopted as the default position, but that this default rule should be accompanied by a discretion vested in the court to adopt an opt-out procedure for the entire class of foreign plaintiffs or for defined sub-classes, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case upon application.

(2) Where defendants are from a jurisdiction or jurisdictions outside Hong Kong, the current rules on service of proceedings outside Hong Kong as set out in Order 11 of the Rules of the High Court (with minor adaptation) should be applicable.

(3) In appropriate circumstances, the court should be able to stay class action proceedings involving plaintiffs from other jurisdictions in reliance on the common law rule of forum non conveniens, if it is clearly inappropriate to exercise jurisdiction and if a court elsewhere has jurisdiction which is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute.

(4) To assist potential foreign parties to consider whether to join in class action proceedings commenced in Hong Kong, information on those proceedings should be publicised on a website.

Question 7: If class action proceedings involve parties from jurisdictions outside Hong Kong, do you agree that:

(a) the default position should be an “opt-in” procedure (in other words, class members will not be bound by the litigation unless they specifically opt into it), with the court able to apply an “opt-out” procedure to foreign plaintiffs in a particular case where an application is made for this approach to be adopted;

(b) the current rules for service of proceedings outside Hong Kong set out in Order 11 of the Rules of the High Court (with minor adaptation) should apply; and

(c) the court should be able to stay the class action proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens if it would be inappropriate for the court to exercise jurisdiction and if a court elsewhere has more appropriate jurisdiction to resolve the dispute?
Chapter 8 considers different funding models for the proposed class action regime. A key component is legal aid. Recommendation 6 (following paragraphs 8.53-8.54) proposes that in class action proceedings involving legally aided plaintiffs:

(1) A legally aided person should not lose his legal aid funding by agreeing to act as representative plaintiff in a class action, but he should only be funded or protected to the same extent as he would be if he were pursuing a personal, as opposed to a class, action;

(2) If a legally aided person becomes a representative plaintiff in a class action, that part of the total common fund costs which would be attributable to the aided person if he were pursuing the action on a personal basis should be disaggregated.

If the Legal Aid Ordinance is amended to accommodate legal aid for class actions, mechanisms should be devised to ensure that those who are not legally aided should share equitably in the costs.

Question 8: Do you agree that:

(a) A legally aided person who agrees to act as representative plaintiff in a class action should only be funded or protected to the extent allowed by the Legal Aid Ordinance;

(b) If a representative plaintiff in a class action is a legally aided person, the part of the total common fund costs which would have been attributable to the aided person if he had pursued the action on a personal basis should be disaggregated; and

(c) If the Legal Aid Ordinance is amended to accommodate legal aid for class actions, those who are not legally aided should share equitably in the costs?

Recommendation 7 (following paragraph 8.158) states

(1) It is generally accepted that if a suitable funding model for plaintiffs of limited means could not be found, little could be achieved by a class action regime. In view of the general rule in Hong Kong that the costs of litigation would follow the event (in other words, the loser pays the costs of the litigation, subject to the discretion of the court to be exercised in accordance with the facts of the case), we have considered the alternatives of transferring the financial burden of group litigation to the following groups: defendants, the class members and the
lawyers representing the class. With the exception of conditional fee arrangements (which warrant further study in the light of the security for costs mechanism that we have proposed for class action proceedings in Recommendation 4(3)), we do not find any of these to be viable or practical in the light of overseas experience and local conditions.

(2) We therefore suggest that, in the light of the conditions in Hong Kong, the extension of the ordinary legal aid and supplementary legal aid schemes to class action proceedings might be more suitable. The extension should be made subject to the Director of Legal Aid's residual discretion to refuse legal aid to prevent class members who are outside the financial eligibility limits for legal aid from benefiting. Our general intention is that a step by step approach should be taken, leading to the establishment of a general class actions fund (ie a special public fund which can make discretionary grants to all eligible class action plaintiffs and which in return the representative plaintiffs must reimburse from proceeds recovered from the defendants) in the long term.

(3) Given the complexity and the difficulties of introducing a comprehensive funding mechanism in Hong Kong, we propose that, in the short term, a better alternative would be to look at specific sectors where there are already funding mechanisms in place, with the aim of applying the new class action regime to one or more of these sectors first to test out its operation. We have considered the possibility of setting up a securities–related litigation fund based on the proposed model of the Hong Kong Association of Minority Shareholders but have come to the view that it would not be likely to provide a solution in the short term. We have discussed the possibility of the extension of the Consumer Legal Action Fund (the Fund) to class action litigation in consumer claims. On the basis of the present framework of a trust fund providing financial support and legal assistance for aggrieved consumers to obtain legal remedies, we propose that the Fund’s resources should be increased to enhance the availability of funding to class action proceedings in consumer claims. If the scope of the Fund were to be expanded to cover class actions, it would be important to devise mechanisms to ensure that members of the class action who are not assisted by the Fund should share equitably in the costs of the proceedings. We have not yet reached any firm conclusion on the preferred option and would welcome the community's views on this.

(4) We have considered the option of involving private litigation funding companies (LFCs) (ie commercial entities that contract with the potential litigants. The LFCs pay the costs of the litigation and accept the risk of paying the other party's costs if the case fails. In return the LFCs are paid a share of the proceeds recovered from successful cases). This is likely to be
a controversial issue on which we have not yet reached a final conclusion and we would welcome the community’s views. If LFCs were to be allowed in Hong Kong, legislation would be necessary to recognise and regulate LFCs, as well as to clarify what activities are approved in commercial third party funding of litigation.

**Question 9:** Do you agree that the ordinary legal aid and supplementary legal aid schemes should be extended to class action proceedings, with the Director of Legal Aid allowed to refuse legal aid to prevent class members who are outside the financial eligibility limits for legal aid from benefiting?

**Question 10:** Do you agree that the eventual aim should be the establishment of a class actions fund? This would make discretionary grants to all eligible class action plaintiffs and the representative plaintiffs would have to reimburse the class actions fund from proceeds recovered from the defendants.

**Question 11:** Do you agree that the scope of legal and financial assistance of the Consumer Legal Action Fund should be extended to class action litigation in consumer claims?

**Question 12:** Should the funding of class actions by private litigation funding companies be recognised and regulated?

10.12 Chapter 9 sets out some more detailed procedural proposals for the new scheme. Recommendation 8 (following paragraph 9.36) proposes that:

(1) The provisions for introducing a new court procedure for class actions in Hong Kong should be made by primary legislation, thus enabling those elements of reform which may affect substantive law to be debated fully and implemented in a way that would preclude *ultra vires* challenges. The detailed design of the legislative provisions to be adopted in class action litigation should be further studied if there is public endorsement for the introduction of a class action regime in this consultation exercise.

(2) To implement our recommendation for appropriate procedures to filter out cases that are clearly not viable, class action proceedings should not be allowed to continue as collective proceedings unless certified by a court in accordance with rules set out in the Rules of the High Court.
(3) The existing rule for representative actions under Order 15 rule 12 of the Rules of the High Court should be replaced by a generic collective action procedure to be set out in a self-contained Order of the Rules of the High Court.

(4) Depending on the operational experience gained from the implementation of the recommendations in the report of the Chief Justice’s Working Party on Civil Justice Reform, features which facilitate active case management should be incorporated into the class action procedural rules.

(5) The extension of the District Court jurisdiction to hear class actions should be deferred for a period of at least five years until a body of case law of the Court of First Instance on the new procedures has been established.

(6) District Court judges should be given the power to transfer appropriate class action cases (on the ground of complexity) to the Court of First Instance.

(7) The Small Claims Tribunal should not be empowered to hear class action proceedings.

| Question 13: | Do you agree that, if a class actions regime is introduced in Hong Kong, it should be established by legislation? |
| Question 14: | Do you agree that class actions should only be allowed to proceed if they have been certified by the court as complying with rules to be set out in the Rules of the High Court? |
| Question 15: | Should the existing rule for representative actions under Order 15 rule 12 of the Rules of the High Court be replaced by a new collective action procedure to be set out in the Rules of the High Court? |
| Question 16: | Do you agree that provisions to facilitate active case management by the court should be incorporated into the class action procedural rules? |
| Question 17: | Do you agree that class actions should not be heard in the District Court for at least five years after the new regime has been introduced? |
| Question 18: | Should District Court judges be given the power to transfer complex class actions to the Court of First Instance? |
| Question 19: | Do you agree that the Small Claims Tribunal should not be able to hear class action proceedings? |
Types of cases that might be suitable for class action proceedings and relevant provisions

Insurance cases (tortious or contractual claims)

Real estate development cases (such as purchasers’ claims against developers on late delivery of vacant possession or poor workmanship)

Environmental cases

Labour disputes

(a) Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund

1. To recover debts owed by an insolvent employer such as arrears of wages, wages in lieu of notice and severance payment, employees may need to present a bankruptcy or winding-up petition against their insolvent employer, usually with the assistance of the Legal Aid Department. In addition, employees may also apply under the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance (Cap 380) for \textit{ex gratia} payment from the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund (the PWI Fund), which is financed by an annual levy on business registration certificates. The Labour Department processes and verifies applications for payments from the PWI Fund.

2. An \textit{ex gratia} payment may be made out of the PWI Fund to pay:

   (1) arrears of wages
   (2) wages in lieu of notice
   (3) severance payments

3. The Commissioner for Labour may make an \textit{ex gratia} payment on condition that a winding-up petition or a bankruptcy petition (as the case may be) has been presented against the employer. The Commissioner for Labour may waive the requirements where:

   (1) an employer employs less than 20 employees;
   (2) sufficient evidence exists to support the presentation of a petition; and
   (3) it is unreasonable or uneconomic to present a petition in that case.

4. Where an \textit{ex gratia} payment has been made from the PWI Fund to an applicant, his rights and remedies in respect of items of claim declared in the application will, to the extent of that payment, be transferred and vested in the Fund Board. The subrogation right of the Fund Board will not affect the rights or remedies of the applicant in respect of other debts, including accrued
holiday pay, the balance of wages in lieu of notice, and the balance of severance payment.

(b) **Existing provisions which allow representative claims**

5. There are existing provisions which allow representative claims in the context of labour disputes. Under section 25 of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap 25), where two or more persons have claims against the same defendant, their claims may be brought in the name of one of them as the representative of some or all of them. If at any stage of the proceedings the tribunal considers that the bringing of a representative claim may prejudice the defendant, the tribunal may order that the claims of all or any of the persons represented will be inquired into separately. The tribunal may, in making an award in respect of a representative claim, allocate such part of the award to each person represented as it thinks fit.

6. The tribunal may cause public notice to be given, in such manner as it may think fit, of the particulars of a representative claim which has been filed and of the date and place which have been fixed for the hearing of the claim. The tribunal may, at any time before making an award, grant leave to any person to join as a person represented in a claim on such terms as it may think fit.

7. There are almost identical provisions in section 24 of the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance (Cap 453) and section 21 of the Small Claims Ordinance (Cap 338).

**Consumer cases** (such as product liability and consumer fraud)

**The Consumer Legal Action Fund**

8. The Consumer Legal Action Fund (the CLA Fund) is a trust fund set up to enable consumers to obtain legal redress by providing financial support and legal assistance. The Consumer Council is the trustee of the CLA Fund and is advised by a Management Committee on the eligibility and merits of cases seeking assistance under the CLA Fund.

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1 "(3) Each person represented in a representative claim shall be deemed to have authorized the representative on his behalf to -
   (a) call and give evidence and make submissions to the tribunal on any matter arising during the inquiry into the claim;
   (b) file affidavits, statements or other documents;
   (c) agree to a summary of facts prepared by a tribunal officer;
   (d) agree to an adjournment or change of venue;
   (e) agree to the holding of and to take part in conciliation;
   (f) agree to a settlement of the claim on such terms as he may think fit;
   …
   (h) amend the claim in respect of all or any of the individual claims or to abandon the claim; and
   (i) act generally in as full and free a manner as such claimant could act himself.
(4) The authority deemed to be given to a representative by subsection (3) shall not be withdrawn save by leave of the tribunal."
9. The CLA Fund aims:

(a) to assist consumers to bring or defend representative action;
(b) to assist consumers to pursue joint claims out of the same or same series of transaction with a common question of law or fact;
(c) to group consumers with similar causes of action and claims together administratively and arrange for them to be heard at the same time or consecutively;
(d) to bring action in the interest of the public; and
(e) to handle cases of significant consumer interest.

10. The scope of the CLA Fund covers matters that involve significant public interest or injustice, or relate to consumer transactions, in particular:

(i) unmerchantable goods, including food and drugs;
(ii) sharp, unscrupulous or restrictive trade practices;
(iii) unfair and unconscionable contract terms;
(iv) exemption clauses in consumer contracts;
(v) false or misleading advertising claims;
(vi) false trade descriptions;
(vii) misdescription or misrepresentation of goods, services or real property; or
(viii) any other case of significant consumer interest.

11. A consumer applicant must have already exhausted all other means of dispute resolution and not qualify for any form of legal aid. The Consumer Council, as the trustee, however, has discretion in granting or refusing assistance. There is no means test for the CLA Fund, but the Consumer Council may take into account an applicant's financial resources in deciding whether to accept or reject a particular case.

Public interest cases (such as constitutional issues, right of abode cases, etc)

Discrimination cases

12. Under rule 3 of the Sex Discrimination (Investigation and Conciliation) Rules (Cap 480B), a representative complaint alleging that another person has committed an unlawful act may be lodged by:

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2 There are identical provisions in Rule 3 of the Disability Discrimination (Investigation and Conciliation) Rules (Cap 487B) and Rule 3 of the Family Status Discrimination (Investigation and Conciliation) Rules (Cap 527A).
(a) a person aggrieved by the act, on behalf of that person and another person or other persons also aggrieved by the act;
(b) two or more persons aggrieved by the act, on behalf of themselves and another person or other persons also aggrieved by the act; or
(c) a person on behalf of another person or other persons aggrieved by the act.

13. Such a complaint can be lodged only with the consent of the class members and, where there is more than one class member, only:

(a) if the class members have complaints against the same person;
(b) if all the complaints are in respect of, or arise out of, the same, similar or related circumstances; and
(c) if all the complaints give rise to a substantial common issue of law or fact.

14. The Equal Opportunities Commission (the EOC) is required by law to first investigate the case and then try to settle the matter through conciliation. If the complaint cannot be resolved through conciliation, the complainant may apply to the EOC for legal assistance to go to court. Assistance may include the giving of legal advice, representation by the EOC’s lawyers, legal representation by outside lawyers or any other form of assistance the EOC considers appropriate.

**Securities cases**

*Misappropriation or theft of securities*

15. Since the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO) came into force, there have been a number of cases where misappropriation of client assets by officers of licensed corporations has been discovered. In some instances, clients’ securities had been wrongly pledged to the licensed corporation’s banks. In other instances, clients’ securities had been sold or transferred to third parties. The common link was that the intermediary had dealt with clients’ securities without authorisation, in breach of the Securities and Futures (Client Securities) Rules.

16. In each case, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) applied for various remedies pursuant to section 213(1) of the SFO to protect the clients’ interests. The SFC applied for the appointment of administrators to manage the affairs of the licensed corporations, to preserve the remaining client assets, to investigate the extent of the loss, to seek directions from the court as to clients’ entitlement to the remaining securities and to return the securities as expeditiously as possible. When seeking directions from the court as to the method of allocating remaining securities, it has been the administrators’ practice to group clients’ claims into different categories according to the factual circumstances.
17. Investors are entitled to seek compensation under the statutory compensation scheme set out in Part XII of the SFO and the Securities and Futures (Investor Compensation-Claims) Rules. Under the Rules, investors who have suffered loss arising from the default of a specified person (as defined in the Rules) may claim compensation from the Investor Compensation Fund. "Default" is defined as "the insolvency, bankruptcy or winding up of the specified person or an associated person of the specified person" or "any breach of trust, defalcation, fraud or misfeasance committed by the specified person or associated person of the specified person". The maximum compensation payable per claimant is currently $150,000. The claims procedure is straightforward and involves the use of standard forms and the provision of records to support the claimant's entitlement to securities. The Investor Compensation Company determines the claims. Compared to pursuing a claim through the courts, the statutory compensation scheme appears to provide an effective remedy for those clients whose loss (after taking into account any securities or cash returned by the administrator) does not exceed $150,000.

18. Investors whose loss exceeds this amount will have a claim for damages. However, in practice, proceedings are not often pursued because the potential respondents tend to be in financial difficulties and are wound up, leaving investors to prove in the liquidation for any outstanding loss.

**Insolvency of an intermediary holding securities on behalf of its clients**

19. The case of CA Pacific Securities Ltd is an example of the use of test cases in the context of securities. In the course of the liquidation of CA Pacific, the liquidators applied to the court for directions as to whether CA Pacific's clients had any proprietary interest in the securities purchased on their behalf by CA Pacific through CCASS. Due to the large number of clients involved, directions were given for the appointment of two representative respondents. One represented those clients whose recovery in the liquidation would be authorised if it were found that clients had a proprietary interest in the securities. The other represented those who would recover most if it were found that the securities formed part of CA Pacific's general assets. For the purposes of returning remaining securities, and on the particular facts of the case, the court directed that cash clients had priority over margin clients, with each class of client sharing *pari passu*. Applying the decision, the liquidators proceeded to classify clients as either "cash" or "margin", resulting in the filing of over 400 notices of objection. The liquidators were able to distil the objections into five types and sought directions. At the hearing, legal representatives appeared for a number of clients whose objections, taken together, covered the five types. The court found that "by reason of such legal representation, the time and costs of making a representative order for each category of client could be saved." The court expressed the hope that its subsequent decision, which dealt with samples of all the types of objections, would be applied to the majority of cases, thus saving the time and costs of having individual objections determined. This appears to have been what happened.
**Mis-selling, unsuitable recommendations and negligent investment advice**

20. Claims arising from negligent advice may be unsuitable for representative or class actions because the personal and financial circumstances of the client are fundamental considerations in determining liability and will vary from case to case. It is therefore not clear that potential class members would have the "same interest" in any proceedings as required for a representative action under Order 15 rule 12(1). Further, compensatory damages are to be calculated with reference to the particular loss suffered by members of the class represented and this is likely to be difficult to calculate.

21. A multi-party procedure similar to that introduced in England by the Group Litigation Orders (GLO), which provides for the case management of claims which give rise to common or related issues of fact or law, would appear to have benefits but the unreported decision of the High Court of England and Wales in March 2006 in *Allerton and others v Brewin Dolphin Securities and others* suggests there may be difficulties. In that case, Class Law Solicitors made an application on behalf of 74 of their clients for a GLO in respect of proposed negligence claims against 11 financial advisers. The applicants were investors who had entered into agreements with the respondents for the provision of financial advice or the making of financial investments on their behalf. The investors had allegedly informed their investment advisers that they had a low to medium risk tolerance but, despite this, the advisers had recommended investment in high risk investments. The applicants asserted that the adviser in each case had breached his duty when providing advice or making the investment decision and that their claims therefore arose from similar circumstances and presented substantial common issues. Chief Master Winegarten declined to grant a GLO on the basis that it was not suitable on the facts. He could not find a common issue of fact or law among the cases because each case was fact specific. Each investor received advice at a different time, each investor had his own risk profile and each investor had his own portfolio. These were all matters which a financial adviser would have had to take into account when giving advice, even if the investor had a low risk appetite. Therefore, any apparent common issues of fact depended on the particular investor characteristics and investment characteristics, which needed to be investigated in order to determine whether the advice or actions of each particular investment adviser were negligent. On the facts of this case, a GLO was considered inappropriate where the question of negligence depended on a suitability assessment that differed in every individual case. In light of the difficulties encountered with group litigation, many investors agreed to settle their claims in return for partial compensation offered, under pressure from the Financial Services Authority, by 21 product providers on an *ex gratia* basis.

22. If mis-selling cases are considered unsuitable for multi-party litigation procedures, one consequence is that regulators are likely to face increasing public pressure to negotiate compensation from those they regulate. Although the Hong Kong SFC has no power to order a regulated person to pay
compensation, the SFC may, in appropriate cases, seek to facilitate a settlement for investors.³ Towry Law (Asia) HK Limited is a case in point. The SFC brought disciplinary proceedings against Towry Law, an investment adviser licensed by the SFC, in relation to a number of funds sold by Towry Law. It was alleged, inter alia, that Towry Law had failed to carry out sufficient due diligence into the funds and sold them to investors whose investment objectives and risk tolerance did not always match the risk profile of the funds. The funds were subsequently suspended and went into liquidation. Over 1000 investors were affected. The SFC’s disciplinary proceedings were concluded on terms that included an ex gratia compensation scheme for investors who were willing to settle their claims.

Civil liability under the SFO

23. The SFO created a number of statutory causes of action which in theory could give rise to many individual claims connected with a single company.

24. Section 108 of the SFO creates a statutory cause of action against a person who, through any fraudulent, reckless or negligent misrepresentation (as defined in that section), induces another person to acquire, dispose of, subscribe for or underwrite securities or to enter into a regulated investment agreement or to acquire an interest in or participate in a collective investment scheme. Regardless of whether he incurs any other liability, the maker of the misrepresentation is liable to pay compensation by way of damages for any pecuniary loss suffered by the other person as a result of reliance on the misrepresentation.

25. Section 281 of the SFO provides that a person who has committed a relevant act in relation to market misconduct (as defined in that section) shall be liable to pay compensation by way of damages to any other person for any pecuniary loss sustained by the other person as a result of the market misconduct. In such proceedings, determinations by the Market Misconduct Tribunal that market misconduct has taken place and that certain persons have engaged in market misconduct are admissible in evidence and, if admitted, create a presumption. Market misconduct includes insider dealing, false trading, price rigging, stock market manipulation and disclosing false or misleading information inducing transactions.

26. Section 305 of the SFO provides for civil liability where there has been contravention of any of the provisions of Divisions 2 to 4 of Part XIV of the SFO (these provisions establish offences in relation to insider dealing, false trading, price rigging, stock market manipulation and disclosing false or misleading information inducing transactions). The claimant must have suffered pecuniary loss as a result of the contravention.

³ For example, the negotiations on the Lehman Brothers minibonds in 2009.
27. Section 391 of the SFO provides for civil liability for false or misleading public communications concerning securities and futures contracts. A person who issues or makes a false or misleading communication to the public concerning securities or futures contracts or which may affect their price knowing, or being reckless or negligent as to whether the communication is false or misleading in a material particular, is liable to pay compensation by way of damages to any person for any pecuniary loss sustained by that other person as a result of relying on that communication.

28. Although it may be possible to satisfy the numerosity test under Order 15 rule 12(1) for the purposes of a representative action, it is less clear that the affected investors would have the “same interest” in any proceedings commenced under these provisions of the SFO. Where issues such as reliance, inducement and causation fall to be determined individually, representative proceedings are unlikely to be appropriate. There are also likely to be difficulties in calculating compensatory damages which are to be assessed with reference to the particular loss suffered by members of the class represented.

Other types of cases

(1) Antitrust/competition cases;
(2) Insolvency cases (eg multi-creditor litigation);
(3) Professional negligence cases (eg audit negligence, negligence in relation to construction work (such as sub-standard buildings));
(4) Copyright infringement cases (eg claims by record companies against Napster for copyright infringement);
(5) Usage of the internet (eg claims against internet service providers for mishandling personal data);
(6) Defamation claims (eg defamation against a religious group or an organisation);
(7) Personal injury cases (eg food poisoning cases, infection of hepatitis due to the consumption of contaminated seafood);
(8) Claims against service providers for inadequate or substandard services (eg claims against healthcare providers for improper practices); and
(9) Claims against computer companies for hardware or software failures.
Annex 2

Class actions and litigants in person

1. Professor Elsa Kelly of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (and a member of the Class Actions Sub-committee) has reviewed relevant parts of the data gathered for the Litigants in Person project which she undertook. The purpose was to see whether any of the respondents might have engaged in class action proceedings had they been available.

2. Eighty-two courtroom observations and 81 exit interviews were carried out. The single biggest category of case in which litigants in person were involved was the appeal process, including appeals from decisions of tribunals, of masters and of the Court of First Instance. The categories are set out in the following two tables.

3. Professor Kelly found little evidence to suggest that the litigants in person observed or interviewed would have engaged in class action proceedings had that option been available. However, this data was gathered using an indicative sampling method only and the issue of class actions was not an aim of the project. To obtain a fuller and more accurate picture of whether litigants in person would engage in class actions would require specific empirical research.
Litigants in Person
Nature of case - Courtroom Observations (82 respondents)
Litigants in Person
Nature of case - Exit interviews (81 respondents)
Potential risks of a class action regime

Various overseas law reform agencies and academics have discussed the potential risks of introducing a class action regime. This table lists those risks and the related arguments.

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| Promotes litigation       | "Some persons who would not choose to sue in the absence of class action legislation will join class actions solely because they happen to be members of a defined class. This is most likely to occur where the claims are small because joining the class action costs little or nothing. In this way, class actions promote litigation unnecessarily. They simply become a means of harassing corporations, government and other defendants."  
                           | "The alternative to accepting the risk of additional litigation is to fail to compensate persons with legitimate claims. We recognize that it can be uneconomical to pursue relatively modest claims whether or not multiple claims are involved. We are not saying that no consideration should be given to the social cost of litigation when designing the litigation system; we are saying that the law should foster just results. Modern class actions do this by making it possible for persons to gain access to justice where they would not otherwise sue because pursuing justice would be uneconomical or because the court system intimidates them. Moreover, although the individual claims may be small, when multiplied by a large number of persons small claims can add up to a large gain for a potential defendant if they are not pursued. Permitting enrichment from wrongdoing is unjust and should be discouraged." |

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<td>&quot;a litigious climate and the targeting of 'deep-pocket' defendants&quot;³</td>
<td>&quot;A facet of this risk involves the assumption that claims that lack merit are easily identified. In the United States, the Rand Institute found, instead, that the merit of claims, in particular class actions, cannot be readily determined. That is because complex stories and ambiguous facts underlie most class actions.</td>
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<td>&quot;encourage litigation which ought to be a last resort&quot;⁴</td>
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<td>Unmeritorious claims</td>
<td>&quot;This risk stems from the belief that class actions 'magnify and strengthen unmeritorious claims.' This happens when class actions are launched as fishing expeditions in order to ascertain whether a cause of action exists. It also happens when a 'strike action' is brought.&quot;⁵</td>
<td>Defendants may 'sharply contest' their culpability, but because the issues tend to be complex and very few cases go to trial, the merits of the claims being made cannot be properly assessed. While a 'significant fraction' of class action cases are dropped before certification in the US, empirical data on the reasons why are lacking. It may occur 'when the plaintiff counsel concludes that the case cannot be certified or settled for money, when the case is dismissed by the court, or when the claims of representative plaintiffs are settled.' Moreover, protection against this risk rests in the fact that courts have ways of weeding out claims that lack merit. For example, the court may</td>
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|      | "The opponents of class actions assert that the abuses of the procedure in the United States are sufficient reason not to introduce them into Australian courts. They point to amorphous classes where one person or a small group have brought legal proceedings purporting to make claims on behalf of:  
  • 'all consumers of gasoline' in a given state';  
  • 'all consumers of eggs in the United States'; and even  
  • 'all persons in the United States'.  
They fear enormous awards of damages which will have disastrous effects on Australian industry. They allege that large classes of unidentified members each with a small claim result in 'strike suits', that is, frivolous claims which utilise the threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel defendants to settle because of the risks inherent in any litigation and the enormous costs of defending a class action. They say that a defendant faced with a class action is, therefore, forced to settle even if the plaintiff's claim is weak." | "Yet, as the examples above demonstrate, class actions for large amorphous classes are often not permitted to proceed. These arguments perhaps underestimate procedural safeguards already available to defendants in the United States. One study has noted that of 120 cases for damages over a six-year period, 81 had reached some kind of disposition at the trial level. Forty-four of the 81 cases were dismissed on preliminary motions. The same study referred to interviews with defendants' attorneys which disclosed that no more than a handful would label their opponents' cases as frivolous. The high proportion of dismissed claims tends to indicate that the class action is not a very effective tool for forcing an unjustified settlement." |

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<td>&quot;... may be abused by the raising of large claims of no substance ('blackmail litigation'). A class litigation may be unmanageable, particularly where damages, rather than a declarator or an interdict, are sought.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;In our view, it would be inappropriate to reject an expanded class action procedure that can play a legitimate role in asserting the rights of persons with real grievances, simply because some individuals might abuse that procedure. A far more appropriate solution to the problem of unmeritorious class actions, or class actions brought solely to further the personal financial interest of the representative plaintiff, is to develop procedures to preclude the prosecution of such actions.&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;Entrepreneurial&quot; lawyers</td>
<td>&quot;Legal entrepreneurialism, whereby issues are sensationalised to encourage litigation and lawyers act for their own enrichment to initiate claims that would otherwise not be made, is becoming more common. Claims may be filed without due enquiry into the merits of the application. There are no clear rules regarding pre-trial use of the media by plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers. Financial and reputational pressure can induce substantial out-of-court settlements regardless of the merits of the case.&quot;</td>
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<td>Group cited in Phillips C, “Class Actions - Quo Vadis?” (Paper given at 1998 Corporate Law Conference, Melbourne, 24 September 1998) at [2.2].&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>“This risk is that class actions will benefit persons whom they are not intended to benefit at the expense of the class members; that, motivated by the prospect of their own gain, entrepreneurial lawyers drive the frequency and variety of class actions litigation upwards. The risk, in other words, is that class actions will become simply vehicles for entrepreneurial lawyers to obtain fees. Plaintiff lawyers may launch an action in the hope of obtaining huge fees for relatively little work by reaching a quick settlement. Even though they may have a good defence, defendants may make a business decision to settle rather than defend because of the enormous costs involved in defending a large class action. They choose, in effect, to pay the litigants to go away. The risk of abuse is greatest where contingency fees are high and the risks low. The potential for gain causes class counsel to jockey for control of the litigation as lead counsel. Where government is targeted in this way the settlement amount comes out of tax payers' pockets, an outcome which does not benefit society.”&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>“Overall, the Rand Institute studies 'tell a more textured tale' of how damage class actions arise and certification is obtained in the US. They point out that class action lawyers played 'myriad roles'; they did not 'routinely garner the lion's share of settlements.' What was learned was that class counsel were sometimes more interested in reaching a settlement than in protecting the interests of class members by 'finding out what class members had lost, what defendants had gained, and how likely it was that defendants would actually be held liable if the suit were to go to trial, and negotiating a fair settlement based on the answers to these questions.' However, the facts did bear this much out: in the US, entrepreneurial plaintiff counsel do sometimes bring actions in the hope of obtaining a windfall fee based on a quick settlement. In our view, people should not be denied justice because lawyers will be paid for helping them to obtain it. Class counsel play a role that is quite different from the role of counsel in ordinary litigation and they should be remunerated appropriately for assuming and carrying out the additional risks and responsibilities associated with this role. In these circumstances, a large fee is not</td>
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<td>necessarily an excessive fee. Moreover, Canadian class action regimes add a safeguard to that available in ordinary litigation by requiring court scrutiny and approval of fee agreements in every case. In fact, more room for abuse exists where one lawyer acts for numerous individual litigants in mass non-class actions that may be brought under the existing law than in class action regimes that require court scrutiny and approval of fees. In addition, we think that if lawyers' earnings from litigation are to be reined in, the whole problem should be addressed, not just the problem in class actions.&quot;¹³</td>
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<td>&quot;may have adverse effects upon the courts and the legal profession if 'lawyer entrepreneurs' are allowed to take charge of class litigation&quot;¹⁴</td>
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<td>&quot;Some judges have expressed reservations about the legal entrepreneurialism associated with class actions. For example, Callinan J of the High Court of Australia has said:</td>
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<td>'T]he problems to which I have just referred are likely to be aggravated by the increasingly competitive entrepreneurial activities of lawyers undertaking the conduct of class or group actions, in which, in a practical sense, the lawyers are often as much the litigants as</td>
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<td>the plaintiffs themselves, and with the same or even a greater stake in the outcome than any member of a group. This reality is likely to be productive of a multiplicity of group actions throughout the country.‘ Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v The state of Victoria (2002) 211 CLR 1 at 183.15</td>
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<td>&quot;As to the first aspect of this risk, in our view, to limit access to justice on the grounds that it will impose costs on wrongdoers is not the appropriate social policy. The measure of the wrong is the loss caused by the wrongful conduct. We do not see a compelling difference between a 'minor slip up' that causes a big company to suffer a $100 million loss and a minor slip up that causes 100,000 people each to suffer a $1,000 loss (totalling $100 million). A moment's careless driving or a short-term failure to warn people about contaminated water in order to provide an opportunity to try to fix it may be expensive to the wrongdoer but no one says there should not be a remedy. The fact that a great many people are harmed should not make a difference to their right to obtain a remedy. We also suspect that the size of the damages awards in class actions in the United States may have something to do with punitive damages awarded by juries. Neither punitive damages nor jury awards are common features of</td>
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| Disproportionately high damages awards                               | "There are two aspects to this risk. The first aspect is that damages awards will be disproportionate to the wrong. For example, a class action brought for a small mistake, say the manufacture of a defective product resulting in individual claims for $10, could bankrupt a company if two million products were sold. One perception coming out of the US is that 'the aggregation of claims makes it more likely that a defendant will be found liable and result in a significantly higher damages award.' The prospect of a disproportionately high award may 'create a stronger than usual incentive to settle, even where the probability of an adverse judgment is low.' The second aspect of this risk is that defendants who are only remotely connected to the litigation will become liable for payment of the damages award which is already disproportionate. This will occur through the operation of the doctrine of joint and several liability which leads plaintiffs to sue 'deep pocket' defendants."16 |                                                                                                                                                                                                           | 15 Damian Grave and Ken Adams, Class Actions in Australia (Lawbook Co, 2005), at para 1.210.  
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<td>civil justice systems in Canada. As to the second aspect of this risk, the impact of the doctrine of joint and several liability is an issue that should be addressed separately. The procedure followed to gain legal remedies to legal rights is not the proper means through which to alter the legal right.&quot;</td>
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<td>Interests of class members poorly served</td>
<td>&quot;This concern is that class actions do not adequately protect the interests of class members, which in turn means that they do not adequately serve the public interest. The risk stems from the fact that class members typically play a small role in the litigation. If the representative plaintiff is not actively instructing the class counsel, this 'clientless' litigation may lead plaintiff lawyers to engage in questionable practices, such as serving their own financial ends rather than the interest of class members. Beyond this, some plaintiff lawyers object that certification denies people an opportunity to pursue claims individually and leads to settlements that are questionably fair to class members. Settlements may be reached when plaintiff lawyers are 'motivated by the prospect of substantial fees for relatively little effort' and defendants want to 'settle early and inexpensively' in order to avoid the large transaction costs and adverse publicity of continued litigation. Such settlements 'may send inappropriate deterrence</td>
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<td>&quot;We agree that precautions need to be taken to ensure that the class actions provisions adequately protect the interests of class members and, through them, the public. We have kept our awareness of this need at the forefront in making our recommendations. The range of protections we recommend includes: a protective role for the court; notification to class members of critical events in the proceedings; attention to class counsel duties to class members; opportunities for class member participation; the possibility of replacing an ineffective representative plaintiff; and compensation as either a percentage of an aggregate award or on the basis of individual factors.&quot;</td>
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| Risk signals, waste resources, and encourage future frivolous litigation.' Also, a proposed settlement may satisfy the interests of the representative plaintiff but pay insufficient attention to the interests of class members. A further risk is that the compensation awarded will be uneven and, as a consequence, unfair. That is because, in the interests of minimizing transaction costs, compensation is often determined according to a formulaic scheme which may pay insufficient regard to variations in the nature and severity of class members' injuries. The result may be that some individual class members are overcompensated while others are under-compensated."  

"A further by-product of class actions is that, apart from the representative party, the role of the individual claimants and the degree of control they exercise is necessarily diminished. The individual claimants cannot prosecute their claims with the same degree of control as they would if conducting individual or unitary litigation."  

"So much was recognised by Lord Woolf, who in 1996 commented: ‘[T]he effective and economic handling of group actions necessarily requires a diminution, compromise or adjustment of the rights of individual litigants for the greater good of the action as a whole'. Lord Woolf, *Access to Justice Inquiry*, Issue Paper (Multi-Party Actions, 1996) at [2] and [2(a)]."

"loss of autonomy and individual representation for class members"  

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<td>Costs outweigh benefits</td>
<td>&quot;The argument here is that 'damage class actions achieve little in the way of benefits for class members and society while imposing significant costs on defendants, courts and society.' An assumption underlying this risk is that the benefits to individual class members are often trivial. A second aspect has to do with the fact that the costs of litigating class actions can be substantial. They include not only fees and expenses for the plaintiff and defence lawyers but also the costs of notice and settlement administration. When this is combined with defendants' increased exposure to damages, some argue that, looked at from a business stance, 'certification gives them no recourse but to settle.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Experience in the US does not bear out the first assumption. In the lawsuits the Rand Institute examined, class members' estimated losses ranged widely. They were generally too modest to support individual action, but nevertheless often numbered in the hundreds or thousands of dollars. As for the second aspect, while it may be true that the costs of litigating class actions can be substantial, surely the question of whether the costs outweigh the benefits to the class is best answered by potential class members when they choose whether to join the class.&quot;</td>
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<td>even in the absence of evidence proving liability.”²⁴</td>
<td>&quot;We agree with the Rand Institute that forum choice provides plaintiff lawyers with an opportunity to jockey for control over the litigation. As in the US, it may allow defendants to 'seek out plaintiff lawyers who are attractive Settlement partners.' Furthermore, the interests of class members and the public may not be well-served: 'Broad forum choice weakens judicial control over class action litigation.' It enables 'both plaintiff class action lawyers and defendants to seek better deals for themselves, which may or may not be in the best interests of class members or the public.' A means of minimizing this risk is required. We note that an Ontario judgment sets out some basic ground rules to 'cut through the clutter and impose some organization on multiple actions begun by competing counsel in different parts of Ontario.' However, the courts are 'still wrestling with the problem of imposing control on related class actions begun in different provinces.' It is beyond the scope of this project to address the inter-jurisdictional issues. The Uniform Law Conference of Canada has already adopted a Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act which rationalizes the basis for exercising jurisdiction in ordinary proceedings and also provides a mechanism to transfer cases to the most convenient</td>
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<td>Forum shopping</td>
<td>&quot;This risk is that class action lawyers will file law suits in certain courts simply because they believe that the law or procedures in a jurisdiction give a strategic advantage, or that a particular judge is most likely to grant certification. The risk is heightened because class actions do not respect geographical boundaries, meaning that often they may be brought legitimately in any one of many jurisdictions – locally, nationally or internationally. What is more, as the Rand Institute points out, 'class action lawyers often have greater latitude in their choice of forum or venue than their counterparts in traditional litigation' and this drives transaction costs upwards: 'Under some circumstances, an attorney filing a statewide class action can file in any county of a state and an attorney filing a nationwide class action can file in virtually any state in the country, and perhaps any county in that state as well. In addition, class action attorneys often can file duplicative suits and pursue them simultaneously. These are powerful tools for shaping litigation, providing opportunities not only to seek out favourable law and positively disposed decision makers, but also to maintain</td>
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<td>(or wrest) control over high-stakes litigation from other class action attorneys.</td>
<td>forum. It would be an appropriate body to examine forum shopping issues in relation to class actions and make recommendations.</td>
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<td>Alteration of substantive law</td>
<td>&quot;The size of classes and consequent problems of managing the facts and legal issues generated by so many individual claims (what in the United States is called the problem of 'manageability') have resulted in changes of the substantive law. … [C]ourts in the United States have had to develop new techniques to calculate damages because it is simply not possible to examine the separate claim of each individual member of the class where the class may number thousands or even hundreds of thousands.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;The question to be considered in Australia is whether the time has arrived to develop less formal and rigid rules to assess damages so that the defendants cannot take advantage of conventional mechanisms to avoid compensating those who have suffered loss as a result of widespread wrongful conduct. At the same time the interests of defendants in being able to test claims against them cannot be overlooked. A proper balance must be achieved between these competing interests.&quot;</td>
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<td>Delay in receiving legal redress</td>
<td>&quot;Because the potential liability is so much greater, class actions are more strenuously contested than individual litigation which could mean that a plaintiff does not receive his legal redress for some time later than might have been the case, if he had brought his own action.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;This assumes, perhaps unjustifiably in many, if not most, cases, that the plaintiff would have brought his own action. The choice may sometimes be between the possible delay in receiving redress and receiving no redress at all.&quot;</td>
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<td><strong>Penal characteristics</strong></td>
<td>“Some of the new techniques for assessing damages calculate the total amount received by the defendant from its unlawful activities which is distributed to those members of the class who claim. A surplus often remains. Many members of the class do not bother to claim. Others may not be located. The courts order the surplus to be directed to a specific public purpose or to be paid into Consolidated Revenue. Opponents of class actions assert that there is a penal effect in depriving a defendant of his unjust enrichment. Deterrence and punishment, they say, are now the real goals; class actions result in confiscation not compensation. The proceedings are said to be no longer civil but criminal in character where the special protections of the criminal law (such as right to jury trial and proof beyond reasonable doubt) are denied the defendant.”</td>
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|                                                  | “involve a misuse of civil procedure by, in effect, punishing the defender”  
| **Persons other than parties to an action would be bound** | “A view often advanced is that only those sufficiently motivated to approach the court should recover compensation. Windfall benefits received through a cheque in the mail, merely because someone unknown to the recipient has instituted an action on his behalf, are said to be a misuse of the proper function of the courts. Nor, it is said, should litigation be forced on those who have not chosen to...” |

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<td>bring it or who might not wish to bring it. Courts exist to resolve real disputes brought before them by interested contending parties: not to create funds to provide windfall benefits.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;But to acknowledge this unfortunate reality is not to deny class actions. Fly-by-nighters have no monopoly in the field of unlawful or wrongful corporate activity. Why should redress be denied to those who suffer at the hand of an otherwise reputable corporation simply because it is usually law-abiding? Furthermore, so far as the Commission has been able to ascertain, class actions have not been the cause of any company going out of business in the United States.&quot;</td>
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<td>Destroys legitimate, reputable businesses</td>
<td>&quot;Opponents of class actions point out that they have the potential to destroy legitimate, reputable businesses whereas the real villains are small &quot;fly-by-night operators one step ahead of the law and the would-be plaintiff&quot;. Fly-by-night operators will often escape the law.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Some commentators have gone so far as to say that class actions could lead to an impediment to doing business in Australia: 'If the business community fails to lobby for legislative changes at the federal, state and territory level, class actions will become much more of an impediment to doing business in Australia.' Clarke S and Williams G, 'Class Actions - A Growing Threat', Australian Financial Review (11 March 2004) at 79.&quot;</td>
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| **The community ultimately bears the cost of class actions** | “The bill for any verdict, large or small, must be paid by someone. Unless the market is extremely competitive, the defendant will pass the cost on to other consumers in higher prices. If it cannot pass it on, it may go out of business. Alternatively, insurance premiums against class action recoveries will add to costs to be passed on to consumers. Management time spent in unproductive or defensive measures and in litigation itself will also add to costs. Moreover, the risk of liability in a class action could inhibit new initiatives and techniques which might have otherwise provided advantages to consumers.”  

39 The Australian Law Reform Commission, *Access to the Courts – II, Class Actions* (Discussion Paper No 11, 1979), at para 23-31. | “But why should not the threat of a class action equally result in improved efficiency to avoid potential liability? There is little empirical evidence upon which a cost/benefit analysis of class actions could be undertaken. The general confidentiality of corporate finance precludes any meaningful study of this type. Instead of certain consumers incurring individual loss because of defective products, the cost of taking steps to avoid these defects is passed on to the general community. However, should individual redress achieved through a class action be denied only because of its potential to spread the cost more generally across the community in this way?”  


| **Technical breaches by defendants** | “Successful class actions may lead to suppliers or manufacturers increasing their prices to offset anticipated claims”  

41 Scottish Law Commission, *Multi-Party Actions* (Scot Law Com No 154, 1996), at para 2.11. | “However, these arguments overlook the fact that, given the same circumstances, the defendant would be liable in law to each individual plaintiff who chose to bring an action. If so, why should it not be liable to the many who have suffered a loss which is legally actionable? On closer examination, it can be seen that the complaint is addressed more to a defect in the substantive law by which defendants are held liable. But the substantive law has been developed...” |

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<td>suffered or the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.(^{42})</td>
<td>in a legal system without the facility of class actions. Penalties and liability for damages for illegal conduct have been predicated on individual breaches. The problem should not be faced necessarily by denying class actions. It may be preferable to alter the substantive law. The existence of defects in the substantive law is not a reason for denying class actions.(^{43})</td>
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<td>Imposes inappropriate duties on judges</td>
<td>&quot;For example, problems in the disbursement of a damages fund may raise difficult questions of social policy for the judge and may raise doubts about the ability of the courts adequately to consider all the competing claims(^{44}).&quot;</td>
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<td>Superficial sense of closure of legal claims</td>
<td>&quot;multiple, separate proceedings (eg certain individual claims may have to be left over to another day)... arbitrary results from the standpoint of both plaintiffs and defendants(^{45}).&quot;</td>
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<td>Involvement of the media</td>
<td>&quot;Successful manipulation of the media to publicise claims the subject of a particular class action undoubtedly heightens the pressure on a defendant to settle a claim irrespective of its merits. ... Most defendants placed in the position simply cannot afford to allow adverse publicity, accurate or</td>
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\(^{44}\) Scottish Law Commission, *Multi-Party Actions* (Scot Law Com No 154, 1996), at para 2.11.

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<td>otherwise, to damage their business. In the absence of any effective pre-emptive remedies to dispose of such actions, few, if any, defendants are prepared to endure the months or years of pain involved in allowing such a matter to proceed to trial. In those circumstances, many defendants would consider that there is no practical alternative to negotiating a settlement on the best terms available.⁴⁶</td>
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Human rights and Basic Law issues relevant to an opt-out class action regime in Hong Kong

Article 35 of the Basic Law: access to the courts

1. Adopting an “opt-out” class action regime may raise concerns as to the right of access to court under Article 35 of the Basic Law and the right to a fair hearing under Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The first part of BL 35 provides that:

   “Hong Kong residents shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, choice of lawyers for timely protection of their lawful rights and interests or for representation in the courts, and to judicial remedies.”

2. The first part of Article 14(1) of the ICCPR (reflected in Article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights) provides that:

   “All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination ... of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

3. While BL 35 expressly guarantees HK residents’ right of access to the courts, the same protection is also implied under ICCPR Article 14(1). The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) indicates that the European equivalent of ICCPR Article 14(1) confers a right on individuals to submit disputes as to their civil rights and obligations for determination by a court (*Golder v UK*).

4. As to whether the right of access to the courts is engaged by the opt-out approach, the Irish Law Reform Commission opined that:

   “it is at least arguable that the right of access to the courts involves a corresponding and converse right of non-access or, in other words, a right not to be compelled to litigation.”

5. We are not aware of any authorities of the local courts, the English court or the ECtHR upholding the right of “non-access” as contemplated by the Irish Law Reform Commission. Our preliminary view is that, whether or not there is a right of “non-access”, ICCPR Article 14(1) and BL 35 are engaged in the present case. We note that the class members will be bound by the outcome of the litigation on the common issues, even though

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1. (1975) 1 EHRR 524.
they are not party to and do not take any active part in that litigation. If the defendants win the common issues at trial, all class members' claims will be extinguished. In a way, the class action restricts an individual class member's access to the court and substantially limits his control of the conduct of his individual claim. In the absence of the class members' express consent, an “opt-out” approach to class actions is likely to be regarded as an interference with the individual members' right of access to court under both BL 35 and ICCPR Article 14(1). In this regard, the “opt-in” approach would address the potential human rights concerns as the individual class members must expressly give consent to taking part in the class proceedings.

6. As regards whether this interference is justified, there have been extensive discussions in both Professor Mulheron's book and in other commentaries of the pros and cons of the opt-out and opt-in models and their effectiveness in promoting access to justice. We do not propose to go into those issues in detail. For the present purpose, we assume that adoption of an opt-out regime would be made on the basis that it would be more effective in promoting access to justice and achieving the other objectives of saving court resources and achieving the consistent disposal of all claims with similar causes of action. On that assumption, we see no in-principle human rights objection to the adoption of an opt-out model. We would assume, for the present purpose, that the interference with an absent class member's right of access to court by the opt-out model pursues a legitimate aim (eg promotion of access to justice).

7. The remaining human rights issue is whether the interference with the right of access to court under BL 35 and ICCPR Article 14(1) is proportionate to the aim which it is sought achieve. That can only be determined by taking into account the procedures to be adopted under our proposed opt-out model.

8. As the human rights concern about the opt-out approach arises mainly from the absence of express consent from individual class members, it will be important to build in procedural safeguards to ensure that the potential class members are adequately informed of the class action and of their right to opt out. This raises the questions as to (i) whether the opt-out notice should be mandatory, (ii) whether personal notice should be given to individual class members; (iii) how the notice should be served; and (iv) what should be stated in the notice. In this connection, we note that the response to these issues differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We think it may be helpful to identify the relevant principles which have to be taken into consideration in assessing the options.

9. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution is not in the same terms as BL 35 and ICCPR Article 14(1), but it is nevertheless useful to make reference to the decision of the US Supreme Court in Philips Petroleum Co v Shutts, which was affirmed by the Federal

Court of Australia in *Femcare Ltd v Bright.* It was held in *Philips Petroleum* that:

“If the forum State wishes to bind an absent plaintiff concerning a claim for money damages or similar relief at law, it must provide minimal procedural due process protection. The plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel. The notice must be the best practicable, ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ The notice should describe the action and the plaintiffs’ rights in it. Additionally, we hold that due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an ‘opt-out’ or ‘request for exclusion’ form to the court. Finally, the Due Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members.”

10. More extensive notice requirements (eg individual personal notice) coupled with procedures for opting out at a later stage would provide better safeguards for absent class members. However, an extensive notice requirement would be costly and might, in some cases, unnecessarily delay the proceedings. The principle set out in *Philips Petroleum* provides some guidance as to what is likely to be considered proportionate and therefore to satisfy BL 35 and ICCPR Article 14(1).

11. Some existing features of Hong Kong’s civil justice system may, to some extent, interfere with an individual’s right of access to court (eg limitation periods, leave requirements and security for costs). However, those features serve legitimate purposes (eg ensuring legal certainty and finality; and ensuring more effective use of court time). The same consideration arises in relation to an opt-out regime: while it interferes with the absent class members’ right of access to court, that interference by pursues a legitimate aim and adequate procedural safeguards have been incorporated. The adoption of an opt-out model is in our view permissible so long as the procedures recommended for that model amount to a proportionate response to a legitimate aim (eg promotion of access to justice).

**Articles 6 and 105 of the Basic Law: property rights**

12. Articles 6 and 105 of the Basic Law protect an individual’s property rights. The question arises as to whether the opt-out model is consistent with the property rights guaranteed under BL 6 and 105.

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5 Cited above, at 8-10.
13. BL 6 provides that “[t]he [HKSAR] shall protect the right of private ownership of property in accordance with law.”

14. BL 105 provides:

“The [HKSAR] shall, in accordance with law, protect the right of individuals and legal persons to the acquisition, use, disposal and inheritance of property and their right to compensation for lawful deprivation of their property.

Such compensation shall correspond to the real value of the property concerned at the time and shall be freely convertible and paid without undue delay. …”

15. In Scott v Government of the HKSAR, Hartmann J was satisfied that BL 6 and BL 105 protected only existing property rights. He said:

“In my judgment, arts 6 and 105 extend their protection to existing rights in property, not to anticipated rights, rights still uncertain as to their delineation. In short, they do not extend their protection to what in effect is no more than an expectation.”

16. In his dissenting judgment in Lau Kwok Fai Bernard v Secretary for Justice and Michael Reid Scott v Secretary for Justice, Ma CJHC agreed with Hartmann J’s reasons for rejecting the applicants’ arguments based on BL 6 and 105. Neither the majority judgments in the Court of Appeal nor the judgments in the Court of Final Appeal dealt with BL 6 and 105 and Hartmann J’s views in Scott were not overturned by the CA’s or the CFA’s decisions in Lau Kwok Fai Bernard and Michael Reid Scott.

17. Hartmann J’s view appears to be in line with the jurisprudence developed by the European Court of Human Rights under Article 1 of Protocol No 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects property rights. The European Court’s approach is that for a claim to constitute a “possession” within the protection of Article 1, the applicant must be able to show that there is a legal entitlement to the economic benefit at issue, or a legitimate expectation that the entitlement will materialise.

18. For instance, in Stran Greek Refineries v Greece, in order to determine whether the applicants had a “possession”, the court examined whether the relevant domestic judgment and arbitration award “had given rise

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6 Constitutional and Administrative Law List No. 188 of 2002, at para 79.
7 (CACV 199/2003).
8 (CACV 401/2003).
9 At para 54. Ma CJHC also agreed with Hartmann J that the reduction of pay of public officers was not a deprivation of “property”.
10 Simor and Emmerson (eds), Human Rights Practice (loose-leaf edition, updated as of Jan 2008), para 15.010.
to a debt in their favour that was sufficiently established to be enforceable”. The court then distinguished between the judgment and the award. The former was a preliminary decision, the effect of which was merely to furnish the applicants with the hope that they would secure recognition of the claim put forward. However, this was not the case with regard to the arbitration award, which clearly recognised the state’s liability. Under Greek legislation, arbitration awards had the force of final decisions and were deemed to be enforceable; and no provision was made for an appeal on the merits. The European Court thus concluded that the applicants’ right under the arbitration award (but not that under the judgment) constituted a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1.

19. In his comparative study of the constitutional protection of property rights in 18 jurisdictions, Professor AJ van der Walt observed that:

“[i]t is generally accepted that any debt or right, to qualify as property, must have been created or established as an independent right, and must have vested in the claimant in terms of statute or a court order or the law of contract. Mere expectancies or future claims usually do not qualify.”

20. The “opt-out” approach allows a class action to be commenced by the representative plaintiff without the express consent of the class members, and the class members will be bound by the outcome of the litigation on the common issues, whether favourable or adverse to the class. These features of the “opt-out” model would impact on the right to claim of those class members who do not take any active part in the litigation. However, if the same approach is adopted as that followed by the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), which only applies to a cause of action arising after the commencement of Part IVA, it may be reasonably argued that the opt-out model will not engage BL 6 and 105 because no accrued rights of action and hence no existing property rights will be affected. As it is not yet clear if the proposed “opt-out” model will be so limited in its application, it is assumed in this paper that the model does affect property rights protected under BL 6 and 105.

Deprivation of property

21. In the case of Weson Investment Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the Court of Appeal held that BL 105 had no application to legitimate taxation, which was governed under BL 108. Government taxation of necessity deprived the taxpayer of his property without any right to

12 The discussion of this case was based on P van Dijk and GJH van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd ed, 1998), pp 623-4.
14 See Femcare Ltd v Bright (2000) 100 FCR 331, para 11: Part IVA was inserted into the Federal Court Act in 1991 by the Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act 1991 (Cth), which commenced on 4 March 1992. Proceedings may be brought under Part IVA only in respect of a cause of action arising after that date by virtue of section 33B.
15 [2007] 2 HKLRD 567.
compensation. The court decided that the word “deprivation” in BL 105 was used in the sense of “expropriation” which was the expression used in its original Chinese text (namely, “徵用”). Genuine action taken to assess and enforce payment of tax, even if subsequently found to be wrong, did not come within the scope of expropriation of property under BL 105.16

22. This interpretation of the meaning of “deprivation” was followed by the Court of First Instance in *Harvest Good Development Ltd v Secretary for Justice & Ors*17 and *Hong Kong Kam Lan Koon Ltd v Realray Investment Ltd* (No.5),18 as well as by the Court of Appeal in *巫振漢 訴 漁農自然護理署*.19

23. However, in *Fine Tower Associates Ltd v Town Planning Board*,20 the Court of Appeal held that the reliance on the Chinese language version of BL 105 (which, in the event of a discrepancy between the English and Chinese versions, must prevail21) was of no consequence for the courts would look to the reality rather than to the form to see whether there had been expropriation, and that if the effect of regulation was to denude a property of all meaningful economic value, deprivation in the sense intended by BL 105 had occurred, even though through no formal act by that name. In the Court of Appeal’s view, it was well established that action adversely affecting the use of property, despite falling short of formal expropriation, might in certain circumstances nonetheless properly be described as deprivation, in which case there would be a right to compensation. To ascertain whether there had been a deprivation, the court looked to the substance of the matter rather than to the form. Absent a formal expropriation, the question whether there had been a *de facto* deprivation of property was a question of fact and degree in every case: “The general rule, at least, is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognised as a taking.”22

24. Applying the judicial interpretation of “deprivation” referred to at paras 21 and 22 above, it can be argued that the proposed “opt-out” model for class actions cannot be reasonably considered as an “expropriation” of property by the Government. In his judgment in *Harvest Good Development Limited* Hartmann J quoted with approval Professor A J van der Walt:

“The term expropriation … does not apply to or adequately explain the position in all jurisdictions. When referring to the acquisition of property in terms of the power of eminent domain,

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16 At paragraphs 18-20, 79 and 82.
18 [2007] 5 HKC 122.
21 The decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted on 28 June 1990 provides: “… the English translation of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China which has been finalized upon examination under the auspices of the Law Committee of the National People’s Congress shall be the official English text and shall be used in parallel with the Chinese text. In case of discrepancy between the two texts in the implication of any words used, the Chinese text shall prevail.”
most constitutions in the Anglo tradition refer to compulsory acquisitions, whereas most jurisdictions in the Germanic tradition refer to expropriations, with the two terms having roughly the same meaning. The fairly widely accepted interpretation is that these terms require the state to actually acquire property or derive a benefit from the expropriation or acquisition in some way, thereby excluding state actions that destroy or take away property without any benefit for the state.\footnote{23}

25. The “opt-out” model, to the extent that it may result in a class member being bound by an adverse determination by the court which rejected the claim for relief brought by the representative plaintiff, may bar the class member from suing for the same claim. However, this loss of a right to claim appears to fall within the scope of exclusion discussed by Professor AJ van der Walt.\footnote{24}

26. If the judicial approach of interpreting “deprivation” outlined in para 23 above is followed, it can be argued that the opt-out model for class actions does not amount to \textit{de facto} deprivation in the light of its impact on the rights of a class member. This argument is supported by the decision by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in \textit{Femcare Ltd v Bright}.\footnote{25} The Full Federal Court of Australia concluded there that the opt-out procedure did not effect an acquisition of property of a group member as protected by section 51 of the Commonwealth constitution.\footnote{26} A chose in action is not capable of being “used” although it may be enforced.

\textbf{Australian jurisprudence}

27. Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian constitution deals with the power of Parliament to make laws relating to the acquisition of property from any State or person. As observed by Peter Hanks,\footnote{27} the orthodox and unchallenged view of section 51(xxxi) was expressed by Dixon J in \textit{Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth} as follows:

“Section 51(xxxi) serves a double purpose. It provides the Commonwealth Parliament with a legislative power of acquiring property: at the same time, as a condition upon the exercise of the power, it provides the individual or the State affected with a protection against governmental interferences with his proprietary rights without just recompense … In requiring just terms s 51(xxxi) fetters the legislative power by forbidding laws

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[23] Professor AJ van der Walt, \textit{Constitutional Property Clauses} (1999, Juta & Co. Ltd), at 18, quoted by Hartmann J in Harvest Good Development Ltd \cite{24} \textit{v} \textit{Bright}, at paragraph 134.
\item[24] The discussion here assumes that the affected right amounts to a property right protected under BL 6 and 105: see paras 20-25 above.
\item[25] (2000) 100 FCR 331.
\item[26] Section 51 (xxxii) of the constitution provides that Parliament has power to make laws with respect to “the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws.”
\item[27] Peter Hanks, \textit{Constitutional Law in Australia} (2$^{nd}$ ed, 1996), at 499.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In Femcare, the court considered whether provisions in Part IVA of the Federal Court Act authorising representative proceedings permitted an acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms for the purposes of section 51(xxxi) of the Australian constitution. The appellant submitted that under the provisions there would be an acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms which would not be authorised by section 51(xxxi). The acquisition was said to be the conferring upon the representative party of the right to "use" property of a group member, being the chose in action consisting of the group member’s claim against the respondent in a representative proceeding. The “use” of the property, so it was argued, was the prosecution of the cause of action. The court rejected these arguments and held that the provisions authorising enforcement of that chose in action on behalf of another person could not be described as giving the representative party the “use” of the chose in action; nor as involving an alienation of any interest in the chose in action. There was thus no breach of section 51(xxxi). The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:

"108 It may well be that the conferring on one person of the right to use property of another person, whether real property or chattels, involves an acquisition of property. Such an acquisition is not an acquisition of ownership or dominium. Rather, it is the creation of a ius in re aliena. That is to say, it is the creation of a proprietary right in respect of property owned by another. Thus, a leasehold interest, and a life estate are both property. The carving out of the fee simple, or unencumbered ownership, of such a right and conferring that limited right on a third party is clearly capable of being an acquisition of property.

109 However, a chose in action, or an obligation, is not something that is capable of ‘use’. It may be enforced. Nevertheless, absent any assignment, where enforcement of a chose in action or obligation is for the benefit of the owner of the chose in action or obligation, it is an unwarranted extension of language to suggest that a person who is authorized to enforce the chose in action or obligation on behalf of another person has the ‘use’ of that obligation. The submission that there is an alienation of an interest in a chose in action in litigation in a court on behalf of the holder is completely without substance."

This decision should be viewed in the context of the scheme provided for in Part IVA of the Federal Court Act, where the commencement of a representative proceeding is subject to various threshold requirements and procedural safeguards to preserve a group member’s freedom of choice. The applicants must show, inter alia, that seven or more persons have claims against the same person and that the claims of all those persons give rise to a

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28 (1948) 76 CLR 1, at 349-350.
substantial common issue of law or fact (section 33C(1)(a) and (c)). Further, the application commencing a representative proceeding, or a supporting document, must specify the nature of the claims made on behalf of group members (section 33H(1)(b)). If a respondent is able to establish not merely that there is uncertainty as to whether the claims of all group members will be made out, but that some claims on behalf of the group members have not been made in good faith, or otherwise constitute an abuse of the court’s process, it is unlikely that the threshold requirements of section 33C will be held to have been satisfied.

30. With respect to provisions in Part IVA that are designed to preserve a group member’s freedom of choice, while it is true that the consent of a person to be a group member in the representative proceeding is not generally required, a group member may opt out of the representative proceeding simply by giving notice at any time prior to the final date for opting out fixed by the Court (section 33J(1) and (2)). The time limit for opting out may be extended, in accordance with section 33J(3). Section 33T provides a remedy for a group member who considers that a representative party is not able adequately to represent the interests of the group members. In those circumstances, the court may substitute another group member as a representative party.

31. In Femcare, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia noted that representative proceedings under Part IVA did not necessarily require that individual notice be given to members of the represented group: section 33Y(5) provides that the court may not order that notice be given personally to each group member unless it is satisfied that it is reasonably practicable, and not unduly expensive to do so. The court held that in determining what was “reasonably” practicable and not “unduly” expensive for the purposes of section 33Y(5), the court was bound to take account of the possible adverse consequence to a group member of the representative proceeding as well as any possible benefits. In its view, the court would be more likely to be satisfied that personal notice was reasonably practicable and not unduly expensive if an adverse determination would have significant consequences for a group member.

32. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia was clear as to the benefits of representative proceedings:

“Part IVA of the Federal Court Act aims to enhance access to justice by establishing procedures that enable legitimate common grievances to be remedied. These procedures provide advantages to group members whose claims would otherwise be without practical redress. The legislation in this respect seeks to strike a balance between the impracticability of requiring personal notice in every case and the need to give effective notice of the proceeding to group members. …”

The court noted that while a representative proceeding might lead to an adverse judgment rejecting the claim for relief, it might also result in a favourable judgment acceding to the claim.

33. As the proposed “opt-out” model bears features similar to those

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30 Femcare Ltd v Bright, cited above, at para 75.
provided for in Part IVA of the Federal Court Act discussed above, it would be difficult to argue that that model would involve any taking (de facto or otherwise) of an individual group/class member’s right to claim.

**Fair balance**

34. There remains the question of whether the proposed “opt-out” model would satisfy the “fair balance” test. Although the Hong Kong courts have not so far formally embraced the “fair balance” test developed under the European jurisprudence, it would be prudent to apply this test as an implicit requirement under BL 6 and 105 for interference with property rights which fall short of deprivation. Under this test, any such interference must strike a fair balance between the demands of the general interests of society (which such interference strives to serve) and the requirement that the individual’s rights be protected. There must be a reasonable relationship between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.

35. In *Femcare*, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia said that the scheme of representative proceedings under Part IVA of the Federal Court Act was aimed at enhancing access to justice. It may also be noted that in *Lithgow v United Kingdom*, the European Court of Human Rights considered the merits of a collective or multi-party system for dispute resolution. In that case, the Aircraft and Ship Building Industries Act 1977 established a collective system for the settlement of disputes about compensation, where individual shareholders of the applicant company were denied individual rights of access to the Arbitration Tribunal. The court held that this limitation on a direct right of access pursued a legitimate aim (namely, the desire to avoid, in the context of a large-scale nationalisation measure, a multiplicity of claims and proceedings brought by individual shareholders), and there was a proportionate relationship between the means employed and the aim.

36. These judgments support the argument that the proposed “opt-out” model does pursue legitimate aims. If that model includes threshold requirements and procedural safeguards to preserve a group member’s freedom of choice comparable to those provided for in Part IVA of the Federal Court Act, it is likely that it would meet the “fair balance” requirement arguably implicit in BL 6 and 105.

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31 (1986) 8 EHRR 329.
32 The case was concerned with, inter alia, whether such a system (on the basis that it excluded the right to bring private litigation) complied with Article 6(1) of ECHR which provides that “[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. .....”.
Examples of opt-in procedure used within an opt-out class action regime

1. In Chapter 7, we propose the establishment of a flexible regime which allows the court wide discretion (within an otherwise opt-out class action regime) to adopt an opt-in procedure for cases involving plaintiffs from other jurisdictions. This Annex provides examples from the US and Australia when court directions have been made for opt-in notices within otherwise opt-out class regimes.

Australia

King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings Ltd)\(^1\)

2. This class action was initiated in the Federal Court of Australia under Part IVA of the Federal Court Act. The respondents were GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (GIO), its former board of directors and an advisor merchant bank to GIO. GIO was listed on the Australian Stock Exchange and had a number of subsidiaries which carried on business as insurers and financiers. The representative proceedings were brought on behalf of all persons who were shareholders of GIO and who did not accept a hostile takeover bid from AMP Insurance Investment Holdings Pty Ltd (AMP) in reliance on alleged misrepresentation made by the respondents with regard to the value of GIO shares. It was alleged that each of the respondents had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in contravention of section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) or section 12DA of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 (Cth) or section 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1978 (NSW) and had made various statements which were alleged to be negligent. The directors were also alleged to have breached their fiduciary duty and the advisor merchant bank was alleged to have breached section 995 of the Corporation Law.

3. Although the proceedings were originally commenced on behalf of approximately 68,000 shareholders, orders were made by the court during the course of the litigation which had the effect of converting the proceedings from "opt-out" to "opt-in" proceedings. The respondents were allowed to send correspondence to unrepresented members of the plaintiff group. The court agreed with the respondents that there were two advantages for so doing. The first was that the responses from the unrepresented members might identify how many nominal group members maintained a claim in the proceedings. Although they might not have returned opt-out notices to exclude themselves from the proceedings, not all members of the group who did not opt out believed or asserted they had a cause of action against the

\(^1\) [2002] FCA 1560.
respondents. The second advantage was that it would give the respondents some understanding of the position taken by individuals who had not been legally represented concerning GIO's liability in relation to them.

4. The court ordered that GIO could communicate by way of a sample letter with the shareholders who had not opted out (the letter and its associated forms are at the end of this Annex). The modifications to the wording of the sample letter ordered by the court were shown in bold type. Forms A and B were attached to the sample letter. Form A was a non-compulsory questionnaire which identified nominal group members (insofar as Form A is concerned, the exact terms were to be agreed between the applicant and GIO). The answers to Form B might allow GIO and other respondents to better assess which members of the group did not, or were unlikely to, maintain a claim of the type of damage pleaded. Hence the respondents might make some assessment, even if only a crude one, of their potential liability in the proceedings.

5. The court considered, however, that it was not appropriate for the sample letter to make the following reference:

"In the event that you do not complete the questionnaire and return it by [deadline], your claim will be permanently stayed. What this means is that no further steps will be able to be taken on your behalf to further your claim unless you are permitted to do so by the Court after making an application to the Court."

The court refused to exercise its discretion to direct that if questions posed in the questionnaire were not answered, an individual group member's claim should be stayed. The court was of the view that there could be a number of reasons why any particular group member in the proceedings did not answer the compulsory questionnaire and it would be difficult and uncertain for the court to determine what constituted a failure to complete the questionnaire.

6. Over 20,000 shareholders exercised their right to "opt in". Although substantially narrowing the ambit of the class, this helped ensure that the participating shareholders were likely to have meritorious claims (particularly in relation to the issue of individual reliance, discussed below), made the proceedings more manageable, enabled the parties to quantify the loss claimed and enhanced the prospects of settlement. Eventually, a settlement agreement was reached that $97 million was to be paid to participating shareholders, plus legal costs.

7. On 26 August 2003, the Federal Court approved the settlement and on 27 November 2003 it made orders finalising the list of shareholders entitled to participate in the settlement. The list comprised 22,051 shareholders, the vast majority of whom were small investors. The overall rate of return for members of the class action group was 60.124 cents for each dollar of total loss claimed. This equated to $1,262.60 for every 1,000 eligible

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2 King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings Ltd) [2003] FCA 1420.
shares that were held for the period through to AMP's compulsory acquisition of GIO shares in December 1999. In addition, each applicant's legal costs incurred in connection with the class action proceedings were paid in full, without any contribution being required out of the settlement money allocated to compensate eligible shareholders.

USA

**CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v Goldfeld**

8. In this case the underwriter for a private stock placement brought a securities fraud action against the stock sellers and sought class certification on behalf of 25 British investors. The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that class certification was not appropriate because the court was able to use its equitable powers to certify a class under an "opt-in" arrangement in order to resolve *res judicata* problems under British law and the traditional rule of joinder was more appropriate than class certification. Affidavits filed by the defendant stated that a British court would not recognise a foreign judgment in a United States "opt-out" class action because the British subject had done nothing to invoke the assistance of the foreign court. In reliance upon that opinion, the defendant argued that a judgment in favour of the defendants would not bar future actions by the absent class members against the same defendants in the United Kingdom and other countries. Recognising this dilemma, the plaintiff proposed an extraordinary form of class action: an "opt-in" class. The plaintiff described it this way:

"This would involve a notice of pendency of class action stating that the class members will not be included within the class unless they transmit to the Court a specific request for inclusion. The language in the notice of pendency characterizing the action and the effect of membership in the class would be approved by the Court. Consequently, class members who opted in would do so in full knowledge of the consequences if defendants should prove successful in the action. Since the class members would be affirmatively agreeing to be bound and voluntarily subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court for such purposes, the ultimate outcome in this action could not be relitigated by the class members in England."

The court was of the view that this procedure would satisfy the requirements for *res judicata* in Britain as set out in the defendant's affidavit and would protect defendants from a second litigation by anyone who opted into the class.

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3 127 FRD 454, 459 (SDNY 1989).
4 *CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v Goldfeld* 127 FRD 454, 459 (SDNY 1989), [459].
**Minnesota v US Steel Corp**

9. Eight different governmental entities commenced actions against six steel companies seeking treble damages from the defendants under the Sherman and Clayton Acts allegedly for conspiring in restraint of interstate trade and commerce affecting the structural steel fabricating industry. It was claimed that the defendants had conspired to fix prices, unduly inflating them and rendering them non-competitive. It was further claimed that the defendants had allocated contracts and business among themselves. The Attorneys General of the respective states were asked to send notice to the governmental entities within their borders. The District Judge referred to rule 23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and said that the rule:

"... provides that 'the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances.' The court does not interpret this as requiring personal notice from the court itself but as permitting the court to direct one or some of the parties to give a notice in such form as the court may approve. Each of the Attorneys General in the Fourth Division cases has indicated it has adequate lists of, and facilities for mailing notice to, governmental entities within its borders. The court therefore directs that these offices fulfill this function of giving notice."

10. The court specified that the following matters should be covered in the notices:

"The notices should contain the matter required by Rule 23(c)(2), and in addition should include something in the nature of a verified proof of claim form to be filled out and returned so as to indicate name of the claimant, the appropriate or knowledgeable government official familiar with the details of the claim, the gross amount of purchases and dates thereof for which claim is made, the person or firm from or through whom bought or general contractor dealt with, type of building or structure into which the steel was incorporated or other end use made of the product and any other matters deemed appropriate. Attached to or accompanying the proof of claim form should be a certified

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5 44 FRD 559 (D Minn 1968).
6 Section 23(c)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"For any class certified under rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood language:
* The nature of the action,
* The definition of the class certified,
* The class claims, issues, or defenses,
* That a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the members so desires,
* That the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded, and
* The binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule 23(c)(3)."
7 Minnesota v US Steel Corp, cited above, at 12, 13.
resolution of the governing body authorizing the submission of
the claim. Plaintiffs may desire from, or may wish to furnish to,
class members other information. There is no prohibition by the
court against such, provided that the notice or any information
shall be informative and not urging action nor solicitations."  

11. The court also gave detailed directions on the service of the
notice and fixed the following timetable:

"WITHIN 10 days from date of this order, Fourth Division
plaintiffs shall submit to all defendants, the other plaintiffs, and to
the court for its approval, a copy of the proposed notice and proof
of claim forms.

WITHIN 10 days thereafter, defendants and the other plaintiffs
may send to these plaintiffs and to the court suggestions or
objections as to the form of notice and proof of claim forms for
consideration by the court.

WITHIN 15 days from the court's approval of the notice and proof
of claim form, the same shall be transmitted to the prospective
members of the class by the four Attorneys General.

WITHIN 60 days from such latter date, Fourth Division plaintiffs
shall file with the clerk of this court and makes copies available to
each defendant the responses or proofs of claims received from
the members of the class, and this, subject to further court order,
shall then comprise the classes (together with any such filings in
addition to present pleadings made by or in the cases
represented by the Third Division plaintiffs) and all not so filing
shall be barred and excluded from the classes. Each Attorney
General also shall file and furnish a copy to the other parties
proof of mailing, showing a list of those to whom mailed."  

12. It should be noted that by virtue of the last paragraph of the order
of the court, all those class members who had not sent responses or proof of
claims were excluded from the class and would be barred and excluded from
the classes. In effect, an opt-in requirement was imposed by the notices.

**Harris v Jones**

13. This was a consolidated claim brought by one depositor on
behalf of all depositors of a bankrupt savings institution against the savings
institution, its officers and directors, an advertising agency and a radio station.
The claim alleged violations of the Securities Act. The court ordered that the
members of the class of depositors in the bankrupt savings institution should,

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8 Minnesota v US Steel Corp, cited above, at 12, 13.
9 Minnesota v US Steel Corp, cited above, at 12, 13.
10 41 FRD 70 (D Utah 1966).
after being furnished with an initial notice of action and an opportunity to be excluded therefrom, be furnished with a further notice requiring them to file simple statements of claims upon forms provided. Notice was given that if such statements were not filed within a specified time, the action might be dismissed with prejudice as to defaulting members for failure diligently to prosecute. The requirements imposed by the court with regard to the second opt-in notice were as follows:

"Proceeding, as it is believed should be done, under Rule 23 as amended, I think compliance must be made with subsection (c)(2) by giving individual notice so far as practicable to each member of the alleged class, advising him that the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date, that the judgment, whether favourable or not will include all members who do not request exclusion and that any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel at any time. Within a reasonable time after a determination of exclusion from the class as a result of the foregoing notices, and with appropriate relationship to the prospective date of trial and the necessities of discovery, there will be a further notice directed to members of the class requiring them to file simple statements of their claims upon furnished forms, particularly with reference to the types and sources of representation, if any, upon which they relied in purchasing their securities and the time they first learned any representations were false. An order will be made, and notice given, that if such statements without good cause are not filed within the time specified the action may be dismissed with prejudice as to defaulting members for failure diligently to prosecute. When the latter stage has been completed the court should be in a position better to determine the adequacy of the existing representation, more effectively to define the class or to establish or eliminate sub-classes, and to establish practical guides for the trial of the cases and, it is hoped, the submission of the issues for meaningful determination by a jury.""}

14. In a footnote to the paragraph quoted, the court expressed the view that it believed that power to give an additional notice existed by reason of the court's essential general power as well as by virtue of Rule 23(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23(d) reads as follows:

"In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the

11 Harris v Jones, cited above, at 2, 3.
members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time."

Practical problems and possible solutions

15. It has been pointed out that there may be problems in imposing an opt-in notice requirement. In an article in the Fordham Law Review, Debra Lyn Bassett discussed the consequences of adopting the opt-in procedure in the context of trans-national litigation where foreign class members were involved:

"As the Supreme Court has noted, 'great caution should be used not to let fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact.' Accordingly, for class actions involving foreign claimants, such foreign claimants should be provided with the opportunity to affirmatively opt into the class litigation in order to be bound by the resulting judgment. In Shutts, the Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that due process required an affirmative opting-in procedure for all Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. However, potential language barriers, unfamiliar legal procedures, and potential intimidation in dealing with the courts and lawyers of another country all tend to increase the risks of fear, confusion, and misunderstandings by foreign claimants. Requiring foreign claimants to affirmatively opt in, rather than absurdly construing their silence as an agreement to be bound by the class litigation, will ensure that their consent is genuine.…

The potential risks of requiring foreign claimants to opt into the class lawsuit include the possibility that many will not elect to do so, and thus the class litigation will bind few foreign claimants. However, it is not intrinsically unfair to expect a defendant to defend in more than one country if the harm allegedly caused by the defendant crosses national borders. Moreover, if the other country affected does not offer a class action procedure, foreign class members with modest claims may be more motivated to opt into the class litigation, while foreign claimants who do not opt into the U.S. class litigation may have larger claims that would warrant individual litigation. Although there remains the risk that some foreign claimants will not understand the notice, and that some will fail to opt in due to confusion or
procrastination, the opt-in procedure is a superior device from a due process perspective."12

16. To address the potential problems posed by the adoption of opt-in procedures for non-US claimants in class litigation, Ms Bassett proposed a number of precautionary measures. These include the appointment of a foreign claimant as a class representative or as a class counsel; attention by the trial court to the non-US interests at stake and the use of a cover letter to accompany the class notice to provide an explanation of the significance of the class notice in the recipient's native language. The suggestions are as follows:

"1. For All Class Actions: Adequate Representation

In order to satisfy the Rule 23(a) prerequisite of adequate representation for a multi-national class, a non-U.S. class representative should be a presumptive requirement. This non-U.S. class representative may be either a named representative or a class counsel. If the factual circumstances indicate disparities in interests among various non-U.S. class members, it may become necessary to have more than one non-U.S. representative in order to provide adequate representation. …

2. For All Class Actions: Focused Court Review

… A court might ensure that a foreign claimant is appointed as one of the class representatives, but then that foreign class representative may be too timid or too self-interested to follow through in protecting the interests of other foreign class members. Similarly, a court might ensure that a non-U.S. attorney is appointed as one of the class counsel, but then that non-U.S. attorney may be too timid or too self-interested to follow through in protecting the interests of the foreign class members. Accordingly, the trial judge should watch the proceedings with his or her usual care, and should keep in mind the special circumstances that may be encountered when foreign claimants have a stake in the proceedings, especially at the settlement stage.

3. For Mandatory Notice Class Actions: Cover Letters

The confusing nature of a class action notice requires additional care when the recipient resides in a foreign country. To facilitate the recipient's comprehension, notice under such circumstances should include a cover letter, in the language of the recipient's home country, addressed to the specific individual recipient, explaining the purpose of the notice in a

straightforward manner without legal jargon. Although the cover letter would necessarily need to tell the recipient to read the actual legal notice in full, the cover letter would provide an introduction to the notice and would help the recipient to understand its significance." 13

13 Debra Lyn Bassett, cited above, at 89-90.
Sample letters and forms used in King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings Ltd)

Letter

"Please read this letter carefully.

In August 1999 Shane Robert King commenced representative proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia against GIO Australia Holdings Limited ("GIO"), Grant Samuel & Associates Limited, and the former directors of GIO, David Mortimer, Bruce Hogan, Stewart Steffey, Ronald Ashton, Marina Darling, Andrew Kaldor, Lloyd Lange, David O'Halloran and Ian Pollard (the 'Respondents'). The representative proceedings by Mr King are on behalf of those former shareholders of GIO, who did not accept AMP's offer for GIO shares during the takeover bid made for GIO by AMP Insurance Investment Holdings Pty Limited ("AMP") in 1998 who allege that they suffered financial loss caused by representations and other conduct of the Respondents. These shareholders are, for the purposes of the proceedings, called the group members. The allegations made by Mr King in these proceedings relate to things that were said and things that were not said in the Part B Statement and in other communications by some of the Respondents to the GIO shareholders during the takeover period. The Respondents deny these allegations and are defending the proceedings.

As you have not opted out of these proceedings you are potentially one of the group members.

If you do not consider yourself to be a group member would you please answer the question by ticking the box on FORM A which is enclosed, sign it and return it in the reply paid envelope provided. If you do this it is not necessary to complete FORM B.

If you consider yourself to be a group member, it may become necessary for the Court to determine in these proceedings why you did not accept AMP's offer. If that occurs you may be required to give sworn evidence. You may (also) be cross examined on any sworn evidence given by you in support of your claim. So that GIO can prepare its defence to your claim and to enable GIO to consider the merits of your claim, we ask you to complete FORM B (the questionnaire) and return it in the reply paid envelope by no later than 28 February 2003.

If you are unable to answer any of the questions, you should write that you are "unable to answer the question" in the space provided.

Your answers should be posted in the enclosed reply paid envelope. They will be held by an independent firm of accountants pending finalisation of the proceedings. Copies will be provided to the Respondents and Mr King.
You may inspect a copy of AMP’s Part A Statement (referred to in question 1), GIO’s Part B Statement (both Booklets 1 and 2 referred to in question 2) on an internet website located at http://www.[to be advised]. If you are not connected to the internet and you wish to inspect those documents, then you should enquire at your local public library for internet access and assistance. A statement as to the requirements necessary to be a group member is also set out on the internet site.

The questionnaire is an important document which may affect your legal rights. You should read it carefully and you may wish to seek legal advice about its contents. You may direct any questions in relation to the questionnaire or this letter to Maurice Blackburn Cashman, the firm of solicitors acting for Mr King, on the following number, [complete] or to your own solicitor.

The Court is aware that we are writing to you in these terms.

Thank you for taking the time to complete and return the questionnaire.

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**Forms**

**"FORM A"**

1. I am not a group member □

In answering this question, it is important that you carefully read the following description of the representative group.

You are a group member if you:

a) were registered as an owner of shares in GIO continuously between 25 August 1998 and 4 January 1999; and

b) did not accept the takeover offer for those shares made to you by AMP on 25 August 1998 and varied on 9 December 1998; and

c) did not accept the takeover offer by reason of the various representations and conduct of the Respondents detailed in the Statement of Claim; and

d) suffered loss as a consequence; and

e) have a claim against all the Respondents.

The claim referred to in (e) is the claim summarised in the first large paragraph at the beginning of the letter enclosing this form.

Dated:
"FORM B
Questionnaire

1. (a) Did you receive AMP’s Part A Statement setting out its offer to acquire your shares in GIO?
   □ YES
   □ NO

   (b) If the answer to (a) is yes, did you read:
       (i) all of AMP’s Part A Statement?
           □ YES
           □ NO

       (ii) (1) part of AMP’s Part A Statement?
            □ YES
            □ NO

           (2) if “yes in part” which part or parts did you read? ........................................

2. (a) Did you receive GIO’s Part B Statement (Booklet One and Booklet Two) responding to AMP’s takeover offer for GIO?
   □ YES
   □ NO

   (b) Did you read GIO’s Part B Statement before making a decision to accept or reject AMP’s offer?
    □ YES
    □ NO

   (c) If the answer to 2(b) is yes:
        (i) did you read both Booklet One and Booklet Two of the Part B Statement?
            □ YES
            □ NO

        (ii) if you did not read all of the Part B Statement, which part did you read? ...........

        (iii) if you read all or part of the Part B Statement, how long did it take you? ...........
3. (a) Did you obtain advice from any person or organisation including from a financial adviser (for example, financial planner, accountant, stockbroker or your solicitor) as to whether you should accept the offer by AMP to acquire your shares in GIO?

☐ YES
☐ NO

(b) If yes, please identify the person or organisation.

.............................................................

(c) If yes, when was that advice provided to you?

.............................................................

4. Did you attempt to accept the AMP offer?

☐ YES
☐ NO

Dated:

.............................................................

(signature)

.............................................................

PRINT NAME

.............................................................

Shareholder Registration Number (SRN)"
The application of the *forum non conveniens* doctrine to group litigation in other jurisdictions

**England and Wales**

1. In *Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd*, Lord Goff set out the basis for the application in England and Wales of the doctrine of *forum non conveniens*:

   "...a stay will only be granted on the ground of forum non conveniens where the court is satisfied that there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i.e. in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice."\(^1\)

2. In *Connelly v RTZ Corporation PLC*,\(^2\) the House of Lords considered the application of the principle of *forum non conveniens* to an application by the defendant company to stay the personal injuries proceedings commenced by a Scottish plaintiff claiming damages for cancer allegedly caused by his work in Namibia. The plaintiff had worked for four years in a uranium mine in Namibia operated by a Namibian subsidiary of the first defendant, an English company. Three years later he was found to be suffering from cancer of the throat and underwent a laryngectomy. He commenced proceedings in England against the first defendant and one of its English subsidiaries claiming damages for negligence on the grounds that he had contracted the cancer as a result of their failure to provide a reasonably safe system of work affording protection from the effects of uranium ore dust while he worked in the mine. The defendants applied for an order staying the proceedings in England on the grounds of *forum non conveniens*.

3. The House of Lords dismissed the application and held that substantial justice could not be done in the appropriate forum (which was Namibia) but could only be done in a forum where appropriate resources were available. Lord Goff said:

   "$I therefore start from the position that, at least as a general rule, the court will not refuse to grant a stay simply because the plaintiff has shown that no financial assistance, for example in the form of legal aid, will be available to him in the appropriate forum, whereas such financial assistance will be available to him in England. ... I cannot think that the absence of legal aid in the"

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appropriate jurisdiction would of itself justify the refusal of a stay on the ground of forum non conveniens.

... Even so, the availability of financial assistance in this country, coupled with its non-availability in the appropriate forum, may exceptionally be a relevant factor in this context. The question, however, remains whether the plaintiff can establish that substantial justice will not in the particular circumstances of the case be done if the plaintiff has to proceed in the appropriate forum where no financial assistance is available."

4. The House of Lords took into account the fact that there was no practical possibility of the issues which arose in the case being tried without the plaintiff having the benefit of professional legal assistance and that his case could not be developed before a court without evidence from expert scientific witnesses. If the case were to be tried in England, then the plaintiff would either obtain assistance in the form of legal aid or receive the benefit of a conditional fee agreement with his solicitor. In these circumstances, the court came to the conclusion that the discretion to stay the proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens should not be exercised:

"I am satisfied that this is a case in which, having regard to the nature of the litigation, substantial justice cannot be done in the appropriate forum, but can be done in this jurisdiction where the resources are available."

5. In the case of Lubbe v Cape Plc, the House of Lords considered an application for stay of proceedings commenced in England by more than 3,000 plaintiffs who were South African citizens resident in South Africa. The plaintiffs claimed damages for personal injury and death against the defendant, a company registered in England which owned a number of subsidiary companies in South Africa engaged in the mining and processing of asbestos and the sale of asbestos-related products. The cases were ordered to proceed as a group action. The House of Lords held that South Africa was clearly the more appropriate forum. However, when the claimants could be denied justice in South Africa because of the non-availability of funding (legal aid or contingency fee arrangements), legal representation and expert advice and established procedures for group litigation, then group action proceedings could be brought in the UK against UK-based parent companies of multinational corporations, arising from the actions of their subsidiaries in other jurisdictions. Lord Bingham said:

"If these proceedings were stayed in favour of the more appropriate forum in South Africa the probability is that the plaintiffs would have no means of obtaining the professional representation and the expert evidence which would be essential if these claims were to be justly decided. This would amount to

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3 Connelly v RTZ Corporation PLC, cited above, at 873A-874D.
4 Connelly v RTZ Corporation PLC, cited above, at 874D.
5 [2000] 1 WLR 1545.
a denial of justice. In the special and unusual circumstances of these proceedings, lack of the means in South Africa to prosecute these claims to a conclusion provides a compelling ground, at the second stage of the Spiliada test, for refusing to stay the proceedings here.”

Australia

6. The Australian courts have adopted a different approach to forum non conveniens. In Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co v Fay the High Court of Australia held that if the forum selected had a significant connection with the action (such as being the place of the transaction or the defendant’s residence, or its law is applicable to one of the issues involved, or the proceedings instituted there involve a legitimate and substantive advantage to the plaintiff such as local assets against which judgment can be executed) the forum could not be described as clearly inappropriate. Three reasons have been given for this development: "a desire to adhere to established Australian authority, the view that the plaintiff has a right to select the forum which the court cannot deny, and a general distrust of judicial discretionary powers.” This approach was confirmed in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills where the High Court of Australia refused to adopt the "most suitable forum" approach and instead devised its own "clearly inappropriate forum" test: if the Australian court finds itself to be a "clearly inappropriate forum", it will decline jurisdiction.

7. The difference between the Australian formula and the English formula of Spiliada has been described as follows:

"The Australian formula is loaded in favour of a trial continuing in the forum, since, in practice, it is harder to show that the local forum is 'clearly inappropriate' than it is to show, under the Spiliada formula, that the alternative forum abroad is 'clearly more appropriate'. Where the present forum is proved to be appropriate for trial, there can be no stay under the Australian formula, while it is still possible under the Spiliada approach as long as there is a forum abroad that is clearly more appropriate."
8. The adoption of this "clearly inappropriate forum" test leads to a more restrictive approach to forum determination by Australian courts. A study in 1999 found that of the 51 cases decided since Voth, orders for a stay of proceedings had been issued in only 10 (or approximately 19 per cent) of the cases.\[12\]

USA

9. In Gulf Oil Corporation v Gilbert,\[13\] the Supreme Court dealt with an appeal arising out of the decision of a Federal District Court which applied the doctrine of *forum non conveniens* in dismissing a tort action in New York. In this case, a resident of Virginia brought suit in the Federal District Court of New York against Gulf Oil, a Pennsylvania corporation qualified to do business in both Virginia and New York. The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, alleging that the defendant negligently delivered gasoline to his Virginia warehouse tanks and pumps causing an explosion and fire. The District Court's jurisdiction was solely based on diversity of citizenship (ie jurisdiction in suits between citizens of a state and foreign citizens). As all the events giving rise to litigation had happened in Virginia, the New York District Court applied the doctrine of *forum non conveniens* and dismissed the action. The decision of the District Court, which had been overturned by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, was reinstated by the Supreme Court (by majority). As a result, the plaintiff was required to pursue the action in Virginia, where he was resident, rather than New York.

10. The Supreme Court was of the view that in the exercise of its discretion in determining whether or not the case should be dismissed on the grounds of *forum non conveniens*, the court should have regard to various private and public interest factors. The relevant paragraphs of the decision are as follows:

"The principle of *forum non conveniens* is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorised by the letter of a general venue statute. … A plaintiff sometimes is under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for any adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself. …

Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will justify or require either grant or denial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts ….

…If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to forecast or state, those to be considered


are not difficult to name. An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to resources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, 'vex'; 'harass', or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is strongly in favour of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of form should rarely be disturbed.

… Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.”

11. These principles were applied in an international context in Piper Aircraft Co v Rayne. The relevant facts of the case are as follows. In 1976, a small commercial aircraft crashed in Scotland. The pilot and all five passengers were killed. The decedents of the deceased were all Scottish citizens and residents. The wrongful death actions brought against both Piper Aircraft Company, the Pennsylvania manufacturer of the aircraft, and Hartzell Propeller Inc, the Ohio manufacturer of the propeller, were eventually transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Both defendants moved to dismiss the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. Relying on the balancing test of private/public interest factors developed in Gulf Oil Corporation v Gilbert, the District Court granted the motions. The Appellate Court reversed this decision, holding that “dismissal is never appropriate where the law of the alternative forum is less favourable to plaintiff.” The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal by the District Court. Importantly the Supreme Court held that the strong presumption in favour of the plaintiff's

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14 Gulf Oil Corporation v Gilbert, cited above, at paras 3 to 5.
choice of forum applied with less force when the plaintiff or the real party in interest was foreign and stated:

"The Court of Appeals also erred in rejecting the District Court's Gilbert analysis. The Court of Appeals stated that more weight should have been given to the plaintiff's choice of forum, and criticized the District Court's analysis of the private and public interests. However, the District Court's decision regarding the deference due plaintiff's choice of forum was appropriate. …

The District Court acknowledged that there is ordinarily a strong presumption in favour of the plaintiff's choice of forum, which may be overcome only when the private and public interest factors clearly point towards trial in the alternative forum. It held, however, that the presumption applies with less force when the plaintiff or real parties in interest are foreign. …

The District Court's distinction between resident or citizen plaintiffs and foreign plaintiffs is fully justified. … When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice deserves less deference."16

12. Furthermore, the fact that the law of the foreign forum (Scotland in this case) was less favourable to the plaintiff than US law did not, by itself, prevent the case from being dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. The Supreme Court described the legal position as follows:

"The Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs may defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is less favourable to the plaintiffs than that of the present forum. The possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry."17

13. Applying the Gilbert analysis to the private interest factors, the Supreme Court upheld the conclusion reached by the District Court and said that: "the District Court did not act unreasonably in concluding that fewer evidentiary problems would be posed if the trial were held in Scotland. A large proportion of the relevant evidence is located in Great Britain." The Supreme Court also supported the District Court's conclusion that the problems posed by the inability to implead potential third-party defendants clearly supported holding the trial in Scotland.

16 Piper Aircraft Co v Rayne, cited above, at pages 265-266.
17 Piper Aircraft Co v Rayne, cited above, at page 261.
Turning to the analysis of the District Court’s review of the factors relating to the public interest, the Supreme Court was of the view that it was also reasonable for the following reasons:

“Scotland has a very strong interest in this litigation. The accident occurred in its airspace. All of the decedents were Scottish. Apart from Peper and Hartzell, all potential plaintiffs and defendants are either Scottish or English.”

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the American citizens have an interest in ensuring that American manufacturers are deterred from producing defective products and stated the following:

“[T]he incremental deterrence that would be gained if this trial were held in an American court is likely to be insignificant. The American interest in this accident is simply not sufficient to justify the enormous commitment of judicial time and resources that would inevitably be required if the case were to be tried here.”

Piper Aircraft established itself as the leading decision in the determination of the proper forum for US cases with foreign plaintiffs:

“More than two decades later, federal and state courts continue to follow the Piper Aircraft Court’s instructions: (1) give less deference to the foreign plaintiff’s forum choice; (2) determine whether there is an adequate alternative forum for the plaintiff’s claim; (3) apply Gilbert’s private and public interest factors; and (4) expect that the appeals courts will review trial court’s forum non conveniens dismissals only for abuse of discretion.”

Recent case law in the USA

There are recent instances in which foreign residents have been precluded from joining opt-out class actions in the USA in accordance with the forum non conveniens doctrine at common law.

In Re VIOXX

In this action, 98 plaintiffs residing in England and Wales filed actions in New Jersey alleging product liability causes of action based upon defective design and failure to warn, as well as claims of breach of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, breach of express warranty, wrongful death and survivorship, as well as loss of consortium. The causes of action related to a suspected association between long-term use of VIOXX (a medication used in

18 Piper Aircraft Co v Rayne, cited above, at 268.
19 Piper Aircraft Co v Rayne, cited above, at 268.
the treatment of symptoms of arthritis) and an increased risk of heart attack. The Superior Court, Appellate Division of New Jersey held that the United Kingdom provided an adequate alternative forum for products liability litigation in terms of substantive/procedural law (and damages) and dismissed the consumers' personal injury lawsuits on the grounds of *forum non conveniens*.

19. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that, as there was no UK analogue to the Consumer Fraud Act, there might be no basis for their breach of express warranty claims and a claim for loss of consortium would not be recognised. The court said:

"[I]f litigation were to occur in the UK, plaintiffs could still assert their strict liability causes of action, which are presently recognized in England and Wales and which constitute the mainstay of plaintiffs' legal theories of liability, as well as those causes of action arising from the death of persons taking Vioxx, and possibly, a negligence cause of action. Although relief under New Jersey's statutory Consumer Fraud Act would not be available, as well as other likely subsidiary causes of action, the unavailability of a specific cause of action in a foreign jurisdiction does not preclude *forum non conveniens* dismissal. As long as some cause of action is still available to plaintiffs, the unavailability of a specific claim in the alternate forum cannot be said to render that form inadequate. …

"[W]e are aware of no precedent holding that jurisdiction must be maintained in an inconvenient form simply because loss of consortium claims would not be recognized by the alternative court. … We deem it unreasonable to accord dispositive weight in a *forum non conveniens* analysis to such a derivative cause of action, regardless of the loss of a damages remedy. Such tail-wagging cannot overcome the well-established principles governing forum determination in this context."

20. The court considered that the costs-shifting regime in the UK would not put the plaintiffs at a disadvantage compared to the "American costs rule" (ie no costs rule) and did not render New Jersey the appropriate or convenient forum. The court stated:

"We are further satisfied that, as the result of the discretion given to courts of the UK in the imposition of costs on the loser, as we have described it, the 'English System' of cost recovery does not render the UK an inadequate forum for *forum non conveniens* purposes. …

In sum, we have difficulty accepting the position of a group of residents of the UK that perceived inadequacies in the tort and damages laws and the rules for funding and cost allocation of

\[22\] In Re Vioxx, cited above, at paras 11-12.
their countries of residence entitle them to seek justice in New Jersey where the law and fee arrangements are more favourable. By this argument, plaintiffs essentially contend that the UK provides an inadequate forum for the resolution of the disputes of the English and Welsh living within its borders. We do not regard the claimed inadequacies of one country’s system of funding suits and allocating costs as a ticket to relief elsewhere, but rather, as a subject for legislative or court reform, should such be warranted.  

*In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products*  

21. In this action, haemophiliac residents of United Kingdom commenced suit against manufacturers of blood-clotting products for contracting HIV or Hepatitis C virus through exposure to those products. The manufacturers moved to dismiss, on the grounds of *forum non conveniens*. The Court of Appeals of the 7th Circuit held that the courts in the UK offered an adequate alternative forum.  

22. The court was of the view that an alternative forum which lead to a change in applicable law unfavourable to the plaintiffs would not ordinarily justify a dismissal of the defendant’s *forum non conveniens* application. The court held: 

"The real question is whether the [district] court’s conclusion that the UK courts offer an ‘adequate’ alternative was within its discretion. We think that it was. *Piper Aircraft* establishes that the law in the United Kingdom need not be identical to US law, or even as favourable to plaintiffs as US law may be. The *Fairchild* decision [a recent English House of Laws decision on the ‘but for’ principles of causation] demonstrates that the highest court of the United Kingdom has, at least in one setting, recognized the need to modify strict ‘but for’ rules in this kind of case. We do not know, of course, whether the UK courts will apply *Fairchild* to the present case, but that kind of certainty is not required (especially in a common-law system like theirs)."

23. Turning to the funding issue of mounting cases such as the present one, the court was of the view that the difference in costs regimes between the United Kingdom and the USA did not justify the dismissal of the defendant’s *forum non conveniens* application. The court held that:  

"Plaintiffs argue that there are ‘extreme impediments’ to their funding of the litigation, if it were to proceed in the United Kingdom, largely because the English legal system uses a ‘loser pays’ rule for attorney fees and because compensatory damages tend to be low. We do not see how the use of a different

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24 484F 3d 951 (7th Cir, 2007).  
25 *In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products*, cited above, at para 4.5.
fee-shifting rule for attorneys' fees can weigh against dismissal, however, in light of Piper Aircraft. Obviously the English Rule is less favourable to plaintiffs whose chances of losing are too great (which, for risk-averse plaintiffs, might even be 30% or 40%), but we believe that must be regarded as the kind of unfavourable difference in legal systems that carries little weight. In fact, the United States stands almost alone in its approach toward attorneys’ fees, and so if we were to find that dismissal was wrong for this reason, we would risk gutting the doctrine of forum non conveniens entirely.  

In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Securities

24. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey excluded all non-US purchasers of the securities of the defendant companies from taking part in a class action based on alleged securities fraud. The District Court Judge, adopting the finding of a special master appointed by the court, held that the defendants' conduct relating to the reclassification of its oil and gas reserves was insufficient to amount to more than mere preparatory acts in furtherance of the alleged fraud in reporting its proved oil and gas reserves in the United States. The court therefore lacked subject matter of jurisdiction over the securities claims brought by non-US purchasers of its stock.

25. The court adopted the conduct test of jurisdiction. That test requires a nexus between conduct in the United States and the alleged fraud, which the court suggested may mean "a showing of direct causation ... [and] that the level of domestic conduct, at the very least, must be significant and material to the fraud."  

Reviewing the factual findings of the special master, the court found that:

(a) all of Shell's public disclosures originated in Europe and the compilation, review and approval of oil and gas reserves occurred at its headquarters in the Netherlands;

(b) Shell's New York investor relations office did not take part in preparing announcements about oil and gas reserves or handle the documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission of USA;

(c) None of the shareholder and analyst meetings in which Shell participated in the United States were with European-based analysts or investors or included information about proved reserves; and

(d) Shell's US based service organisations, which specialised in deepwater exploration and technology research and development did not report or maintain proved reserves.

26 In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products, cited above, at para 6.
28 In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Securities, cited above, at 718.
29 In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Securities, cited above, at 719-721.
26. The court therefore agreed with the findings of the special master that Shell's US activities were merely preparatory and non-essential to the alleged fraud on the non-US purchasers. The court therefore declined to exercise jurisdiction over the claims of the non-US purchasers.

27. In dismissing the claims of the non-US purchasers, the court was cognisant of the fact that a settlement agreement had been entered into and filed in the Amsterdam Court of Appeals in the Netherlands that would resolve all asserted and unasserted claims of non-US purchasers. As a joint request by all parties to the settlement agreement, Shell sought the Amsterdam Court of Appeals to declare the settlement agreement binding on all non-US purchasers pursuant to the Dutch Collective Financial Settlement Act. The court said:

"The Court also emphasizes that this holding does not leave the Non-US Purchasers without an alternative recourse to address their alleged injuries. Significantly, the Non-US Purchasers can seek recovery through the Settlement Agreement entered into before the Amsterdam Court of Appeals or through procedures available within their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, the result reached here does not prejudice the Non-US Purchasers and ultimately serves to preserve 'the precious resources of the United States courts.'"

The Hague Conference on Private International Law

28. Article 22 of the Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (dated August 2000) deals with exceptional circumstances for declining jurisdiction. It provides as follows:

"1. In exceptional circumstances, ... the court may, on application by a party, suspend its proceedings if in that case it is clearly inappropriate for that court to exercise jurisdiction and if a court of another State has jurisdiction and is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute. Such application must be made no later than at the time of the first defence on the merits.

2. The court shall take into account, in particular –
   (a) any inconvenience to the parties in view of their habitual residence;
   (b) the nature and location of the evidence, including documents and witnesses, and the procedures for obtaining such evidence;
   (c) applicable limitation or prescription periods;

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30 In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Securities, cited above, at 724.
(d) the possibility of obtaining recognition and enforcement of any decision on the merits.

3. In deciding whether to suspend the proceedings, a court shall not discriminate on the basis of the nationality or habitual residence of the parties."

29. The Hague Draft's analysis of forum non conveniens is in line with that in Gulf Oil Corporation v Gilbert. The court must be satisfied that in the circumstances of the particular case:

"(1) It is clearly inappropriate for that court to exercise jurisdiction;
(2) a court of another State has jurisdiction; and
(3) that court is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute.

Each of these three conditions must be fulfilled. ... That three conditions must also be looked at separately. Thus, the fact that another forum may be 'clearly more appropriate' does not necessarily mean that the forum seised is itself 'clearly inappropriate'. For example, a plaintiff may bring suit against a corporate defendant at its principal place of business in respect of injuries the plaintiff received while employed by that corporation in another country where the plaintiff was resident and was hired. It may be that the second country is the 'clearly more appropriate' forum, but, if the major decisions, including those affecting safety of employees throughout its operations, were made at the principal place of business, it cannot be said that this place is a 'clearly inappropriate' forum. [This example is based on the facts of the United Kingdom case of Connelly v RTZ Corp Plc [1997] 3 WLR 373 discussed above] ..."  

30. Paragraph 3 of Article 22 prohibits discrimination against a party because that party is resident abroad. Sub-paragraph (2)(a) requires consideration to be given to any inconvenience to the parties which may arise from their place of residence. Provided any such inconvenience is properly balanced and one party is not preferred merely because he resides within the forum in question, no issue of discrimination arises.

31. The Hague draft does include any public interest (such as the administrative burden on local municipal courts) in the list of relevant considerations.

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31 See paragraph 9 above.